2C:11-3

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY CHECK

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LAWS OF: 1999 CHAPTER: 209

NJSA: 2C:11-3 (Death penalty—adds aggravating factors)

BILL NO: S947 (Substituted for A2637)

SPONSOR(S): Gormley & Bryant

DATE INTRODUCED: March 23, 1998

COMMITTEE: ASSEMBLY: Judiciary

SENATE: Judiciary

AMENDED DURING PASSAGE: Yes

DATE OF PASSAGE: ASSEMBLY: June 17, 1999

SENATE: January 28, 1999

DATE OF APPROVAL: September 17, 1999

FOLLOWING ARE ATTACHED IF AVAILABLE:

FINAL TEXT OF BILL: 1st Reprint

(Amendments during passage denoted by superscript numbers)

S947

SPONSORS STATEMENT: (Begins on page 7 of original bill)

COMMITTEE STATEMENT:

ASSEMBLY:

Yes

SENATE: Yes

FLOOR AMENDMENT STATEMENTS: No

LEGISLATIVE FISCAL ESTIMATE: No

A2637

SPONSORS STATEMENT: (Begins on page 7of original bill)

Yes

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: <u>ASSEMBLY</u>: <u>Yes</u>

SENATE: No

FLOOR AMENDMENT STATEMENTS: No

LEGISLATIVE FISCAL ESTIMATE: No

VETO MESSAGE: No

GOVERNOR'S PRESS RELEASE ON SIGNING: Yes

FOLLOWING WERE PRINTED:

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| REPORTS: | | |
| | | No |
| HEARINGS: | | |
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| NEWSPAPER ARTI | ICLES: | |

P.L. 1999, CHAPTER 209, approved September 17, 1999 Senate, No. 947 (First Reprint)

1 AN ACT concerning the death penalty and amending N.J.S.2C:11-3.

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3 **BE IT ENACTED** by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey:

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- 1. N.J.S.2C:11-3 is amended to read as follows:
- 7 2C:11-3. Murder.
- 8 a. Except as provided in N.J.S.2C:11-4 criminal homicide 9 constitutes murder when:
- 10 (1) The actor purposely causes death or serious bodily injury 11 resulting in death; or
- 12 (2) The actor knowingly causes death or serious bodily injury 13 resulting in death; or
- 14 (3) It is committed when the actor, acting either alone or with one 15 or more other persons, is engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, 16 sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping¹, carjacking¹ or criminal 17 escape, and in the course of such crime or of immediate flight 18 19 therefrom, any person causes the death of a person other than one of 20 the participants; except that in any prosecution under this subsection, 21 in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant: 22
 - (a) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof; and
 - (b) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article or substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons; and
 - (c) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article or substance; and
- 31 (d) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant 32 intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious 33 physical injury.
- b. (1) Murder is a crime of the first degree but a person convicted of murder shall be sentenced, except as provided in subsection c. of this section, by the court to a term of 30 years, during which the person shall not be eligible for parole, or be sentenced to a specific term of years which shall be between 30 years and life imprisonment of which the person shall serve 30 years before being eligible for parole.

EXPLANATION - Matter enclosed in bold-faced brackets [thus] in the above bill is not enacted and is intended to be omitted in the law.

Matter underlined thus is new matter.

Matter enclosed in superscript numerals has been adopted as follows:

¹ Senate SJU committee amendments adopted October 19, 1998.

- (2) If the victim was a law enforcement officer and was murdered while performing his official duties or was murdered because of his status as a law enforcement officer, the person convicted of that murder shall be sentenced, except as otherwise provided in subsection c. of this section, by the court to a term of life imprisonment, during which the person shall not be eligible for parole.
- (3) A person convicted of murder and who is not sentenced to death under this section shall be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole if the murder was committed under all of the following circumstances:
 - (a) The victim is less than 14 years old; and

- 12 (b) The act is committed in the course of the commission, whether 13 alone or with one or more persons, of a violation of N.J.S.2C:14-2 or 14 N.J.S.2C:14-3.
 - The defendant shall not be entitled to a deduction of commutation and work credits from that sentence.
 - c. Any person convicted under subsection a.(1) or (2) who committed the homicidal act by his own conduct; or who as an accomplice procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value; or who, as a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 and in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3, commanded or by threat or promise solicited the commission of the offense, shall be sentenced as provided hereinafter:
 - (1) The court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or pursuant to the provisions of subsection b. of this section.

Where the defendant has been tried by a jury, the proceeding shall be conducted by the judge who presided at the trial and before the jury which determined the defendant's guilt, except that, for good cause, the court may discharge that jury and conduct the proceeding before a jury empaneled for the purpose of the proceeding. Where the defendant has entered a plea of guilty or has been tried without a jury, the proceeding shall be conducted by the judge who accepted the defendant's plea or who determined the defendant's guilt and before a jury empaneled for the purpose of the proceeding. On motion of the defendant and with consent of the prosecuting attorney the court may conduct a proceeding without a jury. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prevent the participation of an alternate juror in the sentencing proceeding if one of the jurors who rendered the guilty verdict becomes ill or is otherwise unable to proceed before or during the sentencing proceeding.

(2) (a) At the proceeding, the State shall have the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of any aggravating factors set forth in paragraph (4) of this subsection. The defendant shall have the burden of producing evidence of the existence

of any mitigating factors set forth in paragraph (5) of this subsection but shall not have a burden with regard to the establishment of a mitigating factor.

- (b) The admissibility of evidence offered by the State to establish any of the aggravating factors shall be governed by the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials. The defendant may offer, without regard to the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials, reliable evidence relevant to any of the mitigating factors. If the defendant produces evidence in mitigation which would not be admissible under the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials, the State may rebut that evidence without regard to the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials.
- (c) Evidence admitted at the trial, which is relevant to the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in paragraphs (4) and (5) of this subsection, shall be considered without the necessity of reintroducing that evidence at the sentencing proceeding; provided that the fact finder at the sentencing proceeding was present as either the fact finder or the judge at the trial.
- (d) The State and the defendant shall be permitted to rebut any evidence presented by the other party at the sentencing proceeding and to present argument as to the adequacy of the evidence to establish the existence of any aggravating or mitigating factor.
- (e) Prior to the commencement of the sentencing proceeding, or at such time as he has knowledge of the existence of an aggravating factor, the prosecuting attorney shall give notice to the defendant of the aggravating factors which he intends to prove in the proceeding.
- (f) Evidence offered by the State with regard to the establishment of a prior homicide conviction pursuant to paragraph (4)(a) of this subsection may include the identity and age of the victim, the manner of death and the relationship, if any, of the victim to the defendant.
- (3) The jury or, if there is no jury, the court shall return a special verdict setting forth in writing the existence or nonexistence of each of the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in paragraphs (4) and (5) of this subsection. If any aggravating factor is found to exist, the verdict shall also state whether it outweighs beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more mitigating factors.
- (a) If the jury or the court finds that any aggravating factors exist and that all of the aggravating factors outweigh beyond a reasonable doubt all of the mitigating factors, the court shall sentence the defendant to death.
- (b) If the jury or the court finds that no aggravating factors exist, or that all of the aggravating factors which exist do not outweigh all of the mitigating factors, the court shall sentence the defendant pursuant to subsection b.
- 45 (c) If the jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict, the court 46 shall sentence the defendant pursuant to subsection b.

- 1 (4) The aggravating factors which may be found by the jury or the 2 court are:
- 3 (a) The defendant has been convicted, at any time, of another 4 murder. For purposes of this section, a conviction shall be deemed 5 final when sentence is imposed and may be used as an aggravating 6 factor regardless of whether it is on appeal;
 - (b) In the commission of the murder, the defendant purposely or knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim;

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- (c) The murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated assault to the victim;
- 13 (d) The defendant committed the murder as consideration for the 14 receipt, or in expectation of the receipt of anything of pecuniary 15 value;
- 16 (e) The defendant procured the commission of the offense by 17 payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value;
 - (f) The murder was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, punishment or confinement for another offense committed by the defendant or another;
- 21 (g) The offense was committed while the defendant was engaged 22 in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after 23 committing or attempting to commit murder, robbery, sexual assault, 24 arson, burglary or kidnapping ¹or the crime of contempt in violation 25 of N.J.S.2C:29-9b. ¹;
 - (h) The defendant murdered a public servant, as defined in N.J.S.2C:27-1, while the victim was engaged in the performance of his official duties, or because of the victim's status as a public servant;
- 29 (i) The defendant: (i) as a leader of a narcotics trafficking network 30 as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 and in furtherance of a conspiracy 31 enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3, committed, commanded or by threat or 32 promise solicited the commission of the offense or (ii) committed the 33 offense at the direction of a leader of a narcotics trafficking network 34 as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated 35 in N.J.S.2C:35-3;
- (j) The homicidal act that the defendant committed or procured
 was in violation of paragraph (1) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:17-2;
 [or] ¹or ¹
- 39 (k) The victim was less than 14 years old [; or
- 40 (1) At the time of the murder, the defendant was subject to a
 41 temporary or permanent order under the "Prevention of Domestic
 42 Violence Act of 1991," P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-17 et al.) which
 43 restrained the defendant from contact with the victim 1.
- 44 (5) The mitigating factors which may be found by the jury or the 45 court are:
 - (a) The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or

1 emotional disturbance insufficient to constitute a defense to 2 prosecution;

- 3 (b) The victim solicited, participated in or consented to the conduct which resulted in his death;
 - (c) The age of the defendant at the time of the murder;

- (d) The defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired as the result of mental disease or defect or intoxication, but not to a degree sufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution;
- (e) The defendant was under unusual and substantial duress insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution;
- (f) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity;
- (g) The defendant rendered substantial assistance to the State in the prosecution of another person for the crime of murder; or
- (h) Any other factor which is relevant to the defendant's character or record or to the circumstances of the offense.
- (6) When a defendant at a sentencing proceeding presents evidence of the defendant's character or record pursuant to subparagraph (h) of paragraph (5) of this subsection, the State may present evidence of the murder victim's character and background and of the impact of the murder on the victim's survivors. If the jury finds that the State has proven at least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt and the jury finds the existence of a mitigating factor pursuant to subparagraph (h) of paragraph (5) of this subsection, the jury may consider the victim and survivor evidence presented by the State pursuant to this paragraph in determining the appropriate weight to give mitigating evidence presented pursuant to subparagraph (h) of paragraph (5) of this subsection.
- d. The sentencing proceeding set forth in subsection c. of this section shall not be waived by the prosecuting attorney.
- e. Every judgment of conviction which results in a sentence of death under this section shall be appealed, pursuant to the Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. Upon the request of the defendant, the Supreme Court shall also determine whether the sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. Proportionality review under this section shall be limited to a comparison of similar cases in which a sentence of death has been imposed under subsection c. of this section. In any instance in which the defendant fails, or refuses to appeal, the appeal shall be taken by the Office of the Public Defender or other counsel appointed by the Supreme Court for that purpose.
 - f. Prior to the jury's sentencing deliberations, the trial court shall inform the jury of the sentences which may be imposed pursuant to subsection b. of this section on the defendant if the defendant is not

S947 [1R]

sentenced to death. The jury shall also be informed that a failure to reach a unanimous verdict shall result in sentencing by the court pursuant to subsection b.

g. A juvenile who has been tried as an adult and convicted of murder shall not be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of subsection c. but shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of subsection b. of this section.

h. In a sentencing proceeding conducted pursuant to this section, no evidence shall be admissible concerning the method or manner of execution which would be imposed on a defendant sentenced to death.

i. For purposes of this section the term "homicidal act" shall mean conduct that causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death. (cf: P.L.1998, c.25, s.1)

13 (cf: P.L.1998, c.2

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15 2. This act shall take effect immediately.

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Adds violation of domestic violence restraining order to list of "aggravating factors" in death penalty statute.

SENATE, No. 947

STATE OF NEW JERSEY

208th LEGISLATURE

INTRODUCED MARCH 23, 1998

Sponsored by:

Senator WILLIAM L. GORMLEY

District 2 (Atlantic)

Senator WAYNE R. BRYANT

District 5 (Camden and Gloucester)

SYNOPSIS

Adds violation of domestic violence restraining order to list of "aggravating factors" in death penalty statute.

CURRENT VERSION OF TEXT

As introduced.



1 AN ACT concerning the death penalty and amending N.J.S.2C:11-3.

BE IT ENACTED by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey:

- 1. N.J.S.2C:11-3 is amended to read as follows:
- 7 2C:11-3. Murder.
- 8 a. Except as provided in N.J.S.2C:11-4 criminal homicide 9 constitutes murder when:
 - (1) The actor purposely causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death; or
- 12 (2) The actor knowingly causes death or serious bodily injury 13 resulting in death; or
 - (3) It is committed when the actor, acting either alone or with one or more other persons, is engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping or criminal escape, and in the course of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, any person causes the death of a person other than one of the participants; except that in any prosecution under this subsection, in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant:
 - (a) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof; and
 - (b) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article or substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons; and
 - (c) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article or substance; and
 - (d) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury.
 - b. (1) Murder is a crime of the first degree but a person convicted of murder shall be sentenced, except as provided in subsection c. of this section, by the court to a term of 30 years, during which the person shall not be eligible for parole, or be sentenced to a specific term of years which shall be between 30 years and life imprisonment of which the person shall serve 30 years before being eligible for parole.
- 41 (2) If the victim was a law enforcement officer and was murdered 42 while performing his official duties or was murdered because of his 43 status as a law enforcement officer, the person convicted of that

EXPLANATION - Matter enclosed in bold-faced brackets [thus] in the above bill is not enacted and is intended to be omitted in the law.

- 1 murder shall be sentenced, except as otherwise provided in subsection 2 c. of this section, by the court to a term of life imprisonment, during 3 which the person shall not be eligible for parole.
- 4 (3) A person convicted of murder and who is not sentenced to 5 death under this section shall be sentenced to a term of life 6 imprisonment without eligibility for parole if the murder was committed under all of the following circumstances:
 - (a) The victim is less than 14 years old; and

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9 (b) The act is committed in the course of the commission, whether 10 alone or with one or more persons, of a violation of N.J.S.2C:14-2 or 11 N.J.S.2C:14-3.

12 The defendant shall not be entitled to a deduction of commutation 13 and work credits from that sentence.

- Any person convicted under subsection a.(1) or (2) who committed the homicidal act by his own conduct; or who as an accomplice procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value; or who, as a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 and in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3, commanded or by threat or promise solicited the commission of the offense, shall be sentenced as provided hereinafter:
- (1) The court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or pursuant to the provisions of subsection b. of this section.

25 Where the defendant has been tried by a jury, the proceeding shall 26 be conducted by the judge who presided at the trial and before the jury 27 which determined the defendant's guilt, except that, for good cause, 28 the court may discharge that jury and conduct the proceeding before 29 a jury empaneled for the purpose of the proceeding. Where the 30 defendant has entered a plea of guilty or has been tried without a jury, 31 the proceeding shall be conducted by the judge who accepted the 32 defendant's plea or who determined the defendant's guilt and before a 33 jury empaneled for the purpose of the proceeding. On motion of the 34 defendant and with consent of the prosecuting attorney the court may conduct a proceeding without a jury. Nothing in this subsection shall 35 36 be construed to prevent the participation of an alternate juror in the 37 sentencing proceeding if one of the jurors who rendered the guilty 38 verdict becomes ill or is otherwise unable to proceed before or during 39 the sentencing proceeding.

(2) (a) At the proceeding, the State shall have the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of any aggravating factors set forth in paragraph (4) of this subsection. The defendant shall have the burden of producing evidence of the existence of any mitigating factors set forth in paragraph (5) of this subsection but shall not have a burden with regard to the establishment of a mitigating factor.

(b) The admissibility of evidence offered by the State to establish any of the aggravating factors shall be governed by the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials. The defendant may offer, without regard to the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials, reliable evidence relevant to any of the mitigating factors. If the defendant produces evidence in mitigation which would not be admissible under the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials, the State may rebut that evidence without regard to the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials.

- (c) Evidence admitted at the trial, which is relevant to the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in paragraphs (4) and (5) of this subsection, shall be considered without the necessity of reintroducing that evidence at the sentencing proceeding; provided that the fact finder at the sentencing proceeding was present as either the fact finder or the judge at the trial.
- (d) The State and the defendant shall be permitted to rebut any evidence presented by the other party at the sentencing proceeding and to present argument as to the adequacy of the evidence to establish the existence of any aggravating or mitigating factor.
- (e) Prior to the commencement of the sentencing proceeding, or at such time as he has knowledge of the existence of an aggravating factor, the prosecuting attorney shall give notice to the defendant of the aggravating factors which he intends to prove in the proceeding.
- (f) Evidence offered by the State with regard to the establishment of a prior homicide conviction pursuant to paragraph (4)(a) of this subsection may include the identity and age of the victim, the manner of death and the relationship, if any, of the victim to the defendant.
- (3) The jury or, if there is no jury, the court shall return a special verdict setting forth in writing the existence or nonexistence of each of the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in paragraphs (4) and (5) of this subsection. If any aggravating factor is found to exist, the verdict shall also state whether it outweighs beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more mitigating factors.
- (a) If the jury or the court finds that any aggravating factors exist and that all of the aggravating factors outweigh beyond a reasonable doubt all of the mitigating factors, the court shall sentence the defendant to death.
- (b) If the jury or the court finds that no aggravating factors exist, or that all of the aggravating factors which exist do not outweigh all of the mitigating factors, the court shall sentence the defendant pursuant to subsection b.
- (c) If the jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict, the court shall sentence the defendant pursuant to subsection b.
- 44 (4) The aggravating factors which may be found by the jury or the 45 court are:
- 46 (a) The defendant has been convicted, at any time, of another

- murder. For purposes of this section, a conviction shall be deemed
- 2 final when sentence is imposed and may be used as an aggravating
- factor regardless of whether it is on appeal; 3
- 4 (b) In the commission of the murder, the defendant purposely or knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition 5
- 6 to the victim;

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- (c) The murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or 7 8 inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an 9 aggravated assault to the victim;
- 10 (d) The defendant committed the murder as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt of anything of pecuniary value;
 - (e) The defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value;
 - The murder was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, punishment or confinement for another offense committed by the defendant or another;
- 18 (g) The offense was committed while the defendant was engaged 19 in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after 20 committing or attempting to commit murder, robbery, sexual assault, 21 arson, burglary or kidnapping;
- 22 The defendant murdered a public servant, as defined in 23 N.J.S.2C:27-1, while the victim was engaged in the performance of his official duties, or because of the victim's status as a public servant; 24
- 25 (i) The defendant: (i) as a leader of a narcotics trafficking network 26 as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 and in furtherance of a conspiracy 27 enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3, committed, commanded or by threat or 28 promise solicited the commission of the offense or (ii) committed the 29 offense at the direction of a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated 30 31 in N.J.S.2C:35-3;
- 32 (j) The homicidal act that the defendant committed or procured 33 was in violation of paragraph (1) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:17-2; 34 or
- 35 (k) The victim was less than 14 years old; or
- 36 (1) At the time of the murder, the defendant was subject to a 37 temporary or permanent order under the "Prevention of Domestic 38 Violence Act of 1991," P.L.1991, c.261 (C.2C:25-17 et al.) which 39 restrained the defendant from contact with the victim.
- 40 (5) The mitigating factors which may be found by the jury or the 41 court are:
- 42 (a) The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or 43 emotional disturbance insufficient to constitute a defense to 44 prosecution;
- 45 The victim solicited, participated in or consented to the conduct which resulted in his death; 46

1 (c) The age of the defendant at the time of the murder;

- (d) The defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired as the result of mental disease or defect or intoxication, but not to a degree sufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution;
- (e) The defendant was under unusual and substantial duress insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution;
- (f) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity;
 - (g) The defendant rendered substantial assistance to the State in the prosecution of another person for the crime of murder; or
 - (h) Any other factor which is relevant to the defendant's character or record or to the circumstances of the offense.
 - (6) When a defendant at a sentencing proceeding presents evidence of the defendant's character or record pursuant to subparagraph (h) of paragraph (5) of this subsection, the State may present evidence of the murder victim's character and background and of the impact of the murder on the victim's survivors. If the jury finds that the State has proven at least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt and the jury finds the existence of a mitigating factor pursuant to subparagraph (h) of paragraph (5) of this subsection, the jury may consider the victim and survivor evidence presented by the State pursuant to this paragraph in determining the appropriate weight to give mitigating evidence presented pursuant to subparagraph (h) of paragraph (5) of this subsection.
 - d. The sentencing proceeding set forth in subsection c. of this section shall not be waived by the prosecuting attorney.
- e. Every judgment of conviction which results in a sentence of death under this section shall be appealed, pursuant to the Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. Upon the request of the defendant, the Supreme Court shall also determine whether the sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. Proportionality review under this section shall be limited to a comparison of similar cases in which a sentence of death has been imposed under subsection c. of this section. In any instance in which the defendant fails, or refuses to appeal, the appeal shall be taken by the Office of the Public Defender or other counsel appointed by the Supreme Court for that purpose.
- f. Prior to the jury's sentencing deliberations, the trial court shall inform the jury of the sentences which may be imposed pursuant to subsection b. of this section on the defendant if the defendant is not sentenced to death. The jury shall also be informed that a failure to reach a unanimous verdict shall result in sentencing by the court pursuant to subsection b.

S947 GORMLEY, BRYANT

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| 1 | g. A juvenile who has been tried as an adult and convicted of |
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| 2 | murder shall not be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of subsection |
| 3 | c. but shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of subsection b. of |
| 4 | this section. |
| 5 | h. In a sentencing proceeding conducted pursuant to this section, |
| 6 | no evidence shall be admissible concerning the method or manner of |
| 7 | execution which would be imposed on a defendant sentenced to death. |
| 8 | i. For purposes of this section the term "homicidal act" shall mean |
| 9 | conduct that causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death. |
| 10 | (cf: P.L.1997, c.60, s.1) |
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| 12 | 2. This act shall take effect immediately. |
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| 15 | STATEMENT |
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| 17 | This bill would amend the death penalty statute, N.J.S.A.2C:11-3, |
| 18 | to provide that the defendant's violation of an existing domestic |
| 19 | violence restraining order would constitute an "aggravating factor" to |
| 20 | be considered by the jury in making its determination whether to |
| 21 | sentence the defendant to death. Under the provisions of the death |
| 22 | penalty law, the jury must weigh the "aggravating factors" of a |

particular case against the "mitigating factors" of that case to determine whether a defendant convicted of murder will be sentenced

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to death.

ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE

STATEMENT TO

[First Reprint] **SENATE, No. 947**

STATE OF NEW JERSEY

DATED: FEBRUARY 11, 1999

The Assembly Judiciary Committee reports favorably Senate Bill No. 947 (1R).

Under the provisions of the death penalty law, the jury must weigh the "aggravating factors" of a particular case against the "mitigating factors" of the case to determine whether a defendant convicted of murder should be sentenced to death. One of the aggravating factors which may be considered is that the murder occurred during the commission of another crime such as robbery, sexual assault or kidnaping. This bill would add contempt if the contempt consisted of violation of a restraining order issued pursuant to the "Prevention of Domestic Violence Act" to the list of crimes covered by that aggravating factor.

This bill is identical to Assembly, No. 2637.

SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE

STATEMENT TO

SENATE, No. 947

with committee amendments

STATE OF NEW JERSEY

DATED: OCTOBER 19, 1998

The Senate Judiciary Committee reports favorably and with committee amendments Senate Bill No. 947.

Under the provisions of the death penalty law, the jury must weigh the "aggravating factors" of a particular case against the "mitigating factors" of the case to determine whether a defendant convicted of murder should be sentenced to death. One of the aggravating factors which may be considered is that the murder occurred during the commission of another crime such as robbery, sexual assault or kidnaping. Under the amendments adopted by the committee, contempt would be added the list of crimes covered by that aggravating factor if that contempt consisted of violation of a restraining order issued pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act. In its original form, the bill would create a separate aggravating factor dealing the defendant's violation of an existing domestic violence restraining order.

[Corrected Copy]

ASSEMBLY, No. 2637

STATE OF NEW JERSEY 208th LEGISLATURE

INTRODUCED NOVEMBER 16, 1998

Sponsored by:
Assemblyman KENNETH C. LEFEVRE
District 2 (Atlantic)
Assemblyman TOM SMITH
District 11 (Monmouth)

Co-Sponsored by:


Assemblymen Merkt, Corodemus and Assemblywoman Heck

SYNOPSIS

Adds violation of domestic violence restraining order to list of "aggravating factors" in death penalty statute.

CURRENT VERSION OF TEXT

As introduced.



| 1 | AN ACT | concerning | the death | penalty and | amending | N.J.S.2C:11-3. |
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BE IT ENACTED by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey:

- 1. N.J.S.2C:11-3 is amended to read as follows:
- 7 2C:11-3. Murder.
- 8 a. Except as provided in N.J.S.2C:11-4 criminal homicide 9 constitutes murder when:
 - (1) The actor purposely causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death; or
 - (2) The actor knowingly causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death; or
 - (3) It is committed when the actor, acting either alone or with one or more other persons, is engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, carjacking or criminal escape, and in the course of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, any person causes the death of a person other than one of the participants; except that in any prosecution under this subsection, in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant:
 - (a) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof; and
 - (b) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article or substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons; and
 - (c) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article or substance; and
 - (d) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury.
 - b. (1) Murder is a crime of the first degree but a person convicted of murder shall be sentenced, except as provided in subsection c. of this section, by the court to a term of 30 years, during which the person shall not be eligible for parole, or be sentenced to a specific term of years which shall be between 30 years and life imprisonment of which the person shall serve 30 years before being eligible for parole.
- 41 (2) If the victim was a law enforcement officer and was murdered 42 while performing his official duties or was murdered because of his 43 status as a law enforcement officer, the person convicted of that

EXPLANATION - Matter enclosed in bold-faced brackets [thus] in the above bill is not enacted and is intended to be omitted in the law.

- murder shall be sentenced, except as otherwise provided in subsection c. of this section, by the court to a term of life imprisonment, during which the person shall not be eligible for parole.
 - (3) A person convicted of murder and who is not sentenced to death under this section shall be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole if the murder was committed under all of the following circumstances:
 - (a) The victim is less than 14 years old; and

- 9 (b) The act is committed in the course of the commission, whether alone or with one or more persons, of a violation of N.J.S.2C:14-2 or N.J.S.2C:14-3.
- The defendant shall not be entitled to a deduction of commutation and work credits from that sentence.
 - c. Any person convicted under subsection a.(1) or (2) who committed the homicidal act by his own conduct; or who as an accomplice procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value; or who, as a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 and in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3, commanded or by threat or promise solicited the commission of the offense, shall be sentenced as provided hereinafter:
 - (1) The court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or pursuant to the provisions of subsection b. of this section.

Where the defendant has been tried by a jury, the proceeding shall be conducted by the judge who presided at the trial and before the jury which determined the defendant's guilt, except that, for good cause, the court may discharge that jury and conduct the proceeding before a jury empaneled for the purpose of the proceeding. Where the defendant has entered a plea of guilty or has been tried without a jury, the proceeding shall be conducted by the judge who accepted the defendant's plea or who determined the defendant's guilt and before a jury empaneled for the purpose of the proceeding. On motion of the defendant and with consent of the prosecuting attorney the court may conduct a proceeding without a jury. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prevent the participation of an alternate juror in the sentencing proceeding if one of the jurors who rendered the guilty verdict becomes ill or is otherwise unable to proceed before or during the sentencing proceeding.

(2) (a) At the proceeding, the State shall have the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of any aggravating factors set forth in paragraph (4) of this subsection. The defendant shall have the burden of producing evidence of the existence of any mitigating factors set forth in paragraph (5) of this subsection but shall not have a burden with regard to the establishment of a mitigating factor.

(b) The admissibility of evidence offered by the State to establish any of the aggravating factors shall be governed by the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials. The defendant may offer, without regard to the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials, reliable evidence relevant to any of the mitigating factors. If the defendant produces evidence in mitigation which would not be admissible under the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials, the State may rebut that evidence without regard to the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials.

- (c) Evidence admitted at the trial, which is relevant to the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in paragraphs (4) and (5) of this subsection, shall be considered without the necessity of reintroducing that evidence at the sentencing proceeding; provided that the fact finder at the sentencing proceeding was present as either the fact finder or the judge at the trial.
- (d) The State and the defendant shall be permitted to rebut any evidence presented by the other party at the sentencing proceeding and to present argument as to the adequacy of the evidence to establish the existence of any aggravating or mitigating factor.
- (e) Prior to the commencement of the sentencing proceeding, or at such time as he has knowledge of the existence of an aggravating factor, the prosecuting attorney shall give notice to the defendant of the aggravating factors which he intends to prove in the proceeding.
- (f) Evidence offered by the State with regard to the establishment of a prior homicide conviction pursuant to paragraph (4)(a) of this subsection may include the identity and age of the victim, the manner of death and the relationship, if any, of the victim to the defendant.
- (3) The jury or, if there is no jury, the court shall return a special verdict setting forth in writing the existence or nonexistence of each of the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in paragraphs (4) and (5) of this subsection. If any aggravating factor is found to exist, the verdict shall also state whether it outweighs beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more mitigating factors.
- (a) If the jury or the court finds that any aggravating factors exist and that all of the aggravating factors outweigh beyond a reasonable doubt all of the mitigating factors, the court shall sentence the defendant to death.
- (b) If the jury or the court finds that no aggravating factors exist, or that all of the aggravating factors which exist do not outweigh all of the mitigating factors, the court shall sentence the defendant pursuant to subsection b.
- (c) If the jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict, the court shall sentence the defendant pursuant to subsection b.
- 44 (4) The aggravating factors which may be found by the jury or the 45 court are:
- 46 (a) The defendant has been convicted, at any time, of another

- murder. For purposes of this section, a conviction shall be deemed
- 2 final when sentence is imposed and may be used as an aggravating
- factor regardless of whether it is on appeal; 3

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- 4 (b) In the commission of the murder, the defendant purposely or knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition 5 6 to the victim;
- 7 (c) The murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or 8 inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an 9 aggravated assault to the victim;
- 10 (d) The defendant committed the murder as consideration for the 11 receipt, or in expectation of the receipt of anything of pecuniary 12 value;
 - (e) The defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value;
- The murder was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, punishment or confinement for another 16 offense committed by the defendant or another;
- 18 (g) The offense was committed while the defendant was engaged 19 in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after 20 committing or attempting to commit murder, robbery, sexual assault, 21 arson, burglary or kidnapping or the crime of contempt in violation of N.J.S.2C:29-9b.; 22
 - (h) The defendant murdered a public servant, as defined in N.J.S.2C:27-1, while the victim was engaged in the performance of his official duties, or because of the victim's status as a public servant;
- 26 (i) The defendant: (i) as a leader of a narcotics trafficking network 27 as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 and in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3, committed, commanded or by threat or 28 29 promise solicited the commission of the offense or (ii) committed the 30 offense at the direction of a leader of a narcotics trafficking network 31 as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated 32 in N.J.S.2C:35-3;
- 33 (j) The homicidal act that the defendant committed or procured 34 was in violation of paragraph (1) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:17-2; or
- (k) The victim was less than 14 years old. 35
- (5) The mitigating factors which may be found by the jury or the 36 37
 - (a) The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution;
- 41 (b) The victim solicited, participated in or consented to the conduct which resulted in his death; 42
- 43 (c) The age of the defendant at the time of the murder;
- 44 (d) The defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 45 conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired as the result of mental disease or defect or 46

1 intoxication, but not to a degree sufficient to constitute a defense to 2 prosecution;

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- (e) The defendant was under unusual and substantial duress insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution;
- (f) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal 5 6 activity;
 - (g) The defendant rendered substantial assistance to the State in the prosecution of another person for the crime of murder; or
 - (h) Any other factor which is relevant to the defendant's character or record or to the circumstances of the offense.
 - (6) When a defendant at a sentencing proceeding presents evidence of the defendant's character or record pursuant to subparagraph (h) of paragraph (5) of this subsection, the State may present evidence of the murder victim's character and background and of the impact of the murder on the victim's survivors. If the jury finds that the State has proven at least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt and the jury finds the existence of a mitigating factor pursuant to subparagraph (h) of paragraph (5) of this subsection, the jury may consider the victim and survivor evidence presented by the State pursuant to this paragraph in determining the appropriate weight to give mitigating evidence presented pursuant to subparagraph (h) of paragraph (5) of this subsection.
 - d. The sentencing proceeding set forth in subsection c. of this section shall not be waived by the prosecuting attorney.
 - e. Every judgment of conviction which results in a sentence of death under this section shall be appealed, pursuant to the Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. Upon the request of the defendant, the Supreme Court shall also determine whether the sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. Proportionality review under this section shall be limited to a comparison of similar cases in which a sentence of death has been imposed under subsection c. of this section. In any instance in which the defendant fails, or refuses to appeal, the appeal shall be taken by the Office of the Public Defender or other counsel appointed by the Supreme Court for that purpose.
 - f. Prior to the jury's sentencing deliberations, the trial court shall inform the jury of the sentences which may be imposed pursuant to subsection b. of this section on the defendant if the defendant is not sentenced to death. The jury shall also be informed that a failure to reach a unanimous verdict shall result in sentencing by the court pursuant to subsection b.
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- 42 g. A juvenile who has been tried as an adult and convicted of 43 murder shall not be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of subsection 44 c. but shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of subsection b. of 45 this section.
- 46 h. In a sentencing proceeding conducted pursuant to this section,

A2637 LEFEVRE, T. SMITH 7

| 1 | no evidence shall be admissible concerning the method or manner of |
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| 2 | execution which would be imposed on a defendant sentenced to death. |
| 3 | i. For purposes of this section the term "homicidal act" shall mean |
| 4 | conduct that causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death. |
| 5 | (cf: P.L.1998, c.25, s.1) |
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| 7 | 2. This act shall take effect immediately. |
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| 10 | STATEMENT |
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| 12 | Under the provisions of the death penalty law, the jury must weigh |
| 13 | the "aggravating factors" of a particular case against the "mitigating |
| 14 | factors" of the case to determine whether a defendant convicted of |
| 15 | murder should be sentenced to death. One of the aggravating factors |
| 16 | which may be considered is that the murder occurred during the |
| 17 | commission of another crime such as robbery, sexual assault or |
| 18 | kidnaping. This bill would add contempt to the list of crimes covered |
| 19 | by that aggravating factor if the contempt consisted of violation of a |
| 20 | restraining order issued pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic |
| 21 | Violence Act. |

ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE

STATEMENT TO

ASSEMBLY, No. 2637

STATE OF NEW JERSEY

DATED: FEBRUARY 11, 1999

The Assembly Judiciary Committee reports favorably Assembly Bill No. 2637.

Under the provisions of the death penalty law, the jury must weigh the "aggravating factors" of a particular case against the "mitigating factors" of the case to determine whether a defendant convicted of murder should be sentenced to death. One of the aggravating factors which may be considered is that the murder occurred during the commission of another crime such as robbery, sexual assault or kidnaping. This bill would add contempt if the contempt consisted of violation of a restraining order issued pursuant to the "Prevention of Domestic Violence Act" to the list of crimes covered by that aggravating factor.

This bill is identical to Senate, No. 947 (1R).

PO BOX 004 TRENTON, NJ 08625

Office of the Governor NEWS RELEASE

CONTACT: Gene Herman 609-777-2600

RELEASE: September 17, 1999

Gov. Christie Whitman today signed the following pieces of legislation:

S-947, sponsored by Senators William L. Gormley (R-Atlantic) and Wayne R. Bryant (D-Camden/Gloucester) and Assembly Members Kenneth C. LeFevre (R-Atlantic) and Tom Smith (R-Monmouth), adds the violation of a domestic violence restraining order to the list of aggravating factors for a jury to consider in the penalty phase of a murder case. The state's murder statute sets forth a list of aggravating factors, including that the murder was committed in an outrageously or wantonly vile manner, involved an aggravated assault, or was committed in the course of a robbery, burglary, sexual assault or other specified serious offense. A murder charge only may be tried as a death penalty case if the prosecutor gives notice to the defense near to the time of indictment that one or more of the statutory aggravating factors are present. Before a jury in such a case can consider imposing the death penalty, it must find that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of the aggravating factors.

S-1388, sponsored by Senator Martha W. Bark (R-Atlantic/Burlington/Camden) and Assembly Member Francis L. Bodine (R-Atlantic/Burlington/Camden), amends the Long Term Tax Exemption Law to permit the assignment of long term tax abatements from urban renewal entities to owners in fee simple. Owners in fee simple own their housing units, which are not a part of a condominium. The law allows urban renewal entities, which are non-profit corporations established to rehabilitate urban housing for resale to qualified individuals, to receive such abatements for improvements made to urban housing developments. Previous law expressly permitted owners of condominium units to sell their property along with tax abatements.

S-1959, sponsored by Senator Robert E. Littell (R-Sussex/Hunterdon/Morris) and Assembly Members Guy R. Gregg (R-Sussex/Hunterdon/Morris) and E. Scott Garrett (R-Sussex/Hunterdon/Morris), appropriates \$5 million to the Department of Environmental Protection from the Natural Resources Bond Act of 1980 for a grant to Hopatcong Borough for a clean water project. The grant will be used to install sewers for residents that reside near Lake Hopatcong. The \$5 million grant is the state's share of the project, which is projected to cost \$20 million. The appropriation will leverage \$8.7 million in federal funds.

S-1515, sponsored by Senator Robert J. Martin (R-Essex/Morris/Passaic) and Assembly Members Carol J. Murphy (R-Essex/Morris/Passaic) and Neil M. Cohen (D-Union), authorizes the regulation of viatical agreements by the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance. A viatical agreement is an agreement to sell a life insurance policy by a person who typically is ill and in immediate need of money. The bill is intended to protect particularly vulnerable persons from aggressive or fraudulent business tactics. The bill requires licensure as a viatical settlement provider for any person who is involved in three or more agreements in the period of one year.

The regulatory aspects of the bill include permitting alterations to viatical agreements, tax implications, rights of recision, and Medicaid issues. The viatical agreement must contain several consumer protection provisions as set forth in the bill. Among other things, the viatical settlement provider must disclose to consumers possible alternatives to the contract, the need for professional tax advice, the effect of receiving a lump sum of money on pending claims by creditors, and the person's eligibility for government benefits.

The Commissioner of Banking and Insurance is given broad discretion to suspend, revoke or refuse to review licenses. Licensees are required to file annual statements containing information that the Commissioner may require by regulation. The Commissioner has the right to examine the business activities of any licensee.

S-673, sponsored by Senator Peter A. Inverso (R-Mercer/Middlesex), implements a series of recommendations made by the Supreme Court Committee on the Tax Court to amend the laws dealing with property tax appeals and certain Tax Court matters. The amendments are primarily procedural in nature and are designed to increase uniformity, efficiency and flexibility in key areas of the administration of property tax appeals, such as filing deadlines, the Freeze Act and tax payment requirement. The Freeze Act freezes the property assessment for three years when a taxpayer is successful in a tax appeal. The bill also contains several technical amendments, such as incorporating gender neutral language and updating references to judicial bodies and governmental entities.

S-1977 provides for continuity of legal representation through the Office of the Public Defender (OPD) for children and indigent parents in child abuse and termination of parental proceedings. The bill specifically directs that, where practicable, the same attorney will represent a parent or child in each of these types of matters. The continuity is intended to increase the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the legal system in its handling of termination of parental rights cases. The state's recently enacted Adoption and Safe Families Act (AFSA) provided the framework for continuity of legal representation by granting the OPD the authority to represent parents and children in termination of parental rights matters. Prior to AFSA, the OPD was statutorily authorized to provide legal counsel in abuse and neglect matters, but not termination matters. In such termination matters, the courts appointed pro-bono counsel to represent indigent parents and children. The bill was sponsored by Senators William L. Gormley (R-Atlantic) and Edward T. O'Connor, Jr. (D-Hudson) and Assembly Members Richard H. Bagger (R-Middlesex/Morris/Somerset/Union) and Rose Marie Heck (R-Bergen).