## CERTIFICATE

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SUSAN KELLY, C.S.R., C.R.R. Official Court Reporter
Ocean County Courthouse

Dated: 9-9-04

1 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY Ocean County - LAW DIVISION 2 CRIMINAL PART INDICTMENT NO. 02-09-01247 A.D.# 6934-03-T4 3 4 5 STATE OF NEW JERSEY TRANSCRIPT 6 VS. 0F TRIAL APPELL ATE DIVICION 7 RENATO SANTOS, GREGORY MAPLES. MARVIN WORTHY. OCT 19 2004 8 JAMES IRWIN. SUPERIOR COURT 9 Defendants. OF NEW JERSEY 10 Place: Ocean County Courthouse 11 120 Hooper Avenue Toms River, New Jersey 12 May 12th, 2004 Date: 13 BEFORE: 14 HONORABLE EDWARD J. TURNBACH, J.S.C., and a Jury 15 TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY: Raymond S. Santiago, Esq. 16 17 APPEARANCES: 18 WILLIAM J. HEISLER, ESQ. Assistant County Prosecutor 19 Attorney for the State. OCT 1 3 2004 20 JAMES R. KINARNEY, ESQ. Attorney for Defendant Santos, 21 22 23 GAYLE L. GARRABRANDT, C.S.R. Official Court Reporter 24 120 Hooper Avenue Ocean County Courthouse 25 Toms River, NJ 08753

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1	THE COURT: Ready to proceed, Mr. Heisler?
2	MR. HEISLER: Yes, your Honor.
3	THE COURT: Jury out, please.
4	(Jury in the box at 9:55 AM.)
5	THE COURT: Good morning to each of you.
6	Nice to see you back again.
7	Mr. Heisler.
8	MR. HEISLER: Thank you, your Honor. Daniel
9	Barrett.
10	DANIEL BARRETT, Witness for the State,
11	sworn.
12	THE COURT: Mr. Heisler.
13	MR. HEISLER: Thank you, your Honor.
14	DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. HEISLER:
15	Q Good morning, Mr. Barrett.
16	A Good morning, counselor.
17	Q sy whom are you employed, sir?
18	A Ocean County Sheriff's Department.
19	Q And what do you do for the Sheriff's
20	Department?
21	A I work at CIU, the laboratory. I'm a forensic
22	scientist.
23	Q And how long have you been employed as a
24	forensic scientist by the Ocean County Sheriff's
25	Denartment?

1	A 28 years this October.
1	
2	Q And what's your educational background?
3	A Bachelor of Science in chemistry, Bachelor of
4	Science in electronics, and a Master's in software
5	engineering.
6	Q And over the years, have you had any
7	particular training regarding firearms and ballistics?
8	A Yes, I have.
9	Q And can you tell us generally what that
10	training has consisted of?
11	A Initially, I was employed by the New Jersey State
12	Police for three years. I had six months' on-the-job
13	training thered during the number of years I have
14	been employed, I have been to various seminars and
15	courses offered by the FBI, ATF.
16	Q And in your experience with the New Jersey
17	State Police and with the Ocean County Sheriff's
18	Department, have you conducted ballistics tests and
19	ballistics examinations?
20	A Yes, I have.
21	Q And examined firearms and things along those
22	lines?
23	A Yes, I have.
24	Q They're part of your normal job duties?
25	A Yes.

Have you ever qualified in the Superior Court 1 Q 2 of New Jersey before as an expert witness in the area of firearms and ballistics? 3 4 A Yes. MR. HEISLER: Judge, at this time I'd offer 5 Mr. Barrett as an expert witness in the area of 6 firearms and ballistics. 7 THE COURT: Counsel? 8 9 DEFENSE ATTORNEYS: No objection. 10 11 12 13 14 15 his testimony. 16 17 Q 18 19 are we talking about? 20 21 22 23

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THE COURT: There being no objection, once again, members of the jury, I'm going to authorize this witness to testify as an expert in the field of firearms and ball tics and give you opinion testimony. What I said about all the other experts also applies to MR. HEISLER: Thank you, your Honor. Now, Mr. Barrett, when we are talking about the field of ballistics, in reference to firearms, what You're talking about firearms examination, the discharge of cartridge ammunition through modern firearms. You're talking about lands and grooves, ballistic and -- signature on the bullet or projectile. You're talking about ballistic ridge face signatures on the casing, basically tool mark identification as it

relates to firearms. 1 2 And that's to determine whether a particular projectile has been fired from a firearm, or a 3 particular shell casing was ejected from one? 4 There's a lot of objectives; but basically what 6 you're trying to do is, you're trying to see if the casing and/or projectile was discharged or fired from 7 that particular weapon. 8 Now, with respect to handguns of a revolver 9 10 type, which is the area you concentrate on more, the 11 actual projectile or the casing? Both. 12 13 Q With res it to automatic handguns, do you get different information from casings in that 14 15 situation than you do from revolvers? well, it would depend on the situation. I mean, 16 17 we try to get whatever evidence we can from whatever's submitted. 18 19 And in this case, were two handguns submitted Q 20 to vou? 21 Yes, they were. 22 Q

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Q And they were both revolvers; is that right?

A That is correct.

Q And what types of comparisons did you do with respect to those weapons and the projectiles that were

1	recovered in connection with this case?
2	A I examined the submitted projectiles that came in
3	with the evidence submission against laboratory-fired
4	projectiles from the weapons to see if, in fact, I
5	could find any comparison.
6	Q When you say "laboratory-fired projectiles,"
7	do you actually fire the weapons in your laboratory?
8	A Yes, I do.
9	Q And by doing that, do you get the projectile
10	that you are going to compare to the ones that were
11	submitted?
12	A Yes, I do.
13	Q Let me show you two items that have been
14	marked as S-2 and S-3. Start with S-2. Do you
15	recognize the box, for starters?
16	A Yes. It's from Case Number 1372-02, has an
17	evidence sticker with my initials on it.
18	( And this item on the evidence list was which
19	number?
20	A I believe this was the Smith & Wesson six-shot.
21	It was 77, I believe. I'd have to refer to my
22	laboratory notes.
23	Q Okay. We have the evidence report blown up
24	as S-39. Is item 77 shown on there?
25	A Ves

Q And it's described as: Smith & Wesson .38
Special six-shot revolver, silver, with brown wooden
grips, no serial number?
A Yes.
Q Is this that item?
A Yes, it is.
Q And also in that box is an envelope. What's
contained in the envelope?
A Four spent without opening it, just reading the
outside, four spent shell casings.
Q Is that what was submitted to you as one of
the items to be tested?
A I believe so. Again, I'd have to refer to the
laboratory submission.
Q Let me show you a photograph that's been
marked as S-35, from when that weapon was recovered.
Does it show a number of casings in that weapon?
A Yes.
Q And how many are they?
A It looks like four.
Q And that's out of a six-shot revolver;
correct?
A Yes.
Q So you test-fired this weapon?
A Yes, I did.

1	Q And let me show you S-3. We'll open that up.
2	And is that evidence item Number 76?
3	A Yes, it is.
4	Q And what else is in that box?
5	A Envelope with five spent shell casings.
6	Q And that's a five-shot revolver?
7	A Yes.
8	Q Let me show you a photograph that's S-38 in
9	evidence, showing a recovery of that weapon. What does
10	that show?
11	A It shows a revolver with the cylinder opened, and
12	there's five casings in the cylinder.
13	Q Now, in addition to the guns and the spent
14	casings, were certain recovered projectiles turned over
15	to you?
16	A They were there with other evidence submitted in
17	the laboratory.
18	Q And they consist of projectiles recovered
19	from the scene and recovered from the victim; is that
20	correct?
21	A I believe so, yes.
22	Q And did you conduct an examination of the
23	projectiles that were submitted to you?
24	A Yes, I did.
25	O And of the five projectiles that were

1	submitted, were any of them of ballistic value for you
2	to make comparisons?
3	A Yes.
4	Q How many?
5	A Two, I believe, if I could refer to my notes.
6	THE COURT: Do you have your notes? Let him
7	have his notes.
8	MR. HEISLER: Sure.
9	A Yes. Two.
10	Q And for the purpose of continuity and
11	documentation, are those items referred to in your
12	report by the same evidence numbers that there are on
13	the CIU evidence list?
14	A I believe so.
15	Q So of the two that were of ballistic value
16	let me ask you this. What does that mean?
17	A Ballistic value, that there's sufficient detail
18	and/or tool mark characteristics to make a
19	determination as to whether it was or was not
20	discharged from that weapon.
21	Q And in making that initial determination as
22	to what may or may not be of ballistic value, what do
23	you do?
24	A well, I normally look at it and, you know, if it's
25	deformed and out of shape, or devoid of any markings,

1	then I would say it's of no ballistic value, not even
2	attempt identification. I try to get the bullets as
3	close to whole as I can.
4	Q Okay. And in this case, you determined three
5	of the five were of no ballistic value?
6	A Items Number 16, 66 and 68 were of no ballistic
7	value.
8	Q Okay. And again referring to your evidence
9	list, let's start with the first of those. Item 16 is
10	shown on the evidence list as, will you tell us,
11	please?
12	A Projectile from under front of vehicle Number 1,
13	parking space Number 8, east side of parking lot, 402
14	Prospect Street, ballistic comparison.
15	Q So item Number 16, the projectile from under
16	that vehicle, was of no ballistic value?
17	A Correct.
18	Q What was the next one?
19	A 66.
20	Q And 66 shows on the evidence list?
21	A One projectile recovered from upper right chest
22	plate, collected at autopsy.
23	Q So that was collected from the victim?
24	A Yes.
25	Q And the last one that was of no ballistic

1	value?
2	A 68. One projectile recovered from right upper
3	chest of victim, collected at autopsy.
4	Q Now, the two that were of ballistic value,
5	you said one was 69?
6	A Yeah.
7	Q Could you tell us what that is?
8	A One projectile recovered from lower right rib cage
9	of victim, collected at autopsy.
10	Q So you were able to compare that one from the
11	victim's lower right rib cage?
12	A Yes.
13	Q And item Number 1, I believe you said, was of
14	ballistic value?
15	A Yes.
16	Q Could you tell us what that is?
17	A Projectile from right lane of parking lot, 402
18	Prospect Street, in front of west side parking space
19	Number 2.
20	Q So with respect to item Number 1 and item
21	Number 69, which were of ballistic value, what did you
22	do with those items?
23	A I compared them against identical ammunition fired
24	from the specimen weapons.

Q And once you've test-fired them and gotten

your test-fire projectiles, what do you do with those to compare them?

A I place them under a lights comparison, ballistic comparison microscope, to see if I can match them.

Q And when you say "match them," what you are looking for?

A I am looking for sufficient details, we call striations, that have been imparted to the projectile from the lands, the grooves and the rifling. And the way the premise works is, that since the bullet is of softer material than the metal that's made up of the barrel, then it will impart characteristic striations to the projectile.

Then if you fire another projectile from that weapon, theoretically you could compare the two weapons to see if, in fact, they did give sufficient details to say positively that they were fired from the same weapon.

Q Okay. And when you say "lands, grooves and rifling" in the barrel, what are you talking about?

A One of the processes in order to make a barrel is that a special plug that's harder than the steel that's composed the barrel is pushed through the barrel. What this does, it puts what is called lands and grooves in a twist motion.

And the lands and grooves bite into the bullet and direct the bullet to a spiral. And some weapons spiral left, some weapons spiral right, and the purpose of this is to increase its ballistic coefficient as it flies through the air, make it more accurate, similar to a football being thrown. They spiral it so it cuts through the air with better co-efficient.

Q So a bullet comes out spiraling like a thrown football, rather than tumbling?

A Yes. It adds to the distance and the accuracy of the projectile.

Q And in this case, did you take some photographs of the comparisons that you made under the microscope?

A Yes, I did.

 MR. HEISLER: If we could have the easel, please.

Q Mr. Barrett, if you could step down here, let's start with what's been previously marked as S-71. I'm going to ask you to step to the side, on one side or the other, so you don't block anybody's view. Tell us first what that shows.

A All right. If you look carefully, you'll see a shadow that goes down; and what this is, this is the

cut. Actually, you're looking at two different projectiles, one being on the left side, which is the unknown, and one being on the right side, which is the known.

The known is a cartridge that I fired from that weapon, that I know in fact did come from that weapon, compared to one of the specimens that was submitted, which is now considered to be unknown.

Q And this particular blown-up photograph, which projectile is that of the two that you found to have ballistic value?

A well, the projectile that you are looking at on the left is from Case 1372. It's specimen Number 1. On the right was la' ratory-fired projectile.

Q So this is Number 1?

A Yes.

Q And on the right and in that comparison, can you show us what you're looking for and what you found? A Okay. I'd like to preface that first with an understanding of the rifling in the barrel. The rifling in the barrel has what we call lands and grooves. The lands project further from the barrel than the grooves do.

So it would be like the teeth on a sprocket. If you can think of it as a sprocket, the part that

extends higher would be the land, and the part that doesn't would be the groove; however, when the bullet goes through, they're reversed. The one that's deep-seated a little bit is imparted by the land, and the one that's raised a little bit would get its compression or markings from the groove, so it's reversed. All right?

And what you are looking at is one section of what would be the land here, of the two projectiles compared together.

Q And in that comparison, what do you see that tells you this is or is not fired from the same weapon?

A The barrel has a, I wouldn't call it necessarily manufacturing defect, but an unfinished or insufficiently polished imperfection in the barrel. It left another striation that's offset from the inner section of the land and groove. So what I'm looking at right here --

THE COURT: Move over a little bit so that the --

THE WITNESS: What I'm looking at right here is, this particular line right here, you'll see that not only is it offset, but it increases in angle. It starts here slow and starts angling away, and if you can see by matching up where the lands and grooves

were, this is -- continues all the way through, just as 1 2 though if you were looking at from one bullet. 3 So you have this characteristic, not to mention the two lands and grooves. 4 5 And if you also look further down, you will 6 see indentations, striations here, and on the other side, that go across. So, if you can follow them from 7 8 one projectile to the other projectile, that's an indication that they were fired from the same weapon. 9 10 So we all understand, to this side, to the 11 jury's left, is the specimen that was turned in as 12 evidence, and this is the side-by-side comparison to the right of the projectile that you fired in the 13 14 laboratory? 15 Yes. 16 And these lines continue from one to the 17 other, and they match? 18 Yes. 19 And in your opinion, were those two 20 projectiles fired from the same weapon? Yes, they were. 21 22 And which weapon was that? 23 That was the six-shot Smith & Wesson. I believe 24 it was specimen Number 77.

Let's take a look now at S-72. And what

specimen is this showing?

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A This is also Number 1, but on a different set of lands and grooves, all right, not the same one. And if you notice, you have a particular shading or a roll-over of the land right here, that's the same width as the one over here, and this has a similar angle.

Probably what happened was, when this barrel was being produced, that the tool was damaged or was used too many times, whatever, and it also gave an angular secondary ballistic signature off to the side here that lines up.

Remember though, this is, I wouldn't say extreme magnification, but it's 125 times what it would normally look like to the eye.

- Q And that's why you use the microscope?

  A Yes.
- Q Now, as you do these comparisons, do you rotate the projectiles?

A Yes.

- Q And they're round, so you have to turn them over to check them; correct?
- A Yeah, they're 360 degrees. That's why any projectile that's flattened on one side is very poor, or less capable of being a suitable projectile to be compared to, because you've lost, you know, half the

And does that also sometimes distort what you

would see?

A Certainly.

Okav. So again, did what we see in S-72 contribute to your opinion that --

You have two different sections on different rotations of the bullet where they line up.

So the specimen that was in evidence as Number 1, in your opinion, was fired from the gun that's in evidence as Number 77?

That's correct.

Now we'll move on to S-73, and can you tell 0 us what this shows?

Yes. Now, this is another projectile. But notice, you could say, oh, look, that's the same as on the other one. Well, it's the same gun. So you can see right now from this that, by looking at this, you can ID this gun quite readily now, 'cause you've seen it before. All right?

And this is the same markings; however, you have more detail in this picture. Instead of just a single line, you have a shadow here, and another line which is also equal. In the side over here, you notice you have one, two, three lines or separate striations

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that also match up to the other side.

Q And S-74?

A S-74 is similar. It's specimen Number 69, against the specimen Number 77, the six-shot Smith & Wesson.

And notice here additional lines. Here, you have a larger departation (sic) from the inner section of the land and groove, much wider. But the angle stays the same.

In addition to that, you have striations right here that go across, ones right here go across; and although this came out poor here, I believe there's also here. Remember, you're trying to put a three-dimensional image on a two-dimensional image.

Q Two-dimensional photograph?

A Photograph. 1. 5 a lot clearer under the microscope.

Q And S-75?

A Here we have the same thing as I showed you previously, except right here you notice that there must have been a slight cavity in the rifling, and the lead melted and flowed into that, so you have a bubbling effect on both of them. And the angle is right here, goes across. Now, these striations are much clearer to see over here.

Q And in your opinion, was this projectile that

1	was turned into evidence as Number 69 fired from the
2	gun which is in evidence as Number 77?
3	A Yes.
4	MR. HEISLER: You can resume your seat, Mr.
5	Barrett.
6	Q Now, Mr. Barrett, those were the only two
7	bullets that were of ballistic value that you could
8	compare; correct?
9	A Yes.
10	Q And let me show you what have been marked, to
11	begin with, as S-70. Can you tell us what that is?
12	A One projectile recovered from the upper right
13	chest.
14	Q And what evidence number is that?
15	A Looks like 66.
16	Q And that's one that was not of comparable
17	ballistic value; is that correct?
18	A Yes.
19	Q S-69?
20	A Well, this is 68.
21	Q Okay, but it's S-69.
22	A Oh, I'm sorry. This is specimen Number 68, which
23	is the same determination as Number 66.
24	Q That it was not of any ballistic value?
25	A That is correct.

1	Q And then we have S-68. Which evidence number
2	is that?
3	A Number 69.
4	Q And that was one of the bullets that was
5	comparable?
6	A Yes.
7	Q That you determined was fired from the Smith
8	& Wesson?
9	A Yes, the one from the lower right rib cage.
10	Q Okay. Then we have S-67. Can you tell us
11	what that is?
12	A Yes. This is Number 16, which I determined also
13	to have no ballistic value.
14	Q That was one that was recovered from under
15	the vehicle that was described as Vehicle Number 1?
16	A That is correct.
17	Q And then we have S-66.
18	A This is Number 1, one of the ones I did compare.
19	Q Also determined to be fired from the same
20	gun?
21	A Yes.
22	Q So, were you did you have anything else to
23	compare to the other gun that's marked as item Number
24	76 in S-3 for identification?
25	A well was I would compare all laboratory firings

1	against both weapons, and it just so happened that I
2	matched the two that were matchable to the one weapon.
3	Q So nothing matched this other gun?
4	A That I did, no. I only had two that I felt were
5	of ballistic value, and they matched the one gun.
6	Q Okay. Let's go back for a second to talk
7	about the item that was in evidence as Number 16,
8	recovered from under Vehicle Number 1. You looked at
9	some photographs earlier of that vehicle; correct?
10	A Yes.
11	Q Let me show you S-24 and S-27; and, directing
12	your attention specifically to the door of that
13	vehicle, what do they show?
1.4	A It shows an indentation on the lower, I assume,
15	passenger door.
16	Q And that was determined by Detective Frey to
17	be a possible bullet ricochet; right?
18	A Yes.
19	Q And then S-25, where Detective Frey marked a
20	projectile that was taken into evidence as item Number
21	16?
22	A Yes. That looks like a deformed .38 wad cutter
23	underneath the vehicle.
24	Q Bullets come out of a gun at high velocity;
2.5	correct?

1	A Yes.
2	Q And normally, if it's a bullet's unimpeded
3	and fired in or through a car that's parked next
4	right next to this van, would you expect that bullet to
5	have gone through the door?
6	A Could you rephrase that, please?
7	Q Sure. If you have a car parked right next to
8	this van, where the ricochet mark is
9	A Uh-hum.
10	Q and a gun is fired in it or just from the
11	other side of it, and the bullet goes through
12	unimpeded, would you have expected it to pierce that
13	door rather than ricochet?
14	A The bullet goes through unimpeded of what?
15	Q Unimpeded from the car that it's fired in.
16	A You would have you would imagine it would have
17	sufficient energy to penetrate the sheet metal of the
18	vehicle, yes.
19	Q Okay. What would cause a bullet to ricochet
20	in that manner as opposed to penetrating the door?
21	A well, it's yawing, so it most likely went through
22	something.

Q And when you say "something," would that have to be something of some substance?

A Usually.

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Okav. Now, in this case, the jury's heard 0 testimony that the victim had a through-and-through shot in his left forearm. Would that be sufficient to send that bullet tumbling into that door?

I believe it could.

Okay. What about shots that went through clothing, that didn't strike any body part? Depending on the clothing and the angle, but it's Α more unlikely that that would be a contributor than the body part.

0 And now we see the ricochet back on the door on the right side. The bullet was recovered up under the front part of the car on the right side. Can you account for how it would wind up there?

My quess, since this is a --

MR. WELLE: Your Honor, a guess --

THE COURT: If you have an opinion, you can give your opinion.

THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor. My opinion would be, due to the fact that it's a cylindrical wad cutter, it would probably hit on the tip of it or an angle, and would flip over underneath the car once it came down from the side of the vehicle.

Does it react, does a bullet in that fashion react like any other common object we know, bouncing

1 around? 2 well, it's -- I would say the majority of time you 3 can't necessarily judge how it's going to go. Could be like a football, where it could take a weird bounce, 4 depending on how it hits. 5 MR. HEISLER: That's all I have, Judge. 6 THE COURT: Mr. Welle? 7 8 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. WELLE: 9 Mr. Lesniak --Q 10 MR. HEISLER: This is Mr. Barrett. MR. WELLE: I'm sorry. 11 12 0 Mr. Barrett, you're a highly educated fellow, 13 probably the most educated guy in the courtroom --14 I doubt that. A 15 -- pesides the Judge. You have had 25 years 16 of experience in this field? 17 30. A 18 30 years. During the course of that time, 19 you have gone to how many seminars, would you estimate, 20 or training sessions? 21 I don't know. A dozen, maybe. There are different kinds of examinations and 22 0 23 forensic examinations that you, as a ballistics expert. 24 can do: are there not? 25 A I suppose so, yes.

Q Now, in this particular case, you took remnants of a bullet, matched them up with a gun, and came to some conclusions; correct?

A I wouldn't, I wouldn't classify them as remnants.

I would call, classify them as projectiles. To me, a
remnant is a smaller piece of something.

Q All right. Part of a projectile you were able to match up with a gun?

A projectile I was able to match up with a gun. I am not trying to mince words, counselor, I'm just trying to indicate that it was not a piece of a bullet but it was -- or projectile, but it was, in fact, a projectile itself.

Q Okay. You did testify, did you not, that there was a projectile obtained from the body of this particular victim that was from the upper back area or upper chest area, that you were not able to make any determination about as to what gun that projectile might have come from?

A Yes, that is correct.

Q Okay. Now, you said you had to fire these weapons, you fired these weapons?

A Yes.

Q Did you fire those weapons and attempt to determine whether there was any particular gunpowder

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residue pattern that would be presented by either of
 1
 2
     those weapons?
          No, I did not do a muzzle-to-garment distance
 3
     examination.
 4
               Is that something you were capable of doing?
 5
          I have been trained in it, yes.
 6
 7
               Does the Ocean County Sheriff's Department do
          0
     that kind of work?
 8
          We have done that, yes.
 9
               And the reason for doing that kind of work is
10
11
     to determine the distance from a victim or an impact
12
     point as to where a gun may have been when it was
13
     fired: is that correct?
14
     Α
          It's used to come up with a range.
15
          Q A range?
16
     A
          Yes.
               All right. So that if a gun was fired --
17
18
     and, of course, this is depending on the gun and the
19
     ammunition, and a lot of variables, but if the gun was
20
     fired from seven inches, six inches, the likelihood is
21
     it would leave a pattern; is that correct?
          A pattern of a gunshot residue?
22
     Α
23
               Yes.
          Q
24
     A
          Yes.
               Okay. And as one would move away -- in fact.
25
          Q
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	1	when you do the testing, you would move away or you	1
)	2	would do it at various distances, to see what the	
	3	liffusion of that gunshot residue would be; is that	t
	4	correct?	
	5	That is correct.	
	6	Q And at some point in time, you would read	ch a
	7	point where there would be no pattern; is that cor	rect
	8	That is correct.	
	9	Q But there could still be gunshot residue	
	10	there?	
	11	There could be.	
	12	Q At the maximum distance?	
)	13	We have to set what definition we call a patte	ern.
	14	s a pattern traces? 'Cause if a pattern is trace	5
	15	Q I am suggesting that the pattern is not	
	16	races.	
	17	Okay. Then that is an organized set of traces	5.
	18	Q A diffuse spreading of gunpowder on a	
	19	particular item that is not interpretable as a fin	ite,
	20	defined pattern.	
	21	All right.	
	22	Q All right. At some point, you would get	to
	23	hat?	
)	24	Yes.	
	25	O And then beyond that point you would go	

1 nothina? 2 You would not get gunshot residue, but you would 3 get, say, lead residue. 4 Okay. Well, at some point, all right, Q 5 gunshot lead, the gun would be too far away for either 6 lead or gunpowder residue to be on that item? That is correct. Gravity would have pulled any 7 8 free-floating particles down to the ground. 9 Okay. So doing that kind of pattern test 10 could help in determining whether a particular 11 projectile that caused some damage to an individual was 12 fired at a particular range? 13 A Yes. 14 Q And that would be used by the fact finder to 15 try to determine the distance of whoever had that oun that did that shooting, how far away they would have 16 17 been when that shot was fired? 18 Α Yes. 19 THE COURT: Are you implying that the gun 20 would be identified? 21 MR. WELLE: No, no, no. 22 THE COURT: I want to make that clear. You 23 said, "that gun." 24 MR. WELLE: I'm sorry.

THE COURT:

And --

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Q That the position of the shooter, all right, when the gun was fired, and a particular projectile, that would assist you in determining how far away that person presumably with the gun would have been from the victim?

A Usually how it gets put out or how it gets written is that the gun had to be -- the gun, not the position of the shooter, but the gun had to be within 12 to 15 feet, something like that, or closer than six inches, so on, so forth. They don't mention the position of the shooter. They just talk about the weapon.

Q The gun. But, of course, we're in the real world, and guns don't go off unless somebody's shooting them.

A That's correct.

Q Did you order or direct that this kind of examination be done to assist the fact finders in this case to that particular circumstances?

A That's not my position, to order or direct anybody. I do what I'm told.

Q Are you aware of whether anybody in this case directed or requested anybody to do that kind of test or any kind of test to determine whether there was any lead or gunpowder residue on any item relevant to this case?

1	MR. HEISLER: At this point I am going to
2	object. Whether Mr. Barrett's aware isn't relevant.
3	He said he didn't do the tests.
4	THE COURT: You can rephrase it to ask him if
5	he was requested to do it.
6	Q Were you requested to contact anybody to do a
7	test in this particular area?
8	A No, I was not.
9	Q So you wouldn't be aware of whether one was
10	done and we just don't know the results?
11	A I am aware that one was done, but I was not I
12	am not the person who directed it to be done.
13	Q Okay. So you are aware that one was done?
14	A Yes.
15	MR. WELLE: I have no further questions,
16	Judge.
17	THE COURT: Mr. Kinarney?
18	MR. KINARNEY: Thank you, Judge.
19	CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. KINARNEY:
20	Q Good morning, Mr. Barrett.
21	A Good morning, sir.
22	Q I wanted to direct you to what I think's beer
23	marked for identification as S-39. It's S- something.
24	We'll know in a minute.
25	THE COURTY A lot of Cla horo

A lot of S's, millions of S's. I'm right. 1 0 2 It's S-39, which as Mr. Heisler indicated, is a 3 blow-up of the evidence, let's call it an evidence log: 4 correct? 5 Yes. 6 would it be accurate to say item Number 1, 0 7 001 through item Number 092, are all things of evidential value related to this case, as far as you 8 9 know? 10 Yes, as far as I know. 11 0 Now, you've indicated, and I believe it's 12 marked as S-2 for identification -- yeah, it's been 13 marked as S-2 for identification, and this was the 14 revolver that you determined, in your expert opinion. fired the two projectiles, one of which was extracted 15 16 from the right lower rib cage of the victim, and the 17 other projectile was found in the parking lot? 18 A Yes. 19 Q Correct? 20 A Correct. Q Okay. And S-2, in regards to S-39 -- I know 21 22 it's a lot of S's -- is item Number 77; correct? 23 A Correct. 24 Q And in S-39, item Number 77 is a Smith &

wesson .38 Special six-shot revolver, silver, brown

wooden grip, wooded grip, serial number filed off, 1 2 containing four spent shell casings and one white sock 3 used to cover the weapon. Correct? Right. A 4 5 So the gun that fired the bullets that were 6 found in the parking lot and taken out of the body of the victim were encased in a white sock: correct? 7 8 I believe the firearm was encased in --9 That's what I meant to say. Excuse me if I 10 misstated that. So the gun that fired the two bullets 11 that were of evidential value, one from the body of the 12 victim and one from the parking lot, was in the white 13 sock: correct? 14 Correct. 15 And you've indicated that the tests that you 16 performed on S-2, which is the gun we're talking about, 17 those same tests were performed on S-3, which is the 18 other gun; correct? 19 A Correct 20 And you came back with no forensic findings 21 tying S-3 to anything in this case; correct? 22 A Correct. 23 MR. KINARNEY: I have nothing further.

THE COURT: Mr. Zager?

MR. ZAGER: Thank you, Judge.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. ZAGER:

Q Good morning, Detective.

1 2

3	A Good morning, counselor.
4	Q Detective, S-2 and S-3 are the two guns in
5	front of you; correct?
6	A Let's see. S-2 and S-3, that is correct,
7	counselor.
8	Q Okay. And based on all the tests that you
9	explained to us this morning, that doesn't tell you who
10	shot the gun; correct?
11	A That is correct.
12	Q And does it matter to you the source in which
13	the guns were recovered by the police?
14	MR. HEISLER: Judge, I am going to object,
15	just because I don't understand the question.
16	THE COURT: Do you understand, "the source"?
17	THE WITNESS: I could that could go both
18	ways. I don't know how to answer that. I would say
19	yes and no.
20	Q Pretty safe answer. Let me rephrase the
21	question, Detective. Does your opinion or your testing
22	change in any manner based upon the manner in which the
23	police recovered S-2 and S-3?
24	A Well, I would have concerns ballistically if they
25	were recovered in a condition that made them unsafe for

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testing. But other than that, then no, I have no concerns on how the evidence comes into the laboratory.

Q Okay. There's been testimony in the case that Mr. Barber helped the police recover S-2 and S-3. Do you have any knowledge of that?

A No knowledge of that, counselor.

Q Okay. The question that Mr. Heisler asked you on direct examination about a bullet penetrating the van?

A Yes.

Q Did you understand that question to mean that the bullet that we are talking about that was fired was fired inside the Jeep?

A No. I did not interpret it, that question, that way. I interpreted i that if a bullet's unimpeded, one would expect it to go through the door frame of the parked vehicle. Since it did not, then thus it must be impeded, and if it was such impeded, which would be more likely, the clothing or the body part? And that's how I understood it, and I picked the body part.

Q Okay. And your answer to that question was based upon your assumption that the bullet was or was not fired in the Jeep?

A The assumption is that, knowing the kinetic energy of a projectile that caliber, that it would have no

trouble ballistically penetrating the sheet metal of a U.S.-made vehicle.

Q Okay. There's been testimony in the case that there's no forensic or scientific evidence that any gun was fired in the Jeep. Knowing that, does that change your opinion at all with regard to the answer that Mr. -- the question Mr. Heisler asked you?

A No, as my interpretation of that is based on the kinetic energy of that projectile, which would have no difficulty in penetrating that sheet metal.

Now, if it was determined that it was not inside the van, well, then that's a whole different set of understandings. But my understanding was, if unimpeded, would you expect it to go through the sheet metal of the parked webicle. And yes, I would expect it.

Since it didn't, then it was deflected or slowed down or some of the kinetic energy was lost, and since it was lost, how would it be lost, one would expect it to be lost if it went through a body part.

Q Based on your testing, you don't have an opinion as to whether or not Mr. Barber shot the gun?

A I know nothing of any of the suspects, defendants, who had what gun.

MR. ZAGER: Okay. Thank you, sir.

1	THE COURT: Mr. Somers.
2	MR. SOMERS: No questions, your Honor.
3	THE COURT: Mr. Heisler.
4	REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. HEISLER:
5	Q Mr. Barrett, the fact that you didn't find
6	anything that matched the gun that's S-3, doesn't mean
7	that the projectiles that you couldn't compare couldn't
8	have been fired from that gun, does it?
9	A That's true, correct.
10	Q By the way, does water wash away gunshot
11	residue?
12	A Yeah.
13	MR. HEISLER: That's all I have, Judge.
14	THE COURT: Anything further?
15	MR. KINARN"Y' I just have one in response
16	to
17	THE COURT: Mr. Welle's standing first.
18	MR. KINARNEY: I'm sorry.
19	RECROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. WELLE:
20	Q You said you were aware of some gunshot
21	residue testing being done, after we asked you a couple
22	of questions to get to that point?
23	A Yes, I'm aware that there a report was issued
24	by the State Police.
25	Q So something was sent for examination?

1 Apparently. A 2 MR. HEISLER: I'm going to renew my 3 objection. It's not this witness's test. Whether he 4 is aware of it or not is really not relevant. 5 THE COURT: I think he's answered your 6 question. 7 MR. WELLE: Fine. 8 THE COURT: Mr. Kinarney? 9 MR. KINARNEY: Thank you. 10 RECROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. KINARNEY: 11 0 The last question posed to you by Mr. Heisler 12 concerned possibility; right? 13 Yes. Just because you couldn't make any forensic 14 15 tie-in of the second gun doesn't mean it couldn't have 16 been used; correct? I mean, that's the bottom line. 17 Α Yes. 18 Q But that doesn't mean that it was used; right? You can't form any opinion? 19 20 Α No opinion. 21 Q You are a scientist; correct? 22 Α Yes. 23 Q You are an expert; correct? 24 A Y .. 25 Q You used scientifically accepted tests on

these two weapons; right?

A Yes.

Q And the bottom line is, based upon your expertise and the scientifically valid tests that you performed, there's no way there is any forensic tie-in, in your opinion, on the second gun to this crime; correct?

A Correct. I can only say what I determined to be positive, and which I said.

MR. KINARNEY: Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Heisler, anything further?

MR. HEISLER: No, sir.

THE COURT: Thank you very much, Mr. Barrett. You're excused.

THE WITNESS Thank you, your Honor.

(Witness excused.)

THE COURT: Mr. Heisler.

MR. HEISLER: Your Honor, subject to moving of evidence, the State rests.

THE COURT: Okay. Members of the jury, the State has rested its presentation with regard to evidence in its case-in-chief. At this time I have to review the evidence that the State wants to move into evidence that you are permitted to have in the jury room during deliberations. So I'm going to ask you to

1	step into the jury room while I take care of that.
2	(Jury retires.)
3	THE COURT: Okay.
4	MR. HEISLER: Judge, at this time I would
5	move S-1, which is a photograph of the green Jeep.
6	THE COURT: S-1 in evidence.
7	MR. HEISLER: S-2 and S-3, which is the boxes
8	containing the two firearms with the spent shell cases.
9	THE COURT: S-2 and 3 in evidence.
10	MR. HEISLER: S-4, which is the aerial
11	photograph of Lakewood, going over to Jackson.
12	THE COURT: S-4 in evidence. I presume,
13	counsels, if there is going to be an objection
14	MR. KINARNEY: If I'm going to object, I will
15	let you know, Judge, wes.
16	MR. HEISLER: Judge, I believe everything
17	after that, through S-14, is already in.
18	THE COURT: Is that so?
19	THE CLERK: Yes.
20	MR. HEISLER: S-15, which is the diagram
21	prepared by CIU, I would move that.
22	THE COURT: S-15 in evidence.
23	MR. HEISLER: I believe everything through
24	S-27 is in evidence. I didn't move the photographs,
25	S-28, 29 and 30. I'd like to move those at this time.

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THE COURT: In evidence.

MR. HEISLER: 31 through 38 appear to be in evidence already. I'd move S-39, which is a blow-up of the evidence list.

THE COURT: In evidence.

MR. HEISLER: S-40A, Judge, which was the victim's light-blue shirt. I am not moving the whole box, just the shirt.

THE COURT: In evidence.

MR. HEISLER: And S-41 A and S-41 B, which are the victim's jacket and the victim's pants.

THE COURT: In evidence.

MR. HEISLER: 42 through 53 are in. I'm not moving 54 or 55. They were never identified. 56 through 58 are in. Juage, I'm going to move S-59, which is the latent fingerprint log sheet; S-60, which is the evidence report concerning the latent fingerprints which were not of comparative value; and S-61, which is the report that was of fingerprints of comparative value.

THE COURT: In evidence.

MR. HEISLER: S-62, which is a diagram.

MR. KINARNEY: Judge, if I could just ask, it's listed as "large, multicolored diagram." Which diagram is that?

	1	MR. HEISLER: I believe it's the map.
	2	THE COURT: Street map.
	3	MR. KINARNEY: I have no objection to the
	4	map.
	5	THE COURT: In evidence.
	6	MR. HEISLER: S-63, which was the computer-
	7	assisted dispatch log.
	8	THE COURT: In evidence.
	9	MR. HEISLER: 64, which was the Consent to
	10	Questioning form that Sergeant Hayes testified to
	11	yesterday.
	12	THE COURT: In evidence.
	13	MR. HEISLER: S-65, which was a Miranda
	14	rights form.
	15	THE COURT: In evidence.
	16	MR. HEISLER: S-66 through 70 are the
	17	projectiles.
	18	THE COURT: In evidence.
	19	MR. HEIS! ER: And S-71 through 75, which were
	20	the charts that Mr. Barrett used this morning.
	21	THE COURT: In evidence.
	22	MR. HEISLER: I believe that's it, Judge.
	23	THE COURT: Okay. Counsel ready to proceed?
)	24	MR. WELLE: Well, your Honor with respect to,
	25	I guess motions at this particular point in time

THE COURT: You have motions? I will hear you.

MR. WELLE: Okay. Judge, on behalf of Mr. Worthy, I would move for a motion to dismiss at this particular point in time.

It's Mr. Worthy's position that there is insufficient evidence of the existence of a conspiracy on this particular day, anything that exists to implicate him in a particular conspiracy, or to place him, reasonably and credibly, of course, in a situation where he would be in any way responsible for these events.

THE COURT: Mr. Zager. No. Mr. Kinarney.

MR. KINARNEY: Thank you, your Honor. I join in co-counsel's commenc. I'm going to respectfully move for judgment of acquittal. I don't have to recite the law to your Honor. Your Honor clearly knows it.

I would submit to the Court, giving the State the benefit of all -- even giving the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences, certainly there is insufficient evidence on Count 1, which is the conspiracy count.

As a matter of fact, I think the evidence shows that if there may have been a dispute, the dispute was settled prior to the victim dying. I think

that relates to the conspiracy. I'm just going to submit on the remaining two counts, charging Mr. Santos with murder and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose.

THE COURT: Mr. Zager.

MR. ZAGER: Your Honor, I would be moving for a judgment of acquittal based on the State's failure to present evidence that would allow a jury to make a reasonable inference. Maybe the jury could make an inference, but in light of the State's testimony as I recollect it -- and I don't really want to do a closing argument now, Judge, but I think my client stands a little differently before the Court with regard to the credible evidence that's been submitted than perhaps Mr. Santos and Mr. Worldy.

My understanding and recollection of all of the State's forensic experts was that they had no evidence whatsoever to suggest that Mr. Maples was at Highpoint on April 28th, 2002 at 11:00 AM.

The State's witness who is alleged to be an eyewitness to what occurred is the only person that's put Mr. Maples at the scene. And I'm not going to argue his credibility now, 'cause I don't think that's appropriate.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ZAGER: But taking his testimony, if you wanted to, as truthful, to hold Mr. Maples in on his testimony would, I think, be inappropriate, Judge, because although he puts Mr. Maples at Highpoint, he clearly states that Mr. Maples is not in the Jeep, but, I believe it was, 60 yards away when the shots occurred.

And my suspicion is that you may have a thought about conspiracy with regard to my client with Mr. Santos as contained in, I think, the second or first count of the indictment, from the only witness that the State's produced, which again is Mr. Barber.

He clearly testified on cross-examination that he was not aware of any plan, of any agreement, of anything that was going to go down at Highpoint. I asked him all the questions relating to the jury charge and the elements of conspiracy and accomplice liability, to which he answered no, there was -- he was not there, he didn't -- he was not aware that my client aided or agreed to aid, or planned or anything with regard to conspiracy.

There is an allegation, and I think that that is perhaps the only way that your Honor could even consider keeping my client in the case, and it's based on what goes back to what I asked for, a Rule 104

hearing, about this alleged incident in Yonkers.

You have Mr. Hakim Shabazz, who testifies nothing about Yonkers, simply testified that on Thursday before the Sunday shooting, that my client was mad at the victim, they had an argument, and everything was cool and the argument was done.

You have Mr. Haleem Shabazz testifying that something occurred in Yonkers; but, quite frankly, if you believe his testimony, my client didn't pull the gun. Other people did.

And no matter what may have happened, if anything did happen, quite frankly, Judge, everything was resolved the next day, which would have been a Friday. And, as a matter of fact, there was testimony that, using their words, everything was cool, and there were no problems. And there's testimony that on Friday before the shooting at Highpoint, and on Saturday, the victim was with my client.

So, if the Court were to possibly consider that there was some sort of conspiracy that started in Yonkers, it ended the next day, because everything was fine on Friday and Saturday between my client and the victim.

There's something, there's some allegation that something occurred in Philadelphia; but that's not

part of what I would suspect to be a conspiracy charge, in light of, if there was something, it ended after the alleged incident in Yonkers. And I am not conceding that the thing in Yonkers occurred.

Judge, that's my recollection of the testimony relevant to my client. And I don't have to argue to you that you have to take the evidence separate with respect to my client.

But, quite frankly, Judge, there's nothing here that the jury should be even given the opportunity to consider, because any inference that the State's entitled to get, which they're entitled to get all favorable, reasonable inferences, if you gave them, if you gave the State any benefit of the doubt, the only inference that could be drawn would be an unreasonable inference that my client conspired, because, quite frankly, they have nothing.

And it's 20 witnesses. They have nothing to show that my client conspired or had a purpose, or any of the elements of conspiracy or murder. And, Judge, I don't mean to put your Honor on the spot, but if your Honor is inclined to deny my motion, under <u>State vs.</u>

Reyes and the appropriate case law and court rules, I would ask your Honor to articulate findings of fact.

THE COURT: I don't make findings of fact.

The jury makes findings of fact.

MR. WELLE: Well, perhaps conclusion of law, then, with regard to -- if there is a denial of my motion. Thank you.

MR. SOMERS: Your Honor, Defendant James

Irwin makes -- moves to dismiss those counts of the indictment against him. I do not believe that the State has made a <u>prima facie</u> case. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Well, with regard to this matter, as counsel's aware, the Court accepts the evidence presented by the State, views it in its most favorable light, and gives the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom.

best of my recollection, I've heard testimony of the Shabazz brothers, who were brothers of the victim, with regard to a course of conduct involving the defendants Worthy, Santos and Maples and the victim, starting three days prior to the murder of the victim.

The course of conduct was rather violent in nature, in that guns were possessed by the defendants, two of the defendants, and threats were exchanged, and there was an indication that there was some concern that one of the defendants thought the victim tried to

do him physical harm in Philadelphia, and threats were exchanged and guns were displayed starting three days prior to April 28th. And that's the best of my recollection.

I have heard testimony that on April 28th the defendants worthy and Maples appeared at the Highpoint condominium complex in Lakewood early in the morning; they spoke with Mr. Barber, a State's witness, as well as the accused Irwin in this case, allegedly -- that's the testimony -- and there was some discussion even at that point by the defendant with worthy about the events three days earlier, and the fact that, you know, violence could be done to the victim in this case.

Worthy and Maples left and went -- I think it was Worthy who returned in the Acura. They both left in the Jeep. Worthy returned in the Acura. There was testimony that Worthy then, along with several others, including Mr. Barber, went and retrieved a handgun at Winteringham Village in Toms River, and returned to the Highpoint area.

And there was testimony that, shortly thereafter, the green Jeep was again in the parking lot of the Highpoint complex, and in the green Jeep was the defendant Worthy with the defendant Santos. The defendant Maples entered the Jeep, and there was

testimony that the shots were fired and that the victim came out of the Jeep and started to run, not very well, apparently, having been shot, and that the defendant Santos then pursued him and kept shooting at him until he fell dead.

Once again, it's not up to the Court to pass upon the credibility of the evidence, but merely to note the presence of evidence and that it is sufficient in nature to justify submission of the case to the jury, along with all the ballistics information and other items that have been admitted into evidence.

So, all of the motions are denied.

With regard to Mr. Somers' client, again, Mr. Barber testified that he and Mr. Somers' client, Mr. Irwin, took the Jeep following the murder into the woods in Jackson.

He testified that Mr. Irwin attempted to start a fire in the gas tank by putting a handkerchief or something in the gas tank and attempting to light it, and that Mr. Irwin then went and buried the guns, and he testified that he would be able to locate the guns because there were certain other items, a glove and duct tape, left in the area.

He went there with the law enforcement officers; and, lo and behold, they found the guns, the

duct tape and the glove. So, there's sufficient 1 2 evidence also, then, to hold Mr. Irwin into the case. So all the motion are denied. I'll take ten 3 minutes and see counsel as to your time schedule for 4 5 the event of who's going to testify and who's not. (Recess taken.) 6 7 Counsel, ready to proceed? 8 THE COURT: 9 MR. ZAGER: Yes, your Honor. 10 THE COURT: Do you have witnesses ready? 11 MR. WELLE: I'm sorry? 12 THE COURT: Witnesses ready? 13 MR. WELLE: Judge, we're still looking for a 14 witness. Our investigator is out. But from this point 15 of view, I would ask that you inquire of the other 16 counsel if they're ready to proceed. 17 MR. KINARNEY: Judge, I could call 18 Investigator Mitchell. 19 THE COURT: All right, start with 20 Investigator Mitchell? 21 MR. KINARNEY: Yes, Judge. 22 THE COURT: Jury out. 23 (Jury in the box.) 24 THE COURT: All right. As you're aware, the 25 State has rested its presentation-in-chief. I have

1	marked exhibits into evidence that you will be
2	considering at the conclusion of the case.
3	And, Mr. Kinarney, you have a witness you
4	wish to call?
5	MR. KINARNEY: Yes, I do, Judge, Investigato
6	Joseph Mitchell.
7	JOSEPH MITCHELL, Witness for the Defense,
8	sworn.
9	THE COURT: Mr. Kinarney.
10	MR. WELLE: Thank you, your Honor.
11	DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. KINARNEY:
12	Q Good morning, Investigator.
13	A Good morning.
14	Q Investigator Mitchell, whom are you employed
15	by?
16	A The Ocean County Prosecutor's Office.
17	Q And for how long have you been so employed?
18	A Approximately ten years.
19	Q And what is your function with the Ocean
20	County office?
21	A I am assigned to the Major Crime Homicide Unit as
22	an investigator.
23	Q Now, in reference to the matter of the murde
24	that we have been talking about in this case, were you
25	assigned to this case?

1	A Yes.
2	Q And how did you come to be assigned to this
3	case?
4	A I was contacted by my supervisor and requested to
5	respond out to the crime scene.
6	Q Okay. And do you recall what date that was?
7	A April 28th, 2002.
8	Q And did you, in fact, go to the crime scene?
9	A Yes, sir.
10	Q And as part of your functions in this case,
11	did you interview several citizens?
12	A Yes, I did.
13	Q Lay witnesses; correct?
14	A That's correct.
15	Q People who were not suspected of any criminal
16	activity; am I correct?
17	A That's correct.
18	Q And a couple of the people that you spoke to
19	were a married couple called James and Pamela Dunn?
20	A That's correct.
21	Q And did you interview them?
22	A Yes, I did.
23	Q Did you essentially ask them: Tell me what
24	you know?
25	A That's connect

1	Q And they had a conversation with you and tol
2	you the knowledge they had concerning what they
3	observed; correct?
4	A Yes.
5	Q Now, referring to Mr. Dunn, did you intervie
6	him on April 28th of '02?
7	A Yes, I did.
8	Q And he had certain information he gave to
9	you; correct?
10	A That's correct.
11	Q Did Mr. Dunn tell you that he saw at least
12	three black males run around the Jeep?
13	A That's what he stated, yes.
14	Q He didn't indicate to you that any of those
15	three males was possibly a dark-skinned Hispanic male,
16	did he?
17	A He just stated three black males.
18	Q Did he indicate to you that the subjects ran
19	around the Jeep and that all the suspects entered the
20	Jeep and drove away?
21	A That's what he told me, yes.
22	Q He didn't indicate to you that he couldn't
23	tell if the third guy got in the Jeep or not; right?
24	A I don't believe so.
25	O Okay Now you also had a composition with

1 his wife. Pamela Dunn: correct? 2 Yes. Q She indicated to you that she observed a 3 4 black male jogging in front of the house and down Prospect Street towards Route 9? 5 6 A That's correct. 7 Q She never indicated to you that it was 8 possibly a Hispanic male; correct? 9 That's correct. 10 0 Did she also indicate to you that she saw another man running, and gave a clothing description as 11 12 to the two men? 13 A Yes. 14 One of the men that went towards Route 9 she 0 15 told you was wearing array fleece sweatshirt; correct? Possibly, she stated. 16 17 Possibly? 0 18 A Yes. 19 Did she indicate to you that she saw anything 0 20 in his hands? 21 A No. 22 Did she indicate to you that she saw him handing anything off to another individual? 23 24 A No, she did not. 25 Q Now, as part of your duties in this case, you

1	also had an interview with Halim Shabazz; am I correct?
2	A Yes.
3	Q Halim Shabazz told you that at some point in
4	time prior to this incident, he had gone to Yonkers,
5	correct, with a number of individuals?
6	A Yes.
7	Q He indicated to you that they had made a stop
8	first in Newark; correct?
9	A I believe they were en route to Newark.
10	Q Right.
11	A And eventually ended up in Yonkers.
12	Q Okay. Did he indicate to you that while on
13	the way to Newark he fell asleep?
14	A Yes.
15	Q He didn't is dicate to you that he was awake
16	and he only fell asleep after leaving Newark going
17	to he did not indicate to you that he was awake the
18	entire time up to Newark, and only fell asleep when
19	they left Newark to go to Yonkers; correct?
20	A I'm not sure at what point in time when he fell
21	asleep during the trip, but I do know that he stated he
22	fell asleep during the trip.
23	Q You prepared a police report in reference to
24	this incident; correct?
25	A Yes. sir.

1	Q And I am referring to your report of May
2	16th, 2002.
3	A That's correct.
4	Q You have that with you?
5	A Yes, sir.
6	Q Now, in reference to your police report, you
7	attempt to make it as accurate as possible; correct?
8	A That's correct.
9	Q I would refer you to page three of your
10	four-page report. And I would refer you to the first
11	full paragraph on page 3. The first sentence
12	indicates: "While en route to Newark, New Jersey, Mr.
13	Shabazz fell asleep." Correct?
14	A Yes.
15	MR. KINARNE Thank you. I have nothing
16	further.
17	THE COURT: Mr. Zager? Oh, Mr. Somers?
18	MR. SOMERS: No questions.
19	MR. ZAGER: I'm sorry, Judge. It's me.
20	Thank you.
21	CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. ZAGER:
22	Q Good morning, Detective.
23	A Good morning.
24	Q You were working under the direction of
25	Investigator Hayes?

1	A Sergeant Hayes, yes.
2	Q Sergeant Hayes. And you were called in to be
3	part of the investigation of the shooting of Mr. Roy?
4	A Yes, sir.
5	Q And you got involved on April 28th; correct?
6	A That's correct.
7	Q And on April 29th, the next day, you went to
8	the Ocean County Jail and interviewed Mr. Halim
9	Shabazz; is that correct?
10	A Yes, sir.
11	Q And I know Mr. Kinarney asked that, but you
12	were trying to find out as much information as you
13	could relevant to what happened at Highpoint; correct?
14	A That's correct.
15	Q You were aware that Mr. Shabazz was Mr. Roy's
16	half-brother?
17	A Yes.
18	Q And in the sense that you were getting
19	information from him, you tried to be as accurate as
20	possible; correct?
21	A Yes.
22	Q You engaged in a series of questions, and
23	then he responded?
24	A That's correct.
25	O And did you take some notes?

24

25

A

Yes, sir, I did.

2 Q As we say in the business, did you take 3 copious notes? I noted all the information that he related to me. 4 5 Q Okay. And I hate to be repetitive, but you tried to take down the information from this witness as 6 reliable and as accurate as you could; correct? 7 That's correct. 8 9 So whatever he told you, you would write down in the form of notes and then memorialize from the 10 11 notes into a report: correct? 12 Yes. 13 Q And then as a result, you prepared a report 14 two weeks later, roughly, on May 16th, consisting of 15 four pages? 16 Yes. So, we are on the same page that that report 17 is as accurate as it could have been with regard to 18 19 what Mr. Halim Shabazz told you on April 29th: correct? 20 Α That's correct. 21 Okay. Were you in the courtroom when Mr. Shabazz testified last week? 22 23 A No, sir, I was not.

Q Okay. Mr. Kinarney kind of stole some of my

thunder, but I'm going to ask you anyway, your report

1	notes that Mr. Halim Shabazz told you that he fell
2	asleep on the way to Newark; correct?
3	A Yes, sir.
4	Q He did not tell you that he was half asleep,
5	half awake on the way from Newark to Yonkers?
6	A No, he did not tell me that.
7	Q If I understand what Mr. Halim told you, as
8	you just testified to, he never told you that they went
9	to Newark?
10	A That's correct.
11	Q In other words, as you understood what he
12	said, he slept right through the trip to Newark?
13	A What he stated was that they were en route to
14	Newark and, during that travel time, fell asleep.
15	Q So he didn't cell you that they went to a
16	Muslim shop?
17	A He stated that they were en route to a Muslim shop
18	located in Newark.
19	Q Okay I understand that. But he never told
20	you that they actually got there?
21	A No, sir.
22	Q He never told you that he drove around
23	Newark, after the Muslim shop, for about an hour, did
24	he?
25	A No, sir.

```
He never told you that he bought Hennessy, I
 1
          Q
 2
     quess it's Scotch or bourbon, in Newark?
 3
          No, sir.
 4
          Q According to what he told you, he wakes up,
 5
     and the first thing he sees is a sign that says
 6
     "Yonkers"?
 7
     A
          Yes.
 8
               And then he tells you that he saw a sign that
 9
     said, "welcome to the Home of the Bronx Bombers"?
10
     A
          I don't recall that, no.
11
          Q
              Never told you that?
12
     A
          No.
               Okay. At some point, he tells you that the
13
          Q
14
     vehicle that he was in pulled into a miniature golf
15
     place?
16
     A That's correct.
17
          Q
               Behind it?
18
         Just stated that they pulled into a miniature golf
19
     park.
20
          Q
               Okay. And then he described for you what
     apparently happened there; right?
21
22
     A
          Yes.
23
               Did he ever tell you that an 18-wheel tractor
     trailer pulled into that park?
24
25
     A
          No, sir.
```

1	Q Did he ever mention an 18-wheel tractor
2	trailer?
3	A No, sir.
4	Q As he's describing the incident that occurred
5	behind or near the miniature golf place in Yonkers, did
6	he ever tell you that Mr. Maples got out of the car?
7	A I don't recall exactly, but I can check my report.
8	Q Please do.
9	A I'm sorry. Your question, sir?
10	Q Did he ever tell you, during his description
11	of the alleged incident in Yonkers, that Mr. Maples
12	ever got out of the car?
13	A No.
14	Q Did he ever tell you during the alleged
15	incident that had happened in Yonkers that Mr. Maples
16	ever demanded Rashon Roy's cell phone?
17	A No, sir.
18	Q Did he ever tell you during this incident at
19	the in Yonkers, that Maples said to anyone, "Take
20	the gun off of Peanut," meaning him?
21	A No, sir.
22	Q He never told you that; right?
23	A That's right.
24	Q He does tell you that they leave Yonkers and
25	they drive back to Seaside Heights?

- 1 Α Yes. 2 And that he's dropped off at the Metropol, is that the name of -- the Metropol Hotel? 3 Yes, that's correct. 4 A Q He and Mr. Roy? 5 6 Α Yes. Did he ever tell you that there was a police 7 cruiser within a block of the Metropol Hotel? 8 Not when I interviewed him, no. 9 10 Okay. And then he told you something about 0 11 the next day: correct? 12 That's correct. 13 O He told you he was thinking about reporting 14 to the police what happened in Yonkers; right? 15 Yes. A 16 But in the same breath, he didn't tell you 0 17 that there was a cop car right there for him to do --18 Α No. 19 Let me take you back to Yonkers for a minute. Q 20 'cause I forgot to ask you a question. While there in 21 Yonkers and these guns are allegedly pointed, did he 22 ever say to you that Mr. Santos said: If you run, I'll shoot you? 23
  - Q He never said that; right?

25

A

NO.

A No, he did not. 1 2 The next day, he tells you that he met with 3 Mr. Maples and Mr. Roy and LuRay Maples; right? 4 Yes. 5 Q And he says during that conversation, or that 6 meeting, that Mr. Maples said to Roy, "I wouldn't hurt 7 vou." Correct? 8 A Yes. 9 Something to that effect; right? Q 10 A Yes. But what's omitted from his statement to you 11 0 12 is that he never told you that Maples said: I won't hurt -- I won't hurt you, meaning Halim, "you" meaning 13 Roy, Bus, and Mom. He never mentioned Bus and Mom: 14 15 right? 16 A That's correct. 17 "Bus" meaning his other brother? Q 18 Α That's correct. 19 He tells you that on the next day, which is Saturday, that he and Rashon Roy, Mr. Maples and LuRay 20 21 Maples all get together and they meet some girls on 22 Saturday sometime in the morning; correct? 23 MR. HEISLER: Judge, I think Mr. Zager's 24 referring to the wrong day.

MR. ZAGER: That could be.

25

1	Q Was that on Friday? Am I mistaken?
2	A Yes, that would be Friday.
3	Mr. ZAGER: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Heisler.
4	Q And during that conversation or that meeting
5	on Friday, which is, I guess, the day after what
6	happened in Yonkers occurred right?
7	A Yes.
8	Q He tells you about a problem regarding
9	Anthony Mason and some gentleman by the name of Byron,
10	whose last name was unknown; right?
11	A Yes.
12	Q And as you understood from that, there was a
13	threat made by Byron; correct?
14	A That's what I was told, yes.
15	Q By Mr. Halim Shabazz?
16	A Yes, sir.
17	Q Okay. Now, he told you that this person
18	Byron made a threat against Rashon Roy; isn't that
19	accurate?
20	A If I could check my report.
21	Q Please do.
22	A Yes, that's what he stated.
23	Q He never told you that he understood the
24	threat was against Mr. Maples?
25	A That's correct.

He then tells you that Mr. Roy himself and 1 Q some others go to confront this person by the name of 2 3 Byron; right? Yes. 5 Q There's no question in your mind that this 6 threat by Byron was to rob Rashon Roy? 7 That's what I was told. Q Later that same day, if I'm correct, it's on 8 a Friday, 6:00 PM, you attended the autopsy of Mr. Roy; 9 is that fair to say? 10 11 THE COURT: Not a Friday. MR. HEISLER: Friday? 12 13 MR. ZAGER: I'm sorry. 14 Q On Sunday or Monday -- what day did you attend the autopsy? 15 16 Α Monday the 29th. 17 Monday, obviously, after the shooting? Q That's correct. 18 Α Okay. That was at six o'clock; right? 19 0 20 A Yes, sir. 21 Q And you were there? Yes, I was. 22 Α Along with some other investigators. 23 24 Standard operating procedure? 25 A That's correct.

1	Q And you had known the results of the autopsy
2	when you walked out?
3	A Yes.
4	Q You knew that the victim died by way of
5	gunshot wounds; correct?
6	A That's correct.
7	Q Were you also aware that there was, according
8	to Dr. Park, a bullet from a previous shooting in the
9	victim's chest?
10	MR. HEISLER: Judge, I am going to object to
11	that, just on the grounds of relevance
12	THE COURT: I will sustain it.
13	MR. HEISLER: as to whether Investigator
14	Mitchell's aware.
15	Q Did you know that?
16	THE COURT: I sustained the objection.
17	MR. HEISLER: Objection.
18	Q Anthony Mason was with Halim Shabazz, my
19	client and some other people on Friday night before the
20	shooting; correct?
21	A Yes.
22	Q Anthony Mason was arrested that night for
23	some charges; correct?
24	A I don't know whether he was or not.
25	O Okay. You know, do you know whether or not

1 he was in the Ocean County correctional institution? 2 No. sir. Q Did you or anyone in your office, knowing 3 4 what you may have known from the autopsy, and knowing 5 what Mr. Halim Shabazz told you regarding a threat from this man Brian (sic) to rob Rashon Roy, did you or 6 7 anvone in your office investigate or talk to Anthony 8 Mason relevant to that threat? 9 As far as I'm concerned, no. I did not. 10 Did you or anyone else in your office look 11 for or attempt to interview this person by the name of 12 Brian or Byron? 13 I did not, no. 14 Q No one else in your office did, either: 15 correct? 16 I don't know. 17 Your office is right across the street; Q 18 right? 19 A Yes. 20 0 The detective bureau is downstairs? 21 Α Our unit is, yes. 22 And Investigator Hayes has an office down Q 23 there? 24 Α That's correct. 25 Q You have an office down there?

1	A That's correct.
2	Q Everyone in the prosecutor's investigators'
3	office that's involved in this case has an office
4	across the street in the basement; correct?
5	A That's correct.
6	Q Are you telling this jury that you have no
7	clue as to whether or not any investigator from the
8	Ocean County Prosecutor's Office followed through on
9	this threat from Mr. Byron? Is that your testimony?
10	MR. HEISLER: Objection, Judge.
11	THE COURT: Sustained, sustained.
12	Argumentative, and also seeking hearsay.
13	MR. ZAGER: Just want to know if he
14	investigated, Judge.
15	THE COURT: No, wait. He's answered what
16	he's done. He's been very responsive to what he's
17	done.
18	Q Do you talk amongst yourselves, you
19	investigators that investigate cases, and compare
20	notes?
21	MR. HEISLER: Judge, I am going to object to
22	that whole line continuing.
23	THE COURT: Yes. It's sustained.
24	Q Let me take you back to the Yonkers incident,

'cause it was relayed to you in some sort of fashion by

25

```
1
     Mr. Halim Shabazz; right?
 2
     A Yes.
 3
          Q After you received this information from Mr.
 4
     Shabazz, did you contact the Yonkers police?
 5
          I did not, no.
 6
          Q Did you make any effort to confirm that there
     is even a golf course in Yonkers?
 7
 8
     A
          No, I did not.
 9
          Q Did you make any effort to confirm whether
10
     there was a miniature golf course in Yonkers?
11
     A
          No. sir.
12
          Q Have you ever been to Yonkers?
13
     A
          Not that I am aware of.
14
          Q Have you ever been to the Bronx?
15
     A
          Yes.
16
          O Yankee Stadium?
17
     Α
          Yes.
18
          O Home of the Bronx Bombers?
19
     A
          That's correct
20
               Do you know how to read a map?
          0
21
     Α
          Yes.
22
               MR. ZAGER: Judge, if I could have a map
23
     marked as, I guess, DW maybe, Number 1.
24
               THE COURT: DM?
25
               MR. ZAGER: DM.
```

1	THE CLERK:	DM-1.
2	(DM-1 marke	d for identification.)
3	Q Investigator	, let me show you what's been
4	marked as DM-1 and ask	, would you agree with me this is
5	a map of New York Stat	e?
6	A Yes.	
7	Q And on whate	ver side this is, do you
8	recognize that area th	at's on the map?
9	A Yes.	
10	Q Would you ag	ree with me that that may very
11	well be the five borou	ghs of New York City?
12	A Yes.	
13	Q Can I ask yo	u to come with me over here?
14	Could you take that, p	lease?
15	Can I borrow	Jour marker, Mr. Prosecutor?
16	MR. HEISLER:	Sure.
17	Q Could you po	int out on the map where the
18	Borough of Port New	ark is?
19	A I'm sorry, Port N	ewark?
20	Q Newark, the	city of Newark.
21	A It's right here.	
22	Q Could you ci	rcle that and put an N near it?
23	A (Complies.)	
24	Q And can you	point out the Bronx?
25	A Right there.	

Q Could you circle that and put a B? And could
you point out I don't know if it's a borough or not,
but Yonkers?
A Right there.
Q Would you put a Y there?
A (Complies.)
Q And would you do you know from personal
knowledge, is Yankee Stadium in the Bronx?
A I believe it was.
Q Bronx Bombers; right?
A Yes.
Q And I guess the furthest point this shows is
Sayreville. Could you put an S around Sayreville?
A How about right above it?
Q Okay. And y would agree that if we went
further down to the bottom of the map, somewhere down
below the S would be Lakewood or Seaside?
A Yes, right.
Q Now, as you understand it from what Mr.
Shabazz told you, where did he go? Did he first
went to Newark, according to him?
A They were en route to Newark.
Q And then, according to what he testified to
in court, they were in Newark for a while, and then you
understand him to say that he went up to Yonkers?

1	A Yes.
2	Q And that's where the incident occurred?
3	A That's what I was told, yes.
4	Q Okay. And then did he see the sign that says
5	"Home of Bronx Bombers" before or after the guns were
6	drawn in Yonkers; do you know?
7	A He never mentioned to me that he saw a sign,
8	"Bronx Bombers."
9	Q Okay. So as far as you know, he went from
10	Newark, traveled up substantially north to Yonkers,
11	somehow came back to Brooklyn, and came home; is that
12	it, how you understand
13	A I don't recall his exact route of travel, but
14	once they left New York, they came back down to
15	Seaside.
16	MR. ZAGER: Okay. I have no further
17	questions. Thank you, sir.
18	THE WITNESS: You're welcome.
19	THE COURT: Mr. Somers, do you have any
20	questions?
21	MR. SOMERS: No questions, your Honor.
22	THE COURT: Mr. Welle?
23	MR. WELLE: No questions.
24	THE COURT: Mr. Heisler?
25	CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. HEISLER:

1	Q Investigator Mitchell, let's talk about the
2	Dunns for a second. The descriptions they gave you
3	were black males?
4	A That's correct.
5	Q And Mr. Dunn said he was looking out what
6	part of his house?
7	A He had looked out the back sliding glass door.
8	Q And that's when he said he saw the three
9	fellows around the Jeep?
10	A That's correct.
11	Q He also told you that he saw somebody throw
12	something into the Jeep, didn't he?
13	A Yes, he did.
14	Q And this is after he's heard seven, eight or
15	nine gunshots?
16	A That's correct.
17	Q And with respect to Mrs. Dunn, she said she
18	saw somebody walking in front of her house on Prospect
19	toward Route 9: correct?
20	A That's correct.
21	Q And she also saw somebody else, another black
22	male, with a good build, she said; is that right?
23	A Taller than the one that she saw previously, yes.
24	Q Run into the woods?
25	A That's correct.

1	Q Now, the person who ran into the woods was
2	subsequently identified as Steven Bennett; correct?
3	A Yes.
4	Q When did you interview Halim Shabazz?
5	A I interviewed him on Monday, the 29th of April.
6	Q So this would be the day after the murder?
7	A That's correct.
8	Q And you interviewed him in the jail, because
9	he was in on some kind of a child support problem;
10	correct?
11	A Yes, sir.
12	Q And when you interviewed him, what was his
13	condition when you first started to talk to him?
14	A He was very upset, and had a difficult time
15	composing himself.
16	Q He described this incident of going to
17	Yonkers; correct?
18	A Yes.
19	Q And if my geography is correct, along the
20	Hudson River side, leaving the Bronx, Yonkers is the
21	next city north, isn't it?
22	A Yes, it is.
23	Q So you would go directly from the Bronx into
24	Yonkers, or Yonkers into the Bronx if you chose to?
25	A Yes.

1	Q Correct?
2	A Yes.
3	Q Did Mr. Shabazz indicate to you that he was
4	awake while they were in New York, whether it was
5	Yonkers or the Bronx?
6	A He stated he was awake; when he did wake up, that
7	they were in Yonkers.
8	Q Okay. So the part where he was asleep was
9	before the incident where the guns were pulled?
10	A That's correct.
11	Q And even though he didn't mention the
12	18-wheeler pulling in, did he describe guns being
13	pulled by Santos and by Worthy on him and his brother
14	Rashon Roy?
15	A Yes, he did.
16	Q In fact, he described that in some detail,
17	didn't he?
18	A Yes, he did.
19	Q And did he tell you who was giving the orders
20	at that time while those guns were pulled?
21	A Yes, he did.
22	Q Who was that?
23	A Gregory Maples.
24	Q And he also told you, did he not, that
25	Gregory Manles was doing the talking to the victim

1	telling him that if he ever felt threatened again, he'd
2	have him killed?
3	A That's correct.
4	Q Didn't Mr. Shabazz tell you that when they
5	came back to Seaside Heights, that's when the
6	conversation took place between him and his brother
7	about possibly going to the police?
8	A Yes.
9	Q Immediately after they were dropped off?
10	A Yes, sometime thereafter.
11	Q Then he told you about a situation the next
12	day where Gregory Maples was telling the victim and
13	Mr. Shabazz, "I won't let anyone hurt you." Correct?
14	A That's correct.
15	Q And is there any reason in the world to say
16	anything like that unless there's been some other
17	attempt to hurt somebody, Detective?
18	MR. KINARNEY: Objection.
19	THE COURT: Sustained.
20	Q When you conducted your interview of Halim
21	Shabazz on Monday, were you aware that Renato Santos
22	had confessed to Sergeant Hayes and Sergeant Isnardi
23	the day before?
24	A I don't believe so, no.
25	Q On Monday the 29th, were you aware of the

1 Santos statement to Hayes and Isnardi the day before, 2 that he was the shooter? 3 Yes, I was. 4 And you had information from Halim Shabazz, 5 and there was other information being developed from 6 Hakim Shabazz: right? 7 A Yes. 8 Q Regarding Gregory Maples; correct? 9 A Yes. 10 Q And Marvin Worthy? 11 A That's correct. 12 Q At that point, was there any reason to go 13 looking for somebody named Byron about a robbery that 14 never took place? 15 No, there was not. 16 MR. HEISLER: That's all I have, Judge. 17 THE COURT: Mr. Kinarney. 18 MR. KINARNEY: Thank you. 19 REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. KINARNEY: 20 Q In reference to the gun up in Yonkers that 21 Santos supposedly had, Shabazz said it was a 22 wood-handled gun; right? 23 A Yes, he did. 24 Q He never mentioned anything about it looked 25 like plastic or was plastic; correct?

1	A That's correct.
2	MR. KINAPNEY: Nothing further.
3	THE COURT: Mr. Zager?
4	MR. ZAGER: Briefly, Judge.
5	RECROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. ZAGER:
6	Q Mr. Heisler asked you about comments that Mr.
7	Maples may have made in Yonkers; right?
8	A Yes.
9	Q And he asked you the question, "If I feel
10	threatened again, I'll have you killed." That's the
11	question he asked you; right?
12	A I believe so, yes.
13	Q To which you responded yes; correct?
14	A That's correct.
15	Q That's not really accurate, though; right?
16	MR. HEISLER: Talking about my question or
17	his answer, Judge?
18	THE COURT: Yeah.
19	MR. ZAGER: Both.
20	Q Take a look at your report, Detective, page
21	3, first full paragraph, second sentence. At the right
22	it says, "He would kill him." It doesn't say he would
23	have him killed. Am I right?
24	A You're referring to what Maples stated to the
25	victim?

1	Q That was the question Mr. Heisler asked you.
2	I guess what I'm trying to point out is that Halim
3	Shabazz says that Maples said he would kill Roy, not he
4	would have him killed?
5	A That's correct.
6	Q That's correct. Mr. Heisler also asked you
7	if Mr. Shabazz told you if Mr. Maples in Yonkers was
8	giving the orders. Remember that question a minute
9	ago?
10	A Yes, I do.
11	Q Your answer was yes?
12	A That's correct.
13	Q In your report does it reflect anything abou
14	Maples giving orders in Yonkers?
15	A Do you mind if I check my report?
16	Q Help yourself.
17	A "Maples did not have a gun, but ordered them out
18	of the van."
19	Q Ordered them out of the van?
20	A That's correct.
21	Q But yet Halim told you nobody got out of the
22	van; right?
23	A As far as who getting out of the van, sir?
24	Q All right, I'm sorry, I will withdraw that
25	question He asked you about Mr Shahazz's demoanor of

1	the day after his brother was shot, when you
2	interviewed him at the county jail; right?
3	A Yes, he did.
4	Q And we've already established that you take
5	copious notes and try to write everything from your
6	notes into your report; correct?
7	A That's correct.
8	Q Nowhere in your report does it reflect that
9	Mr. Shabazz was very upset, does it?
10	A NO.
11	Q And we can assume that he was upset; right?
12	A Absolutely.
13	Q But you don't reflect that in your report?
14	A That's correct.
15	Q Nor do you reflect in your report that Mr.
16	Shabazz could barely compose himself; am I right?
17	A That's correct.
18	MR. ZAGER: I have nothing further.
19	THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Heisler?
20	MR. HEISLER: Yes, just a couple, Judge.
21	RECROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. HEISLER:
22	Q Do you need a note in your report,
23	Investigator Mitchell, for you to sit here and remember
24	now that Mr. Shabazz was upset?
25	A NO.

1	Q And with respect to maybe I misspoke when I
2	asked the question, the threat from Maples that he
3	would kill the victim if he ever felt threatened again,
4	the time that threat was made, who did Mr. Shabazz tell
5	you was holding the guns on the victim?
6	A Santos and Worthy.
7	MR. HEISLER: Thank you. That's all I have,
8	Judge.
9	THE COURT: Anything further? Thank you.
10	You're excused.
11	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
12	(Witness excused.)
13	THE COURT: Is there another witness?
14	MR. KINARNEY: Judge, can we approach
15	side-bar, off the record?
16	THE COURT: Yes.
17	(Side-bar conference off the record,
18	after which the following occurs.)
19	THE COURT: Officer Finnegan.
20	MR. ZAGER: I believe he is a detective.
21	THE COURT: Detective?
22	MR. ZAGER: Yes.
23	THE COURT: Detective Finnegan, please.
24	JAMES FINNEGAN, Witness for the Defense,
25	sworn.

1	THE WITNESS: Good afternoon, Judge.
2	THE COURT: Good afternoon.
3	Mr. Zager.
4	DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. ZAGER:
5	Q Good morning, Detective.
6	A Good morning.
7	Q Are you employed by Lakewood Police?
8	A Yes, I am.
9	Q And in what capacity?
10	A I am a detective.
11	Q How many years have you been a police
12	officer?
13	A About eleven years now.
14	Q And how many years have you been a detective?
15	A A little bit over eight.
16	Q In your capacity as a detective, on April
17	28th were you dispatched to the Highpoint condos or
18	apartments for a shooting?
19	A Yes, I was.
20	Q And would it be fair to say that you were the
21	lead detective out of Lakewood regarding this incident?
22	A I was one of, one of a team of detectives from
23	Lakewood.
24	Q Okay. Who was the lead, or is there such a
25	thing as a lead?

1 A We had supervisors. 2 Q Supervisors? Okay. Isnardi was your supervisor? 3 4 He was one of the supervisors, yes. Do you guys work in conjunction with the 5 investigators from the prosecutor's office? 6 7 A Yes, we do. And do you work in conjunction with CIU from 8 9 the Sheriff's Department of Ocean County? 10 Α Yes. 11 Q You all work together to solve the case; 12 right? 13 That's correct. 14 Q You were assigned, by whoever it was, various 15 duties in this investigation? 16 A Yes. 17 Q was one of your duties to investigate or 18 interview a gentleman by the name of Steven Bennett? 19 A Yes. 20 Q And did you, in fact, do that? 21 Yes, I did. Α 22 Q Did you go to someone's house looking for Mr. 23 Bennett? 24 A Yes, I did. 25 Q And what happened when you got to that house?

MR. HEISLER: Judge, I am going to object to this on grounds of relevance as to anything that's been brought up to this point.

MR. ZAGER: Judge, why do I have to be concerned about what he's brought up? This is my case, and --

MR. HEISLER: Well, in that case, Judge, if we can approach side bar, I'd like an offer.

THE COURT: All right.

(The following takes place at side bar.)

THE COURT: I gather your objection was founded on the fact that you anticipated this was a witness with prior inconsistent statements.

 $$\operatorname{MR}$.$$  HEISLER: That's the first thing I was anticipating, Judge

THE COURT: But now Mr. Zager says that's not what he's about to engage in.

MR. ZAGER: Well, that's -- to be fair to Mr. Heisler, that's the majority of the purpose for which I was calling this witness, was the inconsistencies in the statements between Barber, his testimony, and what he told this witness. On the other hand, I'm certainly entitled to ask this investigator what he did during the course of the investigation.

THE COURT: You just asked a very broad

question about what happened when he got there. Now, 1 2 let's --MR. HEISLER: We got Bennett hanging out a 3 window and trying to get away from the cops. What does 4 5 that have to do with anything at this point? MR. ZAGER: Bennett was charged with 6 conspiracy to commit murder. 7 MR. HEISLER: Not by the grand jury he 8 9 wasn't, so what difference does it make? 10 MR. ZAGER: If I want to point a finger at 11 Bennett and Barber, I'm certainly entitled to do that 12 during my defense. 13 THE COURT: You certainly can do that if, you 14 know, if you can produce relevant testimony. My only 15 concern is, you are not going to be able to introduce 16 statements that Bennett may have made, to challenge --17 raise inconsistent statements by Barber or someone. 18 MR. ZAGER: I think I understand that. 19 THE COURT: In other words, it's all 20 statements of witnesses who have testified. 21 MR. ZAGER: Understood, for the 22 inconsistencies. 23 THE COURT: Yes. 24 MR. HEISLER: And the other thing, Judge, is, 25 as far as Barber's concerned, I think he, every time he

1	brought out an inconsistent statement, he admitted that
2	he made it. So I don't think that he gets a second
3	shot at putting a witness on that's inconsistent with
4	what he said.
5	MR. WELLE: I don't think that's a
6	reasonable
7	MR. ZAGER: Judge, I can just actually,
8	I'm not going far with Bennett. I just want to bring
9	to this jury's attention that
10	MR. WELLE: The guy was running. Bennett was
11	running.
12	MR. ZAGER: Mr. Bennett ran from the
13	detectives. He ran. He attempted to flee. He ran
14	from the scene. This guy's an eyewitness to him
1.5	running from the scene. They interviewed Bennett. I'm
16	not going to ask him what Bennett said, 'cause I'm not
17	allowed to. If you want, I can perhaps lead. But at
18	the risk of being objected to
19	THE COURT: All right, elicit testimony that
20	he ran when they arrived there, but, you know
21	MR. ZAGER: All right. Thank you.
22	(Sidebar conference concluded.)
23	BY MR. ZAGER:
24	Q Did you and Investigator Frulio, from the
25	prosecutor's office, attempt to locate Mr. Rennett at

1	someone's house, at 223 White Street?
2	A Yes, we did.
3	Q In some town?
4	A In Jackson.
5	Q All right. And when you arrived at the
6	house, did you learn that Mr. Bennett was there?
7	A Yes, we did.
8	Q Did Mr. Bennett attempt to flee from you?
9	A Yes, he did.
LO	Q Did you eventually take Mr. Bennett down to
11	the Lakewood Police Department?
L2	A Yes.
L3	Q And did you interview him?
L4	A Yes.
15	Q And did you as. him questions regarding what
L6	happened at Highpoint on April 28th?
L7	A Yes.
L8	Q As the result of talking to Mr. Bennett, were
19	you I'm sorry. were you at the crime scene?
20	A Yes, I was.
21	Q And you were working in conjunction with
22	other detectives, so you kind of had an idea of what
23	had happened at the crime scene?
24	A Yes.
25	O Did you come to the conclusion that

1	Mr. Bennett ran from the scene?
2	A Yes, I believe so.
3	Q Did you come to the conclusion that Mr.
4	Bennett was wearing a multicolored, striped tee shirt
5	or polo shirt?
6	A Yes.
7	Q And one of the stripes was yellow; correct?
8	A I'd have to look through my report. I don't
9	recall that, if there was stripes or not.
10	Q Please do that.
11	A Is that in my report, sir?
12	Q You know what, Detective? To be fair to you,
13	I'm not really sure. So don't go looking through eight
14	pages. I'm sure Mr. Kinarney may want to ask you a
15	question about that.
16	A Okay.
17	Q You also came to the conclusion that whatever
18	it is that Mr. Bennett told you, his version was such
19	that he ran right through the crime scene; correct?
20	A Yes.
21	Q And the path that he took was right where the
22	victim had been shot; correct?
23	A In that general area, yeah.
24	Q Okay. Well, we're not talking about a
25	parking lot that's very wide; right?

1	A I'm talking about a street.
2	Q Okay. The shooting occurred in a parking
3	lot; right?
4	A Yes.
5	Q The victim ran toward Prospect; correct?
6	A That's correct.
7	Q And as I understand it, Bennett ran somewhere
8	in that path?
9	A He also ran across Prospect Street.
10	Q That was my next question. So he ran out of
11	the parking lot, north across Prospect Street; right?
12	A Yes.
13	Q Through the woods, and he was gone?
14	A That's correct.
15	Q Okay. And it was your job to go chat with
16	him?
17	A Yes.
18	Q Okay. And as part of your having chatted and
19	interviewed him, and based on the rest of your
20	investigation, Mr. Bennett was originally charged with
21	conspiracy to commit murder; right?
22	A I don't remember what he was charged with, if he
23	was charged with anything.
24	Q I'm going to show you Investigator Vincent
25	Erulio's report from the prosecutor's office and

1	would you direct your attention to about the fourth
2	paragraph down on page 7 of his report. Could you read
3	the last sentence to yourself?
4	A Yeah, okay. I did that already.
5	Q You did?
6	A Uh-hum.
7	Q Does that refresh your recollection as to
8	what charges Mr. Bennett had as a result of your
9	investigation?
10	A Well, based on what I'm reading, that's what's in
11	Investigator Frulio's report. I believe that's what he
12	was charged with, but I don't recall charging Mr.
13	Bennett or even being aware that he was charged with
14	anything.
15	Q Okay. You would agree with me now that he
16	was charged with conspiracy?
17	MR. HEISLER: Objection, Judge.
18	THE COURT: Sustained, sustained.
19	Q In the course of your investigation, you had
20	the pleasure of interviewing Ernesto Barber; correct?
21	A Yes.
22	Q And not once, but three times?
23	A Several times, at least three times.
24	Q Okay. The first statement was April 29th,
25	the day after the shooting, page 5 of your report?

1	A Yes, I have it.
2	Q Okay. And then you had another statement
3	with him, I guess the date's irrelevant, and then you
4	interviewed him at his hotel room on May 3rd; right?
5	A Yes.
6	Q But you didn't take a statement that day; is
7	that right? You chatted with him, but you didn't take
8	a formal statement at his hotel room?
9	A I believe we did take a statement from him on that
10	day, if you look to page eleven on my report.
11	Q Well, I'm referring you to page nine, down
12	toward the bottom. On May 3rd, you went to his hotel
13	room and chatted with him; is that right?
14	A What's the question, sir?
15	Q On May 3rd, did you go to Mr. Barber's hotel
16	room and chat with him?
17	A Yes, we did.
18	Q And as a result of chatting with him on that
19	day, did you then formalize the statement on May 8th in
20	a formal taped statement, on page eleven of your
21	report?
22	A Yes.
23	Q Okay. So you had an opportunity to talk to
24	him on three different times, one when he was
25	incarcerated, you pulled him out of jail; right?

1	A Yes.
2	Q Brought him to Lakewood?
3	A Yes.
4	Q Okay. Did Mr. Barber ever tell you in any o
5	his three statements let me give you a frame of
6	reference here. You discussed with him the morning of
7	the shooting on April 28th, what occurred prior to the
8	shooting; accurate?
9	A Yes.
10	Q Okay. And there was some discussion about
11	what occurred at the Coventry Apartments and who was
12	there; you recall that?
13	A Yes.
14	Q And according to Mr. Barber, certain people
15	showed up in a Jeep, and chere was a discussion in
16	Coventry; right?
17	A I'd have to review my notes. I believe that he
18	told us that some people had showed up in Coventry, and
19	there was a discussion, yes.
20	Q Okay. Did you review your notes before you
21	came in here, sir?
22	A Briefly. I only got a call last night that I was
23	to come in this morning.
24	Q Okay. You know
25	THE COURT: I'll tell you what, Mr. Zager.

1 It's 12:25. If you are going to ask the witness here 2 questions about his reports and notes, I'm going to 3 give the jury their lunch hour at this time, so that 4 way, he can refresh his memory and move right along 5 that way: okay? 6 MR. ZAGER: Judge, you know why he didn't get 7 any notice, but I didn't necessarily want to bring that 8 up. 9 THE COURT: Okav. No problem. 10 I will excuse you for lunch. Have a nice 11 lunch. Please be up there at 1:30. We'll have you 12 over and continue with the trial. 13 (Jury dismissed for lunch at 12:25 PM.) 14 (Witness steps down.) 15 THE COURT: We il reconvene at 1:30. Mr. 16 welle, can I just see you up here for a second? 17 (Luncheon recess taken.) 18 (Exhibits S-1 through S-4; S-15; S-28; S-29; S-30; S-39; S-40A; S-41A; S-41B; S-59 through S-75 marked 19 into evidence.) 20 21 22 AFTERNOON SESSION 23 THE COURT: Is our witness --MR. HEISLER: I believe he's right outside, 24 25 Judge.

THE COURT: Would you tell him to come in. 1 2 JAMES FINNEGAN, previously sworn, resumes 3 the stand. 4 (Jury in the box.) 5 THE COURT: Good afternoon to each of you. 6 Mr. Zager. 7 MR. ZAGER: Thank you, Judge. 8 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. ZAGER (Cont'd): 9 Good afternoon, Detective. Q 10 Good afternoon. 11 0 Did you have a chance to review your report? 12 I have reviewed it, yes, I did. 13 I apologize. I should have given you Mr. Q Barber's statements. So, if you need them, let me 14 15 know. Okay? 16 A I have, I think, two of his statements with me. 17 You have two, okay, good. All right. I Q 18 forget where I was, so let me take you to April 28th. 19 the day of the shooting. Mr. Barber tells you certain 20 things that occurred prior to the shooting; is that 21 right? 22 A Yes. 23 0 okay. 24 MR. HEISLER: Judge, can we fix a time frame on which interview with Mr. Barber we're talking about? 25

1	THE COURT: Was there an interview on April
2	28th?
3	MR. ZAGER: Judge, I am talking okay.
4	Q If you want a time frame, I'm talking about
5	around 9:30 Sunday, April 28th, which seems to be in
6	Mr. Barber's first report, dated statement taken
7	April 29th at 6:14 PM. Do you have that, Detective?
8	A Yes, I do.
9	Q Okay. Let me do it this way. Directing your
10	attention to page three of that report, some of the
11	questions at the top of that report, did Mr. Barber
12	tell you in that statement that he got into the Jeep at
13	Coventry? Third question.
14	A He says he's standing outside in the front of the
15	passenger. Is that
16	Q Yes.
17	A Yes.
18	Q So he never told you he got in the Jeep?
19	A Not at that
20	Q He told you: I was standing outside the
21	front passenger door. Correct?
22	A He states: "I'm standing outside, in front of the
23	passenger."
24	Q Okay. I'm looking for an answer to the one
25	question, though. He never told you he got inside that

1	Jeep?
2	A I don't believe at that time he told me he got
3	into the Jeep, no.
4	Q Or at any time; right?
5	A Later, in another interview, he did tell me that
6	he got into a vehicle and left Coventry and went to
7	Highpoint.
8	Q Understood. But at the time at Coventry that
9	he's listening to a conversation that what may have
10	occurred in Yonkers, he specifically told you he stood
11	outside the Jeep?
12	A That's correct.
13	Q Okay. At no point in time, when he's
14	describing what happens at Coventry, does he tell you
15	that he and everyone with him at Coventry are smoking
16	pot; correct?
17	A Are you still referring to the same statement that
18	I am looking at now, or somewhere else in my
19	investigation and my report?
20	Q I think I am referring to the first
21	statement.
22	A Not at that time, he did not tell me that he
23	smoked marijuana.
24	Q Did he tell you at any other time that they
25	smoked pot, during this conversation regarding Yonkers

1	at Coventry?
2	A No, not in Coventry Square.
3	Q Okay. And directing your attention to the
4	bottom of page two, top of page three, on that same
5	statement of April 29th, when he related to you the
6	incident regarding Yonkers, he never told you, "he"
7	meaning Barber, that the issue of something that
8	occurred in Philadelphia was discussed?
9	A That's correct.
10	Q That's correct?
11	A Yes.
12	Q During that same time frame, he never told
13	you that he heard anything in that conversation about
14	Mr. Maples helping the victim out and putting him on
15	his feet to get him established; is that right?
16	A That's correct.
17	Q I'm going to refer you to both the April 29th
18	statement and the April 30th statement. I'm sorry.
19	well, you know, all three, if you don't mind. Which
20	statement are you missing, May 8th?
21	A I have May 8th. I have April 29th.
22	Q So then you would be missing April 30th?
23	A That's correct.
24	Q Is that right?
25	A Yes

1 MR. HEISLER: I have an extra copy of it, Mr. 2 zager. MR. ZAGER: I got it, thank you. Three 3 pages, Mr. Heisler? 4 5 MR. HETSLER: Yes. 6 MR. ZAGER: Thank you. 7 when he described the trip to Highpoint, he 0 originally -- at no point did he ever tell you that on 8 9 the way to Highpoint, however, whatever version it is 10 that he used to get there, he never told you that 11 Steven Bennett was dropped off in Jackson: is that 12 right? 13 That's correct. 14 In fact, he basically told you that he drove Q there with worthy; and then in another statement, he 15 16 told you he went in Mr. Bennett's red Pontiac Grand Am. Is that accurate? 17 18 A Yes. 19 But in neither of those two trips did they go 0 20 to Jackson, according to him? 21 That's correct. Α 22 And I think that I'm directing you to the April -- the May 8th statement, where he's describing 23 24 what happens at Highpoint. I think it starts somewhere 25 around the top of page 3, the middle of page 3, I'll

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kind of refer my questions to you.

Mr. Barber never told you that, at Highpoint, Mr. Maples did anything other than walk, and I emphasize the word "walk," out of the Jeep. Was that accurate?

A Yes, that's correct.

Q He never said, "walked briskly"?

No, I believe he said he walked from the Jeep to

the Acura.

Q There were no adjectives before the word "walk"?

A No, I don't believe so.

Q Okay. Besides the three stories that -- or statements that Mr. Barber gave you, at any point did Mr. Barber ever tell you that -- let me withdraw that. Besides Mr. Barber's three statements, do you know of any other evidence to support the allegation that Mr. Maples was at Highpoint on April 28th at 11:00 AM?

MR. HEISLER: Judge, I am going to object to that question at this point. I think we need --

THE COURT: I will sustain the objection.

MR. ZAGER: Judge, did I use the words, "do you know?" Or did I say, "Are you aware?"

THE COURT: No, but I will be glad to see you at side-bar for a minute.

1 MR. ZAGER: Thank you. (The following takes place at sidebar.) 2 THE COURT: My concern, I note the 3 prosecutor's is the statement of Renato Santos. 4 MR. HEISLER: Judge, there is the 5 6 statement --MR. KINARNEY: I'm a little concerned, too. 7 MR. HEISLER: There's a statement of Renato 8 Santos, there's a statement of -- subsequently from 9 James Irwin: there's a statement from Steven Bennett. 10 11 And I don't really think Mr. Zager wants to open this 12 door. MR. ZAGER: No, I don't. Thank you. 13 14 (Sidebar conference concluded.) MR. ZAGER: Thank you, Judge. 15 16 Detective, did you take any other statements 0 17 from Mr. Barber besides those three that we have 18 discussed? 19 A No. MR. ZAGER: Thank you for your time. 20 21 THE WITNESS: You're welcome. 22 THE COURT: Mr. Kinarney. 23 MR. KINARNEY: Thank you, Judge. 24 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. KINARNEY: 25 Q Good afternoon, Detective.

A Good afternoon. 1 2 One of the first things, if not the first 3 thing, you did in this case is, you canvassed the area; 4 correct? 5 A Yes. Q Your job at that point, to do a good police 6 job, is you want to find out anybody who's got any 7 knowledge about what occurred: correct? 8 9 That's correct. 10 Civilians, anybody. You're just looking for 0 11 people who knew what happened; right? 12 Yes. 13 Q And you come upon four individuals, four 14 Spanish-speaking individuals who saw at least part of 15 what occurred; correct? 16 A Yes. 17 Q And as a result of gaining that information, 18 those four individuals are taken to police 19 headquarters; correct? 20 A Yes. 21 And they are questioned by, I think his name 22 is Officer Shimonovich? 23 Yes. Actually, it's a female. It's Jeanette 24 Shimonovich. 25 Okay. And the reason that she's aiding you Q

1	in your duties is because you are not Spanish-speaking
2	A That's correct.
3	Q So it's a situation, and correct me if I'm
4	wrong, where you asked the female officer, who I'm
5	assuming is Spanish-speaking correct?
6	A Yes.
7	Q to ask these four individuals questions;
8	they will then respond to those questions; and she'll
9	translate back to you what they said?
10	A That's correct.
11	Q Am I correct? And two of these individuals
12	were Maria Arenas and Mario Molina; am I correct? This
13	is on page 3 of your report, down at the bottom.
14	A Yes.
15	Q Okay. And, as a matter of fact, all the
16	individuals indicated to you that they were eating
17	breakfast; correct?
18	A Yes.
19	Q They heard gunshots or what sounded like
20	gunshots; correct?
21	A Yes.
22	Q They looked outside, they see an individual
23	chasing another individual in the parking lot; correct?
24	A That's correct.
25	O These two individuals are running across the

1	parking lot?
2	A Yes.
3	Q Correct? Did they indicate to you, any of
4	those four individuals, that they observed the
5	individual who was chasing the other individual
6	actually shoot the man as he was laying on the ground?
7	A No.
8	Q And, as a matter of fact, they went on and
9	told you, they all went on and told you that three or
10	four males ran towards vehicles; correct?
11	A Yes.
12	Q Attempted to get in, two of the guys tried to
13	get in a green van and couldn't get in, so they went
14	into a Jeep Cherokee; correct?
15	A That's correct.
16	Q They indicated to you at that point in time a
17	third man ran over to the green Jeep Cherokee and threw
18	something into the Cherokee; correct?
19	A Yes.
20	Q He then took off running down towards
21	Prospect Street; correct?
22	A That's correct.
23	Q And the individuals all indicated to you that
24	that man was dressed in a short-sleeve, striped shirt,
25	possibly yellow and white; correct?

1	A Yes.
2	Q None of the four said that man who threw
3	something in the Jeep Cherokee and ran towards Prospect
4	Street was dressed in a gray sweatshirt; correct?
5	A That's correct.
6	Q They never used the word "gray" at all;
7	correct?
8	A That's correct.
9	MR. KINARNEY: Thank you, Officer. I have
10	nothing else.
11	THE COURT: Mr. Somers, do you have any
12	questions?
13	MR. SOMERS: No questions, your Honor.
14	THE COURT: Mr. Welle, anything?
15	MR. WELLE: No questions, Judge.
16	THE COURT: Mr. Heisler?
17	MR. HEISLER: Just a few, Judge.
18	CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. HEISLER:
19	Q Detective Finnegan, Steven Bennett took off
20	from the scene; correct?
21	A Yes.
22	Q Everybody took off from the scene; is that
23	correct?
24	A That's correct.
25	O A reasonable reaction when completely being

1	snot at?
2	A Yes.
3	Q Whether you're involved or not?
4	A Everybody runs.
5	Q Now, you spoke to some witnesses, you got a
6	description of what Bennett was wearing that day;
7	correct?
8	A Yes.
9	Q And Mr. Bennett was wearing a velour
10	sweatsuit; is that right?
11	A That's correct.
12	Q As you got these descriptions, the one that
13	Mr. Kinarney just asked you about of the person that
14	threw something into the Jeep, he was described to you
15	as a light-skinned black male; is that correct?
16	A Yes, light-skinned black male.
17	Q And that's the person with the shirt with the
18	yellow and white stripes?
19	A That's correct.
20	Q Isn't it a fact that Renato Santos, when he
21	was picked up, was wearing a multicolored striped
22	shirt, the first of which were yellow and white?
23	A I didn't get to see Mr. Santos when he was brought
24	in.
25	O Did you see him at all that day at Lakewood

1	Police Headquarters?
2	A No, no, sir.
3	Q When you started taking statements from Mr.
4	Barber, starting right from the first things that he
5	started to tell you, it was apparent to you and
6	Investigator Frulio that he wasn't being entirely
7	truthful; correct?
8	MR. WELLE: Your Honor, I'm going to object.
9	MR. SOMERS: Object as well.
10	THE COURT: Sustained.
11	Q Did you start checking into things that Mr.
12	Barber told you?
13	A Everything, yes.
14	Q You found inconsistencies, didn't you?
15	MR. WELLE: You. Honor, I'm going to object.
16	MR. SOMERS: Object again.
17	MR. WELLE: Side-bar, please?
18	THE COURT: I will have a side-bar with you,
19	sure.
20	(The following takes place at sidebar.)
21	THE COURT: Mr. Welle, you're objecting, and
22	yet you didn't even ask any questions.
23	MR. WELLE: I know that. I'm trying to
24	protect the record.
25	THE COURT: Oh. okav. Well. we appreciate

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your protection, then.

MR. WELLE: And my objection is, it seems to me when the direct attempted to show either inconsistencies in other witnesses' statements, or lapses or failures, it's improper for the prosecutor to then try to rehabilitate Mr. Barber or any of these witnesses with what he believes to be consistencies.

I mean, there is a direct purpose for that direct examination, and it was: The man never said this, or he did in fact say this, which is different from something we heard.

But for then -- that does not open the door to the prosecutor, in my opinion, being able to just rehash all of what he believes to be probative and supportive testimony of that witness.

MR. KINARNEY: I join.

THE COURT: The present questions that you are objecting to are not the attempt to show that what he said was consistent, but rather to show that upon further investigation and inquiry, he said other things.

MR. ZAGER: That's why I didn't object, but I am ready to at any moment.

MR. KINARNEY: I think that has to be brought out in the case-in-chief. I agree with Mr. Welle. I

think if the purpose of the direct examination is to point out prior inconsistent statements, the State can't then, on cross, attempt to combat that by showing prior consistent statements.

We are not alleging recent fabrication here. We are alleging he fabricated from the get-go.

THE COURT: I appreciate that. And I don't think he's doing that, but rather showing that there was an on-going investigation, and when he went back and questioned further, what he said -- is that what you're doing?

MR. HEISLER: Basically, yeah, Judge.

MR. WELLE: Then we get to the end of line with: Well, the end result is, this person believes that the last thing he got out of the guy's mouth was the truth.

THE COURT: No, he is not going to be allowed to ask that. There was an objection to that right from the get-go, when he said, "was it apparent to you."

And I sustained that objection. We are not going to let him give his opinion as to what the truth is or anything like that. Jury will decide that. Okay.

(Sidebar conference concluded.)

BY MR. HEISLER:

Q Now, Detective, as you're talking to

1	Mr. Barber, you also have other investigative
2	activities going on; correct?
3	A Yes.
4	Q Mr. Barber gives you some information that
5	he's with somebody named Matt LaBatch. You checked
6	that, or had somebody check it; correct?
7	A Yes.
8	Q LaBatch said no, that wasn't true. You went
9	back to Barber with that; correct?
10	A That's correct.
11	Q And as you start pointing these things out,
12	you start getting more information from Mr. Barber?
13	A Yes.
14	Q And you were able to corroborate at least
16	some of what he told you about what happened on that
16	Sunday; correct?
17	A That's correct.
18	Q By way of example, he told you about the Jeep
19	being in the woods; correct?
20	A Yes.
21	Q By the time you got to Mr. Barber, the Jeep
22	had already been recovered; correct?
23	A Yes.
24	Q But he told you that you there had been a
25	homeowner, that he and Mr. Irwin had gone to use the

1	phone. Did you speak to that homeowner?
2	A Yes, I did.
3	Q And what was his name?
4	MR. ZAGER: Judge, I am going to object.
5	THE COURT: We're going rather far afield
6	now. I will sustain the objection.
7	Q But in any event, you were able to
8	corroborate things he told you?
9	MR. ZAGER: Objection.
10	THE COURT: Sustained. Jury will disregard.
11	Q There came a point in time in May when you
12	went back to Mr. Barber to speak to him again. What
13	investigative activity led you to do that?
14	MR. ZAGER: Objection. Basis you're looking
15	for? Basis is, Judge, that I called this witness for
16	specific limited purposes, inconsistencies.
17	THE COURT: Yes, and I think he's attempting
18	to explore some of that with him.
19	MR. HEISLER: Yeah, Judge. I remind counsel
20	I am on cross with this witness.
21	THE COURT: I appreciate that.
22	MR. ZAGER: But he doesn't get to retry his
23	case.
24	THE COURT: He is not going to retry his
25	case.

1	Q Was there a specific investigative finding
2	that led you back to Mr. Barber with respect to the
3	guns?
4	A Yes.
5	Q What was that?
6	A I believe it was information from the prosecutor's
7	office or CIU that a specific amount of shells or
8	casings were in each gun, and we wanted to speak to
9	Ernesto Barber about more specifically about how
10	many times each weapon was fired and who might have had
11	each weapon.
12	Q And you did that, and he gave you that was
13	the final taped statement that you took from Mr.
14	Barber?
15	A Yes, that's correct
16	MR. HEISLER: I think that's all I have for
17	the detective right now, Judge.
18	THE COURT: Mr. Zager?
19	REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. ZAGER:
20	Q The reason that you went back to interview
21	Mr. Barber at his hotel room was not what you just
22	said, but was in fact because you or the prosecutor
23	weren't sure which weapon was the murder weapon; isn't
24	that the real reason you went back to his hotel room?
25	MR. HEISLER: Objection, Judge, it's

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argumentative. Mr. Zager's leading. He is on direct
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     here.
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               THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection.
     Rephrase, or attempt to rephrase it.
 4
               MR. ZAGER: Thank you, Judge.
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               THE COURT: Opening up a new area.
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               Detective, you have your report dated July
          Q
 8
     5th?
 9
          Yes, I do.
     A
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          Q
               2002?
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     A
          Yes.
12
               Do you have page nine of that report?
          Q
13
          Yes, I do.
     A
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               Do you have the last paragraph on page nine?
          Q
15
          Yes.
     A
16
          Q
               Is the question 1 just asked inappropriate?
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               MR. HEISLER: Objection.
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               THE COURT: Wait, wait, wait now.
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               MR. ZAGER. I'm sorry, Judge.
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               Let me ask you this, Detective. You prepared
          Q
21
     this report?
22
          I did, yes.
23
               Did that last paragraph have a reason why you
24
     went back to the hotel to interview Mr. Barber for the
25
     third time?
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1	A Can you rephrase that question? I don't
2	understand what you are trying to get at.
3	Q Okay. Did you go back to interview Mr.
4	Barber at his hotel on May 3rd, 2002?
5	A Yes, I did.
6	Q Did you have a specific reason why you were
7	going back there?
8	A Yes.
9	Q Was that reason a little different than the
10	reason that you just gave Mr. Heisler?
11	A It was
12	Q Similar but different?
13	A information developed.
14	Q Okay. Why don't you just read to the jury
15	what you put in your report. That should straighten it
16	out.
17	MR. HEISLER: Objection.
18	THE COURT: Sustained.
19	Q Did the interview take place due to
20	information that was developed in reference
21	MR. HEISLER: Objection, Judge. It's
22	leading. It's Mr. Zager's obviously reading from
23	the report.
24	THE COURT: I appreciate that. But obviously
25	there is some numpess to his question which is not

being objected to, and I want him to elicit --1 2 MR. ZAGER: I'm trying the best I know. 3 THE COURT: I know, all right, just take a breath and let's --4 5 MR. ZAGER: All right. 6 THE COURT: Why did you go there? MR. ZAGER: That's the question. 7 8 THE COURT: Okay? You can answer that. 9 THE WITNESS: Okay. We went there 10 specifically to find out more about the two handguns. And did you go there about the handgun that 11 0 12 perhaps it's alleged that Mr. Santos may have used? 13 Yes, that's one of the handguns we wanted to 14 question him about. 15 were you going there because that most likely 16 may not have been the murder weapon? 17 MR. HEISLER: Object to the leading nature of 18 the question. 19 MR. ZAGFR. Judge, it's not that leading. 20 MR. HEISLER: It's almost like --THE COURT: I know, I know. 21 22 MR. ZAGER: I only have two more sentences to go, Judge. 23 24 THE COURT: I think he's answered your 25 question, so --

MR. ZAGER: All right. 1 At the time that you went there on May 3rd, 2 had the possibility developed that the gun in the sock 3 may have been the murder weapon? In other words, you 4 went to Mr. Santos' -- to Mr. Barber's house, or his 5 hotel, on May 3rd, to try to figure out which was the 6 7 murder weapon? To get more information on the weapons, yes. 8 I said "Santos," but I meant Barber's hotel; 9 0 right? 10 11 A Yes, that's correct. To get more information to determine which 12 13 was the murder weapon? 14 Yes. Α 15 That's the real reason we have been going 16 through this for five minutes, right? 17 That's correct. A 18 Q 'Cause that's why you went there? 19 Α Yes. 20 MR. ZAGER: Okay. Nothing further. 21 THE COURT: Mr. Kinarney. MR. KINARNEY: Thank you, Judge. 22 23 RECROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. KINARNEY: 24 Let me try it this way. When you filed your Q

report, you tried to make it as accurate as possible;

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1	correct?
2	A That's correct.
3	Q And you filed your report within a fairly
4	short period of time after this event; correct?
5	A Yes.
6	Q Would it be fair to say that your memory of
7	what you were doing and why you did it was probably
8	clearer in 2002 than in 2004?
9	A Much.
10	Q Okay. Now, referring to page 9 of your
11	report, the last paragraph, I ask you to read that to
12	yourself. You have read it; right?
13	A Yes.
14	Q Probably read it a few times; right?
15	A Yes.
16	Q And I ask you if it refreshes your
17	recollection as to the reason that you went to talk to
18	Barber at his motel room was because the possibility
19	was developed that, most likely, the murder weapon was
20	not Santos'. Yes or no?
21	A What was the question?
22	Q Does that refresh your recollection as the
23	reason why you went to speak to Barber again in
24	Barber's motel room was, evidence was developed that
25	the weapon Renato Santos supposedly fired at poy was

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most likely not the murder weapon?

we went to the hotel room to try to determine, again, who had which handgun.

0 okav.

And to see -- to seek further information from Mr. Barber in reference to the handguns.

And without going into it, did you gain this information?

Yes. we did.

Okay. And, as a matter of fact, in your report, which you determined you wanted to make as accurate as possible, that's what it says. You wanted to develop information, or information had been developed, that in reference to the weapon Santos has, it was most likely not the murder weapon; is that correct?

That's what I put in my report, yes.

Now, just getting back to a question that Mr. Heisler asked you in reference to the interview of the four Spanish-speaking individuals who, among other things, told you that an individual wearing a striped shirt threw something in the Jeep and then ran down Prospect Street, Mr. Heisler indicated to you or asked you if, in fact, they described that man as a light-skinned black male; is that correct?

	1	And I'm referring to page 4 of your report,
)	2	if you need to, third paragraph.
	3	A Light-skinned black male, yes, with short hair,
	4	yes.
	5	Q None of those four individuals described that
	6	man as Hispanic; correct?
	7	A That's correct.
	8	Q And all four of those individuals themselves
	9	were Hispanic; correct?
	10	A That's correct.
	11	MR. KINARNEY: Thank you. Nothing further.
	12	THE COURT: Mr. Heisler, anything further?
	13	RECROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. HEISLER:
	14	Q Would you describe Mr. Bennett's complexion.
	15	A He is dark-skinned.
	16	Q As you sit here today, with what you know
	17	about the ballistics testing, do we know which gun
	18	fired all the rounds in this case? In other words, we
	19	know we have matches to two bullets, but we don't have
	20	matches to others; correct?
	21	A That's correct.
	22	Q So, as you sit here today, both guns could
	23	have been involved; correct?
	24	A I believe
	25	MR. KINARNEY: Your Honor, I'm going to

object. That's pure speculation. 1 2 THE COURT: I will sustain the objection. 3 You want to rephrase that? 4 MR. HEISLER: I will withdraw it, Judge. I'm 5 finished. Thank you. 6 THE COURT: Anything further? 7 MR. KINARNEY: Nothing, your Honor. MR. ZAGER: Judge, I just have perhaps an 8 9 omitted question, very briefly. 10 THE COURT: Sure. 11 MR. ZAGER: Thank you. 12 FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. ZAGER: 13 Q Directing your attention to the April 30th statement of Mr. Barber, last page, when Mr. Barber 14 tells you that he doesn't know whose gun it was, but it 15 16 was the gun he saw in the hands of Debo, meaning Steve Bennett, on a prior occasion, do you know which gun he 17 18 is talking about? 19 The gun that was in the sock. 20 Q Yes. Thank you. 21 FURTHER RECROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. HEISLER: 22 He didn't say he saw the gun in Bennett's hand that day, did he, on April 28th? 23 No, he never referred to seeing the -- he never 24 25 said that Steven Bennett had a handgun on April 28th.

1	MR. HEISLER: That's all I have, Judge.
2	THE COURT: Thank you. You're excused.
3	THE WITNESS: Thank you, Judge.
4	(Witness excused.)
5	THE COURT: Counsel?
6	MR. ZAGER: Investigator Ronald Velardi.
7	THE COURT: Investigator Velardi, please.
8	RONALD VELARDI, Witness for the Defense,
9	sworn.
10	THE COURT: Mr. Zager.
11	MR. ZAGER: Thank you, Judge.
12	DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. ZAGER:
13	Q Investigator Velardi, are you employed by the
14	Ocean County Prosecutor's Office?
15	A Yes, I am.
16	Q And how long, sir?
17	A Six years now.
18	Q And you have been with the Major Crimes
19	Homicide Unit for how many of those six years?
20	A Three years.
21	Q And were you assigned to the investigation of
22	the homicide that took place on April 28th of 2002 at
23	Highpoint?
24	A Yes, sir.
25	Q In the capacity as an, I guess, an

1	investigator working under Detective-Sergeant Hayes?
2	A That is correct.
3	Q Thank you. During, in the course of that
4	investigation, did you have occasion to interview a
5	gentleman by the name of Hakim Shabazz, on April 28th,
6	approximately 4:00 PM?
7	A That is correct.
8	Q And did that interview take place at the
9	Lakewood police station?
10	A Yes, it did, sir.
11	Q And it was shortly after the death of his
12	brother; right?
13	A That is correct.
14	Q In the course of a normal interview, do you
15	take notes?
16	A Yes, I do, sir.
17	Q Do you take copious, detailed notes?
18	A Correct.
19	Q And then from those notes, do you eventually
20	transcribe it into a typewritten report?
21	A That is correct, sir.
22	Q And the object of your endeavor would be to
23	take accurate notes and put in your report everything
24	that would be told to you, as accurately as you can; is
25	that fair to cay?

1	A That is correct, sir.
2	Q That's what you try to do; correct?
3	A Correct.
4	Q Okay. Directing your attention to the
5	interview of Mr. Hakim Shabazz on April 28th, did he
6	tell you details of an incident that occurred on April
7	25th, which would be the Thursday before the Sunday of
8	the shooting that occurred in, I guess in Seaside?
9	A He explained an incident that occurred that day,
10	correct, sir.
11	Q Okay. And you took notes and you questioned
12	him about that incident; is that right?
13	A That is correct.
14	Q So you understood who was there and what the
15	basis of that incident was; is that right?
16	A That is correct.
17	Q During the course of his explanation to you
18	of what occurred, did Mr. Shabazz ever tell you that
19	Mr. Maples was in a bar in Philadelphia?
20	A No, sir.
21	Q He never mentioned a bar?
22	A No, sir.
23	Q If he didn't mention a bar, then I'm assuming
24	he never told you that the bar that he never mentioned,
25	Mr. Maples had his son with him in that bar; is that

1	accurate?
2	A That is accurate.
3	Q During the course of that conversation, did
4	he tell you that it started in Seaside with all of
5	these people that he mentioned?
6	A No, sir.
7	Q He didn't tell you where this incident
8	occurred?
9	A Are you asking the questions pertaining to the
10	incident that occurred in Philadelphia, or the
11	conversation or the incident that occurred that day?
12	Q I'm referring to what he told you about what
13	happened on Thursday, I believe it was in the
14	afternoon, April 25th, in Seaside, where Mr. Worthy and
15	his brother Halim and certain other people were in
16	Seaside.
17	MR. WELLE: I'm sorry. What was that? Mr.
18	Worthy and his brother Halim? I didn't I'd just
19	like to object to the connection.
20	THE COURT: Yes.
21	MR. ZAGER: That's fair enough.
22	THE COURT: Halim is not Mr. Worthy's
23	brother.
24	MR. ZAGER: After two weeks of trial, I'm a
25	little burned out

1	Q He told you about a meeting he had or an
2	incident in Seaside; right?
3	A Correct. He explained an incident that occurred,
4	not in great detail, but he explained an incident,
5	correct.
6	Q That's what I'm talking about.
7	A Okay.
8	Q Did he tell you that meeting, incident,
9	whatever we are calling it, that happened in Seaside,
10	did he tell you it was in Seaside?
11	A No, sir.
12	Q He didn't?
13	A No, sir.
14	Q Then I'm assuming that he didn't tell you
15	that everyone was in a van and they drove to Toms River
16	and continued to discuss everything?
17	A During the course of that interview, it was
18	explained that they were hanging around in the area,
19	hanging out during the course of that day. And during
20	the course of that day, that's when he explained that
21	particular incident, what had occurred.
22	THE COURT: Are you talking about an incident
23	in Philadelphia, or an incident that day?
24	THE WITNESS: That day.

THE COURT: All right. Let's say "an

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1	incident that day."
2	MR. ZAGER: That's all I'm talking about,
3	Judge. Maybe I didn't make myself clear.
4	Q Mr. Shabazz, Hakim Shabazz, was telling you
5	what happened in Seaside on April 25th; right?
6	A Again, he didn't specifically say "Seaside."
7	Q Okay. That answers one of my questions. Did
8	he ever tell you that that conversation he was having,
9	wherever it may have been, since he didn't tell you
10	Seaside, continued in a van and traveled to Toms River?
11	A No, sir.
12	Q Did he ever tell you the conversation he had,
13	wherever it may have occurred, continued in a van and
14	not only went to Toms River, but went to Lakewood?
15	A No, sir.
16	Q What was his demeanor that day? Was he
17	upset?
18	A Yes, he was.
19	Q He was still able to talk to you, though;
20	right?
21	A Yes.
22	MR. ZAGER: I have nothing further.
23	THE COURT: Mr. Kinarney.
24	MR. KINARNEY: Nothing, your Honor.
25	THE COURT: Mr. Somers.

1	MR. SOMERS: No questions, your Honor.
2	THE COURT: Mr. Welle.
3	MR. WELLE: Nothing.
4	THE COURT: Mr. Heisler.
5	CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. HEISLER:
6	Q Investigator Velardi, I think you just told
7	Mr. Zager that Mr. Shabazz did not describe this
8	incident in great detail; correct?
9	A Correct.
10	Q And you said he was very upset?
11	A That is correct.
12	Q And your interview took place at around four
13	o'clock in the afternoon on the 28th; is that right?
14	A That is correct.
15	And his brother had been urdered just a
16	couple of hours earlier that day?
17	A That is correct.
18	MR. HEISLER: That's all I have, Judge.
19	THE COURT: Anything further?
20	MR. ZAGER: No, sir.
21	THE COURT: Thank you, sir. You're excused.
22	(Witness excused.)
23	MR. ZAGER: The defense of Mr. Maples rests.
24	THE COURT: I want to see all counsel at side
25	bar. You can stay there, if you want.

(Side-bar conference off the record, after which the following occurs.)

THE COURT: Would you take a step into the jury room for a moment? Things are moving rather quickly.

(Jury retires at 2:30 PM.)

THE COURT: We're going to clear the courtroom and allow counsel to talk to their clients right here. Would clients and counsel stay here.

We'll give you five to ten minutes.

MR. WELLE: Thank you, Judge.

(Recess taken.)

\* \* \*

(In open court at 2:40 PM.)

THE COURT: All right. I have given counsel further time to discuss matters with their respective clients. Mr. Welle, have you discussed with Mr. Worthy his right to testify or not to testify?

MR. WELLE: Yes, I have, your Honor. I've gone over it with him, I went over it with him at lunch time, and we've continued to go over it. I have advised him of the pros and the cons in light of the case and how it's situated, and the proofs that the State believes that it has, and my evaluation of the quality of those proofs. And we have discussed it.

I also explained to him that if he chose not to take the stand, there is a charge that I would suggest and request to the Court to give, which is his failure to take the stand could not be used against him, and he understands that.

At this point in time, I believe it is his desire to take the stand.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Worthy, you understand you have the right to testify, you know, and respond to questions asked by your attorney, and to be cross-examined by counsel for the State, if you so choose; or, you have the right to exercise your right not to testify, in which case the Court would advise the jury that they are not to take that into consideration with regard to their decision in this matter in any way, shape or form.

Do you understand that?

MR. WORTHY: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: And you have had sufficient time to discuss with Mr. Welle what your options are and what your choice would be?

MR. WORTHY: Yes.

THE COURT: And what do you choose, sir?

MR. WORTHY: I choose to take the stand.

choose to testify.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. You may sit down.

Mr. Kinarney, have you had the chance to explain the same to your client, Mr. Santos?

MR. KINARNEY: Yes, I have, Judge. We have discussed it a number of times. It's been my advice to the defendant that he not testify, based upon --

(Temporary power failure in courtroom.)

MR. KINARNEY: I didn't know that it was that earth-shattering.

Yes, we have discussed the pros and cons,

Judge. I have advised my client, in reference to

certain evidence that could be adduced against him,

only if he testifies and not if he doesn't, that it was

my advice that he not testify.

I also advised him of the model jury charge concerning a defendant's election not to testify. I further advised him he could request that the Court charge that or request that the Court not charge that.

He indicates to me he does not wish to testify, and elects to have your Honor advise the jury that they can draw no adverse inference from his failure to testify.

THE COURT: Mr. Santos, you understand your right to testify if you wish, and respond to questions

1 by your attorney and cross-examination by counsel for 2 the State? 3 MR. SANTOS: Yeah. 4 THE COURT: You also understand that you have the right, if you choose, to waive your right to 5 testify, and that if you make that election, the Court 6 would instruct the jury that they are not to consider 7 8 that in any way, shape or form in arriving at their 9 verdict in this matter? 10 MR. SANTOS: Yes. THE COURT: Is it your choice, as your 11 counsel indicates, that you have chosen not to testify? 12 13 MR. SANTOS: Yes. 14 THE COURT: You're doing this freely and 15 voluntarily? 16 MR. SANTOS: Yes. 17 THE COURT: Thank you. 18 Mr. Zager. 19 MR. ZAGER: Judge. I've -- my client and I 20 have gone over the pros and cons in detail for over three months. My client elects not to testify. 21 22 THE COURT: Mr. Maples, you also understand 23 you have the right to testify and respond to questions by counsel and cross-examination by counsel for the 24 25 State, if you so choose?

1 MR. MAPLES: Yes. 2 THE COURT: And you also have a right not to testify if you so elect; and if you elect not to 3 testify, the Court will instruct the jury they're not 4 5 to consider that in any way, shape or manner. Do you 6 understand that? 7 MR. MAPLES: Yes. 8 THE COURT: And is it correct, as your counsel reports, that you are electing not to testify 9 10 in this matter? 11 MR. MAPLES: Yes. 12 THE COURT: Are you doing that freely and voluntarily? 13 14 MR. MAPLES: Yes. 15 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Zager? 16 My client does not want you to MR. ZAGER: 17 give the charge regarding his right to testify or not 18 to testify. 19 THE COURT: I will make a legal ruling on 20 that tomorrow, then. 21 MR. ZAGER: Okay. Thank you. 22 THE COURT: Mr. Somers. 23 MR. SOMERS: Your Honor, my client will not 24 testify. 25 THE COURT: Okay. You explained to him his

right to take the stand and respond to questions by yourself and the State with regard to this matter?

MR. SOMERS: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And you both explained to him that he has a right, if he so chooses, to waive testifying, and that if he does so waive, the Court will instruct the jury that it's not to take that into consideration with regard to deciding issues in this matter?

MR. SOMERS: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Irwin, is it your choice, as your counsel reports, that you choose not to testify in this matter?

MR. IRWIN: Yes.

THE COURT: Are you doing that freely and voluntarily?

MR. IRWIN: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

All right. I understand the defendants wish to have a bathroom break. Let's do that as quickly as we can and get back out here, at which time Mr. Worthy will take the stand.

(Recess taken.)

\* \* \*

THE COURT: Mr. Welle, are you ready to

1	proceed?
2	MR. WELLE: Yes, sir.
3	THE COURT: Jury out, please.
4	(Jury in the box.)
5	THE COURT: Mr. Welle.
6	MR. WELLE: Yes. Your Honor, we call Marvin
7	Worthy to the stand.
8	THE COURT: Come forward, Mr. Worthy.
9	MARVIN WORTHY, Witness for the Defense,
10	sworn.
11	THE COURT: Mr. Welle.
12	DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. WELLE:
13	Q Good afternoon, Mr. Worthy.
14	A Good afternoon.
15	Q I want you to keep your voice up and speak to
16	me and to the jury so they can hear you. Can you tell
17	us how old you are?
18	A 23 years old.
19	Q And where do you reside?
20	A Newark, New Jersey.
21	Q And who do you live there with?
22	A My mother.
23	Q And how long have you lived up in the
24	northern part of the State?
25	A All my life

1		Q Did you go to high school?
2	A	Yes.
3		Q What high school did you go to?
4	A	St. Benedict's Preparatory High School.
5		Q Where is that located?
6	A	Newark, New Jersey.
7		Q Is there any particular thing that would
8	brin	g you down to this Ocean County area from time to
9	time	?
10	A	I have a son by somebody that lives in Ocean
11	Coun	ty.
12		Q What's your son's name?
13	A	Marvin.
14		Q Marvin, Jr.?
15	Α	Yeah, the third.
16		Q The third? How old is he?
17	A	He's four.
18		Q And he lives with his mother?
19	A	Yes.
20		Q And where do they live?
21	А	In Bayville.
22		Q Did there come a time in May of 2002 that
23	some	one advised you that the police were looking for
24	you?	
25	۸	Vac

1	Q And who was it that told you the police were
2	looking for you?
3	A My son's mother.
4	Q And what's her name?
5	A Buffy.
6	Q Buffy. And do you remember what date it was?
7	A NO.
8	Q when you heard they were looking for you, did
9	you also learn for what kind of crime it was the police
10	were looking for you?
11	A Yes.
12	Q And what was that crime?
13	A Conspiracy to commit murder.
14	Q And what did you do?
15	A I told my mother well, actually, she showed me
16	the newspaper article, and my mother knew about it
17	before I did, 'cause I came in the house, and she
18	showed me the newspaper article, and she gave me the
19	number to a lawyer that works in Newark.
20	The next day, I went to him and brought the
21	newspaper article to him and asked for advice.
22	Q And did you thereafter, with him, turn
23	yourself in to people down here?
24	A Yes. He made a phone call and arranged for me to
25	turn myself in, face the charges.

1	Q You've heard testimony from some people who
2	talked about the date of April 25th, I think, 2002, an
3	about some trip that began somehow in Ocean County and
4	ended up in Yonkers. Do you recall hearing that?
5	A Yes.
6	Q And your name was mentioned in that; do you
7	recall that?
8	A Yes.
9	Q And people, like, were putting things in you
10	hands?
11	A Yes.
12	MR. HEISLER: Judge, may we approach side-ba
13	briefly?
14	THE COURT: Yes, sir.
15	MR. HEISLER: With the reporter, please.
16	THE COURT: Yes, sir.
17	(The following takes place at side bar.)
18	MR. HEISLER: I'm starting to smell an alibi
19	defense here, Judge.
20	THE COURT: well, it's going to be a denial.
21	I don't know that it's going to be an alibi.
22	MR. WELLE: It's going to be a denial.
23	THE COURT: In other words, he is denying he
24	was here and denying that he did it, but it's not an
25	alihi

MR. HEISLER: Okav. 1 THE COURT: Am I correct, Mr. Welle? 2 MR. WELLE: Yes, exactly. 3 (Sidebar conference concluded.) 4 MR. WELLE: Your Honor, do you think this 5 officer could move just sort of away a little bit? 6 It's a little tough working here. I don't know the 7 8 purpose of --THE COURT: Well, it's just -- relax, okay? 9 10 You can work around him. On the 25th of April, there was some 11 Q 12 testimony concerning you. Did you have anything to do with any of those activities that were testified to 13 14 about April 25th of 2002? 15 No. 16 0 And you've heard a lot of testimony from 17 different people about events that occurred and the 18 killing of a person by the name of Rashon Roy? 19 Yes. Α 20 Correct? Q 21 Α Yes. And that's -- that occurred on Sunday, the 22 Q 23 28th? 24 A Yes. 25 All right? Did you have anything at all to Q

```
1
     do with that particular event as has been testified and
 2
     as the prosecutor is accusing you of doing?
 3
         No. nothing at all.
 4
               MR. WELLE: I have no further questions,
 5
     Judge.
 6
               THE COURT: Mr. Kinarney.
 7
               MR. KINARNEY: Nothing, your Honor.
 8
               THE COURT: Mr. Zager.
 9
               MR. ZAGER: No. thank you.
10
               THE COURT: Mr. Somers?
11
               MR. SOMERS: Nothing, your Honor.
12
               THE COURT: Mr. Prosecutor.
13
     CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. HEISLER:
14
          Q
               So, Mr. Worthy, you're telling us that on
15
     April 25th you weren't with these collows in the van
16
     that went up to Newark and then up to New York?
17
     Α
          No.
18
          Q
              Were you with them at all that day?
19
     A
          No.
20
          Q Did you know Gregory Maples before April 25th
21
     of 2002?
22
     A
          Yes.
23
          Q
               How did you know him?
          That's my family. That's my cousin.
24
     A
25
          Q He's your cousin. What about Renato Santos;
```

```
had you ever met him before?
 1
 2
     A Yes.
         Q Before April 25th of 2002?
 3
 4
     A
        Yes.
         Q Okay. Where did you meet, and when did you
 5
     meet him?
 6
     A About four years ago. He has a child by one of my
 7
 8
     cousins, Donna Brown.
 9
          Q Okay. Donna Brown is your cousin?
10
     A Yes.
11
         Q And Renato Santos has a child with her?
12
     A
         Yes.
13
         Q And Gregory Maples is your cousin as well?
14
     A
         Yes.
15
         Q And prior to April 25th or 2002, did you know
16
     James Irwin?
17
     A Yes, I knew of him.
18
         Q Okay. When you say "I knew of him," explain
19
     to me what you mean.
20
     A He's not a friend of mine.
21
         Q He's not a friend of yours?
22
     A Not a friend of mine.
23
         Q But did you know who he is?
24
     A Yes. I know his name. I know what he looked
25
     like. He's not a friend. He's not someone --
```

```
Q Okay. But you knew who he is?
 1
 2
          Yes.
              And had you ever seen him around your cousin
 3
          0
     Gregory Maples?
 4
 5
          No.
               Had you ever seen him around your cousin's
 6
          Q
 7
     baby's father --
 8
     Α
          No. sir.
          Q -- Renato Santos?
 9
10
     A
          No.
          Q Do you know Hakim Shabazz?
11
12
     A
          Yes.
13
          O How do you know him?
          I met him a few years ago, about five years ago.
14
     A
          O And what about Halim Shabazz?
15
16
          The same, around the same time.
     A
17
          Q
               How do you know them?
18
          I met them through Gregory Maples.
          Q So you've only met the Shabazz twins, like,
19
20
     five years ago?
21
     Α
          Yes.
22
          Q You say you live in Newark with your mother.
     what's her name?
23
24
     A Mary Steplight.
25
          Q Mary Steplight. And your mother owns a beige
```

```
1
     Acura automobile, or did?
 2
          Yes.
 3
          Q Does she still have it?
 4
     Α
          No.
 5
          Q When did she get rid of it?
 6
          I don't know. I'm not sure.
          O She owned it in April of 2002, though, didn't
 7
 8
     she?
 9
     A
          Yes.
10
          Q And you had access to that car: right?
11
     A
          Yes.
12
          Q In fact, you drove it?
13
     A
          Yes.
14
          Q When were you taken into custody?
15
     A
          I turned myself in May 7th, 2002.
16
          Q Okay. Where were you on April 25th of 2002?
17
     A
          Home.
18
          Q Just home in Newark?
19
         Yes. I wasn't in Ocean county. I don't live in
20
     Ocean County.
21
          Q Were you in Newark at all that day aside from
     at your home, maybe around the Muslim shop somewhere?
22
23
     A
        No.
24
          Q Did you ever meet up with anybody that you
     knew from down here or knew of from down here --
25
```

1	A NO.						
2	Q in Newark?						
3	A NO.						
4	THE COURT: One at a time. Let him finish						
5	his question, then let him finish his answer before you						
6	inquire again.						
7	Q And you tell us you weren't in Lakewood on						
8	April 28th?						
9	A NO.						
10	Q Prior to that April of 2002, did you know						
11	somebody named Ernesto Barber?						
12	A NO.						
13	Q Okay. You saw him in court here?						
14	A Yes, I seen him.						
15	Q So you didn't know him b; -						
16	A First time I ever seen him.						
17	Q That's the first time you'd ever seen him?						
18	A Yes.						
19	Q So you didn't know him but know him by some						
20	other name?						
21	A NO.						
22	Q What about somebody named Steven Bennett?						
23	A Yes, I know Steven Bennett.						
24	Q You know Steven Bennett?						
25	A Yes.						

```
1
          Q You know him by another name?
 2
     A
          Yes.
 3
          O What's that?
 4
          Debo.
 5
        Q Okay. By the way, do you know another name
     for your cousin Gregory?
 6
 7
     A
         Yes.
         Q What's that?
 8
 9
     A Khaleef.
10
         Q And do you know any other name for Renato
11
     Santos?
12
     A Yes.
13
         Q What's that?
     A Red.
14
15
         And you know of James Ir in. Did you ever
16
     hear anybody refer to him by any other name?
17
     A
         Yes.
18
         Q What was that?
19
     A Wee Wee.
20
         Q So you weren't in the company of any of these
     guys on April 28th in Newark or New York or Seaside
21
22
     Heights or Lakewood?
23
     A NO.
24
              THE COURT: April 28th?
25
         Q I'm sorry, April 25th.
```

No, not at all. 1 A 2 Not at all? 0 3 No. 4 And you weren't with anybody in your Acura or Q 5 in that green Jeep Cherokee on April 28th? 6 A No. You weren't anywhere near Lakewood on Sunday? 7 0 8 A No. 9 Had you ever seen that green Jeep before? Q 10 Yes. 11 0 when and where did you see that? 12 I don't remember when, but I seen it before. It's 13 Rashon's Jeep. 14 Okay, you knew it was Rashon's Jeep. 0 15 yes. A 16 Q You knew Rashon; right? 17 Yes. A 18 So May 7th, you find out that you've been charged with conspiracy to commit murder of Rashon, 19 20 that you knew, and you have just sat here through 21 basically two weeks of a trial in which a couple of 22 other guys you know, Halim and Hakim, say that you were 23 involved in pulling guns, around when there was an 24 argument, with Gregory Maples threatening to kill the 25 victim. Is that just all made up?

1	A Yes. Never pulled a gun on anyone.							
2	Q Well, based on your testimony, sir, you told							
3	us you weren't even there; right?							
4	Wasn't there.							
5	Q So the Shabazz brothers are just making	this						
6	stuff up?							
7	A Yes.							
8	Q Okay. Then this other fellow that you	don't						
9	even know, Ernesto Barber, he's making it up, too?							
10	A Yes.							
11	Q And this is all just one big							
12	misunderstanding, as far as you're concerned?							
13	A As far as I'm concerned, I shouldn't be here	•						
14	Q 'Cause you weren't there.							
15	A 'Cause I wasn't there.							
16	Q So people are just throwing your name o	ut in						
17	this thing, and you don't have any involvement with							
18	anything?							
19	A Yes.							
20	MR. HEISLER: That's all I have, Judge.							
21	THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. welle	?						
22	MR. WELLE: No.							
23	THE COURT: You may step down.							
24	(Witness excused.)							
25	THE COURT: Mr. Wollo with morand to co							

1 vs. Marvin Worthy, anything further? 2 MR. WELLE: Yes, your Honor. I had an 3 exhibit. 4 THE COURT: We can deal with that. Aside from moving exhibits. 5 6 MR. WELLE: Just the exhibit. I would indicate, your Honor, we had hoped to bring another 7 witness forward. We haven't been able to find that 8 9 particular witness. 10 THE COURT: Well, we'll just wait and see 11 what happens. 12 MR. WELLE: At this point in time --13 THE COURT: You rest, subject to that? 14 MR. WELLE: Yes. 15 THE COURT: Mr. Kinarney? 16 MR. KINARNEY: Defendant rests, your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Mr. Zager. 18 MR. ZAGER: Judge, we rest, subject to the moving of DM-1. 19 20 THE COURT: And Mr. Somers? 21 MR. SOMERS: We rest, your Honor. 22 THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, you have heard all of the evidence you're going to hear 23 with regard to this matter. And tomorrow morning we're 24 25 going to start closing arguments for counsel. And by

MR. ZAGER: I do, Judge.

noontime tomorrow, I should have instructed you on the law, and you should be getting under way with your deliberations.

Now, once the case is turned over to you, you can take as long as you feel is necessary to decide the issues that are presented. What I throw out to you is in the event that you're still deliberating at the end of the day tomorrow, which is Thursday, if possible, and if you haven't made commitments for Friday, if you can come back in on Friday, well, then, you will be certainly done with the case, but -- you know, and next week will be yours completely.

So, if you give that some thought tonight, talk it over among yourselves, but you definitely have to be here tomorrow at nine, and we . I start there. I just throw that out to you in case, you know, we can work with regard to your scheduling.

Okay. Have a pleasant evening. We'll look forward to seeing all of you tomorrow morning at nine o'clock.

(Jury dismissed for the day at 3:10 PM.)

THE COURT: All right, we'll recess till nine tomorrow. Oh, let's -- exhibits, I'm sorry. Mr. Zager, you wish to move the map?

Counsel

1 MR. HEISLER: No objection, Judge. 2 THE COURT: The map may be marked in 3 evidence. 4 (DM-1 marked into evidence.) 5 MR. KINARNEY: Your Honor, I'm going to move 6 DS-4, which is a copy of the complaint charging Ernesto 7 Barber with his pending charges. That's the only one 8 of my seven I'm moving in. 9 MR. HEISLER: Judge, he was questioned about I don't know that the document should go into the 10 11 jury room. On that basis, I would object. He admitted to it, what the charges were. 12 13 THE COURT: Yes. Okay, no, not in evidence. MR. WELLE: DW-1, Judge, my diagram. 14 15 MR. HEISLER: That would be Mr. Welle's more 16 accurate diagram? I have no objection. 17 THE COURT: Yes. In evidence. 18 (DW-1 marked into evidence.) 19 THE COURT: All right. If there is nothing 20 further, then we'll recess till nine tomorrow. 21 should be ready to address the charge at nine. Have 22 the defendants here definitely at nine. And by 9:30 or 23 earlier, we'll begin summations. Recess till tomorrow.

(Court in recess for the evening.)

24 25

## CERTIFICATION

I, GAYLE L. GARRABRANDT, C.S.R., License

Number XI00737, an Official Court Reporter in and for
the State of New Jersey, do hereby certify the
foregoing to be prepared in full compliance with the
current Transcript Format for Judicial Proceedings and
is a true and accurate non-compressed transcript to the
best of my knowledge and ability.

GAYLE C. GARRABRANDT, C.S.R.,
Official Court Reporter

10-12-04 Date

120 Hooper Avenue Ocean County Courthouse Toms River, NJ 08753

1 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY Ocean County - LAW DIVISION 2 CRIMINAL PART INDICTMENT NO. 02-09-01247 3 A.D.# 6934-03-T1 4 5 STATE OF NEW JERSEY TRANSCRIPT 6 VS. OF RECEIVEDRIAL 7 APPELL ATE DIVISION RENATO SANTOS, GREGORY MAPLES, MARVIN WORTHY, OCT 19 2004 8 JAMES IRWIN. SUPERIUR COURT 9 Defendant. OF NEW JERSEY 10 Place: Ocean County Courthouse 11 120 Hooper Avenue Toms River, New Jersey 12 Date: May 13th, 2004 13 BEFORE: 14 HONORABLE EDWARD J. TURNBACH, J.S.C., and a Jury 15 TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY: Raymond S. Santiago, Esq. 16 (Santiago & Associates, PC) 17 APPEARANCES: 18 WILLIAM J. HEISLER, ESQ. Assistant County Prosecutor OCT 1 2004 19 Attorney for the State. 20 JAMES R. KINARNEY, ESQ. Attorney for Defendant Santos. 21 22 23 GAYLE L. GARRABRANDT, C.S.R. Official Court Reporter 24 120 Hooper Avenue Ocean County Courthouse 25 Toms River, NJ 08753

## APPEARANCES (Cont'd)

PAUL E. ZAGER, ESQ. Attorney for Defendant Maples.

LAWRENCE G. WELLE, ESQ. Attorney for Defendant Worthy.

GEORGE B. SOMERS, JR., ESQ. (Takacs & Somers) Attorney for Defendant Irwin.

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(The following takes place in open court, out of the presence of the jury.)

THE COURT: All right. We're encountering a delay this morning because Mr. Welle claims that he has a witness that he wanted to testify, and that he finally located the witness this morning. And I understand someone is en route.

MR. WELLE: Judge, excuse me. When we are done with this, I'll have an update. I am expecting a call, so we'll know where we stand.

THE COURT: All right. Well, in any event, we can address the charge. I gave the substantial aspects of the charge to counsel yesterday. They've had a chance to review it overnight, and I will hear from counsel with regard to any objection to the Court's proposed charge in this matter.

Mr. Welle?

MR. WELLE: Your Honor, if you wouldn't mind, could we have some of the other counsel express their concerns initially?

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Kinarney or Mr. Zager wish to address the matter first?

MR. ZAGER: I do, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ZAGER: Good morning. Judge, first of

all, I'm going to request an additional charge of false in one, false in all, with respect to Mr. Barber. If you wanted to hear further argument, I'd be happy to.

THE COURT: I can tell you that I don't give that charge, never have given the charge; however, you know, the jury is told that whether a witness testified with intent to deceive you may be considered with regard to the credibility.

MR. ZAGER: Judge, perhaps today might be the one time in your experience that that charge should be given, for the following reasons: Mr. Barber admitted on the witness stand at least five times that he lied. State's expert witnesses contradicted his testimony, at least four out of five of them. The State's detective contradicted his testimony significantly.

And I think that in this particular case, given that he's the State's star witness as far as what may or may not have occurred on April 28th, it would be appropriate for a "false in one, false in all." I apologize for not giving the heads-up for that, but my notes were covered when I told you that.

The next -- I guess these would be objections to the charge, Judge -- is that on the charge of conspiracy, there is no language within the charge with regard to an abandonment of the conspiracy. That's set

forth in 2C:5-2(f). I think that that language should be added.

I think that language, Judge, should be added to the charge based upon the testimony in the case, which I understand the theory of the conspiracy is because something may have occurred in Yonkers, something occurred to cause the murder, and somewhere between Thursday night, the 25th of April, in Yonkers, and 11:00 AM, April 28th, in Lakewood, there was a conspiracy amongst Worthy, Santos and Maples to kill Rashon Roy.

If that's the theory, which apparently it is, 'cause it's alleged in the indictment that there was a conspiracy between the 25th and 28th of April, there is ample evidence in the case to support an abandonment of that, given the testimony of the Shabazz brothers and Mr. Barber himself, if you can believe a word that he says.

So I would request the appropriate language to be added to the conspiracy charge on abandonment. As far as your Honor has a proposed jury charge for accomplice liability, I'm assuming that your Honor has provided that charge, because it's separate and distinct from the conspiracy charge, but it is in the charge because of the count in the indictment alleging

murder.

I would ask your Honor not to give the accomplice liability charge. I don't think it's appropriate in this case. The reason I ask, Judge, is Count 1 of the indictment alleges a conspiracy to commit murder. It alleges two statutory references. One is 2C:11, which is the murder, the homicide statute, and one is 2C:5-2, which is the conspiracy statute.

It obviously doesn't apply to the conspiracy charge, but if it applies to the murder charge, then I think it would be inappropriate in this case based on the testimony, because no one has placed Mr. Maples at the scene of the Jeep when the murder took place.

I think it's over-reaching to give the jury a conspiracy charge on one hand, and say you can decide if he's a co-conspirator, if he's made an agreement, and then you can decide if he facilitated in the murder, given the testimony in this case.

The last thing, Judge, is, I've reviewed the charge with my client. You have included the lesser included charges of aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter, under the count of murder. In nine out of ten cases, Judge, I would ask for the charge, and I think a judge would give it even if I

didn't ask.

My client doesn't want those charges. We're having a little dispute about that. But my client is of the opinion that it's, quite frankly, all or nothing. And there's an indication that, based on the State's theory of this case, this was a planned murder. This wasn't a passion provocation, this wasn't a reckless shooting to constitute aggravated manslaughter. This was a planned murder, a purposeful and knowing murder, and that's the State's case.

And although maybe I don't necessarily agree with my client, I want an objection noted that the lesser included offenses probably do not apply in this case and shouldn't be part of the charge.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WELLE: Your Honor, I would join in the application of counsel with respect to those lesser includeds. I've been instructed by my client that it is his opinion that this is an all-or-nothing case. And as with Mr. Zager, as attorney for Mr. Worthy I may have some different opinions on that. But I would express on behalf of my client his objection to your including the lesser includeds in the charge.

MR. KINARNEY: Judge, I would join in all the requests made by Mr. Zager. I would also indicate for

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the record that my client and I had a somewhat heated discussion about the lesser included offenses. I had. to use court lingo, strenuously objected to his request that I advise your Honor that you not charge the lesser included offenses; however, despite our animated conversation, he indicated to me he did not want those aiven. I would ask him one more time, for the Mr. Santos, you and I discussed whether the Judge should give the charge on the lesser included offenses: correct? MR. SANTOS: Yes. MR. KINARNEY: I told you that I thought basically you were crazy if you didn't agree to that; am I right? MR. SANTOS: Yes.

MR. KINARNEY: Despite that, you indicated to me you wanted me to ask the Judge not to give that charge; am I correct?

MR. SANTOS: Yes.

MR. KINARNEY: Do you still stand by that?

MR. SANTOS: Yes.

MR. KINARNEY: You don't want it given? Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Mr. Somers?

MR. SOMERS: Your Honor, I join in Mr. Zager's request.

THE COURT: Mr. Heisler.

MR. HEISLER: Judge, the charge that's proposed at this particular time appears entirely appropriate to me. The "false in one, false in all" charge that Mr. Zager's asking for is included in the normal charge that your Honor gives. I am familiar with that.

As far as the accomplice liability part of it goes, one of the bases for accomplice liability is being involved in a conspiracy. So, I don't think there is any reason to take that out.

With respect to the lesser includeds, Judge, I think it's in the case. It may not be in the case very strongly, but I also believe we have a record to protect here as well, because in the event there is a conviction for murder, I can foresee some appellate lawyer saying: Judge Turnbach should have given the jury the opportunity to consider lesser includeds.

So I'm going to ask your Honor to leave those in.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I appreciate the arguments of counsel. As I've indicated, I don't charge false in one, false in all in that manner, but I

do indicate to the jury that if they find someone testified with an intent to deceive them, they certainly must consider that in judging that person's credibility.

With regard to abandonment, I will instruct the jury that, you know, if they find there was a conspiracy, that the conspiracy had to continue and be in existence on April 28th of 2002.

Accomplice liability is, from the Court's perspective, all over the record in this case. And the lesser included offenses are appropriate, given the circumstances of the charge and the circumstances of the case here.

Sc, your objections are noted, and we'll proceed without change.

Mr. Welle.

MR. WELLE: Yes, Judge. I'm going to make a couple of calls. I will update you in, like, five minutes.

THE COURT: All right, fine. We'll wait to hear from Mr. Welle.

(Recess taken.)

\* \* \*

(In open court at 10:45 AM.)

THE COURT: All right. It's 10:45. Mr.

welle, I understand that through the offices of the --

MR. WELLE: Yes, your Honor. And, for the record, both myself and Mr. Worthy would like to apologize for this delay that I guess we've occasioned. But the circumstances are such that we'll not be putting on this particular witness. She's up in Asbury Park. There seems to be some trouble with that. So we'd best proceed at this point in time.

THE COURT: Your client has decided he doesn't want the witness?

MR. WELLE: Yes, that's correct.

THE COURT: Ready to sum up?

MR. SOMERS: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Jury out.

(Jury in the bo ...)

THE COURT: A belated good morning to each of you. My sincere apologies for the delay. An issue arose that had to be addressed. It has been addressed. And at this stage of the proceedings, we have what's known as closing statements.

Each attorney is permitted to address you with regard to the testimony and evidence in the case, urging you to view it in one light or another. Closing statements take place in reverse fashion of openings.

In openings, you will recall the prosecutor addressed

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you first. In closing, Mr. Somers for the Defense will address you first.

MR. SOMERS: Thank you very much, your Honor.
Mr. Irwin, co-counsel, members of the jury. I'm George
Somers, and I represent James Irwin. I'd like to talk
about Mr. Barber's testimony and Mr. Barber. That's
what the State's case is based on against my client.
It's based on Mr. Barber's testimony. That's it.

Now let's look at Mr. Barber's testimony, and let's evaluate Mr. Barber and his testimony. We know that on April the 29th, Mr. Barber was visited by the Lakewood police. They go there, and what's Mr. Barber do? Mr. Barber decides to give a statement. And in this statement he says that after the shooting, he and Mr. Irvin get into the Jeep and drive away. Okay.

Now, what else does he say? Or what doesn't he say? Well, in that statement, he's asked by the police if, in fact, somebody threw a gun into the Jeep. Did Renato Santos throw that gun into the Jeep? And he says no. He didn't see any of that. All right.

Now, what happens next? Okay, the police go to the site, they find the Jeep, they notice that the Jeep has perhaps burn marks on the gas tank, around the gas tank, wherever those marks were. And what did they say?

Well, they say somebody must have attempted to burn this Jeep. Well, Mr. Barber, was it you? Or was it Mr. Irwin? Who decided to try to burn the Jeep? Well, what's Mr. Barber going to say? He's going to say: Well, it was Mr. Irwin. He tried to burn the Jeep. He attempted to burn the Jeep.

what else does he do? In this second statement, he tells the police that he knows where the guns are. And he takes them to the guns. Why does he do that?

Well, here again, he wants to save his deal. He's afraid that his deal is in jeopardy. He's got to give the police something. Okay? How can he do that, and also minimize his involvement? Well, he can turn to the police and say: Well, it wasn't me who hid the guns, it was Mr. Irwin. Mr. Irwin hid the guns, not me.

See, all of his testimony is a balancing act between trying to give the police what he thinks that they know or they want, and minimizing his involvement in this case, you see, all the way through, all the way through.

Now, how about the third statement that he gives? Okay. Here again, he changes the location of the guns. In the second statement he said the guns

were under the seat, one on the back seat, one under the seat. In this third statement he says that the guns are on the passenger side of the interior, and another one is on the back seat or around the back seat area. Okay?

He believes that the police want that information. So he gives it to them. Why? Because he wants to save his deal. He's looking at a lot of time if convicted. He told you that. A lot of time. And he is determined that he's going to get a break here. He's going to get a dea!.

Now, what does he do when he comes into court and testifies? Here again, he testifies that, you know, he -- that Mr. Santos threw the gun this time, and the sock, into the car -- okay? -- into the Jeep, and then it was Mr. Irwin who put the gun back inside, in the sock. Changed his testimony.

Now, when I asked him, well, when you were at your plea, did you indicate that there was no -- that Mr. Santos had not thrown the gun into the Jeep? And he said yes. Well, that's a lie, isn't it? You were lying. You had taken an oath, and you're lying. Well, he admitted it. Well, what else could he do?

So here we have a man who lies on three occasions, okay? And he lies under oath. What does

that tell you about Mr. Barber? Mr. Barber has no regard for the truth. He doesn't care about truth or anything else that he has to do, as long as he gets his deal. That's what Mr. Barber is interested in. And if he has to sacrifice everyone, he'll do so to get his deal.

Now, this is a criminal case. So the State must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. It's the highest standard that we have. You have to decide whether Mr. Barber's testimony constitutes proof beyond a reasonable doubt against James Irwin. I submit that it doesn't.

In fact, I feel -- I submit that to base a criminal prosecution on the word of a liar, especially one who lies in court, is an outrage, is an outrage, a true outrage. That's what you have to work with here.

Thank you very much.

THE COURT: Mr. Zager.

MR. ZAGER: Thank you, Judge. Ladies and gentlemen, I guess you know by now my name's Paul Zager. I represent Gregory Maples. I'm going to dispense with some of my usual opening remarks to follow the line of argument that Mr. Somers made on behalf of Mr. Irwin, because when Mr. Barber went in to the police, he was already a two-time convicted felon.

And he knew he didn't have a deal at the time. He knew that if he was convicted again, he would be subject to extended term eligibility. And basically the testimony on that is, is whatever degree of crime it is, whatever the maximum is, if the prosecutor wants to move before the Judge, that period of time can be doubled. So it's called extended term. So if you're facing five years, it could be doubled to ten.

So Barber, who's an experienced criminal at the time, has a motivation to lie to the police in his first statement, his second statement, and his third statement.

And he had a motivation, to follow that argument a little further, he had a motivation to lie to you, because since he gave a statement two years ago, and now, last January, he got arrested, and, lo and behold, for what? A gun, albeit I think a BB gun, but under our law that's a weapon, that's a firearm; pointing it at someone; aggravated assault; terroristic threat; and unlawful possession of a weapon.

Guess what? He hasn't been indicted by the Ocean County Prosecutor's Office, and it's been 15 months.

So don't you think that maybe you can infer that Mr. Barber has a reason to impress this Judge,

who's going to sentence him on this case, and impress this prosecutor, or this prosecutor's office -- 'cause any reference I make to the prosecutor is not against this man as an individual, it's against the State, because they're prosecuting this case.

So when Mr. Barber comes in to testify now, now he's got second-degree charges that are somewhere around ten -- are ten years that can double to 20. So don't you think Mr. Barber wants to package this case and his new case, for which he hasn't been indicted in a substantially long period, together?

And don't you think he wants to impress the authorities in this courtroom so that he doesn't get an extended term of 20 years with maybe, based on his prior record, a jail term of -- a period of parole ineligibility, which means he's gotta serve every day of half of 20, or ten?

So he's looking at twenty over ten if he doesn't testify favorably for the State. So there's your motivation for Mr. Barber, and we'll come back to him.

Normally I would tell you, when I start my closing, that on behalf of everyone, prosecutor included, we thank you. We know you've been here two weeks. God forbid it goes into a third week. We know

you sacrificed for your family and your businesses, and we know that you have been paying attention, so we thank you, because the system doesn't work without you.

This is the period of the trial where we get to comment on the evidence. I think the Judge told you -- and if he didn't, he will -- what we say is not evidence. The evidence that you're going to consider is the physical evidence that's going to go into the jury room with you, and the testimony you heard from the witness stand.

And if I or anyone else tell you that the evidence said this, and your collective recollection says no, he's wrong, it says this, then you go with what you remember.

I told you at the beginning to sit back, relax if you can, enjoy this trial. And I asked you to pay attention to the cross-examination, because you'll -- I'm sure you saw during the trial that certain things don't come out on direct but, lo and behold, they come out on cross-examination.

A little example is, one of the experts was talking about the footprint analysis. And on direct examination he said: Oh, yeah, we had the footprints and we did some tests. But nobody asked him the question on direct examination, you know, what were the

results of those tests? Only on cross-examination did it come out that the tests didn't point to anybody.

So, keep that in mind, that the cross-examination is just as valuable, if not more valuable, than direct examination.

I've divided this -- oh, I'm sorry. Mr.

Somers said it, I am going to repeat it, this is a criminal case. And just because these four gentlemen are sitting here doesn't mean that they're guilty. The Judge told you, will tell you again, and I'm going to tell you, and every defense attorney will tell you, they're presumed to be innocent.

That's how the system works. When you go in to deliberate, you must presume that they are innocent. And the prosecutor's got the burden to prove every single element of every single charge. He's got to prove that beyond a reasonable doubt.

And Mr. Heisler's an experienced prosecutor, and he'll probably stand up here and he will tell you that he welcomes that burden, and that I have done this and I've done that. He's got to prove every question, every element beyond a reasonable doubt.

So, if you have any answers that we weren't able to answer for you because we didn't ask the right questions, or we asked wrong questions, and you go back

in this jury room and you deliberate, and your answers -- your questions haven't been answered, that's his problem, because it's his burden, and you can blame him for not satisfying your questions.

with that in mind, with the proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence, I'm going to analyze the case for you. And I have been known to go too far; and if I do, I apologize.

But my client is facing a significant loss of liberty on this trial, and you guys took an oath that you're going to apply the law and you're going to look at the facts, and you're going to determine the facts and determine their guilt or innocence.

So, you got a heavy burden, and you've got a moral responsibility to do what you're supposed to do under your oath. And it's my job to help you decide what you're going to do here. So, I may go -- I may aggravate you by talking too much, but I got to do it.

I have broken the case down in my mind into types of witnesses. You have lay witnesses, you have expert witnesses, you have interested parties, and you have law enforcement. So I'm going to take them one by one and suggest to you that the case has not been proven anywhere close to beyond a reasonable doubt.

And I'm going to ask you what I asked you in

my opening statement, is that you have to decide Mr.

Maples' case separately from Irwin, Worthy and Santos,
because the evidence that came out applies to this one
and this one and this one, and I'm not going to pretend
to tell you what to do when you get in there, but I'm
going to ask you that it makes sense to look at this
evidence separately as to each defendant.

Four eyewitnesses came in, you remember them, maybe more: The Dunns; the two people who needed an interpreter, I think they were from Mexico. And they testified as to what they saw at the scene.

And I basically had one question for each of them: Did you see Gregory Maples there, on April 28th, at Highpoint? All four said no. One woman said, "could have been." But I, quite frankly, interpreted that as a little prejudicial remark.

How does the State prove that he's there?

Well, so far, they haven't. But maybe like the

gentleman from Jackson who found the car, when he was

asked do you recognize anyone, he said: It's two years

later. He said, did anybody go out with a photographic

array? That's a picture of a person with five or six

other people.

And hey, why didn't they go out when they had all these suspects and go to these four witnesses and

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say: You saw four blacks run in and out. Recognize any of these? They didn't do it, so I don't know what these witnesses do with respect to the other defendants, but they do nothing for Mr. Maples.

The other lay witness was Lisa Santana. She is the -- or was the girlfriend of Mr. Rashon Roy. And she doesn't tell us anything about Mr. Maples being at Highpoint on April 28th; but what she does do is, she tells us that they were friends, they exchanged vehicles. And he, meaning Maples, was with the victim the night before, with some girls, partying.

So, twelve hours before Mr. Roy is killed, he's out with his friend, partying with some girls. That's what she tells us. Does she have any damaging evidence beyond a reasonable doubt? I would suggest to you that she doesn't.

You have expert witnesses. Well, lo and behold, it's not a surprise that Dr. Park would tell us that the victim died from gunshot wounds, because that's not a surprise. On cross-examination, we get a little bit of a surprise, though, because Dr. Park tells us two interesting facts. I don't know what I'm going to do with those facts, but you heard them, so I might as well tell them to you.

Mr. Roy had three different types of

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recreational drugs in his urine and his stomach. And I think Dr. Park said in response to my question that since it was found in your stomach, that would mean use that was very recent to his death.

But more interesting, apparently someone else wanted Mr. Roy killed at a time previous to April 28th. because on cross-examination, again, you find that there was a bullet not related to this case, and you know what Dr. Park said.

So now we come to Scott Frey. Scott Frey had the opportunity to talk to you twice. I'm quessing that maybe, based on some cross-examination from somebody, he decided to go out and do his job a second time. But what does he tell us that relates to Mr. Maples?

He tells us, which will be the beginning of a string of State witnesses, that there is no physical or forensic evidence to put Mr. Maples in the Jeep or at Highpoint on April 28th. That's the State's Criminalistic Investigation Unit detective in charge of this case telling you that.

what else does he do? He's the first in a string of State witnesses to contradict the State's star witness, Mr. Barber. Because you will recall that Mr. Barber said that, in one of his versions, he

arrived at the scene in a red Grand Am, and the Grand Am was driven by Mr. Bennett. And it wasn't parked in a parking spot, it was parked parallel to a parking spot.

Well, how does Scott Frey contradict him? He says that there is no red Grand Am at the scene. Now, he would have seen it. It wasn't parked in a parking spot. It was parallel.

If by chance you don't believe Investigator Frey, Patrolman Humeny, who testified, he was the first -- well, I can't say he was the first. He responds from Lakewood. He goes and finds Mr. Santos. He tells you that there was a dispatch for certain people and certain cars, but there's no dispatch for not only a red Grand Am, there's no dispatch for a beige Acura.

The next expert is Investigator Pozalante. I forget, quite frankly, for what purpose he was called, but he was an expert, qualified as an expert, works for Criminal Investigation, and he continues the trend of two things.

He's another -- he's the second out of five expert witnesses who says that he has no forensic or physical evidence to put Mr. Maples in the Jeep or at Highpoint on April 28th.

MR. HEISLER: Judge, I hate to interrupt at this point, but Frey and Pozalante did not qualify as experts in anything.

MR. ZAGER: If that's true, Judge, I stand corrected.

THE COURT: That's correct.

MR. ZAGER: I stand corrected. Well then, pay no attention to that. What does Pozalante do?

Before there was an objection -- I've got to repeat it -- I told you there is no physical or forensic evidence to put Maples in the Jeep or at Highpoint on the 28th.

What else does he do? He continues the trend of, State's expert or not, to contradict Mr. Barber, because he tells you that there was no forensic evidence to support Barber's story that the victim was shot in the Jeep.

So now you have two State's witnesses, Scott Frey and Pozalante, contradicting the State's key witness.

Sergeant Armstrong came in. I had the nerve to question him about his experience. He may not have a lot of experience, but the man knows what he's talking about, 'cause he gave a very professional presentation on the board. And what does he tell you?

He tells you that there's 22 sets of fingerprint matches on items in the Jeep from my client.

well, I'm not a brain surgeon, but didn't we know that anyway? Because we knew that my client and the victim exchanged their vehicles because they were friends. So that shouldn't come as a surprise to you that my client was in the Jeep at some time.

And what does Armstrong do? He confirms what Lisa Santana tells you. They're friends, he used the Jeep. Roy used my guy's van. They exchanged them. So what does that prove? I don't know. Lisa's telling the truth, maybe?

But what does Armstrong also tell us? He tells us that there's no physical -- I'm sorry -- there's no fingerprints of my client in the Jeep itself. On the items in the Jeep, the CDs and whatever else, but not in the Jeep.

So again, I ask him another question that you guys were probably sick of me asking, but: Sergeant Armstrong, do you have any physical proof that my client was in the Jeep on April 28th? And his response, for I think now the third witness, was no.

More important, he contradicts, and he's now the third State's witness, perhaps the first expert witness, to contradict Mr. Barber, because Mr. Barber

told us, if I remember correctly, that he was in the right front passenger area and he was in the rear driver's side area of the Jeep.

But Sergeant Armstrong, who, quite frankly, is a little more credible than Mr. Barber, I would submit, tells us the only match of Barber to the Jeep is somewhere on the passenger side rear door. But for whatever reason, he can't tell us where the print came from.

So you remember Barber's story at Coventry the morning of the shooting, a couple of hours earlier, where he got into the Jeep? Or at least that's what he told you guys, he got into the Jeep, smoked a little pot, had a little conversation, overheard a conversation about Yonkers, but he undn't tell the investigators, in his three chances, that he got in the Jeep. He said he stood outside the Jeep.

I specifically asked one of the investigators yesterday -- you heard it, I don't have to go through it -- if you're standing outside, maybe put your hand inside, you make the fingerprint? 'Cause there's certainly no prints to support his story that he was inside the Jeep earlier in Coventry.

So you have another State's witness, this time I believe an expert, contradicting Mr. Bennett.

Detective -- I wrote "Bennett." Pay no attention to that. It's Barrett. His testimony basically was with the ballistics. And quite frankly, there is no allegation my guy had a gun, so I'll let somebody else deal with the ballistics, because I don't understand them.

But more importantly, he's qualified as an expert, and what does he tell us? He's now the fourth State witness, second expert, to tell us there is no forensic, there is no physical evidence to put Maples in the Jeep on April 28th.

So, if you are looking for proof beyond a reasonable doubt for Mr. Maples, don't look at any of the State's CIU testimony, and don't look at any of the State's experts, because it ain't there. It's just not there. I don't think there is any argument. Everybody heard them all say: No forensic evidence.

Investigator Hayes is a great witness. He's a credible witness. He takes copious notes, and he tells you about a confession. Well, I'm not going to deal with the confession, 'cause my guy turned himself in twice, and didn't confess, 'cause he didn't do it.

But somebody confessed. It's no secret
Mr. Santos confessed. And Mr. Kinarney can deal with
that as he chooses. But if you look at Investigator

Hayes's testimony and you look for the reason that Mr. Santos says he shot Mr. Roy, you now got a little problem with what happened in Philadelphia, don't you? Because Mr. Santos tells Investigator Hayes: The reason I killed and shot Mr. Roy is because Roy tried to have me, Santos, run down in Philly.

I don't know about you guys, but I would not have risked my rear end for a significant period of a loss of liberty for someone else. So, when you take a look at what may have happened in Philly -- and we'll get to Yonkers in a minute, 'cause you know I got a few things to say about that -- ask yourself, what the heck is going on here?

Investigator Mitchell, a pretty good investigator, got lot of experience, takes copious notes, testified credibly. I think I called him, or somebody on the defense side called him.

And Investigator Velardi. The only reason I think I called him or the Defense called him was to point out to you the inconsistencies, and there were many, at least eight to a dozen, in the stories that Hakeem and Halim Shabazz, the brothers of the victim, gave to the investigators.

Now, I'm not a heartless person, and neither are you guys. They lost their brother. Our sympathies

go out to them and their family, because it's a tragedy that Mr. Roy is gone. But it would also be a tragedy to convict the wrong person on evidence that's just not in front of you.

Now, I understand that Hakeem was interviewed five hours after he got news that his brother died.

And yes, you got to expect that he was upset. And Mr. Halim Shabazz, his brother, was interviewed, I guess, 24 hours later, after he found out about his brother. So you know that they got to be upset.

But there's so many inconsistencies in their stories from what they said on the witness stand as the first and second witnesses in this case, last week, and what you heard yesterday, when I asked Investigator Mitchell and I asked Investigator V ardi a string of questions each, did he tell you this? No. Did he tell you that?

And normally I would go through those questions with you, but it happened less than 24 hours ago, and I'm assuming that you guys -- I know you paid attention. I am assuming you remember it.

So as far as proof beyond a reasonable doubt, you can cross these guys off. That brings us to, if I spelled it right, the interested parties and the State's theory of this case.

Now, don't leave your common sense, please, at the metal detector when you walk into the courthouse, because you have to use your common sense to realize that this case against my client is not a case, it's a theory, built on, what do they call it, smoke and mirrors?

And here's the theory. My client, for some reason, was upset that something happened in Philadelphia, in a bar we don't know the name of, with or without his son. We don't know if his son was there or not. We don't know if something happened in the bar or outside the bar, whether he was a pedestrian and a green Escalade tried to run him over, or whether he was in a car and a green Escalade tried to run him off someplace.

We don't know that. And the prosecutor doesn't really have to prove that. But he does, because it's his theory that my client was so mad at Mr. Roy because of something that happened in Philly, he drove all the way to Yonkers to threaten him with guns.

Then he drives all the way back. They kiss and make up, according to the brothers, everything was cool, in their words. Halim was petrified, he's shaking on the witness stand, he was so scared in

Yonkers. The next day, he has a conversation with Maples, and everything's cool.

The victim, Roy, was so afraid, he was together with Mr. Maples on Friday, and he was out partying with some women and my client twelve hours before he was shot.

So the theory is that something happened in Philly -- what period of time, we don't know -- which resulted in my guy driving up to Yonkers, and then he lets three days pass and he arranges an organized slaughter of Mr. Roy in broad daylight. That's the theory of the case.

Now, they've got to prove the case, because you can't come into court with a theory. So what do they do? First of all, to satisfy we client, let me make it perfectly clear that the reason he entered a not-guilty plea and the reason we're having a trial is because by entering the guilty plea (sic), and having a trial, my client is telling you: I'm guilty of nothing, I'm not involved.

And it's up to the State to prove to you that he is guilty and he is involved. And how's he going to do it?

I went through the lay witnesses, I went through the expert witnesses. There's no forensic,

there is no scientific -- you're getting sick of hearing me say it. He's going to rely on an incident that, quite frankly, my client disputes even occurred; but for purposes of this argument, I have to perhaps assume that maybe something occurred, and then argue it didn't.

Kind of sounds ludicrous, but that's what we are doing.

So, Hakeem Shabazz doesn't go to Yonkers. He just knows about a conversation, a confrontation, that happens, I think, before Yonkers, on Thursday, before Yonkers. And when he tells us that, he tells us that conversation starts at 3:30, and he knows that it's 3:30, because he got off of work.

But he doesn't tell us they drive all over Ocean County, from Seaside to Toms River to Lakewood.

And he says: There were threats from Mr. Maples against my brother Roy.

Halim, who does take this imaginary trip to Yonkers, says this meeting took place in Seaside, somewhere between four and six. And he tells you that: we rode all around the county. And he says: Yeah, Maples was mad, but there weren't any threats.

Don't you think between the two brothers they would know if there were any threats made? So this

April 25th, Thursday, is what the State's alleging in Count 1 of their indictment of conspiracy. That's what they're alleging, the conspiracy started here; and they're alleging that it continued all the way through until Mr. Roy was shot at Highpoint. That's their allegations.

There's a trip to Yonkers, allegedly, where Halim, the brother, is in the car. Now, you know his inconsistencies of what he told you, and what he told the investigator. But let's go through it, this trip.

He doesn't remember how they got from Toms
River to Newark. He doesn't tell the investigator that
they drove around Newark for a couple of hours. He
tells the investigator: I fell asleep on the way to
Newark, I woke up in Yonkers.

He tells you: I didn't fall asleep at all, I was half asleep, half dozing, you know, somewhere, but I was in Newark, and we were riding around for a couple of hours and we were going to go see some rapper that we all liked and some of us knew, and the rapper's in Manhattan.

Now, I don't know who's driving on this imaginary trip, but somebody missed the sign for Manhattan, because the mastermind of all this, Mr. Maples over there, he decides: Well, something

happened to me, something happened to Santos, something happened in Philly, let me go threaten Roy.

So he drives a couple of hours, you know, from Lakewood, and goes to Newark, and then he drives to Yonkers. And he pulls in behind a miniature golf establishment. And guns are drawn, and the victims are threatened. And then they merrily go on their way home. And everything's cool. And this is the start of the great conspiracy.

I don't buy it. I don't think you should buy it. Take a look at the map. I'm not Rand-McNally, but if you look at the map, the route that they took and the landmarks they saw make no sense, because Yonkers is way up north, and the Bronx is south of Yonkers. And you can't go into Yonkers and see "Home of the Bronx Bombers" on Yankee Stadium and then go back to Yonkers for the miniature golf.

My recollection is he saw a sign that said,
"Welcome to Yonkers," he saw Yankee Stadium, but he
thinks he saw the sign that said, "Home of the Bronx
Bombers." And then they went to the miniature golf.
So you go from Yonkers, to Yankee Stadium down south,
backtrack up to Bronx to threaten somebody. Give me a
break.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, ladies and

gentlemen. The conspiracy starts there. How does this conspiracy continue? Because you're allowed to consider that if there was this imaginary trip, and if this theory of a conspiracy started on Friday the -- or Thursday the 25th, did it continue? Or was it abandoned?

Because if it happened and it was abandoned, it's over. That's the law. So, if this imaginary trip happened, everything's cool afterwards, he's partying. And why in the world -- it's ridiculous to think that Mr. Maples was involved in the shooting of Mr. Roy, because if he wanted Mr. Roy dead, don't forget, they have known each other since they're five. There's some relationship. They were friends, they were business associates, they exchanged cars together.

If he wanted him dead, why didn't he kill him in Yonkers? Nobody was around. If he wanted him dead, why would he do it in broad daylight, at eleven o'clock in the morning, in a condominium complex with houses on one side, condos on the other, hundreds of people all around, in a disorganized fashion? Why?

I'm not saying he was there, 'cause there is no proof he was there. There just isn't any, except for Barber. We'll get to him.

And to compound his stupidity in organizing

this murder, he pulls up next to his own van. Of all those parking spots -- you will see the pictures -- he orders whoever's driving -- maybe he's driving, that's the theory, no proof. Pulls up right next to his van. That's going to be the getaway van; right?

How can it be? Because Detective Frey, who didn't run any tests on the van, tells us the doors were locked. Well, it's Maples' van. He knows the doors are locked. Is he some bumbling conspirator who's going to arrange for a killing in broad daylight and have his getaway car with the doors locked?

Conspiracy is a theory. Now, here's your proof of a great conspiracy. Mr. Barber, State's witness — and here I guess I want my cake and eat it too. Might as well be up front with you, I am telling you don't believe a word Mr. Barber says, and now I am going to tell you believe three little answers he gave you. I don't have a choice. You heard it. You decide.

"Mr. Barber, did you know at Coventry, did you know at Winteringham, and did you know at Highpoint that Mr. Roy was going to be killed? No, I didn't know. Did you hear Mr. Maples or Mr. Santos or Mr. Worthy talk about killing him? No. Was there a plan? No. Did you know he was going to get shot? No."

That's the State's witness telling you there's no conspiracy here. Again on the theory of having your cake and eat it too, what does Barber tell us? Well, what am I telling you? He's an absolute liar, don't believe a word he says, but now I'm telling you here's what he said, do with it what you want.

He says that him, Bennett, and Irwin, who's not even charged with murder, all stayed at Irwin's house that night. He says that, told the detective, Bennett had a gun prior to the shooting, not the day of the shooting, but prior to the shooting.

Do you think maybe Bennett, who's not even in this courtroom, might have been involved in a conspiracy with Barber, and Irwin may or may not have been involved? I don't know. It ain't my job to find the killer. But Irwin's -- not Irwin -- Barber is covering up something.

Now, Barber, if you believe him, is the only person that put my client at the scene. The only person. If I stand -- if I'm wrong, there would have been an objection about ten seconds ago. So miraculously, I may be right.

And if you want to convict on Mr. Barber, remember one thing. You have a solemn obligation here. And there's a lot at stake as far as loss of liberty.

So, project yourself into the future, six months, a year, five years down the road, 'cause one morning you're going to wake up, you're going to think about this case, and you're going to want to tell yourselves and face yourselves in the mirror and say, "I did the right thing," 'cause otherwise, you won't be able to live with yourself.

And quite frankly, if the right thing is to convict him, convict him. You got to look in the mirror. But I don't see how that could be the right thing. So the decision you're going to make today, tomorrow, God forbid Monday, you're going to live with the rest of your life.

And I don't think, quite frankly, you would be comfortable making a decision based on the quality of the character that Mr. Barber is, because it wouldn't surprise me, and it may not surprise you, that Barber organized this, pulled the trigger, and is covering his rear end.

Bear with me one second, please. You're going to be charged with a jury charge instruction, the law, by Judge Turnbach, who's far smarter than me. But he's going to tell you something along these lines:

That on the conspiracy charge, Count 1, if my client agreed with someone else, that's conspiracy. Find him

guilty. Look at this evidence very carefully before you make that decision, please.

But he's going to tell you something else, because my client's charged in Count 2 with murder. There's not an allegation that my client's the trigger man. There's a theory, based on everything I've discussed, that my client was involved. Don't buy it.

But here's the jury instruction you're going to get on that. They're going -- the Judge is going to instruct you that on the theory of accomplice liability, my client can be just as responsible for the killing as the shooter, if he agreed to aid someone, if he agreed to promote the commission of the crime, if he agreed to facilitate the crime, etcetera.

In laymen's terms, if Mr. Heisler and I agree that we don't make enough money and we're going to rob a bank, we agree, we shake hands, that's an agreement.

Now we go out and we do something. We agree, but we're not going to shoot anyone. He goes into the bank. I'm the getaway driver. A guard pulls a gun. Unbeknownst to me, he's got a gun. He shoots the guard. The guard is dead.

He gets in the car, we drive away, we got money. "So how did it go?" And he says, "I shot someone." "What the hell you mean, you shot someone?"

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I'm as quilty, under accomplice liability, for shooting that quard. That's what the jury charge means.

Now, Mr. Heisler is going to argue to you that, given the nature of this case and all criminal cases, he doesn't have a contract, he doesn't have a corporate book or a written legal agreement between Worthy, Santos and Maples to come and give to you and say: Here's an agreement, look, here's the conspiracy. of course he doesn't have that.

But what he doesn't have is any proof whatsoever, except for Barber, but Barber puts my quy at the scene but says there is no conspiracy, he didn't know anything about it. And he was in a position to know

So, what Mr. Heisler and the prosecutor's office has presented to you is far beyond reasonable doubt. I shouldn't say "beyond," I should say it doesn't amount to reasonable doubt. It doesn't even amount to credible evidence. They have a theory, the prosecutor's office, that they haven't proved. And you know, listening to the testimony, that their investigation was far from a hundred percent.

So what happened? They got Barber, they put themselves into this pigeonhole, and now they've got my guy on trial for something that Barber or Bennett or

someone else did.

So, I told you at the beginning, I'm going to ask you now, apply the principles of law, look at the facts. And I think when you do that, you'll come back and you will find Mr. Maples not guilty of conspiracy and not guilty of accomplice liability in the murder of Rashon Roy. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Kinarney.

MR. KINARNEY: Thank you, your Honor. Judge Turnbach, co-counsel, Mr. Heisler. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, good morning, almost good afternoon. You know who I am. All the lawyers have introduced themselves. I might as well. I usually don't. Jim Kinarney, and I represent the real bad guy in this case, I guess, Renato Santos.

Of all the evidence that you ladies and gentlemen have heard, you've probably heard the most damaging, the most brutal evidence concerning Renato Santos. But as the other attorneys have indicated to you, we're talking about allegations. We're talking about a court of law.

We're not in some field, we're not at Yankee Stadium -- let's say kind of <u>apropos</u> for this case.

We're not in the library, we're not in a gym. We are in a special place that's called a court of law. This

is a case, and this is a place, particularly a place, where there are certain rules that apply, certain very strict rules that have been around for hundreds of years, that protect people who are accused of crimes.

And each one of these four gentlemen are sitting in the hot seat. And anybody, no matter how powerful, if you are a politician, all the way down to a bum laying in a puddle with a brown paper bag, and inside that brown paper bag is a cheap bottle of wine, can be charged with a crime.

And every defendant in the United States of America is considered equal when it comes to an accusation of crime, because our government is so powerful and has so much resources, that the way we level the playing field and bring it equal are things called presumption of innocence, burden of proof, and reasonable doubt.

So despite the fact that Mr. Santos has had some real bad things said about him the last couple of weeks, he's presumed to be innocent. You ladies and gentlemen can do one of two things here. We know it's an important case. It's a murder case. Doesn't get any bigger than this.

You can do one of two things. You can take the easy way, and you can say: You know what? This

guy Barber came in here and said Mr. Santos was running around like a chicken with his head cut off, shooting, shooting, shooting, shooting, shooting, even to the point where Mr. Roy -- who again, we all have to feel sorry for him and his family, but you can't let that factor into your decision, 'cause you can't decide a case based upon sympathy. You have to put it out of your mind. You'll hear that from Judge Turnbach in his instructions.

But continuing, Mr. Santos is chasing Mr. Roy through this parking lot, according to Mr. Barber, and he's plugging him and he's plugging him, and he's plugging him to the point where Mr. Roy goes down, perhaps in his death throes, and what does Mr. Santos do? He comes up, he stands over him, according to Mr. Barber, and he puts one more round in his upper back.

Pretty cold, huh? By the way, nobody else -- all these, what I would add, disinterested parties, all the normal people who are going about their business and living there, who saw various things, not one of them, not one of them said they saw anybody go up to Mr. Roy on the ground and put a bullet in him.

And these people saw people running around, and these people saw people leaving the scene. And not one of these individuals who lived in that area who saw

individuals leaving the scene, in cars or on foot, into the woods, or up Prospect Street towards Route 9, saw anybody standing over anybody putting a bullet in him.

What does that say about Barber right there? It says he is a liar. Now, what it says is, he's putting the cherry on top of the cake to get Santos. And think about this. Mr. Barber indicated: I know Mr. Maples. I know Mr. Worthy. I know Mr. Irwin. I've known these guys a long time. But when it comes to Mr. Santos, I know of him. I've seen him around.

We have a term in the criminal justice system called "dropping a dime" on somebody. You guys might have heard it on TV shows. Dropping a dime means blaming somebody for something.

So if Mr. Barber, who might have been the guilty party here, needed to drop a dime on somebody to save his own skin, the guy he's going to drop the quarter on -- quarter's a little bigger and heavier than a dime -- is going to be Santos, who he doesn't know, compared to these guys.

The one thing that you ladies and gentlemen have, which is your most valuable tool, is your mind, your common sense. You weren't at Highpoint, none of the 14 of you, I don't think. You don't know for sure what happened.

And by saying "for sure," don't take that to mean that I am saying that this gentleman here must prove this case for sure, because he doesn't. He just has to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, which is less than for sure.

But the point I'm making is, none of you ladies and gentlemen were there on that parking lot on April 28th, 2002. You don't know for sure what happened. So you're going to have to depend, when it comes to Renato Santos, on the testimony of two people that you don't know from Adam, that you never met before, 'cause if you did, you would have said it during jury selection.

And that is A.Z., (phonetic), Ernesto Barber, and Investigator Jeffrey (sic) Hayes from the Ocean County Prosecutor's Office, who supposedly took Mr. Santos' confession, which, by the way Mr. Zager said he confessed. Au contrare, I will differ with Mr. Zager, and I will get back to that, in terms of the confession.

But you're going to have to depend upon the spoken word of two individuals you don't even know.

And when it comes to Investigator Hayes, who took the supposed confession of Renato Santos, each and every one of you 14 people said you wouldn't give any greater

credibility to a police officer simply because he's a police officer.

So I'm going to ask you to apply that when you analyze Investigator Hayes' testimony.

Let's look at evidence pertaining to Renato Santos. Do you recall the young Lakewood police officer, Patrolman Humeny? He's the one who saw Mr. Santos on the street. Use your common sense. Renato Santos chased Mr. Roy through that parking lot. He had a gun, according to the State, one of these two weapons, and he repeatedly shot at Mr. Roy. Mr. Roy went down. He came up and shot him again, and then all the witnesses said everybody ran.

Everybody ran, got in cars. One guy ran into the woods, another guy ran towards route 9 up Prospect Street. Here's where your common sense would come into play.

Human beings, when they're in certain environments, in certain situations, the overwhelmingly vast majority of the time, act the same way, no matter who that human being is. And as a human being, we're -- when we're in a parking lot, and we have a gun, and we chase somebody through the parking lot, and we shoot them and kill them, we don't hang around. We don't hang around, 'cause we don't want to get caught.

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Would you agree with that proposition? I think you would. What is the testimony of Patrolman Humeny? I went through great lengths in trying to establish a time line, for the point of showing you that the State's own witness indicated, "I saw Mr. Santos at least eleven minutes after the dispatch came in of the shooting," meaning that it was more than eleven minutes, because there's got to be some passage of time from actual shooting till the police are notified.

Eleven minutes. If we were to stop right now, do nothing, nobody in this courtroom do a thing, look at that clock, and go eleven, twelve minutes, it would seem to you guys like you've gone through 14 birthdays. Seem like a decade. Eleven, twelve minutes is forever. And how far did he get?

Remember, everybody indicated everybody ran. He got an eighth of a mile. Eighth of a mile might as well be this much (indicating.) So you have the executioner, supposedly, according to the State, you have the executioner, Mr. Santos, a really bad guy, kill somebody in cold blood, everybody says he ran, and he's found eleven minutes later, an eighth of a mile away?

That's where your common sense comes in,

ladies and gentlemen. Mr. Santos was found an eighth of a mile away, eleven or more minutes later? Why?

'Cause he didn't do a shooting. That's why. 'Cause if he did a shooting, he'd have been halfway to Europe.

He'd have been trying to get to Iowa. He wouldn't have been there.

And then think about this. What the State alleges is, Mr. Santos snuck around the Jeep, tried to prevent Mr. Roy from getting out of the Jeep. He's holding the Jeep like that (indicating.) One of the witnesses, Barber -- nobody else said this -- said he got halfway in the Jeep.

He got out of the Jeep. He's shooting inside. He's shooting outside. He's running around. According to Barber -- strike that - according to Investigator Hayes, Santos supposedly said he drove Mr. Roy to the scene. So he's in the vehicle with Mr. Roy.

And what does Patrolman Humeny say, on my cross? "Well, Patrolman, did he appear out of breath? No." Hey, if you're running, you're out of breath. Looked like he was sweating? No. Was his clothes mussed up? No. What about his hair, if he had any? Was, if he had any hair, was his hair messed up? No. Did he look normal? Yes.

Does that jibe with your common sense? If you're in this, won't there be something? There was nothing. Did he appear nervous? No. Also, according to Investigator Hayes, he appeared normal. Calm. He must be a machine. If he just executed somebody, then he must be a machine, ladies and gentlemen, 'cause he was cool as a cucumber. He wasn't sweating or anything.

Well, you know, Mr. Santos, you can leave. That's all right. I won't leave. Think about it. If a police officer said you can leave, and the police officer doesn't even basically know your name, aren't you going to say: Thank you very much, I think I will leave?

I think you would. I think if you shot and killed Mr. Roy, you'd take the chance, if a cop said to you, oh, by the way, you can leave, I think you'd do it. You wouldn't leave if you're not guilty.

Now, what information did Patrolman Humeny have? What he had was that there was a shooting in the Highpoint parking lot; there were two black males who left the scene; one black male was wearing a gray sweatshirt, not striped, a gray sweatshirt. That's the information that came over dispatch. That individual went towards Route 9.

The other individual was another black male.

They were both black males. And he had on a striped shirt, I think the testimony was -- and your recollection governs -- a yellow-and dark-colored striped shirt, and he went through the woods. Well, certainly we know that -- I would submit we should know this -- this man, first of all, is not a black man.

Every single person who saw what happened in that parking lot was questioned. There were at least a half a dozen people who spoke to the police. At least four of those half a dozen people were Hispanic.

And every single person, to the police -- I am not talking about on the stand -- to the police, when it's fresh in their minds, described the two guys who left as black males. Not Hispani, not possibly Hispanic. Black males. And I would submit to you that a Hispanic person knows the difference between another Hispanic person and a black male, an African-American.

And his name is Renato Santos. That is a Hispanic name. It's not an African-American name. So we have a variance in the information, because the information that everybody's given is that it's a black guy.

And then we come up to the fact that Investigator Humeny sees Mr. Santos on the street.

He's wearing a gray sweatshirt, which is the information he's received. I would submit to you if you walk into any store, J.C. Penney's, Sears, Bloomingdale's, whatever, and you go look for a sweatshirt, not talking about any letters, anything on it, let's say a plain sweatshirt, the most common color is gray.

It's not purple, it's not pink, it's not black. There's probably a lot of whites, but I would submit to you -- and your minds are going to govern here -- the most common color is gray. So the fact that he had a gray sweatshirt on is not dispositive.

And he's asked: Where did you come from?

And bear in mind, the State says he just killed

somebody. He didn't say: I came from the hospital, or

I came from down the street or came from -- he's

pointed towards the direction of Highpoint. I submit

to you that's the actions of an innocent person.

And he said he heard something sounded like firecrackers, fireworks or whatever, he went to check it out, and then he left, went on his way. He didn't say he saw anybody. But he is not charged with not telling the cops that he might have seen something. He is charged with murder.

And he said he went on his way. Would you

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like to come to police headquarters with me, essentially? Yeah, I'll go to police headquarters.

And he goes to the scene. He is cool, calm and collected and cooperative. He ends up down at police headquarters where, again, according to Investigator Hayes, he's cool, calm, collected and cooperative.

And according to Investigator Hayes, who you've never met before, and have indicated to everybody here in court you will give no greater credibility than any other witness simply because he's a police officer -- and Mr. Zager said he's a great witness, keeps copious notes.

We don't know that he is a great witness or if he's lying his rear end off. And basically, he said Mr. Santos confessed. And Mr. Santos basically said -- pardon my French -- "I'm also a bad-ass, I carry a gun, I've had this gun for a long time, I did the killing, I killed him because he tried to kill me twice in Philly."

So I guess with him trying -- by "him" I mean Mr. Roy -- I guess with Mr. Roy trying to kill Renato Santos twice in Philly, and then him supposedly trying to kill Mr. Maples in Philly, I guess Mr. Roy does nothing but try and kill people.

This is the first time we're hearing from

anybody, according to Investigator Hayes, that the real grudge was Santos, not Mr. Maples. All the other State's witnesses are saying Maples. All of a sudden, Investigator Hayes is saying no, the guy who had the grudge was Santos, 'cause he's got to say that, because that fits into Santos supposedly confessing.

And it's key that he said -- and by "he" I mean Investigator Hayes -- that when he was talking to Mr. Santos, all this information is new information. He didn't know any of this stuff, including the identity of the victim, Mr. Roy. And he filled out, sure, copious notes, because we end up with a seven-page police report, seven-page police report by Sergeant Hayes, which sets forth the various versions of the confession given by Mr. Santos.

But you know what's interesting about this, ladies and gentlemen? This crime occurred April 28th. This police report was not prepared till May 7th, nine days later. What happened in the interim?

Well, Mr. Barber talked to the cops. He talked to the cops twice at that point in time. Not three times, twice. And in his first statement he says Santos was running down, running all over, shooting and killing, basically, Mr. Roy.

That's not true. Investigator Hayes, when he

prepared this statement where he said Santos confessed, had all this information. He had this supposed information from Barber. And I guarantee you, even though Investigator Hayes didn't take the statement from Mr. Barber, these police officers talked, as was brought out.

They're all in the same office. They wouldn't be doing their jobs if they didn't talk to each other, especially in a murder case.

And here's what I submit to you is key. It's almost like forensic evidence, even though this technically is not forensic evidence. If you are going to charge somebody with something like murder, and you're going to maintain that that person confessed to this murder, I guess we got to take your word for it, because it's not corroborated.

And I'm not even talking about forensics. I will get into that. It's not corroborated by anybody else who said: Yeah, he confessed to me, too. And wouldn't you think, wouldn't you be more comfortable, each and every one of you, if there was a tape, a videotape, made of his confession?

And then the State will say, well,

Investigator Hayes -- he'll say: Investigator Hayes
said, we asked him if we could take a videotape, and he

said, I got to think about it, no, I don't want to do it.

But I brought out the fact that, "Why isn't that in your report, the fact that Mr. Santos has refused to consent to a videotape," when he had every other minor detail in his report, and it's been established that police officers put everything that's important in a report, because then they go to trial two years later and they got to remember the important things. So they review their reports, because they have done eight million cases in the passage of time.

And nowhere in his seven-page report does he say Mr. Santos refused to be videotaped. And you know what? If you are going to confess, why wouldn't you just say, okay, sure, I will do a videotape? You're cooperative, why wouldn't you? You would. There is no videotape.

Okay, you don't want to do a videotape? How about an audiotape? Let me put the machine down and, bup, (phonetic), hit the button, talk. What about a Sipowicz routine? Here's the pad, write it out. We have none of that.

We have the uncorroborated testimony of Sergeant Hayes saying Mr. Santos confessed. And the name of the game, ladies and gentlemen, is proof beyond

a reasonable doubt. And don't do what the police did, wrap it up real quick here, 'cause they say he confessed. There is too much at stake.

And the fact that Mr. Santos might have given the name of Caddo (phonetic) because he had a warrant out of Jersey City, where he's from, means nothing, because he's not charged with having a warrant out of Jersey City.

And I don't know about the other lawyers, but I'll say this: I'm not saying Renato Santos is an altar boy or a Boy Scout. I'm not going to ask you to take him home for dinner if you find him not guilty. That's not the issue. Did he tell them he was Caddo? Yes. Why? 'Cause he didn't want to go to jail. But that's not dispositive of whether the State's proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the crimes charged here.

Now let's get to Mr. Barber. I'm not going to make a lot of big deal about him. Mr. Zager said he is facing -- he's facing 20 years on that charge he wasn't indicted for. He is not facing 20 years. He is facing 31 and a half years. That's the exact amount.

He is charged with a second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. It's a second-degree crime, carrying ten years. With the

extended term, you can double it to 20. He is charged with a third-degree terroristic threat, third-degree crimes carrying five years, double it to ten, now ten and 20, we're up to 30. He's charged with a fourth-degree pointing a firearm, which doesn't carry the extended term, because it's a fourth-degree.

MR. HEISLER: Judge, again I have to object.

I mean, the law is not such that you can get two
extended terms.

MR. KINARNEY: That's what I'm getting at.

THE COURT: You're right.

MR. KINARNEY: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: One extended.

MR. KINARNEY: Thank you, Judge. He is charged with a fourth-degree crime, pointing a firearm, which you can't get an extended term for, but you get a year and a half with an automatic nine months without parole. So, no matter how you slice it, he's in the jackpot. Before he testifies, he's facing a ton of time.

And in addition to that, he pleaded guilty to what was his supposed involvement in this event, and he's facing five years for that. His cooperation will be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, Judge Turnbach, who heard him testify and he -- who he

pleaded guilty in front of.

And he was quite frank. This is one thing that he was true about, I will say about the only thing, when he indicated, because he had no choice but to indicate this, "I don't want to spend a day in jail,"

And so he came in here with a motive, ladies and gentlemen, and he essentially said Mr. Santos is a very, very, very bad guy. Not that he isn't, because he's got a prior record for burglary and robbery, and you can consider whether he would violate the oath, based upon the fact that he's thought so little of society's law that he's robbed people and burglarized them.

And then he gives three separate stories. He changes his statement. He indicates ultimately my guy shot him -- by "him" I mean Mr. Roy -- right in the back. Nobody else saw that, as I indicated. Everybody else said it was black males running around. But let's tie this with what Mr. Barber said Mr. Santos did, into the forensics.

I didn't ask the witnesses in cross-examination, the State's witnesses, what Mr. Zager did, which was: Is there any forensic evidence to prove that my client was at the scene? I could

have. I didn't. I'm just saving it for summation.

Think about it. My executioner, Renato
Santos, supposed executioner, there's not one shred of
forensic evidence showing that he was at the scene.
Not one shred. Forensic evidence, which is beautiful
evidence, 'cause you don't have to judge somebody on
credibility, you can embrace it.

Forensic evidence. You don't have to worry about, is this person telling the truth or not? This is scientific. It's forensic. Okay?

There is not one shred of physical evidence.

And I would submit to you that if there was going to be any forensic evidence supposedly tying anybody of these four individuals to the scene, based upon the other testimony, it should be Renato Santos.

We have two revolvers here. One has been marked S-2, one has been marked S-3. I would anticipate that what Mr. Heisler will say, because he really has to, is, between worthy and Santos, I don't know who had which gun, but you know what? He can't abandon his own witnesses, I would submit to you.

Halim Shabazz said the supposed event up in Yonkers, he said that S-2, which in the exhibit you're going to have, in there is marked as Number 76 -- strike that -- Number 77, was in the hands of Mr.

Worthy, not Mr. Santos, up in Yonkers.

Mr. Barber, I mean, if you want to believe Mr. Barber -- I say you shouldn't. Disregard what he says. Maybe, as Mr. Zager said, is this me wanting my cake and eating it too? Maybe. Mr. Barber said at Winteringham Village, Mr. Worthy went in and got a gun and a sock, and he saw it.

So if Mr. Santos was shooting and killing Mr. Roy, how come when the tests were done on both guns, the same tests, there was no forensic tie-in to the gun that wasn't in the sock, but only to the gun that was in the sock?

And then Mr. Heisler, 'cause he had to at the end of questioning the chemist, Barrett, on his redirect examination, said to Mr. Barrett: Just because there was no forensic tie-in to the gun that wasn't in the sock, doesn't mean that the gun wasn't used? And Mr. Barrett said, "Yeah."

Well, you know what? What does that show?
You know what? I could have been the Pope, but I
wasn't. Coulda, shoulda, woulda. Do you know what I
mean? There is no forensics tie-in to this gun.

And do you think for a minute if Mr. Santos had stood over Mr. Roy, put one in his back, that that projectile would have -- either one of two things would

have happened: It would have remained in the body of Mr. Roy, or it would have ended up underneath him on the ground, 'cause he was laying there.

That bullet wouldn't have ricocheted off of his body laying there and flown out to Missouri. And yet there's no forensic tie-in. What we have, according to Mr. Barrett, is that the bullet that was found in the parking lot and -- the projectile that was found in the parking lot, the projectile that was found inside Mr. Roy, came from the gun that was in the white sock, because that's Number 77, which is a Smith & Wesson .38-special six-shot revolver, silver, brown wooded grip, serial number filed off, containing four spent shell casings, and one white sock used to cover the weapon."

So even under the State's own witnesses, that's not Santos's gun. Think about that. In addition to that, were there any fingerprints of Renato Santos on either one of these guns? No. And the way the State has to address that is through -- I forget the witness's name, the young kid who did the thing for you.

He said "Well," I think his words were, "a revolver can take fingerprints, but it's probably non-conclusive." And then I said to him, 'cause he said

he's done quite a few of these tests, "have you ever taken a print off a revolver?" Do you remember what his answer was? "I don't remember."

"I don't remember?" That's not true. You'd remember. You'd remember if you ever got a print off a revolver. You sure would. And you know it, because that guy was a pretty professional witness, and he didn't seem like a dope. So you would remember.

So you have no forensic match to the gun that the State's witnesses supposedly said Mr. Santos had.

I dispute that he ever had a gun. Wasn't even there.

You have no fingerprints from the gun.

You have the testimony of Scott Frey, who said he went to the scene, and in a muddy area between the fence and the parking lot, there were boot prints. And lo and behold, Renato Santos is arrested right away. What's he wearing? Ten-and-a-half size Timberland boots.

You know what? That helps Mr. Santos, because they take his boots and they compare them to the footprints at the scene, and they don't match. They don't match. And then you have the clothing of Mr. Santos, which is taken from him.

Do you think, if he's in the car with Mr. Roy, do you think, if he's trying to keep Mr. Roy

out of the car, do you think, if he's chasing after him, do you think there might be like a little microscopic hair or something on his clothing?

Did you hear any evidence of this? No, you didn't, because there was no forensic evidence tying his clothes to this event, or you would have heard about it. You're allowed to consider the evidence and the lack of evidence.

And then, in addition to that, what else does Mr. Frey say? He sees, I believe he said, four juice bottles. They appeared to have been recently put in the parking lot. I think he said two -- and your recollection will govern -- two is in by parking space 8, and two is in a grassy area by the parking space.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, don't you think that they should have done a DNA test? Don't you think you could take a cap off -- if you're drinking juice, you're leaving your DNA on the roof -- on the mouth of that bottle, you're leaving your DNA --

MR. HEISLER: Judge, that's a fact that's not in evidence anyway.

THE COURT: Yes, I will sustain the objection to that.

MR. KINARNEY: Again, ladies and gentlemen, just let me say this to you. You can consider the

evidence and the lack of evidence, what they have shown and what they haven't shown. And there is no DNA tie-in to anything, Mr. Santos in this case.

And in addition to that -- so you have the no fingerprints on the gun, there's no DNA, no forensic tie-in to his clothes or his boots. The only thing you have is a fingerprint. There are many, many fingerprints that were taken in this case. And you have a fingerprint where Renato Santos' right thumb was on the front and back of the cover of a tape that was found inside the Jeep.

As one of the lawyers pointed out, I don't know if it was Mr. Heisler or one of the defense attorneys -- it might even have been the witness volunteering, the fingerprint expert, Armstrong, volunteering it.

He said just because you find a fingerprint on an item in a Jeep, doesn't mean the fingerprint was put on the item while that person who put the fingerprint there was in the Jeep. That fingerprint could have been put on that tape box at another location, and then that tape was picked up and ended up in the Jeep.

And even if Mr. Santos put his fingerprint on a tape box in the Jeep, I submit to you it doesn't

matter, because I'm not arguing to you that Mr. Santos don't know these other individuals. Of course he does. That's been the testimony.

And the testimony has also been that all these guys have been in these vehicles, the Jeep, the Acura, the this; that they've all been in these vehicles.

As a matter of fact, Renato Santos, as Mr. Zager pointed out in terms of the partying with the girls, in reference to the Yonkers incident, where he indicated Mr. Worthy -- strike that -- Mr. Maples was partying with the girls, so there couldn't have been any grudge, who's the other guy who was partying with the girls? It was Mr. Santos. Mr. Santos has been in that Jeep, and it proves nothing.

In sum and substance, ladies and gentlemen -and I'm not going to belabor the point -- in sum and
substance, you are doing probably the most significant
thing, outside of a family/personal obligation, that
you're ever going to do in your life, including you
ladies and gentlemen who have served on juries before.

It doesn't get any bigger when it comes to civic responsibility than to judge another human being when he is charged with murder. So on one hand, I kind of sympathize with you guys, 'cause you have a lot of

responsibility.

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But on the other hand, you have to remember this: You can't judge the case based on conjecture. You can't judge the case based on surmise or suspicion. You have to -- or sympathy. You have to almost be a machine. You have to take those understandable emotions that we all have, and you have to put them aside, be very analytical, look at the evidence, the reasonable inferences you can draw from the evidence, and then, using your common sense, establish: Has the State proven each and every element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt?

And I would only say this to you. Forensic evidence is very powerful, because it's unshakable.

The speken word from somebody you den't know from Adam is not as convincing.

So I know you won't do it. I mentioned it in the beginning, you have been a very good jury, you have paid attention, you have been in a good humor. You probably got ticked off at the lawyers, but I would too, if I wasn't a lawyer. And you've really impressed me as somebody who's going to -- people who are going to do a really good job.

I ask you to do that. I mention there's two choices: The easy way and the hard way. I know you're

1 going to do it the hard way. You're going to really 2 analyze things. You're going to keep an open mind. You're going to listen to your fellow jurors, and then 3 you're going to come back with a fair verdict. And 4 that's all I am asking you for, is a fair verdict. 5 6 I submit to you a fair verdict, when it comes 7 to Renato Santos, is one of not quilty. Thank you. THE COURT: Well, members of jury, at the 8 risk of disturbing 200 years' of tradition, it's 12:20, 9 and I think we'll go to lunch from 12:20 to 1:20 today, 10 so please have a nice lunch, be back in Central Jury at 11 12 1:20. We'll bring you over here and conclude the 13 closing statements. 14 Everybody remain in place until the jury 15 leaves. 16 (Jury retires for lunch at 12:20.) 17 THE COURT: All right. Recess till 1:20. 18 (Luncheon recess taken.) 19 20 AFTERNOON SESSION THE COURT: Mr. Welle, are you ready? 21 22 MR. WELLE: Yes. 23 THE COURT: Jury out. 24 (Jury in the box.) 25 THE COURT: Good afternoon to each of you.

Mr. Welle?

MR. WELLE: Thank you, Judge. Counsel, ladies and gentlemen, we're now in the afternoon of what is the coming to the end of this two-week trial, which is, of course, of crucial importance to the young men sitting behind me.

You have been tremendously attentive. You gave each of the lawyers who came before me your attention, each and every one of you. And I know you're going to give me your attention as I point out some things to you that they may have covered, but some things that are particularly important to Mr. Worthy, and also things that may not have been raised up to this point in time.

You know, in adopting some of the things that some of the other counsel say, this is the best country in the world. This is the best system of criminal justice that exists in the world. Our constitution has put in safeguards to protect people charged, because, as Mr. Kinarney said, the power of the State is very strong.

And you, sitting here, do not assume that the government or the State gets it right. You don't sit here and say because there was an indictment and because Mr. Heisler does his job of marshaling some

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people and some exhibits, that they're right.

Because there's that presumption of innocence, and everything abides a full presentation of all the evidence, and then your review of that evidence when you go in the jury room. And each and every one of you individually has to be convinced of every charge and every element of every charge beyond a reasonable doubt, as to each and every one of these defendants.

One man, fortunate for him, has only been charged with some circumstances dealing with a Jeep. You may even consider whether that was an appropriate charging decision. Mr. Santos has been charged, and you've heard the evidence against him. Mr. Maples has been charged and Mr. Worthy has been charged.

The prosecutor -- and, of course, when they talk about it, you know there was an investigation, and evidence was accumulated, evidence. Well, evidence is things; right? But not everything that gets picked up off the ground or determined by some expert is really relevant. Only the things that the Court permits to get out of the mouth of a witness or onto an exhibit number are the relevant stuff.

But then there's the stuff that maybe you should have heard about. Maybe there are the things that the prosecution and the investigation should have

done, maybe now thinking that it was derelict in not doing them, and that you to be possessed of all of the facts, that you would want to feel comfortable coming to a decision about the life of any of these people, you would want to know, you would demand to know, because absent it, in a case like this, how can you be sure?

How can you be firmly convinced beyond a reasonable doubt on the elements of the offenses against any of these people? Because that's the burden that he has. And it's a heavy, heavy, heavy burden.

We have one exhibit. And it was a smaller diagram of the bigger diagram of the parking lot with the building on an angle, and I drew in basically that -- the fact that these buildings were adjoined, because we didn't have any pictures.

We did not have any, in this investigation of two years ago, that would help you understand the true position of vehicles and the location of people who they were going to bring in here and who were going to tell what you they were able to see, but, maybe more to the point, what they didn't see.

And I mean, I did that. I didn't know whether it would generate what it generated, but I was hopeful, and it did generate something, because

remember initially we had some photographs that were taken the day of the police getting to the scene, 'cause you can see the yellow tape, right? And there are a couple of them, and they show this view from Prospect Street into the parking lot.

But what that little exhibit of ours did is, it generated during the course of a trial -- I mean, this is highly, highly unusual, that in the course of a trial, somebody goes out and does something and then it comes in. I mean, you know, this is all supposed to be done months ago. This is supposed to be done on the 28th, the 29th, the 30th, the week, the month, the couple -- you know, back then in 2002, not here in April of 2004.

But I guess it piqued the concerns of the prosecutor, because you remember -- was it Frey? -- somebody went out and took some more pictures. And I'm happy they did, Mr. Worthy is happy they did, because they showed more accurately the viewpoint that the Dunns had and that the Hispanic couple had from those buildings onto the parking lot or across the back yard of the Dunn residence, to see what was going on when supposedly people were running around some cars.

Now, I'm not going to mess around with numbers. I'm just going to show you these quickly.

And when you go through all of this stuff, I'm sure you will want to look at these.

Here's a picture. Obviously, that blue car was not there two years ago, it was there today, but that shows the back of the Dunns' residence looking over the fence, taken so that you could see that he could see some things. He couldn't see things that clearly, but he certainly could see, as he testified, what, three or four people running around the van and the Jeep?

And then -- and fortunately, someone actually went up, finally, onto the apartment in Building 402, where that Hispanic couple lived. And I don't think I took them all. I have a couple here. You will see them, and you'll be able to determine which ones they were.

They were taken so you could see what that man and that woman were able to see when they looked out, as you can see. And the testimony was that from Apartment Number 5, looking out the window, you can see an area that encompasses the place where the van was, where the Jeep was, and all the way out to Prospect Street right here, all the way out here, and probably beyond that, because, you know, the camera only took this much, but we don't have a window here, we don't

have the edge of a window to suggest your view even further would have been disturbed.

So those people, when they looked out, you know -- and your recollection as to what each one of them said is your recollection, but there's a response to some shots, there are people running around, there's a guy running across, chasing somebody; right? Proceeding out and down into Prospect Street.

And one of them was even able to say that there was another guy there too, and a victim's being chased by one guy, but then there's another guy and then those two guys, victim goes down, and two guys disperse.

But what they don't see, because it wasn't there, is, they don't see any other people and any beige Acura. They don't see any beige Acura supposedly parked over here on a yellow line, oddly, nor do they see any black males attempting to get into any vehicle here, because all of this is happening almost simultaneously. Nor do they see any vehicle other than the green Jeep, any of the witnesses he produces, go anyplace.

Now, I want to know why, ladies and gentlemen, if an Acura and a beige Acura is where this Mr. Barber suggests it was, it wasn't seen by the

people who are looking right there. Why was it not seen by any of these other multitudinous people, numbers of people, who were responding to the shots and coming out of the apartments, undoubtedly, over here?

I mean, you will see that overview of the apartment. There's a whole bunch of them, in circular. But people obviously were responding. I mean, you come out, you come from here, you come from over here.

Nobody said to the cops: By the way, we saw a beige Acura or a beige car, we couldn't tell what kind it was, leaving the scene?

That kind of information coming from the police canvass, had it existed, would have been presented to you. It was not, because there was no beige Acura at this scene.

Just bear with me one second. You know, when I got up in my opening I said that the Ocean County Criminalistics group is very good, and they're very good with what they choose to do, that is, the actual analysis. But what's more important is what they choose not to do, or neglect to do, or are not told to do.

Now, in this particular case, left at the scene is this green van that is Gregory Maples' van.

All right? Because when the police get there, they try

to open it, and they can't, they write it off. They say to themselves: This had nothing to do particularly with this event.

Now, I want you to think about that. What's the testimony of witnesses? The testimony of witnesses is that the perpetrators of this event, where do they go? Were a group of people seen running over to the yellow curb where the beige Acura was supposed to be, which Barber says brought them to the scene?

I mean, if you're involved in something, and you get to the scene, and you're complicit in a killing, and the crap's hitting the fan, where do you go? Where do you go? You go to the thing that is there to get you the hell out of there.

where do the people go, the three to four black males who are running around this place? They try to get into the van. They try to get into the van, the same thing you would do under the stress of getting the hell out of there. You'd get out in the vehicle you came in.

Now, I don't know what the answer to this is, whether, as the '97 or '98 Mercury Villager, when you slam the damn door, there's that little latch over there, you know, boom, door slams, maybe the place locks up on you, whether somebody accidentally hit

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something. But they ignored this. They didn't get -or they did get a search warrant, but they didn't execute it.

Now, isn't that human nature, to go to the vehicle that brought you there? When they couldn't get in, what did they do? They got into the Jeep. Mr. Dunn, did he say, I think, three people got into the Jeep? I think he thought more than two people got into the Jeep.

I want you to ask yourselves, has anybody, any independent, disinterested person, been able to tell that you there were six individuals out there, in a credible way, even when you put it all together, disinterested eyewitnesses to this thing? There were six people there? No. Because there were not six people there. There were less than six people. And the person who was not there of this crew of Lakewood homeboys was this man (indicating).

You know, I said to you, and people, when they talk about again the quality of investigative work, you may have seen me on a number of occasions try to examine Mr. Frey and Mr. Barrett about what they did, maybe what they didn't do.

Now, you remember Mr. Barrett? He was your forensics expert with the guns? Didn't bring his

report with him, but he says: I did this testing on this gun, I only did this testing, and I matched up certain things.

But I began to ask him, well, aren't there some other things you could have done? You could have taken the gun and you could have seen how far away it would have developed a pattern. You could have done that. But he didn't think that was done, or he didn't do that.

And we talked about it, and he agreed with me that the closer a weapon would be to the thing that was hit, you'd get a pattern and then a broader pattern, and then some, finally some diffuse indication of nitrates or something. And finally, after, I don't know, ten, twelve questions, he finally said: Oh, yeah, we did send something to the State Police.

Oh. Where is it? Where is the result?

Somebody, late in the game, felt moved to send something for examination. What's the only thing, other than the body, that one would send for examination? It would be the clothing. For what reason? In a ballistics sense, to try to determine if we can tell how close a weapon was to the garment. That's what you would do it for. Or are there any traces of it?

And why is that important? Because it can be done. And they're suggesting here that there was a shooting from the back of the Jeep -- right? -- from somebody in the back of the Jeep, that hit this Mr. Roy, and was a shot that probably killed him or had something to do with killing him. All right?

Now, if you do the testing that is possible on the clothing or in the Jeep, which they didn't do, you can tell whether a gun was fired in that Jeep. It's fundamental. It's fundamental. You can tell. Did they do that test?

If they did, you would know whether, if somebody said a gun was fired in the Jeep, they were lying; if it showed that a gun had been fired in the Jeep, it would be corroboration.

The kind of thing you as reasonable people look for, and what we all look for when we're coming to major decisions, is things that support other things so that we can feel good about our ultimate decision in a case or on anything.

But they didn't do it. Were they lazy, the wrong people were directing them? I don't know. But sending these clothes for examination would have determined whether somebody in the back of that relatively small compact area of the Jeep, right, had

fired the weapon. Because if it was fired from the back seat, it's likely you would have seen it and determined that it was on the front seat, parts of the front seat.

I mean, you would have gotten it. But he can't tell you that.

what they want to do, ladies and gentlemen, is rely upon this Mr. Barber, who they went to a day or so after this event, who was there, was involved, was facing big time. And I'll get into that in a few minutes.

And based on some things that he said, and as they pick up some things, they construct a theory of the case and move it along as they go, to try to get other people to give them a little stuff that makes them comfortable.

Now, Mr. Somers only spoke to you for a short period of time. But what he told you and what he said, I echo. It is outrageous that they, meaning the State, would ask you to convict any of these defendants and Mr. Worthy on the testimony of Mr. Barber.

This is a person who said, I don't know how many times up here with his hand on the Bible, "I lied.

I lied in my first statement. I lied in my second statement. I lied in my third statement. I'm lying

here on the stand. I've lied to you."

I mean, he said that. He said that. He lied when he was in front of this Judge. And the prosecutor was saying that, oh, you gave us three statements, and those statements are true; right? I mean, yes, they are.

Ernesto Barber, when they came to him, was as complicit an individual as any person who was involved in that shooting. All right? He was facing 30 years to life when they came to talk to him, when they came to him and they talked to him for a little bit.

And he talks, and he tells them things about how he gets there, how Debo, Mr. Bennett, gets there. So was Mr. Bennett there? And he's had a chance to talk to Mr. Bennett, and Mr. Bennett's gotten away. And Irwin is Lord-knows-where.

But he has a chance to speak to them and tell them. And in all of this, and to you, he says: I was only in this vehicle on one day. Remember that? What day? Day of the shooting. What places? I ask him particularly, what places were you in in this Jeep? And he said: I was in the right front passenger seat, and I was in the left rear seat.

Was he telling you the truth? Well, he might have been in those seats, but he was also in the right

rear passenger seat, the same place that he wants to put another person, that person being my client.

Latent MV 2-13 was found on the interior door frame of the right rear passenger door, above the interior window frame, and it is the right thumb of Ernesto Barber.

Now, I'm not going to do any kind of contortions. And you can figure it out, so when you go in the jury room, I want you to figure out how, in that position, Ernesto Barber's fingerprint gets there, unless he was getting in or getting out of that particular location in that car. Impossible.

what does that mean? I mean, that's something that you put into this equation. That's something that affects you in your deliberations when you're thinking about the, quote-unquote, evidence that the prosecutor has presented to you.

What does that do to Mr. Barber's testimony?

Because you know that he has taken himself out of everything; right? I mean, he's there at the scene, he doesn't know what's going on, he approaches the car, nobody's talking. He gives a couple of names to the cops of people who were there, but of course he's backing off, he's got nothing to do with anything.

Then he gets into a Jeep, he drives away, and this guy sitting over here is the only one who does anything bad. Come on.

Is there any testimony that the -- credible testimony, supported and corroborated by any independent witness, that the beige Acura was there? Of course not. Is there any testimony of any forensic evidence that places Mr. Worthy in the Jeep or anyplace else? The answer is: Absolutely not.

Mr. Worthy took the stand, all of what, five foot eight, 140 pounds of him, and he looked each of you in the eye. He was not afraid to get on that stand. He was not afraid to expose himself to the questions of this prosecutor.

He's a young kid with famil, in this area.

He is down here on occasion. He grew up in Newark. He went to St. Benedict's, and he lives up in Newark. And what did he say to you? He said: I didn't do this. I didn't do anything on this day, I don't belong here. I don't belong here.

Now, the prosecutor asked him a couple of questions. Now, you'd have to think that either he or I are completely stupid, but when he was asked, "Doesn't your mother have a beige Acura, yes. Yes, she does." You know, sure, he drives the thing. He knows

that. People in Lakewood who are associated with Maples know that fact. He knows that.

Yes, there is a beige Acura to which I'm connected, but I wasn't in it and didn't drive it, and it wasn't there. That's basically what this testimony is.

The prosecutor only asked a few questions, and I think he realized -- and I want you to think back when you saw Mr. Worthy on the stand, about how he looked at you and looked at the prosecutor as he was answering questions, tone of his voice, the firmness of his responses.

And the prosecutor asked him, "Do you know Mr. Barber?" And Mr. Worthy says, "I never saw him before he came in here." Okay? Now, that's the truth. But that doesn't mean that Barber, in Lakewood, and knowing these people, does not know of him or have seen Maples and him or anybody in a beige Acura.

I mean, you'd have to be an idiot to get up here and say: I never saw Barber before in my life. What you say is: Oh, yeah, I saw him around, and that's how he would know I drive the car. But he didn't say that. He said: I never saw the guy until he came in here.

And then, the prosecutor, I think in his last

question, may have asked, "How long have you known the Shabazz brothers," or whatever. And he says: About five years. Okay? And with that, the bulb goes off in the prosecutor's head, and he says: I don't know, one of those Shabazz boys says, "I've known him since he was a baby."

Well, to know him as a baby is to be years older than him and to know when he was born, but we know that this kid grew up in North Jersey. And when Mr. Worthy says, "I just met those people five years ago," he's telling you the truth.

But I think the prosecutor felt, hey, this is ridiculous, one guy says he knows somebody when he was a baby. And he didn't ask him any questions, but Mr. Worthy was there, and he was ready to answer any question Mr. Heisler put to him.

There are two ways of looking at that.

Either Mr. Heisler says, I'm not going to risk it, not going to show this man and permit him to answer my questions, and to exhibit himself and to show you that he's honest and he's telling you the truth; or else he's going to say, ah, look, it's a lot of baloney, the guy's just up there trying to save his butt.

I have tried to give you those things that I think are highly, highly important in terms of your

evaluation of the evidence, its quality, its quantity, whether you can be comfortable in making a decision and a determination which is based on a liar and a person who has talked himself out of this particular case, because there are unanswered questions here.

The one unanswered question, or one answered question, is that Mr. Santos shot the man, 'cause he admitted it. But as to who else was there and who did what, other than Mr. Barber, and Mr. Bennett and Mr. Irwin, that's a real question. He knows there's a real question.

And I submit to you that, based on what you've heard, Mr. Worthy is worthy of your belief, that he was not there, that he did not do this, and there is no corresponation and no independent . Idence of any kind that puts him there.

So when you go into the jury room, and you weigh all this out, and you got to check a box, each of you hold true to your individual evaluations, because you all come from different backgrounds, you all assess people differently. You all have different senses or ideas of people. So do not let go of your firm beliefs when you go in and assess this evidence.

And again I submit to you, Mr. Worthy is not one of six people at this particular event on Sunday

the 28th. Whether there were four or five there, I don't know. But I do know this, the van was one of the vehicles that got people there. It's the one some people went to to get the hell out of there as quickly as they could.

Santos himself said he drove the Jeep, with supposedly the victim in it. What can you point to with surety that puts Mr. Worthy there and would justify your convicting him with certainty?

THE COURT: Mr. Heisler.

MR. HEISLER: Thank you, your Honor. Please the Court, counsel, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, good afternoon. It never ceases to amaze me, when I listen to lawyers give closing arguments, you would think so far you've heard four different guys talking about four different cases in four different courtrooms. And you may think you've heard of five, after I finish.

I would like to start by thanking you, as did other counsel, for your attention. I know you have been paying very close attention today and for the last two weeks. It's tough to sit here and listen. I think I mentioned that when I opened last week. And I thank you for your attention all throughout the trial.

You've heard earlier from counsel. You're

going to hear from Judge Turnbach later. Your function here is to use your common sense, use your life's experiences, apply that to what you find to be the credible evidence in the case, put it together and arrive at a verdict.

That's what you are here for. What makes sense, and what doesn't, based on what you know? I'm going to talk about the charges a little bit before I get into the facts and the evidence.

I told you last week, and you know there is a conspiracy charge, that Marvin Worthy and Gregory

Maples and Renato Santos had a plan or an agreement to kill Rashon Roy.

And Mr. Zager was right, I'm going to stand here and tell you you don't need a written document, a handshake, anything. You look at circumstances, because these things are always done in secret, not in front of Ernesto Barber in the car in the morning. You look at circumstances to determine whether you believe that a conspiracy existed.

One of the things you are going to be considering is the fact that, when this incident started on Thursday night, Mr. Roy wound up dead 60 hours later, less than three full days. As they say, the proof is in the pudding.

And Mr. Zager would like you to believe that, well, if there was a conspiracy Thursday night, maybe it stopped, because they were out partying Friday or Saturday night. That brings to mind two things.

The first is that maybe they were lulling Mr. Roy into a false sense of security, to set him up to kill him later. Maybe they didn't kill him Thursday night because they didn't want to kill his brother Halim. Nobody had a bone to pick with Halim, and you certainly don't want to kill him and leave a witness. So maybe Thursday night didn't work out.

And the other place you can go to look to see what was going on is Sunday morning. If there is a conspiracy in existence on Sunday morning, that's a conspiracy. And look at those circumstances, and I will talk about them in a little bit. It doesn't have to be from Thursday to Sunday. If they conspired Sunday, that's a conspiracy.

The Judge is going to tell you what the elements of murder are. They're pretty straightforward: Purposely causing someone's death, knowingly causing someone's death, or purposely or knowingly causing bodily injury or serious bodily injury that results in their death.

Obviously, Rashon Roy, let's not lose sight

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of this fact, was brutally and cold-bloodedly murdered on April 28th of 2002. Shot in the back, four times. Who can be held responsible for that murder?

Obviously, whoever fired the fatal shot.

Anybody else who was shooting a gun intending to murder him, whether their bullet was fatal or not, is also guilty of that murder as an accomplice. And anybody who conspired to have him murdered is guilty of that murder.

what you folks have to do here is determine what witnesses and what evidence are credible. And with respect to witnesses, there is no magic formula. You do this the same way you do anything else in your life. You listen to what people say, determine whether it makes any sense, whether it kind of fits in or comports with other things that other people say, things that you know to be true based on your common sense and life experience and things along those lines.

You look at their demeanor. Do they answer questions for both sides? You know, they're answering questions for one side but, you know, arguing with the other, that kind of thing? You look at their interest in the outcome, and you look at whether they have any motive to lie.

Those are the things that you put into the

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mix, and it's things you do in your everyday life.

You heard a lot of chipping around the edges of details of things people said that may not have been entirely consistent with what they said on the witness stand, and let's look at some of that.

Let's look at Mr. and Mrs. Dunn, and Mario Molina and Maria Arenas. These people have no interest whatsoever in this case. They're at home, minding their own business, on a Sunday morning, when all hell breaks loose outside their homes.

A man is getting shot to death. And it causes some excitement and some commotion, as you might well imagine. And they see what they see, and they remember what they remember. And they don't see all of it. None of them do.

But what you're getting by way of defense is: Well, Mrs. Dunn, you said "black," not black or Hispanic. Well, I bet Mrs. Dunn was a little excited that morning. She's watching TV with her, I think she said he was an eight-year-old son, while this man's being killed outside her door? She doesn't have any interest in this case. She didn't come in here and lie.

Halim Shabazz. Did you fall asleep going to Newark, or after Newark? Does it make a difference?

He was awake in Yonkers. I mean, you could dink and dunk around the edges here, and doesn't mean that people are lying. People remember things differently, they remember more later.

when you're talking about somebody getting murdered, you know, there are details that you're going to leave out that don't seem important at the time. So you got to take those things into consideration.

Ernesto Barber was caught between a rock and a hard place when the police picked him up on April 29th. He's got a record, no question about it. He could be in trouble for some things. And people he's associated with have just murdered somebody, and they're still out there. Do you trust the police? Do you trust your friends? What do you do?

Well, he starts to talk, and he's not completely on the up and up with the police. It happens all the time. But within days, he's taking them to the guns, and he's told them what happened. He's got no deal in this case. He pled guilty to what he did, stealing the Jeep.

And he got a great deal on this case that he's been charged with a year later. He's been sitting in jail for the last 15 months. A heck of a lot of help I've been to him.

But I am not standing here asking you to believe Ernesto Barber, or Ernesto Barber alone. So let's talk about the evidence, what the evidence does show, as these counsel are real big on telling you what test wasn't done and which fingerprint wasn't where. Let's talk about what evidence we do have, and let's start with that Thursday night.

You had the victim's brothers, Hakeem and Halim. And within four hours of the victim's death, on that Sunday afternoon, Hakeem told Investigator Velardi about the incident that happened in New York on Thursday night.

Now, what possible reason in the world would Hakeem Shabazz have to make that story up about Gregory Maples and Marvin Worthy and Renato Santos? You haven't heard one word, didn't hear one question on cross-examination about what bone he has to pick with any of them. Not one.

Why would Hakeem Shabazz make that story up, tell it to the police within a couple of hours of finding out his brother had been murdered, and come in here and lie about it last week? There hasn't been a suggestion of any reason for him to do that, other than it was true.

And the same thing goes for his twin brother,

Halim. Again, what possible reason would he have, the day after his brother was murdered, to say Gregory

Maples and Marvin Worthy and Renato Santos and I were in New York the other night with my brother, when Maples started giving orders, saying he got threatened, and ordered us out of the van while he had a gun, and he had a gun pointed at me and my brother?

what possible reason has been suggested to you by anybody for him to make that story up? None. Got no motive to lie about that. And let's look and see how that gets corroborated, not in any big way, but there are little things.

For starters, when you listen to the Shabazz brothers, their versions of what happened in the van before the trip north, when both brothers were together with their brother Rashon, were nearly identical. And it was Maples talking about feeling threatened, and if you ever try to kill me again in Philly or anywhere else, we're going to have a problem, I'm going to kill you.

You heard that from both of them. And if they were going to lie about it, why wouldn't they have put a gun in Maples' hand, too, in that story, if they were going to make it up? You're going to make it up, might as well make it a whopper.

And again, dinking and dunking around the edges. Well, you know, Investigator Mitchell, did Mr. Shabazz tell you, you know, there was a police car there when they got home? No. But he did tell him they thought about going to the police, and talked about it. I mean, the fact that he didn't tell him about the police car doesn't make the story untrue.

And what did Lisa Santana tell you about that Thursday night? Not a big, huge thing, but a little piece you can use to corroborate her. They came in, and something was wrong. They were really quiet. They weren't acting normal, as I suspect most of us wouldn't be acting normal if we had just been held at gunpoint and had our lives threatened within the last couple of hours.

But those are kinds of things that you look at and apply your common sense to, say: Okay, this is fitting, this is hanging together.

That's that night. And Halim showed you which gun he believed Marvin Worthy had and which gun Renato Santos had. And they happened to be the same guns, or at least the Worthy gun, same guns that Ernesto Barber identified. The Worthy gun was identified as being in Worthy's possession in that sock that Sunday morning.

Flash forward to Sunday. Ernesto Barber told you he was with James Irwin and Steven Bennett when Gregory Maples and Marvin Worthy showed up. And there was a conversation in the Jeep. And Ernesto Barber was in the back seat, and that's where his fingerprint was left.

Now, Mr. Welle just wants you to believe Barber's now the shooter instead of Marvin Worthy, because his print was in the back seat and Marvin's wasn't. I don't know where that comes from, but there is no evidence to support it, not a shred.

And in that conversation, they start talking. Marvin and Khaleef. Gregory Maples. And Maples is saying: I made him what he is, and look what he did to me. They've had a problem now. The only person in this case that you've heard had any motive to do any harm to Rashon Roy was Gregory Maples, over this incident in Philadelphia, and you heard that from Halim, and you heard it from Hakeem, from the Thursday incident when Maples was all upset at the victim.

And now you're hearing it on Sunday morning.

Now that's coming again from Ernesto Barber. What's different about it at that point? But not so different. You heard Halim tell you Thursday night, as they were driving around, Santos and Marvin are

bragging about, "we shot people before." They're tough guys. They're going to impress people.

So now we get to Sunday morning, and Maples and Worthy are in the van -- or the Jeep, excuse me. And now we're beyond we got them out and held them at gunpoint; now it's we were going to cap them, but the gun jammed, because we're bad, and we're going to impress Irwin and Bennett and Barber with how bad we are. So now we actually pull the trigger, but the gun jammed, and he begged for his life, so we let him go.

Tough guys. It doesn't make what Halim said inconsistent with what Barber said. It's just these guys bragging and making it up as they go along.

And how much of what Barber told you about Sunday morning was corroborated? We went in Marvin Worthy's beige Acura. Marvin Worthy doesn't know Ernesto Barber, if you believe anything he said yesterday. Never saw him until Monday. Doesn't know him, didn't give you any possible reason in the world why Ernesto Barber would want to come in here and lie about him for a murder. What's Ernesto Barber's bone to pick with Marvin Worthy, if Marvin Worthy doesn't even know who he is?

After Khaleef left in the Jeep with Marvin,
Marvin came back in the beige Acura which we know his

mother owned, which we know he drove, and which Ernesto Barber would only know about if he got in it that day. And they went to Winteringham Village, where Marvin Worthy got a gun and a sock.

What did we find in the woods a couple of days later? The gun and the sock. It's corroborative. And there is more talk in the car on the way up to Highpoint. I got a gun, I got three or four bullets in the gun, I ain't afraid to use it, more of that same braggadocio that you were hearing about from Thursday night, from Halim, and earlier that Sunday morning from Barber.

And that's consistent from witness to witness. It's the same stuff, same kind of stuff. And what happens? They get back to Highpoint, or get to Highpoint.

And Mr. Welle was talking about the van being locked, and that being the getaway car, and your natural reaction is to get away in the car that you got there in. Well, Barber showed you here on this diagram where Worthy parked the Acura. It's not in the parking space, it's parked to get out of there. It's pre-positioned to get away.

And that's exactly what Marvin Worthy and Gregory Maples did. Just what Mr. Welle said your

natural reaction would be. They got in the car that brought them there, and they got the hell out, and they left him (indicating) standing there holding the bag.

Barber told you Maples also got out of the Jeep, went to the Acura. He told you he saw Santos get out of the driver's side back seat of the Jeep, and sneak around the car with the gun in his hand.

Was that corroborated by anybody? Yeah, it was. It was corroborated by Renato Santos in his own statement to Sergeant Hayes. Out of his own mouth, he corroborates the witness that everybody wants you to believe is a stone-cold liar. And now I guess today they want you to believe he's a stone killer, too.

Barber says the victim made an effort to get out of the Jeep, he held the door shut. Is that corroborated? You bet. Right out of his own mouth again. Shots are fired. The victim scrambles. He's being murdered. He's being shot in the back, shot in the buttocks, shot in the arm.

He's trying to save his life, and he does the only thing he can do. He starts to scramble like a madman out of that Jeep. And he falls, he hits his head, and he gets up, and, as best he can, he runs. And what does Barber tell you the next thing that happens? Santos starts to chase him and shoot at him.

Is that corroborated by anybody? Well, again, out of his own mouth, to Sergeant Hayes. But it's also corroborated by Maria Arenas, who heard the first group of shots, got up from her dining room table, looked out her window, where she could see clear as a bell.

And I make no apology to Mr. Welle for having these pictures taken last week. If I get information about this case tonight, we'll investigate. I don't care how late it is. Look at the pictures. She's got a clear view. She sees somebody running after somebody else, obviously Santos running after Rashon Roy, shooting at him. She hears shots, and she says to her husband and the other people in her dining room: They're killing him.

Well, that certainly corroborates what Barber told you. What does he say happened next? When Santos is done executing the victim, he comes back to the parking lot. And Barber and Inwin are scrambling around like madmen. They can't get in the van. The Acura's gone.

So in a fit of what's probably really a high level of stupidity, they jump in the Jeep where the shooting started. Not the brightest move in the world. But in the process, they take off, and as did Mr.

Maples and Mr. Worthy then took off in the Acura, they leave Santos there. They get the hell away from him.

But what Barber told you on the witness stand, what Barber told the police during his third interview, I suppose it was after the guns were recovered, is that Santos threw the gun in the Jeep while he was trying to get in. Was that corroborated?

Well, yeah, that's corroborated by Mr. Dunn:
"I saw the third guy throw something in the Jeep, and
then he, yeah, I thought he got in, but I'm not sure,"
'cause the Jeep's moving, and his view is clear up to a
point, but once it starts to move, it's not as clear.

It's corroborated by Mario Molina: I looked out my window after the shots, my wife was very upset, I looked out, and here comes this guy. He's black, but he's not very, very black, coming back. He runs over by the Jeep. Two other guys get in the Jeep. This guy tries to get in, and I see him throw something.

That's two witnesses in addition to Barber.

And by the way, it came out of his mouth again in that statement to Sergeant Hayes.

You know, folks, you've heard a couple of times about the 200-years-plus that we have been doing trials in this country. The Judge likes to talk about the 200-year tradition of the 12:30 lunch. But we have

been doing trials for that long, and we haven't had all this forensic stuff that's been around now for the last few years. You don't have to have it.

And there's two things I have to say about it. When you have it, it's great. Excellent stuff. But I'm going to ask you to disabuse whatever notions you have of what's out there and what's available based on what you see on television. I find "CSI" very entertaining because it's so out-there. It's makebelieve.

You heard Sergeant Armstrong talk about no, we compare fingerprints. You don't have those computers that pop them up and match them for you. You don't get DNA during your bathroom break. Things take a lot of time, they're very involved, chey're very expensive, but when you do get them, they can tell you some things.

when you don't get them, they don't tell you anything. The absence of forensic evidence doesn't prove a thing. And you heard me ask Detective Frey the other day, "You don't leave any fingerprints out there and you don't leave any DNA, does that prove you weren't here today? Absolutely not."

Let's talk about what we do have. His fingerprint on an item in that Jeep. Twenty-two of his

fingerprints, including on items that also contained the victim's fingerprint.

We have two bullets that match the gun that you were told, not only by Ernesto Barber, not only by Ernesto Barber, but by Halim Shabazz, looks like the gun that Marvin Worthy had on Thursday the 25th and on Sunday the 28th.

Mr. Kinarney mentioned something this morning, I'm not sure what he was talking about. Yeah, one of the bullets that was taken from the victim's chest matches that gun. But he said something about a bullet under the body, a ricochet? The shot to the upper back was one of the bullets that was removed from Mr. Roy's body. That's the one that Dr. Park told you lacerated the subclavian artery? It was lodged in his rib.

And that bullet was of no ballistic value to Mr. Barrett. He can't say what gun it came from.

Couple of other things Without getting into too high-tech of a situacion, we did something with Detective Frey. We had him count the bullet holes in the victim's clothes.

Now, we know the victim was hit four times.

He was hit in the arm. That was probably the round
that ricocheted off the vehicle next to it, so, you

know, he was in or just getting out of the Jeep when that bullet hit him.

He was shot in the buttocks. There was an exit wound on his thigh, but no exit on his pants, so most likely that's the bullet that wound up in the parking lot that came from that gun. As he was running, it probably tumbled down his leg.

We know he had two more in his back. But Detective Frey pointed out two other spots on those clothing -- on those clothes where bullets apparently went through. What does that tell you?

Well, the guns are recovered. The five-shot revolver's got five empty casings in it, and the other revolver that matches two of the bullets is a six-shot revolver, but it only had four spent usings. Six shots in this case means that both guns were used. Six shots means that both guns were used.

One other thing I forgot to mention a few minutes ago in talking about corroborating evidence, Lisa Santana not only told you about Thursday night, and how the victim and his brother were not themselves, she also told you that that Sunday morning he made several phone calls to her, where he just, in a very nervous way, said: "Get my brother, get Bus." That's Hakeem. "Get him."

These calls are coming in probably when he's with Worthy and Maples and Santos. What did Santos say to Sergeant Hayes? "When I snuck up on him, he was on his cell phone."

There have been a lot of other things that have been said here today. Mr. Kinarney just flat-out accused Sergeant Hayes of lying. Where is the tape? well, he can't take a tape. Once Santos says, "I'm done talking," he can't say anything else to him. That's just the way it is.

He says you have to take Hayes' word for it?

Well, you heard Sergeant Hayes tell you yesterday, or a

couple of days ago -- excuse me -- that once Santos

told him what happened, he brought Sergeant Isnardi

back in the room, and Santos repeater it in front of

Sergeant Isnardi.

Now, do you think for one second that if Mr. Kinarney thought Sergeant Isnardi was going to say something different than Sergeant Hayes said, he wouldn't have brought him in here? And if Hayes was going to lie about it, since, as Mr. Kinarney reported out this morning, his report wasn't filled out for about seven or eight days, why wouldn't he doctor-up the motive about who was getting run over in Philly?

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Because by then, he knows, at least from Barber and from both Shabazz brothers, that it was Maples who claimed he had a problem with the victim trying to kill him in Philly, not Santos having that problem. So if you are going to lie about it, why not implicate Maples through Santos, and make the stories all match up?

Now, what's going on in there that Sunday afternoon is, Santos is covering for these guys, probably some misguided notion of macho or what being a stand-up guy is all about, but that's what's going on there.

Once the Jeep left the parking lot Sunday. and Irwin and Barber took it into the woods, the only evidence you have in this case is that Irwin tried to burn it. And I don't think there is any question that somebody tried to burn it, because, you know, it didn't spontaneously combust.

Might have been a little bit of overkill. actually putting an expert witness on to say that it was an intentionally set fire. You could see it in the photographs. But Barber told you his association with these guys was through him. Barber's got no reason to cover up for these guys, but he (indicating) certainly does.

Gregory Maples is the person who all the evidence points to as the one having the motive to kill Rashon Roy. It manifested itself in that incident in Yonkers, where guns were pulled by him, (indicating) and him (indicating), and it manifested itself on that Sunday, when that conspiracy came to fruition, when the plan was accomplished, when Rashon Roy was murdered by Marvin Worthy, Gregory Maples and Renato Santos.

If you look at all of the evidence, ladies and gentlemen, put it together, decide what's credible, what corroborates which parts, eliminate the nonsense, the things that the evidence doesn't support, that Barber and Bennett somehow, all of a sudden, became the shooters, without any evidence at all that that happened, put aside that stuff, look the evidence that you do have, and I would respectfully suggest to you that there is only one conclusion you can reach with respect to all charges and all defendants in that case.

And that would be that they're all guilty of each charge. And I ask you to return that verdict. Thank you.

THE COURT: "Gosh," you're probably saying, "what's he going to do now?" I appreciate the attention you're giving to our matter. I appreciate

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the agreement that we made when we selected you as to when you would be here and when you could be here.

My court clerk spoke with you, I think, just before you came over here. You had indicated, in accordance with our agreement, that you had certain commitments tomorrow; and, of course I respect that, and you're not going to be here tomorrow if you have commitments.

I think you also indicated to my clerk that you would be happy to return on Monday at nine; am I correct? So what I'm going to do now is to excuse you. I will have to talk to you for about an hour and 15 minutes or so. It's three o'clock, and you don't want to hear any more. You have heard an awful lot today. especially law. I mean, you might as well wait till Monday to get a law lesson; right?

So I'm going to excuse you, wish you all a happy and safe weekend. I ask you to return Monday at nine. By 10:30 you should be deliberating on the case. okay? Thank you once again for your attention.

Everybody remain in place until the jury leaves.

(Jury dismissed for the weekend.)

THE COURT: All right. In recess till Monday morning, nine o'clock.

(Matter in recess for the weekend.)

\* \* \*

CERTIFICATION

I, GAYLE L. GARRABRANDT, C.S.R., License

Number XI00737, an Official Court Reporter in and for

the State of New Jersey, do hereby certify the

foregoing to be prepared in full compliance with the

current Transcript Format for Judicial Proceedings and

is a true and accurate non-compressed transcript to the

best of my knowledge and ability.

GAYLE L. GARRABRANDT, C.S.R.,

Official Court Reporter

120 Hooper Avenue

Ocean County Courthouse Toms River, NJ 08753 10-12-04

1 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY OCEAN COUNTY - LAW DIVISION 2 CRIMINAL PART INDICTMENT NO. 02-09-01247 3 A.D.# A-6934-03-T1 4 5 STATE OF NEW JERSEY TRANSCRIPT RECEIVED 6 VS. OF TRIAL APPFI I ATE DIVICION 7 RENATO SANTOS, GREGORY MAPLES. MARVIN WORTHY. OCT 19 2004 8 JAMES IRWIN. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 9 Defendant. 10 place: Ocean County Courthouse 11 120 Hooper Avenue Toms River, New Jersey 12 Date: May 17 th. 2004 13 BEFORE: 14 HONORABLE EDWARD J. TURNBACH, J.S.C., and a Jury 15 TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY: Raymond S. Santiago, Esq. 16 (Santiago & Associates, PC) 17 APPEARANCES: 18 WILLIAM J. HEISLER, ESO. Assistant County Prosecutor 19 Attorney for the State. 20 JAMES R. KINARNEY, ESQ. Attorney for Defendant Santos. 21 22 23 GAYLE L. GARRABRANDT, C.S.R. Official Court Reporter 24 120 Hooper Avenue Ocean County Courthouse

Toms River, NJ 08753

APPEARANCES (Cont'd) PAUL E. ZAGER, ESQ. Attorney for Defendant Maples. LAWRENCE G. WELLE, ESQ. Attorney for Defendant Worthy. GEORGE B. SOMERS, JR., ESQ. (Takacs & Somers) Attorney for Defendant Irwin. 

(The following takes place in open court at 9:30 AM.)

THE COURT: Good morning. Please be seated.

All right. Ready to proceed, counsel?

THE ATTORNEYS: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Jury out.

(Jury in the box.)

THE COURT: Good morning to each of you. Good to see all of you back again. You have heard all of the testimonial evidence you're going to hear with regard to this case, and you're going to have with you in the jury room the various exhibits that I've marked into evidence for your consideration during your deliberations.

You have also heard the closing arguments of counsel, which of course are not evidence, but they serve a valuable purpose in that each attorney has urged you to view the evidence in one light or another, as advocates of their respective positions, leading to one conclusion or another.

It's now time for you to give your consideration and judgment to the charges in the indictment in the matter of State of New Jersey versus Marvin Worthy, Renato Santos, Gregory Maples and James Irwin. It's my function at this time to instruct you with regard to the principles of law that control the

case. As I indicated to you at the time you were selected, you're required to follow the law as given to you by the Court, in deciding the issues presented.

Now, while the Court is the only source of the law, you, members of the jury, are the sole judges of the facts in this case. You are the sole and exclusive judges of the facts, of the weight of the testimony, of the credibility of the witnesses, of the inferences to be drawn from the facts, and the ultimate conclusion to be reached upon all of the facts.

After you have made your factual determinations with regard to the evidence, you simply apply the principles of law you receive from the Court to the facts that you determined, and the result will be your verdict.

Now, if I or any of the attorneys, in referring to any of the evidence, were to state as my or their recollection of a fact something that didn't coincide with your recollection, you must be bound by your own recollection and reject that of Court or counsel. Your obligation is to decide this case in accordance with the facts as you find them.

Now, I indicated to you at the outset of the trial the fact that a defendant is standing trial as a result of an indictment by a grand jury is not evidence

and is not to be considered by you in arriving at your factual conclusions in this case.

An indictment is merely a legal document which informs a defendant of the charges brought against him by the State, and it provides the mechanism to bring those charges before a jury such as you for a determination with regard to the charges.

So now you know you're judges, judges of the facts, and the fact that the defendant has been brought to trial isn't evidence, so let's review again what is evidence.

Evidence consists of sworn testimony by witnesses here in this court before you, along with documents, pictures, physical objects and the like that the Court permits you to consider, and the inferences which you reasonably decide to draw therefrom. The credibility of the evidence is solely within your provision -- within your province. You are the sole judges of the facts.

Credible evidence is evidence which, in the light of reason and common sense, is worthy of belief. In order to be believed, testimony should not only proceed from the mouth of credible witnesses, but it also must be credible in itself. It must be such that the common experience of men and women such as

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yourselves can approve it as believable in the circumstances.

In this regard, you had the opportunity during the course of the trial to observe various witnesses appear here and testify.

In determining the weight you choose to place upon their testimony, that is, in determining whether a witness is worthy of belief and therefore credible, you may take into consideration the appearance and demeanor of the witness on the witness stand here: the manner with which the witness testified; the witness's interest in the outcome of the trial, if any; the witness's means of obtaining knowledge of the facts to which the witness testified; the witness's ability to reason, observe, recollect and relate to you; the possible bias, if any, in favor of the side for whom the witness testified; the extent to which, if at all, a witness is either corroborated or contradicted, supported or discredited by other evidence; whether the witness testified with an intent to deceive you; the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the testimony the witness has given to you; whether the witness has made prior inconsistent statements concerning material facts; and any and all other matters in evidence which serve to support or discredit the witness's testimony.

In this regard, you've heard evidence that several witnesses who appeared here and testified on behalf of the State have previously been convicted of crimes. I refer to Halim and Hakeem Shabazz, and Ernesto Barber. And counsel have brought out for you their prior criminal history.

This testimony about a prior conviction of a crime may only be used in determining the credibility or believability of the witness's testimony that you're considering. You, as a jury, have a right to consider whether a person who has previously failed to comply with society's rules, as demonstrated through a criminal conviction, would be more likely to ignore the oath requiring truthfulness on the witness stand than a law-abiding citizen.

You may consider, in determining this issue, the nature and degree of the prior convictions and when they occurred. You are not, however, obligated to change your opinion as to the credibility of a witness simply because of a prior conviction. It is evidence you may consider along with all the other evidence and factors discussed in determining the credibility of the witness in question.

Additionally, Ernesto Barber, one of the defendants in the indictment returned by the grand

jury -- he was charged with theft of the motor vehicle -- has pleaded guilty and testified on behalf of the State. The law requires that the testimony of such a witness be given careful scrutiny.

In weighing his testimony, therefore, you may consider whether he has a special interest in the outcome of the case, and whether his testimony was influenced by the hope or expectation of any special treatment or reward, or as a result of having received special treatment, or by any feelings of revenge or reprisal.

However, if you find the witness Mr. Barber to be credible and worthy of belief, you certainly can consider his testimony along with all the other evidence in the case in arriving at your conclusions with regard to the matter.

Additionally, there was offered for your consideration in this case an oral statement allegedly made to Sergeant Hayes by the defendant Renato Santos. It is your function to determine whether or not the statement was actually made by the defendant Santos and, if made, whether the statement or any portion of it is credible.

In considering whether or not an oral statement was actually made by a defendant and, if

made, whether it is credible, you should receive, weigh and consider this evidence with caution, based on the generally recognized risk of misunderstanding by the hearer or the ability of the hearer to recall accurately the words used by the defendant accurately.

The specific words used and the ability to remember them are important to the correct understanding of any oral communication, because the presence or absence or change of a single word may substantially change the true meaning of even the shortest sentence. You should, therefore, receive and weigh and consider such evidence with caution.

In considering whether or not the statement is credible, you should take into consideration the circumstances and facts as to how the statement was made, as well as all other evidence in the case relating to that issue.

If, after consideration of all these factors, you determine that the statement was not actually made, or that the statement is not credible, then you must disregard the statement completely. If, on the other hand, you find the statement was made, and that part or all of the statement is credible, you may give what weight you think appropriate to that portion of the statement you find to be truthful and credible.

Now, with regard to the alleged oral statement of the defendant Santos should you find that he made such statement and it was credible and it is credible, that statement is not to be considered as evidence against any of his co-defendants in this case, and is not to be considered by you at all in deciding the charges against the co-defendants. It was strictly and solely admitted with regard to the defendant Santos.

Also, evidence was introduced by counsel for the defendant on cross-examination of several witnesses as well as on direct examination of several officers called by the defendants, Investigator Mitchell, Velardi and Detective Finnegan, that at the time the witnesses made their initial statements to authorities, they said something or failed to say something which was inconsistent with their testimony here at trial.

In reviewing such evidence, you should consider whether such prior statements or omissions actually occurred and, if they did, whether they are inconsistent with the witness's testimony at trial. If you determine that to be so, it is evidence you may consider in judging the witness's credibility.

It may also be considered by you as substantive evidence, that is, proof of the truth of

what is stated or omitted in a prior statement; however, before deciding whether a prior inconsistent or omitted statement reflects the truth, in all fairness, you should consider all the circumstances under which the statement was made or failure to disclose occurred.

You should consider the extent of the inconsistency or omission, and the importance or lack of importance of the inconsistency or omission on the overall testimony of the witness you are considering as bearing upon his credibility.

You should consider such factors as where and when the prior statement was made or omission occurred, and the reasons or explanation, if any, given you therefor. The extent to which such inconsistencies or omissions affect the credibility of a witness or reflect the truth, then, is for you to determine.

Consider their materiality in relationship to the witness's entire testimeny and all the evidence in the case; when, where and the circumstances under which they were said or omitted; and whether the reasons given you therefor are believable and logical.

You should, of course, consider other evidence and inferences from other evidence, including statements of other witnesses or acts of the witness

and others disclosing other motives, if any, that the witness may have had to testify as he did, that is, reasons other than the witness gave you.

In a nutshell, members of the jury, it is your responsibility to weigh and consider all of the evidence in this case, accepting that which you find to be credible, rejecting that which you find not credible, and reaching your factual conclusions.

Additionally, you have heard testimony from certain witnesses that the Court permitted to testify as experts and give you opinion testimony. I refer to Dr. Park, with regard to forensic pathology;
Investigator Abrams with regard to cause and origins of fire; Sergeant Armstrong with regard to fingerprint examination identification; and Danier Barrett with regard to firearms and ballistics.

As a general rule, a witness is only permitted to testify concerning facts known by him. Ordinarily, a witness may not testify with regard to his opinion; however, an exception to this rule exists in the case of an expert witness, who may give opinion testimony as to a matter in which the witness is versed which is material to a case.

An expert witness is a witness who has some special knowledge, skill, experience or training that

is not possessed by the ordinary juror, and who thus may be able to provide assistance to the jury in its fact-finding duties.

As I told you at the time these witnesses testified, the fact that I permit them to testify as experts does not mean that I endorse their testimony. The merit and worth of their testimony is strictly within your province as jurors, judges of the facts, to determine.

You are not bound by the opinion of an expert witness any more than you are bound by any other fact that may be testified to in the case. You are not required to accept arbitrarily opinions offered to you.

In considering the opinions offered, you should evaluate the factual bases and reasons given you for them, as well as the expert's qualifications, training, and experience, and the expert's understanding of the matters to which he testified.

In sum, you are required upon your own responsibility to decide the questions of fact after a comparison and consideration of all the evidence, aided by the expert opinion, if in fact you decide the experts' opinions give you any aid or assistance.

Additionally with regard to the subject of evidence, your conclusion could be reached upon the

basis of direct evidence or circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both. Now, direct evidence is evidence which proves a fact without the necessity of you drawing any inference, and which, in itself, if you determine it to be true, conclusively establishes the fact in issue.

If I could give you an example of direct evidence, let's say that a witness appeared here and testified before you that he was in the kitchen of his residence, along with Peter and Eugene, and that Peter and Eugene became involved in a very heated and loud argument, and during the middle of the argument, Peter took a gun out and shot Eugene.

Well, if you determined that this witness was truthful and credible, you would have lirect evidence that Peter shot Eugene. Somebody actually saw it, you found that he was telling you the truth, you conclusively established that fact.

Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, is evidence which proves one fact from which an inference of the existence of another fact may be drawn. An inference is merely a deduction of fact that may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts established by the evidence.

To return to our example, if the witness who

appeared here and testified told you he wasn't in the kitchen but that he was in the family room adjoining the kitchen, and Peter and Eugene were in the kitchen, and he heard a loud argument going on in the kitchen, followed by a gunshot, and Peter walked into the family room with a gun in his hand, and the witness went into the kitchen and saw little Eugene on the floor with a bullet hole in him, well, once again, if you determined that this witness was truthful and credible, you could circumstantially infer that Peter shot Eugene.

The witness didn't see it; but, based upon what he was able to tell you, if you found it to be truthful and credible, you might logically and reasonably infer that Peter shot Eugene.

So your factual conclusions, then, with regard to the issues in this case can be based upon direct evidence or circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both.

In many cases, circumstantial evidence may be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence. But you must scrutinize it and evaluate it carefully. You must be satisfied that the inferences you draw are logical, reasonable, and supported by facts that are in evidence.

There is one area in all criminal cases where

circumstantial evidence always comes into play. That's with regard to the defendant's state of mind at the time he did a particular act.

I'm going to be discussing with you shortly the specific charges against each of the defendants in this matter. And you will see that when the legislature passed laws prohibiting certain conduct, it provided that if the person does something in certain instances purposely, in certain instances knowingly or in certain instances recklessly, he can be found guilty of having violated the law.

So, you see, the legislature imposes upon the State the obligation not only to prove that a person did a certain act, but that he did it with the requisite mental culpability.

How does this involve circumstantial evidence, and inferences logically and reasonably drawn from other proven facts? Well, the State cannot produce for you an exhibit showing what's in a person's mind at the time he did a certain act. Any person, you or I, when we do something, we normally don't say: I'm doing this purposely, or I'm doing this knowingly, or I'm acting recklessly.

So in deciding the nature of the person's conduct, that is, whether his actions were purposeful,

knowing or reckless, it's important for you to consider the factual circumstances surrounding the person's actions; that is, well, what is it that he did, how did he do it? What did he do before he did it? What did he do after he did it? What, if anything, did he say? What do all the surrounding circumstances and facts which have been proven indicate?

Your determination, then, with regard to a person's mental culpability can be based upon what you logically and reasonably can infer from other facts established by the evidence.

Now, I told you during the selection process, and I will tell you again, the defendant in all criminal cases is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That presumption continues throughout the entire trial of the case, and into your deliberations, until such time arrives, if it arrives, that you determine the State has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The burden of proof is on the State, and it never shifts. There is no burden with respect to proof imposed upon a defendant. The defendant is not required to prove his innocence, and indeed not required to present any evidence or testimony at all. The State has the burden to prove the crime charged and

each of its elements beyond a reasonable doubt; and if it failed to do so, a defendant is entitled to be found not guilty.

Now, I mentioned again the State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Some of you may have served as jurors in civil cases, where you were told that it's necessary only to prove that a fact is more likely true than not true. In criminal cases, the State's proof must be more powerful than that. It must be beyond a reasonable doubt.

what is a reasonable doubt? A reasonable doubt is an honest and reasonable uncertainty in your mind about the guilt of a defendant after you have given full and impartial consideration to all of the evidence. A reasonable doubt can arise from the evidence itself or from a lack of evidence.

It is a doubt that a reasonable person hearing the same evidence would have. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof, for example, that leaves you firmly convinced of a defendant's guilt.

In this world we know very few things with absolute certainty. In criminal cases, the law does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that a defendant is guilty of a

crime charged, you must find him guilty.

If, on the other hand, you are not firmly convinced of a defendant's guilt, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty.

During the course of the trial, counsel for the State or the defendant made various objections, and the Court was called upon to make a number of rulings on admission of evidence, you know, the interminable side-bar conferences, okay?

You must understand that the attorneys not only have a right but a duty to make objections that they feel are appropriate, and the fact that the Court ruled for or against any particular party on any particular objection is really of no consequence to you. It's purely a ruling of the Court on a matter of law, which is the Court's responsibility. And you are not to be influenced in any way by the fact that the attorneys made various objections.

Now, finally, the defendants Renato Santos, Gregory Maples and James Irwin have chosen not to be witnesses. It is their constitutional right to remain silent. You are not to consider for any purpose or in any manner in arriving at your verdict the fact that a defendant did not testify; nor should that fact enter into your deliberations or discussions in any manner or

at any time. Each defendant is presumed innocent until the State proves him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Those, members of the jury, are basic charges that are given to every jury in every criminal case, no matter what the crime alleged is involved. I'm going to take up with you now the law with regard to the specific case that you've heard here.

In order for you to appropriately consider the issues presented in this case, it is necessary for me to instruct you initially on the principles of our state law with regard to individual responsibility for criminal acts.

This is so because, as you are aware, the State is charging three defendants, Marvin Worthy, Renato Santos and Gregory Maples, with the murder of Rashon Roy. It is also charging them with conspiracy to commit the murder. The State is alleging that two handguns were fired during the commission of the murder.

You will note that I am and will be constantly using the term, "alleging." This is so because only you, as judges of the facts, can decide whether the State has proven what it alleges beyond a reasonable doubt. If you find that it has proven an allegation beyond a reasonable doubt, then an

allegation becomes a fact; but unless it has and until it has, you certainly can not attribute criminal responsibility to anyone based upon a mere allegation.

Now, a portion of our state law provides as follows: A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or by both.

Thus, you see, there are three ways in which a person can be found guilty of an offense: One, if it is committed by his own conduct. You often hear the term "perpetrator" used in this regard. Two, if he joins with another person or persons in actual commission of an offense. An example of this might be a situation where three individuals, each armed with a handgun, enter a store and commit a robbery.

The third way a person can be found guilty of an offense is when the offense is committed by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable. In this regard, a portion of our state law provides as follows: A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when, one, he is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of an offense, or two, he is engaged in a conspiracy with such other person to commit the

offense.

Let me instruct you first on the law of accomplice liability or responsibility. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when he is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of an offense.

A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he either solicits such other person to commit the offense and/or aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it.

This provision of our state law means not only is the person who actually commits the criminal act responsible for it, but one who is legally accountable as an accomplice is also responsible. Now, this responsibility as an accomplice may be equal and the same as he who actually commits the crime, or there may be responsibility in a different degree, depending on the circumstances as you find them to be. I will further explain this distinction to you shortly.

In this case, the State is alleging that if any specific defendant did not actually commit the murder of Rashon Roy, that such defendant is equally guilty of that crime because he acted as an accomplice

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to the defendant who actually committed the murder, with the purpose that the murder be committed.

In order for you to find the defendant quilty in this case of the crime of murder as an accomplice, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements: One, that one of the three defendants, Marvin Worthy, Renato Santos or Gregory Maples, actually committed the crime of murder, which I will be defining for you shortly; two, that the defendant you are considering either solicited him to commit it, and/or aided or agreed or attempted to aid him in planning or committing it; three, that the defendant you're considering's purpose was to promote or facilitate the commission of the murder of Rashon Roy; and four, that the defendant you're considering possessed the criminal state of mind that is required to be proved against the person who actually committed the murder.

One acts purposely with respect to his conduct or a result thereof if it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result. The term "solicit" means to strongly urge, suggest, lure or proposition. The term "aid" means to assist, support, or supplement the efforts of another.

"Agree to aid" means to encourage by promise of assistance or support. "Attempt to aid" means that a person takes substantial steps in a course of conduct designed to or planned to lend support or assistance in the efforts of another to cause the commission of the offense.

If you find that a defendant you're considering, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the murder of Rashon Roy, solicited one of the other defendants to commit it, and/or aided or agreed or attempted to aid him in planning or committing it, then you should consider him as if he committed the crime himself.

To prove a defendant's liability, the State does not have to prove his accomplice status by direct evidence of a formal plan to commit the crime. There does not have to be a verbal agreement by all those who are charged. Proof may be circumstantial. Participation and agreement can be established from conduct as well as from spoken words.

Mere presence at or near the scene does not make one a participant in the crime; nor does the failure of a spectator to interfere make him a participant in the crime. It is, however, a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence

in determining whether he was present as an accomplice.

Presence is not, in itself, a conclusive evidence of that fact. Whether presence has any probative value depends upon the total circumstances. To constitute guilt, there must exist a community of purpose and actual participation in the crime committed.

Now, while mere presence at the scene of perpetration of a crime does not render a person a participant in it, proof that one is present at the scene of the commission of the crime without disapproving or opposing it is evidence from which, in connection with other circumstances, it is possible for a jury to infer that he assented thereto, lent it his countenance and approval, and was thereby aiding in same.

It depends upon the totality of the circumstances as those circumstances appear from the evidence.

Remember that a defendant can be held to be an accomplice with equal responsibility only if you find that, as a fact, that he possessed the criminal state of mind that is required to be proved against the person who actually committed the crime of murder.

In order to convict a defendant as an

accomplice to a specific crime charged, you must find that the defendant had the purpose to participate in that particular crime, that is, murder. He must act with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the crime of murder with which he is charged.

Now, it's not sufficient to prove only that the defendant had knowledge that another person was going to commit the crime. The State must prove that it was a defendant's conscious objective that the specific crime charged be committed.

In sum, then, in order to find any one of the defendants charged guilty of committing the crime of murder as an accomplice, the State must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: one, that any one of the three defendants committed the crime of the murder of Rashon Roy; two, that the defendant you're considering either solicited him to commit and/or aided or agreed to aid or attempted to aid him in planning and committing it; three, that the defendant you're considering's purpose was to promote or facilitate the commission of the murder; and four, that the defendant you're considering possessed the criminal state of mind that is required to be proved against the person who actually committed the murder.

Now, as I previously indicated, in considering any of the defendants' liability as an accomplice, you will initially consider whether the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted as an accomplice with full and equal responsibility for the crime of murder.

However, if you find a defendant was an accomplice to commission of the crime, but did not act with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the crime of murder, or did not possess the criminal state of mind required to be proved against the person who commits murder, then you should consider whether the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, as an accomplice, is guilty of a lesser offense than the crime of murder.

In this regard, I have told you that I will be instructing you on the elements of the crime of murder. You will see that when I do, I will also be instructing you on the lesser charges of aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter.

Our law recognizes that two or more persons may participate in the commission of an offense, but each may participate therein with a different state of mind.

The liability or responsibility of each

participant in an offense is dependent upon his own state of mind and not anyone else's, so that in considering each defendant, you will do so separately, and consider the evidence or lack thereof with regard to his responsibility or liability as an accomplice.

And should you find the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he was an accomplice, you would also consider, separately as to each, whether the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he was an accomplice to the crime of murder or the lesser offense of aggravated manslaughter or reckless manslaughter.

Now, as I have indicated to you, a person may be held liable for a criminal act if he commits the act himself, if he commits the act jointly with another, and if he is an accomplice to another who commits the act.

Our state law also provides a person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when he is engaged in a conspiracy with another person or persons who commit a crime, and the crime committed is within the scope of the conspiracy.

That, then, members of the jury, constitutes the various ways in which a defendant can be held responsible for a criminal act under our state law.

The initial charge the State has brought against the defendants Marvin Worthy, Renato Santos and Gregory Maples is conspiracy. And I'll instruct you now on the law regarding that criminal offense.

The State initially charges the defendants
Marvin Worthy, Renato Santos and Gregory Maples with
the criminal offense of conspiracy to murder Rashon
Roy. The State alleges that they conspired to
purposely or knowingly cause his death, or serious
bodily injury resulting in his death, between April
25th and April 28th, 2002, the date on which Rashon Roy
died.

Our state statute pertaining to the criminal offense of conspiracy provides in relevant part as follows: A person is guilty of a conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the crime, he agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes the crime, or he agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of the crime.

A conspiracy to commit the crime of murder is a crime in itself, separate and distinct from the crime of murder. In other words, a defendant may be found

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guilty of the crime of conspiracy regardless of whether Defendant's guilty or not guilty of the crime of murder.

In order for you to find any one of the defendants guilty of the crime of conspiracy, the State must prove the following elements which constitute that crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

One, that the defendant you're considering agreed with one or more of the charged defendants that they or one or more of them would engage in conduct which constitutes the crime of the murder of Rashon Roy, and that agreement continued into the day of Sunday, April 28th, 2002, when Mr. Roy was murdered; or two, that the defendant you're considering agreed to aid one or more of the other charged "fendants in the planning or commission of the murder of Rashon Roy, and that he did so up until and including Sunday, April 28th, 2002, the date on Rashon Roy was murdered; and two (sic), the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the purpose of the defendant you're considering was to promote or facilitate the commission of the murder of Rashon Roy.

Now, a person acts purposely with respect to the nature of the conduct or a result thereof if it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that

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nature or to cause such a result. A person acts purposely with respect to the circumstances attendant to his conduct if he is aware of the existence of such circumstances, or believes or hopes that they exist.

In order to find a defendant guilty of the crime of conspiracy, the State does not have to prove that he actually committed the crime of murder; however, to decide whether the State has proven the crime of conspiracy, you must understand what constitutes the crime of murder. I will be instructing you on that shortly.

A conspiracy, again, can be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. It is not essential that there be direct contact among all the conspirators or that they enter into the agreement at the same time. If the defendant is aware that any person he conspired with also conspired with others to commit the same crime, the defendant is guilty of conspiring with the others. He need not be aware of their identity.

Mere association, acquaintance or family relationship with an alleged conspirator is not enough to establish a defendant's guilt of conspiracy; nor is mere awareness of the existence of the conspiracy; nor would it be sufficient for the State to prove only that the defendant met with others or discussed names and

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interests in common. However, any one of these factors, if present, may be taken into consideration along with all the other relevant evidence in your deliberations.

You have to decide whether the defendant's purpose was that he or a person with whom he was conspiring would commit the crime of murder. For him to be found guilty of conspiracy, the State has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that when he agreed, it was his conscious object or purpose to promote or make it easier to commit the crime of murder.

The nature of the purpose with which a defendant acted is a question of fact, again, for you to decide.

Purpose is a condition of the mind which cannot be seen, and can only be determined by inferences from conduct, words or acts. It is not necessary for the State to produce a witness or witnesses who could testify that the defendant stated, for example, that he acted with a specific purpose.

It is within your power to find that proof of purpose has been furnished beyond a reasonable doubt by inferences which may arise from the nature of the acts and the surrounding circumstances.

In summary, the State must prove the

following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: One, that the defendant agreed with another person or persons that they or one or more of them would engage in conduct which constitutes the crime of murder of Rashon Roy, and that agreement continued up to the morning, Sunday morning, April 28th, 2002, or that the defendant agreed to aid another person or persons in the planning or commission of the crime of murder, and that agreement and aid continued up until the morning of Sunday, April 28th, 2002; and two, that the defendant's purpose was to promote or facilitate the commission of the murder of Rashon Roy.

If, after considering all of the evidence.

If, after considering all of the evidence, you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the State has proven all of these elements, then you must find the defendant guilty of the crime of conspiracy. On the other hand, if you find the State has failed to prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more these elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of the crime of conspiracy.

Now, each offense and each defendant in this indictment and the evidence pertaining to him should be considered by you separately. The fact that you may find a particular defendant guilty or not guilty of a particular crime should not control your verdict as to

any other offense charged against the defendant, and it should not control your verdict as to the charges against any other defendant.

So that's the first crime charged with regard to the matter, conspiracy to commit murder.

The next charge brought by the State is that the defendants Marvin Worthy, Renato Santos and Gregory Maples committed the criminal offense of murder, in Lakewood, on April 28th, 2002, by purposely or knowingly causing the death of Rashon Roy, or by purposely or knowingly causing serious bodily injury to Rashon Roy resulting in his death.

Our state statute pertaining to the crime of murder provides as follows: A person is guilty of murder if he caused the victim's deat' or serious bodily injury that resulted in his death; and two, if he did so purposely or knowingly.

In order for you to find any one of the defendants guilty of murder, the State is required to prove each of the following elements which constitute that crime beyond a reasonable doubt: One, that the defendant you are considering caused Rashon Roy's death, or serious bodily injury that then resulted in his death, or that the defendant you're considering was an accomplice and equally responsible for that act as I

have defined accomplice responsibility for you, or that the defendant you're considering entered into a conspiracy to commit that act and is responsible for the murder of Rashon Roy as I have defined conspiracy and conspiracy responsibility to you; and two, that the defendant you're considering did so purposely or knowingly, or that the defendant you're considering was an accomplice, as I have defined accomplice responsibility for you, and possessed that same state of mind, or that the defendant you're considering is responsible as a conspirator as I have defined that for you.

Now, one of the elements the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that a defendant acted purposely or knowingly. A person acts purposely when it is the person's conscious object to cause death or serious bodily injury resulting in death. A person acts knowingly when the person is aware that it is practically certain his conduct will cause death or serious bodily injury resulting in death.

The nature of the purpose or knowledge with which a defendant acted toward Rashon Roy is a question of fact for you, the jury, to decide. Purpose and knowledge are conditions of the mind which cannot be seen and can only be determined by inferences from

conduct, words or acts.

It is not necessary for the State to produce a witness or witnesses who could testify that the defendant stated, for example, that his purpose was to cause death or serious bodily injury resulting in death, or that he knew that his conduct would cause death or serious bodily injury resulting in death.

It is within your power to find that proof of purpose or knowledge has been furnished beyond a reasonable doubt by inferences which may arise from the nature of the acts and the surrounding circumstances.

Such things as the place where the acts occurred, the weapon used, the location, number and nature of wounds inflicted, and all that was done or said by a defendant preceding, connected with, and immediately succeeding the events leading to the death of Rashon Roy, are among the circumstances to be considered.

Although the State must prove that the defendant acted either purposely or knowingly, the State is not required to prove a motive. If the State has proved the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant may be found guilty of that offense regardless of the defendant's motive or lack of motive.

If the State, however, has proved a motive, you may consider that insofar as it gives meaning to other circumstances. On the other hand, you may consider the absence of motive in weighing whether or not Defendant was guilty of the crime charged.

Now, homicide or a killing with a deadly weapon such as a firearm in itself would permit you to draw an inference that the defendant's purpose was to take life or to cause bodily injury resulting in death. A deadly weapon is any firearm which, in the manner it is used or intended to be used, is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.

In your deliberations you may consider the weapon used, and manner and circumstances of the killing. And if you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant shot and killed Rashon Roy with a gun, you may draw an inference from the weapon used, that is, the gun, and manner and circumstances of the killing, as to the defendant's purpose or knowledge.

The other element the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant caused Rashon Roy's death, or serious bodily injury resulting in death. As I previously advised you, in order to convict a defendant of murder, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant either

purposely or knowingly caused the victim's death or serious bodily injury resulting in death.

In that regard, serious bodily injury means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death.

A substantial risk of death exists where it's highly probable that the injury would result in death.

In order for you to find a defendant guilty of purposeful serious-bodily-injury murder, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it was the defendant's conscious object to cause serious bodily injury that then resulted in the victim's death, that the defendant knew that the injury created a substantial risk of death, and that it was highly probable that death would result.

In order for you to find a defendant guilty of knowing serious-bodily-injury murder, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware that it was practically certain that his conduct would cause serious bodily injury that then resulted in the victim's death, that the defendant knew that the injury created a substantial risk of death, and that it was highly probable that death would result.

Whether the killing is committed purposely or knowingly, causing death or serious bodily injury resulting in death must be within the design or

contemplation of the defendant.

Now, all jurors do not have to agree unanimously concerning which form of murder is present, so long as all believe that it was one form of murder or the other; however, for a defendant to be found guilty of murder, all must agree that the defendant either knowingly or purposely caused the death or serious bodily injury resulting in the death of Rashon Roy, or is responsible for that act pursuant to the law of accomplice responsibility or conspiracy responsibility as I've defined that for you.

If you find that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant you're considering purposely or knowingly caused death or serious bodily injury resulting in death, or is responsible for that act pursuant to the law of accomplice responsibility or conspiracy responsibility, then you must find the defendant guilty.

If, on the other hand, you determine the State has failed to prove any one of the required elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant not guilty of murder, and go on and consider whether the defendant should be convicted of the crimes of aggravated manslaughter or reckless manslaughter.

I once again remind you that each offense and each defendant in the indictment and the evidence pertaining to him should be considered by you separately. The fact that you may find a particular defendant guilty or not guilty of a particular crime should not control your verdict as to any other offense charged against the defendant, and it should not control your verdict as to the charges against any other defendant.

Now, with regard to aggravated manslaughter, our state law pertaining to the crime of aggravated manslaughter provides as follows: A person is guilty of aggravated manslaughter if he recklessly causes the death of another person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life.

In order for you to find any one of the defendants you are considering guilty of aggravated manslaughter, the State is required to prove each of the following elements which constitute that offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

One, that the defendant caused Rashon Roy's death, or that the defendant was an accomplice and equally responsible for that act, or that the defendant entered into the conspiracy to commit that act and is responsible on that basis for it; and two, that the

defendant did so recklessly or was an accomplice who acted recklessly or is responsible as a conspirator; and three, that the defendant did so under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, or was an accomplice who acted under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, or is responsible as a conspirator.

One element the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that a defendant acted recklessly. A person who causes another's death does so recklessly when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death will result from his conduct.

The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the defendant's conduct and the circumstances known to the defendant, his disregard of that risk is a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would follow in the same situation.

In other words, you must find that the defendant was aware of and consciously disregarded the risk of causing death. If you find that the defendant was aware of and consciously disregarded the risk of causing death, you must determine whether that risk that he disregarded was substantial and unjustifiable.

In doing so, you must consider the nature and purpose of the defendant's conduct, and the circumstances known to the defendant, and you must determine whether, in light of those factors, the defendant's disregard of that risk was a gross deviation from the conduct that a reasonable person would have observed in the defendant's position.

Another element the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant acted under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life. The phrase, "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life," does not focus on a defendant's state of mind, but rather on the circumstances under which you find he acted.

If, in light of all the evidence, you find that the defendant's conduct resulted in a probability as opposed to a possibility of death, then you may find that he acted under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life. On the other hand, if you find that his conduct resulted in only a possibility of death, then you must acquit him of aggravated manslaughter and consider the offense of reckless manslaughter, which I will explain to you shortly.

The final element the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant caused Rashon

Roy's death. You must find that Rashon Roy would not have died but for the defendant's conduct.

If you find the State has proven, then, beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant you are considering recklessly caused Rashon Roy's death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, or is responsible for that act pursuant to the law of accomplice responsibility or conspiracy responsibility, you must find the defendant guilty of aggravated manslaughter.

If, on the other hand, you determine the State has failed to prove any one of the required elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant not guilty of aggravated manslaughter, and go on to consider whether a defendant should be convicted of the crime of reckless manslaughter.

Our state law pertaining to reckless manslaughter provides as follows: A person is guilty of reckless manslaughter if he recklessly causes the death of another person. In order for you to find any one of the defendants you are considering guilty of reckless manslaughter, the State is required to prove each of the following elements which constitute that offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

One, that the defendant caused Rashon Roy's

death, or two, that the defendant was an accomplice and equally responsible for that act, or three, that the defendant entered into a conspiracy to commit that act and is responsible on that basis for it; and two (sic), that the defendant did so recklessly or was an accomplice who acted recklessly, or is responsible as a conspirator.

Now, the first element the State must prove is that the defendant acted recklessly; and I've just defined "recklessly" for you with regard to aggravated manslaughter. The second element the State must prove is that the defendant caused Rashon Roy's death. You must find that Rashon Roy would not have died but for the defendant's conduct.

The difference between aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter is that with regard to aggravated manslaughter, the State must prove that third element, that the defendant acted under circumstances manifesting excreme indifference to human life. Okay?

If you find the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant you're considering recklessly caused Rashon Roy's death, or is responsible for that act pursuant to the law of accomplice responsibility or conspiracy responsibility, you must

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find the defendant guilty of reckless manslaughter.

If, on the other hand, you determine the State has failed to prove any one of the required elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not quilty of reckless manslaughter.

Now, with regard to the charge, charges of murder and lesser included charges of aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter, as I've indicated to you in instructing you, to return a verdict of guilty or not guilty, the verdict must be unanimous.

However, due to the various ways in which a defendant may be found responsible for any one of these criminal offenses, that is, as a perpetrator or an accomplice or a conspiracy responsibility, a unanimous verdict can be returned even though all 12 of the jurors do not agree on the responsibility basis.

If all 12 jurors find that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that any defendant is guilty of any one of these offenses, but all 12 do not agree on the basis of the responsibility, a unanimous verdict can be returned.

For example, if six jurors were to determine that a given defendant was guilty as a perpetrator, and six jurors determined that the given defendant, the

same defendant, was guilty as an accomplice, you would have reached a unanimous verdict. All 12 would have found the defendant guilty and responsible.

This is not to suggest that I have any opinion that any of the defendants are guilty. I do not. That is not my role as the judge of the law. It is solely your role as judges of the facts to determine whether the State has proven any defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Now, then there are two charges against -one charge each against the defendants Marvin worthy
and Renato Santos of possession of a firearm with a
purpose to use it unlawfully against the person of
another. The State charges the defendants Marvin
Worthy and Renato Santos with the criminal offense of
possession of a firearm with the purpose to use it
unlawfully against the person of another.

The State alleges that on April 28th, 2002, the defendant Marvin Worthy and the defendant Renato Santos each possessed a firearm at the Highpoint condominium complex with the purpose to shoot Rashon Roy.

The relevant portion of our state law pertaining to this offense provides as follows: Any person who has in his possession any firearm with the

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purpose to use it unlawfully against the person of another is guilty of a crime.

In order for you to find either defendant. that is, Marvin Worthy or Renato Santos, quilty of this offense, the State must prove each of the following elements which constitute the offense beyond a reasonable doubt: That Exhibits S-2 and S-3 in evidence are firearms; two, that the defendant whose charge you're considering possessed one of the firearms; three, that the defendant whose charge you're considering possessed the firearm with the purpose to use it against the person of Rashon Roy; and four, that the defendant whose charge you're considering's purpose was to use the firearm unlawfully.

Now, the first element the State must prove is that S-2 and S-3 are firearms. A firearm means any handgun from which may be fired a bullet. Handgun means any pistol, revolver or other firearm originally designed or manufactured to be fired by the use of a single hand.

The second element the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant you're considering possessed the firearm. Now, under our law, the word "possess" as used in criminal statutes signifies a knowing, intentional control of a

designated thing, accompanied by knowledge of its character.

Thus, a person must know or be aware that he possesses the item, in this case one of the firearms; and two, he must know what it is that he does possess, that is, that it is a firearm.

Now, a person can possess an item even though it's not physically on his person at the time of his arrest, if the person had, in fact, at some time prior to his arrest, control and dominion over it. And specifically, the State is charging that each defendant charged here possessed one of those firearms at the condominium complex on the morning of April 28th, 2002.

When we speak of possession, then, we mean a conscious, knowing possession. A person is in actual possession of a particular article or thing when he knows what it is, that is, that it was a gun, and he knows that he has it on him.

Now, the third element the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant's purpose in possessing the firearm was to use it against the person of Rashon Roy. Purpose is a condition of the mind which cannot be seen and, again, can only be determined by inferences from conduct, words or acts.

In determining the defendant's purpose in

possessing the firearm, you may consider that a person acts purposely with respect to the nature of his conduct or a result of his conduct if it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result.

A person acts purposely if he means to act in a certain way or to cause a certain result. A person acts purposely with respect to the circumstances attendant to his conduct if he's aware of the existence of such circumstances or believes or hopes that they exist.

And the fourth element the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant had a purpose to use the firearm in a manner that was prohibited by law.

I have already defined "purpose" for you.

This element requires that you find the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed a firearm with the conscious objective, design or specific intent to use it against the person of another in an unlawful manner.

And in this case, the State contends and must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's purpose in possessing the firearm was for the unlawful purpose of shooting Rashon Roy.

Now, if you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the State has proven each and every one of the elements of this offense as I have defined them, beyond a reasonable doubt, with regard to either Defendant Worthy or Santos, then you should find that defendant guilty; however, if the State has failed to prove any one of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find that defendant not guilty.

Again you are reminded that you must consider each defendant individually and the evidence related to the charge against him separately, and your verdict as to either one does not control your verdict as to the other.

Now I'm going to take up with you the charges with regard to the defendant James Irwin. The State initially charges the defendant James Irwin with the criminal offense of hindering apprehension.

The State alleges that on April 28th, 2002, this defendant, with the purpose to hinder the apprehension and prosecution of Marvin Worthy and/or Renato Santos and/or Gregory Maples, suppressed evidence of the crime of criminal homicide, the murder of Rashon Roy, specifically suppressed -- the State alleges he suppressed the weapons used in the murder, and the green Jeep used by the perpetrators thereof.

Now, our state law pertaining to this offense provides as follows: A person commits an offense if, with the purpose to hinder the detection, apprehension, investigation, prosecution, conviction or punishment of another person for an offense, he suppresses, by way of concealment or destruction, any evidence of the crime.

In order for you to find the defendant James
Irwin guilty of hindering apprehension, the State is
required to prove each of the following elements which
constitute that offense beyond a reasonable doubt:
One, that the defendant James Irwin knew that Marvin
Worthy and/or Renato Santos and/or Gregory Maples were
likely to be charged with criminal homicide or
conspiracy to commit that crime. Criminal homicide is
murder, aggravated manslaughter or recatess
manslaughter.

Two, that the defendant James Irwin suppressed by way of concealment evidence of that crime, specifically two handgurs and the green Jeep; and three, that the defendant James Irwin did so with the purpose to hinder the detection, apprehension investigation and prosecution of Marvin Worthy and/or Renato Santos and/or Gregory Maples.

Now, the first element the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt to this crime, then, is --

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beyond a reasonable doubt, is that the defendant must have known that Marvin Worthy and/or Renato Santos and/or Gregory Maples was liable to be charged with the crime of criminal homicide or conspiracy.

This does not mean that the State must prove that he had actual personal knowledge that any one of them had committed the offense, but rather that he knew such facts either by his own observation or by information given to him as it would reasonably alert someone that one of the three or all of the three were likely to be charged with that offense.

The second element the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant suppressed, by way of concealment, evidence of the crime, specifically two handguns and the green Jeep.

And the third element the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant acted with the purpose of hindering Marvin Worthy's and/or Renato Santos' and/or Gregory Maples' apprehension, prosecution for -- and prosecution for the crime of criminal homicide and/or conspiracy.

Again, defendant must act with that purpose, and I've already defined "purpose" for you. A purpose to aid another to avoid arrest is not proved merely by showing that the defendant helped someone who is a

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fugitive, for such help may be provided with motivations having nothing to do with impeding law enforcement.

Here, the objective of the defendant must have been to obstruct, to prevent, to hinder authorities from arresting, prosecuting, convicting or punishing worthy and/or Santos and/or Maples for the offense.

If, after you've considered all of the evidence in this matter, you find that the State has proven that the defendant James Irwin committed the crime of hindering beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty of that charge, that crime. If the State has failed to prove any one of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty of that charge.

Now, the second charge against James Irwin is, the State charges the defendant James Irwin with theft. The State alleges that on April 28th, 2002, the defendant James Irwin and Ernesto Barber exercised unlawful control over the green 1997 Jeep, with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof. The State charges auto theft.

The relevant portion of our state law pertaining to this offense provides as follows:

person is guilty of theft if he unlawfully takes or exercises unlawful control over movable property of another with the purpose to deprive him or her thereof.

In order for you to find the defendant quilty

of theft of the auto, the green Jeep, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following elements which constitute the offense: One, that the defendant knowingly took or unlawfully exercised control over movable property; two, that the movable property was property of another; and three, that the defendant's purpose was to deprive the other person of the movable property.

The first element, then, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant James Irwin knowingly took or exercised unlawful control over movable property. And the term, "movable property," means anything of value that can be moved. A motor vehicle is movable property.

So the first thing the State must prove is that the defendant James Irwin knowingly took or unlawfully exercised control over the green Jeep.

Again, a person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of his conduct or the circumstances attendant thereto if he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or circumstances exist, or he is aware of a high

probability of their existence.

A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct if he is aware that it is practically certain his conduct will cause such a result.

The second element the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the movable property or Jeep was property of someone else. Property of another includes property in which any person other than the defendant has an interest which the defendant is not privileged to infringe.

And the State alleges that the green Jeep was the property of or registered in the name of someone named Glogower (phonetic) and was also used by the deceased, Rashon Roy.

And the third element the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant's purpose was to deprive the person who owned the property -- the Jeep -- of the property.

For the purpose of the statute, the term "deprive" means specifically, one, to withhold or cause to be withheld property of another permanently or for so extended a period as to appropriate -- as to result in a substantial portion of its economic value -- or two, the term "deprive" means to dispose or cause

disposal of the property so as to make it unlikely that the owner will recover it.

And again, I have defined the term "purposely" for you.

If you find the State has proven each and every one of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, that is, that the defendant knowingly took or exercised unlawful control over the green Jeep, two, that the green Jeep was the property of another, and three, that his purpose was to deprive the other person of the property, you should find the defendant guilty of theft of the Jeep.

If the State has failed to prove any one of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty of that charge.

Now, the final charge in the case against the defendant James Irwin is attempted aggravated arson. The State alleges that on April 28th, 2002, in Jackson Township, the defendant attempted to start a fire in the gas tank of the green 1997 Jeep with the purpose to destroy it.

The relevant portion of our state statute pertaining to this offense provides as follows: A person is guilty of aggravated arson if he starts a fire on another's property with the purpose of

destroying the property or the structure of another.

The law determines "structure" to include a car or vehicle; so for the purposes of this case, a person would be guilty of aggravated arson if he personally -- if he started a fire on another's automobile with the purpose of destroying the automobile.

In order for you to find the defendant guilty of aggravated arson, the State would have to prove the following elements which constitute that offense beyond a reasonable doubt: One, that the defendant James Irwin purposely attempted to set the Jeep on fire; two, that his purpose in doing so was to destroy the Jeep; and three, to accomplish this, the defendant purposely did something which, under the circumstances as a reasonable person would believe them to be, was an act constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in the commission of the offense.

The step taken must strongly show that the defendant's criminal purpose -- that is, it must be a substantial and not just a very remote preparatory act, and must show that the accused had a firmness of criminal purpose.

The State in this regard alleges that the defendant placed a wick-like object in the gas tank and

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lit it, causing some fire damage to the area around the tank; so that the State must prove, then, first of all, that the defendant purposely attempted to set the Jeep on fire, as I have defined "purpose" for you: two, that his purpose in doing so was to destroy the Jeep, again as I have defined "purpose" for you; and three, that he purposely did something which, under the circumstances as a reasonable person would believe them to be, was an act constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in the destruction of the Jeep.

If you find the State has proven each and every element with regard to this particular offense beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant guilty of attempted aggravated arson. If the State has failed to prove any one of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty of that charge.

Now, in a criminal case such as this, your verdict with regard to each charge must be unanimous. All 12 jurors must agree to return a verdict of either guilty or not guilty with regard to any specific charge.

Your verdict must represent the considered judgment of each of you. It's your duty as jurors to

consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to your individual judgment. Each of you has to decide the case for yourself, but you should only do that after you have impartially considered the evidence with all your fellow jurors.

In the course of your deliberations you shouldn't hesitate to re-examine your own views and change your opinion if you are convinced it's erroneous, but you should not surrender an honest conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence solely to please your fellow jurors or to get out of here.

You are not here as partisans, you're here as judges, judges of the facts. And your sole interest is to ascertain the facts from the evidence in the case, and you must do this without any bias, prejudice or sympathy, and without reference to suspicion or conjecture.

when you reach a verdict -- remember, it has to be unanimous -- you will knock on the jury room door, slip a note out saying you've reached a verdict, not what it is, just that you've reached it. You will be returned to open court to announce your verdict.

If, while you're deliberating, you have any

questions you wish to ask, you can write the question on a slip of paper, knock on the door and slip the question out, and I will answer it for you as quickly as I can.

I am now going to answer the first two questions that you might ask, 'cause most jurors do ask them if I don't tell them this. Police reports and statements are never admitted into evidence. So when you're going through all of the various exhibits here, if you are looking for someone's police report that was referred to during their interrogation, examination, or a statement, they're not in evidence.

It's the role of the attorneys in examining the witnesses to elicit from them the relevant portions of reports or statements that are admissible, and they have all done that. They have done their jobs well.

So, the reports themselves never get marked into evidence. So, what you see when you get in there is what you have with regard to things that are marked into evidence.

At this time, we'll reduce our jury.

THE CLERK: Juror in Seat Number 1, William Nothnagel.

THE COURT: Would you have a seat over here in the front row, sir.

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(Juror steps down.)

THE CLERK: Juror in Seat Number 7, Elaine Ferrera.

> THE COURT: And would you join him, please. (Juror steps down.)

THE COURT: Now, our juror in Seat Number 2, you're going to be the foreperson of the jury. Don't get upset. It's nothing to get nervous about. All you have to do is see to it that everybody has a chance to have their say. You take the vote in the jury room, and you will announce what the verdicts are with regard to the charges here in open court.

And that's not going to be anything to get upset, either. You're going to have with you a verdict sheet with regard to each defendant, and what the charges are with regard to each defendant. And below each charge there is a place for you to check off "not quilty" or "guilty."

I'll have a copy of that. When you return to court with your verdict, I will ask you all the questions. You just have to tell me what the jury found. Okay?

Now I am going to ask the 12 of you, if you would, to retire to the jury room at this time. Don't start your deliberations until the exhibits are brought

in. They will be brought in shortly. Just go in and relax for a little bit.

(Jury retires at 10:45 AM.)

THE COURT: Now, you two are still members of the jury. You're just not part of the deliberating jury at this time. Should anything happen where one of them have to leave, one of you would go in and take their place. So I'm going ask both of you, if you would, just return to the Central Jury area and relax until we hear from the jury.

If they have a question, you will brought here to hear the question and the Court's answer. And, of course, if one of them have to leave because of some emergency, one of you will go in to take their place.

And since only one of you could go in and take their place, I must instruct you not to deliberate with each other as to what you think the findings are, because we only want one of you, not two of you, to go in. Okay? So you may return to Central Jury. We'll be in touch with you as soon as we hear from the jury.

MR. KINARNEY: Excuse me. Before the alternates leave, can we approach side-bar?

> THE COURT: Yes.

> > (Side-bar conference not held.)

THE COURT: I'm going to ask the alternates

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to please step outside.

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2 (Alternates exit courtroom.) THE COURT: I'm going to ask you what your 3 4 exceptions were. 5 MR. KINARNEY: Judge, I do have one 6 exception. THE COURT: Mr. Heisler, exceptions to the 7 8 Court's charge? 9 MR. HEISLER: None, your Honor. 10 THE COURT: Mr. Welle? 11 None at the moment, your Honor. MR. WELLE: 12 THE COURT: Mr. Zager? 13 MR. ZAGER: Judge, I would renew my 14 objections. 15 THE COURT: Okay. I think I ruled on that. 16 Mr. Kinarney? 17 MR. KINARNEY: Thank you, your Honor. I do have one exception. When your Honor talked to the 18 jury about their assessment of the credibility of 19 Ernesto Barber concerning the charges that he had in 20 this indictment, I would submit to the Court you also 21 should have included that they should assess his 22 23 credibility concerning the pending charges that he has 24 that he hasn't been indicted on yet. 25 I think when we talk about a hope or

1 expectation of favorable treatment, it would not only 2 be for the charge that your Honor's going to sentence 3 him on, but also for the pending charges he's in jail 4 on now. 5 THE COURT: Well, I think by telling them not 6 only whether he was already received favorable 7 treatment, whether he hopes to receive that treatment 8 in the future, I think that adequately covered that 9 issue. But your exception is noted. 10 MR. KINARNEY: Thank you, your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Mr. Somers. 12 MR. SOMERS: None, your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Okay. Would all of you get 14 together and make sure the evidence is packed 15 appropriately, and only that that's been marked in goes in there. And let's see, Andrew, would you go tell the 16 17 two jurors that they can return to Central Jury now, 18 and we'll be in touch with them. 19 THE LAW CLERK: Yes, sir. 20 (Recess taken.) 21 22 (The following takes place in open court.) 23 (Alternates present.) 24 THE COURT: For the record, we have a

question from the jury. And I have conferred with

counsel as to the response, and we have agreed upon it, so jury out.

(Jury in the box at 11:55 PM.)

THE COURT: I have your question, which reads: "If Barber set the Jeep on fire, is Irwin quilty by association?"

No one can be found guilty by association of anything. The only way anyone can be found guilty is if the State proves each and every allegation of the crime against them beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the person is either the person who did the crime or is an accomplice or is responsible as a conspiracy.

However, with regard to the charge that pertains to Mr. Irwin, there is no charge that he was an accomplice to anything. He is charged separately. He was charged with theft of the Jeep, attempted arson of the Jeep, and hindering apprehension.

And the State contends and the charge is that Irwin set the Jeep on fire, and the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Irwin set Jeep on fire, along with all the other elements of attempted arson, for you to find Irwin guilty of that offense.

So there is no accomplice or conspiracy responsibility with regard to that charge against Mr. Irwin. So the allegation is, and must be proved, that

1	Irwin set that Jeep on fire or attempted to set the
2	Jeep on fire. Okay? I trust that answers your
3	question.
4	THE JURORS: Yes.
5	(Jury retires to continue deliberating.)
6	THE COURT: Thank you, alternates. You may
7	return to the Central Jury area.
8	(Alternates excused.)
9	THE COURT: All right. Anything further with
10	regard to
11	THE ATTORNEYS: No, Judge.
12	THE COURT: Okay. We'll recess until we hear
13	further.
14	(Recess taken.)
15	(Jury excused for lunch at 12:25 PM.)
16	* * *
17	(The following takes place in open court.)
18	THE COURT: We have a request from the jury
19	for a read-back regarding the two Shabazz brothers,
20	Ernesto Barber, and Detective Hayes. So we will call
21	the jury out.
22	(Jury in the box at 2:30.)
23	THE COURT: Would you two alternates come
24	forward? Everybody should move over just to the end.
25	(Alternates in the how)

THE COURT: The alternates can sit on the end. They are both there, okay. The alternates can sit right there. This way, the court reporter -- you have asked for the read-backs of the testimony of the Shabazz brothers, Ernesto Barber and Detective Hayes.

Our court reporter who took the testimony of the Shabazz brothers will do the testimony of their read-back first.

(Whereupon the testimony of Hakeem Shabazz and Halim Shabazz were read back by Nancy Iannini, CSR.)

THE COURT: I appreciate your attention. We will have the court reporter who took the testimony of Ernesto Barber and Detective Hayes at nine o'clock tomorrow to complete the read-back tomorrow; and after that, I'l' answer the questions about the three types of murder charges.

Your jury room will be locked. No one will be going in there, and it will be kept closed. You can, of course, go in and retrieve what you want now, and have a pleasant evening and be back at nine o'clock tomorrow morning. Everyone remain in place until the jury leaves.

(Jury and alternates dismissed for the evening.)

THE COURT: All right, counsel, 9:00
tomorrow.

(Court in recess for the evening.)


## CERTIFICATION

I, GAYLE L. GARRABRANDT, C.S.R., License Number XI00737, an Official Court Reporter in and for the State of New Jersey, do hereby certify the foregoing to be prepared in full compliance with the current Transcript Format for Judicial Proceedings and is a true and accurate non-compressed transcript to the best of my knowledge and ability.

GAVLE C. GARRABRANDT, C.S.R., Official Court Reporter

120 Hooper Avenue

Ocean County Courthouse Toms River, NJ 08753



## A- 6934-1311

1	SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
2	LAW DIVISION: OCEAN COUNTY INDICTMENT NO. 02-9-1247
3	APPELLATE NO. A- 006934-037-1
	STATE OF NEW JERSEY, :
4	: Complainant, :
5	: STENOGRAPHIC : TRANSCRAPT
6	vs.
7	RENATO SANTOS, GREGORY MAPLES,
8	MARVIN WORTHY and JAMES IRWIN,
9	Defendants. : OCT C Lynn
10	brien
11	Place: Ocean County Courthouse
11	120 Hooper Avenue Toms River, New Jersey
12	Date: May 18, 2004
13	BEFORE:
14	THE HON. EDWARD J. TURNBACH, J.S.C.
15	TRANSURIPT ORDERED BY:
16	RAYMOND S. SANTIAGO, ESQ. (Raymond S. Santiago, Esq.)
17	
18	APPEARANCES:
19	WILLIAM J. HEISLER, ESQ. (Assistant Prosecutor, Occan County)
20	Attorney for the State
21	JAMES R. KINARNEY, ESQ. (James R. Kinarney, Esq.)
22	Attorney for the Defendant R. Santos
23	CHOAN ABILLY C C D C D C C D C C C C C C C C C C C
24	SUSAN KELLY, C.S.R., C.R.R. (XI01154) OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
25	OCEAN COUNTY JUSTICE COMPLEX 120 HOOPER AVENUE TOMS RIVER, NEW JERSEY

1	APPEARANCES CONTINUED:
2	PAUL E. ZAGER, ESQ. (Paul E. Zager, Esq.)
3	Attorney for Defendant G. Maples
4	LAWRENCE G. WELLE, ESQ. (Lawrence G. Welle, Esq.)
5	Attorney for Defendant M. Worthy
6	GEORGE B. SOMERS, JR.,ESQ. (Takacs & Somers)
7	Attorneys for Defendant J. Irwin
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1 (The following is heard without the presence 2 of the jury.) THE COURT: All right. With regard to the 3 4 matter, and for purposes of the record, at the end of the day yesterday, the jury sent a note out saying they 5 6 wanted to hear the testimony of Ernesto Barber, among other testimony. And this morning, they revised their 8 request to say they "only wanted to hear Barber's 9 direct, Sunday morning going to High Point, up until 10 Jeep left." 11 Counsel for the defense had requested that 12 the jury also hear the cross-examination pertaining to 13 that time period. I think it's appropriate, and I've 14 agreed to do so, and all counsel have reviewed the 15 complete testimony of Barber and have greed with regard to that portion that would be read back to the 16 17 jury. 18 Okay. Now we need our alternates. Okay. 19 You can open the court, too, I guess. 20 (The alternates are escorted into the 21 courtroom.) 22 (The jury enters the courtroom from 23 deliberations at 10:30 a.m.)

THE COURT: Good morning to each of you.

I'm sorry for the delay, but we had to go

1	through the testimony with regard to Mr. Barber. At
2	the end of the day yesterday, you had indicated you
3	wanted to hear Mr. Barber's testimony. This morning
4	you revised that request and said, "We wanted to hear
5	only Barber's direct, Sunday morning going up to High
6	Point, until Jeep left."
7	Well, you're going to hear Barber's direct in
8	that regard. You're also going to hear the
9	cross-examination relating to that same time period.
10	So, you'll have everything that was questioned in that
11	particular area.
12	You also indicated you no longer wished to
13	hear Detective Hayes' testimony, so we're going to
14	proceed with the Barber aspects that you asked for.
15	(Whereupon, the readback of Ernesto Barber's
16	testimony began at 10:30 a.m. and ended at 11:30 a.m.
17	The exact testimony which was read back can
18	be found in the previously-prepared transcript dated
19	May 10, 2004, by Susan Kelly, C.S.K., C.R.R., on the
20	below-listed page numbers and page lines:
21	Page 7, line 2, through and inclusive to Page
22	36, line 7.
23	Page 52, line 10, through and inclusive to
24	Page 55, line 2.

Page 60, line 1, through and inclusive to

1 Page 69, line 18. 2 Page 75, line 16, through and inclusive to 3 Page 76, line 7. 4 Page 81, line 22, through and inclusive to Page 82, line 13. 5 6 Page 93, line 19, through and inclusive to 7 Page 116, line 8.) 8 THE COURT: You also indicated you still want 9 to hear the definition of murder and manslaughter. Am I correct? Okay. 10 11 The state charges the defendants Marvin 12 Worthy, Renato Santos and Gregory Maples committed the 13 criminal offense of murder in Lakewood on April 28, 14 2002, by purposely or knowingly causing the death of 15 Rashan Roy, or purposely or knowingly causing serious 16 bodily injury to Rashan Roy resulting in his death. 17 Our state statute pertaining to the crime of 18 murder provides: 19 "A person is guilty of marder if he: One, caused the victim's death or serious bodily injury that 21 then resulted in death, and; two, that he did so 22 purposely or knowingly. 23 In order for you to find any one of the 24 defendants guilty of murder, the state is required to

prove each of the following elements which constitute

that crime beyond a reasonable doubt:

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One, that the defendant you are considering caused Rashan Roy's death or serious bodily injury that then resulted in his death, or that the defendant you are considering was an accomplice and equally responsible for that act, as I've defined accomplice responsibility; or that the defendant you are considering entered into a conspiracy to commit the act and is responsible for the murder of Rashan Roy, as I've defined conspiracy and conspiracy responsibility for you, and; two, that the defendant you are considering did so purposely or knowingly, or was an accomplice, as I defined the accomplice responsibility for you, and possessed the same state of mind or is responsible as a conspirator, as I defined that for vou.

One of the elements the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant acted purposely or knowingly. A person acts purposely when it is the person's conscious object to cause death or serious bodily injury resulting in death. A person acts knowingly when the person is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause death or serious bodily injury resulting in death.

Now, the nature of the purpose or knowledge

with which a defendant acted towards Rashan Roy is a question of fact for you, the jury, to decide. Purpose and knowledge are conditions of the mind which cannot be seen and can only be determined by inferences from conduct, words or acts.

It is not necessary for the state to produce a witness or witnesses who could testify that the defendant stated, for example, that his purpose was to cause death or serious bodily injury resulting in death, or that he knew his conduct would cause death or serious bodily injury resulting in death. It is within your power to find that proof of purpose or knowledge has been furnished beyond a reasonable doubt by inferences which may arise from the nature of the acts and the surrounding circumstances.

Such things as the place where the acts occurred, the weapon used, the location, number and nature of wounds inflicted, and all that was done or said by a defendant preceding, connected with, and immediately succeeding the events leading to the death of Rashon Roy are among the circumstances to be considered.

Although the state must prove that the defendant acted purposely -- acted either purposely or knowingly, the state is not required to prove a motive.

If the state has proved the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant must be found guilty of that offense, regardless of the defendant's motive or lack of motive.

If, however, the state has proved a motive, you may consider that insofar as it gives meaning to the other circumstances. On the other hand, you may consider the absence of motive in weighing whether or not the defendant is guilty of the crime charged.

Now, a homicide or killing with a deadly weapon, such as a firearm, in itself, would permit you to draw an inference that the defendant's purpose was to take life or cause serious bodily injury resulting in death. A deadly weapon is any firearm which in the manner it is used, or intended to be used, is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.

In your deliberations, you may consider the weapon used and the manner and circumstances of the killing. And if you are satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant shot and killed Rashon Roy with a gun, you may draw an inference from the weapon used -- that is the gun -- and from the manner and circumstances of the killing as to the defendant's purpose or knowledge.

The other element the state must prove beyond

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a reasonable doubt is that the defendant caused Rashon Roy's death or serious bodily injury resulting in death.

As I previously advised you, in order to convict the defendant of murder, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant either purposely or knowingly caused the victim's death or serious bodily injury resulting in death.

In that regard, serious bodily injury means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death.

A substantial risk of death exists where it is highly probable that the injury will result in death.

In order for you to find the defendant guilty of purposeful serious bodily injury murder, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it was the defendant's conscious object to cause serious bodily injury that then resulted in the victim's death, that the defendant knew that the injury created a substantial risk of death, and that it was highly probable that death would result.

In order for you to find the defendant knowing caused serious bodily injury murder, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware that it was practically certain that his conduct would cause serious bodily injury that then

resulted in the victim's death, that the defendant knew
that the injury created a substantial risk of death,
and that it was highly probable that death would
result.

Whether the killing is committed purposely our knowingly, causing death or serious bodily injury resulting in death must be within the design or contemplation of the defendant.

Now, all jurors do not have to agree unanimously concerning which form of murder is present, so long as all believe it is one form of murder or the other. However, for the defendant to be guilty of murder, all must agree that the defendant either knowingly or purposely caused the death or serious bodily injury resulting in the death or Rashon Roy or is responsible for that act pursuant to the law of accomplice responsibility or conspiracy responsibility as I've defined that for you.

If you find that the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant you are considering purposely or knowingly caused death or serious bodily injury resulting in death, or is responsible for that act pursuant to the law of accomplice responsibility or conspiracy responsibility, then you must find the defendant guilty of murder.

state has failed to prove any one of the required elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant not guilty of murder and go on to consider whether a defendant should be convicted of the crimes of aggravated manslaughter or reckless manslaughter.

If, on the other hand, you determine the

I, once again, remind you that each offense and each defendant in this indictment and the evidence pertaining to him should be considered by you separately. The fact that you may find a particular defendant guilty or not guilty of a particular crime should not control your verdict as to any other offense charged against that defendant, and it should not control your verdict as to the charges against any other defendant.

Now, with regard to aggravated manslaughter, the state law pertaining to that offense provides, as follows:

"A person is guilty of aggravated manslaughter if he recklessly caused the death of another person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life."

So you see, right off the bat now, with murder you're talking about purposeful or knowing

action. With aggravated manslaughter, you're talking about reckless action. Okay?

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In order for you to find any one of the defendants guilty -- you are considering guilty of aggravated manslaughter -- the state is required to prove each of the following elements that constitute that crime beyond a reasonable doubt:

Rashon Roy's death, or that the defendant you are considering was an accomplice and equally responsible for that act, or that the defendant entered into a conspiracy to commit that act and is responsible on that basis for it, and; two, that the defendant did so recklessly, or was an accomplice who acted recklessly, or is responsible as a conspirator, and, three, that the defendant did so under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, or was an accomplice who acted under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, or is responsible as a conspirator.

Now, one element the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant acted recklessly. A person who causes another's death does so recklessly when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that

death will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that considering the nature and purpose of defendant's conduct, and the circumstances known to the defendant, his disregard of that risk is a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would follow in the same situation.

In other words, you must find the defendant was aware of and consciously disregarded the risk of causing death. If you find that the defendant was aware of and disregarded the risk of causing death, you must determine whether the risk he disregarded was substantial and unjustifiable.

In doing so, you must consider the nature and purpose of the defendant's conduct and the circumstances known to the defendant. And you must determine whether, in light of those factors, defendant's disregard of that risk was a gross deviation from the conduct a reasonable person would have observed in the defendant's situation.

Another element the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant acted under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life. The phrase, "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life," does not focus on

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defendant's state of mind, but rather on the circumstances under which you find he acted.

If, in light of all the evidence, you find the defendant's conduct resulted in a probability, as opposed to a mere possibility, of death, then you must find he acted under extreme indifference to the value of human life. On the other hand, if you find his conduct resulted in only a possibility of death, then you must acquit him of aggravated manslaughter and consider the offense of reckless manslaughter which I'll explain shortly.

The final element the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant caused Rashon Roy's death. You must find that Rashon Roy would not have died but for defendant's conduct. If you find the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant you are considering recklessly caused Rashon Roy's death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life or is responsible for that act pursuant to the law of accomplice responsibility or conspiracy responsibility, you must find the defendant guilty of aggravated manslaughter.

If, on the other hand, you determine the state has failed to prove any of the required elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the

defendant not guilty of aggravated manslaughter and go on to consider whether a defendant should be convicted of the crime of reckless manslaughter.

Our state law pertaining to reckless manslaughter provides, as follows:

"A person is guilty of reckless manslaughter if he recklessly causes the death of another person."

In order for you to find any one of the defendant's guilty of reckless manslaughter, the state is required to prove each of the following elements which constitute that crime beyond a reasonable doubt:

One, that the defendant caused Rashon Roy's death, or that the defendant was an accomplice and equally responsible for that act, or that the defendant entered into a conspiracy to commit that act and is responsible on that basis for it, and; two, that the defendant did so recklessly, or was an accomplice who acted recklessly, or who is responsible as a conspirator.

So, you see the state must prove, again, reckless conduct, the same reckless conduct that would have to be proved for aggravated manslaughter. And the state must prove the defendant they were considering caused Rashon Roy's death as the actor or principal perpetrator or accomplice or conspirator.

The basic difference between aggravated 1 2 manslaughter and reckless manslaughter is very simply 3 this. For reckless manslaughter, the state does not have to prove that the defendant's conduct resulted in a probability of death. In other words, if the 5 6 defendant's conduct resulted in a probability, as opposed to a mere possibility, of death, you can find 8 that that would be a circumstance manifesting extreme 9 indifference to human life; all right? 10 That's the added element for aggravated 11 manslaughter, reckless conduct causing death and acting 12 under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life. If all three of those elements are 13 present, it would be aggravated manslaughter. If 14 merely reckless conduct and causing dea ' are present, 15 16 that's reckless manslaughter. 17 All right. I trust that you all understand 18 that, and I invite you to return to your deliberations. 19 (The jury retires to the jury room to 20 continue deliberations at 11:45 a.m.) 21 THE COURT: Anything further, counsel? 22 MR. HEISLER: No, your Honor. 23 THE COURT: We'll recess for now. 24 (A recess was taken.) 25 (The following is heard without the presence

1 of the jury.) 2 THE COURT: All right. I have a note that the jury has reached a 3 verdict. And I'll make it very clear that I don't know 4 5 what the verdict is, and nobody else does either, but if there's any outburst, whatsoever, in this courtroom 6 7 at any time when the Court is taking the verdict, I 8 will clear the courtroom immediately. 9 Jury out. 10 (The jury enters the courtroom with a verdict 11 at 12:25 a.m.) 12 THE COURT: Members of the jury, I've 13 received a note from you that you've reached a verdict. And while I address my questions to the jury, as a 14 15 whole, I'll ask the foreperson to respond on your 16 behalf. 17 We will take up first the State of New Jersey 18 versus Marvin Worthy. 19 With regard to question one, conspiracy to murder Rashon Roy, how does the jury find? 20 21 JUROR NO. 1: Guilty. 22 THE COURT: All twelve jurors agree? 23 JUROR NO. 1: Yes. 24 THE COURT: Question two, murder of Rashon 25 Roy, how does the jury find?

1	JUROR NO. 1: Guilty.
2	THE COURT: All twelve jurors agree?
3	JUROR NO. 1: Yes.
4	THE COURT: Question three, possession of a
5	firearm for the purpose to use it unlawfully against
6	Rashan Roy, how does the jury find?
7	JUROR NO. 1: Guilty.
8	THE COURT: All twelve jurors agree?
9	JUROR NO. 1: Yes.
10	THE COURT: Renato Santos.
11	Question one, conspiracy to murder Rashon
12	Roy, how does the jury find?
13	JUROR NO. 1: Guilty.
14	THE COURT: All twelve jurors agree?
15	JUROR NO. 1: Yes.
16	THE COURT: Question two, murder of Rashon
17	Roy, how does the jury find?
18	JUROR NO. 1: Guilty.
19	THE COURT: All twelve jurors agree?
20	JUROR NO. 1: Yes.
21	THE COURT: Question three, possession of a
22	firearm with the purpose to use it unlawfully against
23	Rashon Roy, how does the jury find?
24	JUROR NO. 1: Guilty.
25	THE COURT: All twelve jurors agree?

1	JUROR NO. 1: Yes.
2	THE COURT: Gregory Maples.
3	Question one, conspiracy to murder Rashon
4	Roy, how does the jury find?
5	JUROR NO. 1: Guilty.
6	THE COURT: All twelve jurors agree?
7	JUROR NO. 1: Yes.
8	THE COURT: Question two, murder of Rashon
9	Roy, how does the jury find?
10	JUROR NO. 1: Guilty.
11	THE COURT: All twelve jurors agree?
12	JUROR NO. 1: Yes.
13	THE COURT: James Irwin.
14	Question one, hindering apprehension, how
15	does the jury find?
16	JUROR NO. 1: Guilty.
17	THE COURT: All twelve jurors agree?
18	JUROR NO. 1: Yes.
19	THE COURT: Question two, theft of a 1997
20	green Jeep, how does the jury find?
21	JUROR NO. 1: Guilty.
22	THE COURT: All twelve jurors agree?
23	JUROR NO. 1: Yes.
24	THE COURT: Question three, attempted arson,
25	how does the jury find?

1 JUROR NO. 1: Not quilty. THE COURT: All twelve jurors agree? 2 3 JUROR NO. 1: Yes. THE COURT: Anything further of the jury? 4 5 (No response.) 6 If not, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, on behalf of the Superior Court System here in Ocean 7 County, and myself, personally, I want to thank you for 8 9 taking time out from your normal duties and 10 responsibilities which are serious enough, I'm sure, 11 and coming to the courthouse to decide the issues 12 presented in the case. 13 Our system of justice which works quite fine has integrity and meaning only because it's based on 14 15 the judgment of the community, people and as 16 yourselves. Without your participation, what we do 17 here would be a meaningless exercise. So I sincerely 18 appreciate your sacrifice and your willingness to stay 19 beyond the normal week and be the judges of the facts in this case. 21 I thank you very much, and I would ask all fourteen of you, if you would, to just step into the 23 jury room at this time. 24 (The jury is excused from jury service.)

THE COURT: All defendants will be remanded

1	to jail without bail pending sentencing day.
2	Sentencing date will be
3	THE COURT CLERK: July 9th.
4	THE COURT: July 9th is the sentencing date.
5	Everybody is remanded without bail pending sentence,
6	and this Court will be going to recess now.
7	MR. HEISLER: Thank you, your Honor.
8	MR. KINARNEY: Thank you.
9	MR. WELLE: Thank you.
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11	(The hearing was concluded.)
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## CERTIFICATE

I, Susan Schaub-Kelly, C.S.R., License

Number XIO1154, C.R.R., License Number 30XR00013600, an Official Court Reporter in and for the State of New Jersey, do hereby certify that the foregoing to be prepared in full compliance with the current Transcript Format for Judicial Proceedings and is a true and accurate non-compressed transcript to the best of my knowledge and ability.

SUSAN KELLY, C.S.R., C.R.R.
Official Court Reporter

Ocean County Courthouse

C.R.R. Dated: 9-8-04

1	SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
2	LAW DIVISION: OCEAN COUNTY INDICTMENT NO. 02-9-1247
3	APPELLATE NO. A-006934-03T-1
4	STATE OF NEW JERSEY, :
5	Complainant, : STENOGRAPHIC
6	: TRANSCRIPT
	vs. : OF : SEW ENCES
7	MARVIN WORTHY, GREGORY MAPLES, and JAMES IRWIN,
	Defendants.
9	OCT Elyman
10	Place: Ocean dente Courthouse
11	120 Hooper Avenue
12	Toms River, New Jersey Date: July 9, 2004
13	BEFORE:
14	THE HON. EDWARD J. TURNBACH, J.S.C.
15	TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY:
16	RAYMOND S. SANTIAGO, ESQ. (Raymond S. Santiago, Esq.)
17	
18	APPEARANCES:
19	WILLIAM J. HEISLER, ESQ. (Assistant Prosecutor, Ocean County)
20	Attorney for the State
	LAWRENCE G. WELLE, ESQ.
21	(Lawrence G. Welle, Esq.) Attorney for Defendant M. Worthy
22	
23	CHEAN MELLY C.C. D. C. D.D. (MIGHTER)
A4	SUSAN KELLY, C.S.R., C.R.R. (XI01154) OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
IV	OCEAN COUNTY JUSTICE COMPLEX 120 HOOPER AVENUE
V	TOMS RIVER, NEW JERSEY

## APPEARANCES CONTINUED: PAUL E. ZAGER, ESQ. (Paul E. Zager, Esq.) Attorney for Defendant G. Maples JAMES R. KINARNEY, ESQ. (James R. Kinarney, Esq.) Attorney for the Defendant R. Santos

1 THE COURT: Are we ready to proceed on the 2 sentencing in the matters of State versus Worthy, 3 Maples and Santos? 4 Mr. Welle, I think you were first during the course of the trial, so . . 5 6 MR. WELLE: Fine, your Honor. 7 At this time, on behalf of Mr. Worthy, let me say we've gone over the presentence report, and he 8 9 indicates to me that in all major respects, it is 10 accurate. 11 On behalf of Mr. Worthy, let me -- can we 12 wait until they're seated, Judge? 13 THE COURT: Certainly, yes. 14 MR. WELLE: As you can see from the 15 presentence report, your Honor, Mr. Worthy is a young 16 man with a limited contact with the criminal justice 17 system. He has no adult convictions. He's from a good 18 family. He grew up in north Jersey. His mother raised 19 him. He has a good education. 20 He did indicate to you and he was the only 21 one who took the stand in this case to tell his side of 22 the story which was that he was innocent, that he was 23 falsely accused, that somehow he was put into this scenario where he didn't deserve it. He maintained 24

that from the beginning, and he maintains it now.

1 All I can say, in light of the conviction and 2 the sentencing requirements that you have in front of 3 5 a thirty in, and not thirty with life. 6 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 wish to say? 16 (No response). 17 18 of the trial: 19 20 21 22

you, is we would ask you, please, to give him the least amount that you can. And that would be a thirty, with He's a young man. He is going to have to do a considerable amount of time, if he's not successful on appeal. And we think that he may in the future still have a life in front of him when he gets out of jail if that appeal, of course, is not successful. I don't know if he wishes to address the Court at this particular time, but we would ask for your mercy in this particular case in your sentencing. THE COURT: Mr. Worthy, is there anything you THE COURT: Mr. Zager, I relieve you were the next one in the order of presentation during the course

MR. ZAGER: Good morning, your Honor. Paul Zager, Eatontown, on behalf of Gregory. Maples.

Judge, I reviewed the presentence report, and my client has reviewed it, and -- excuse me. I find it adequate for its purposes today, with one minor notation, Judge. On his criminal record, on the second

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page, there's an entry in the Lakewood Municipal Court dated November 21st, 1997. My client contends that that's not him, but it's his father.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ZAGER: Judge, my client went to trial asserting his innocence. He was convicted. I understand the verdict of the jury. My client still maintains he's innocent. He intends to file an appeal.

At this point, Judge, based on the testimony at the trial, although he contends that he was not involved, I thin's the testimony was that the two gentlemen standing -- sitting on either side of him had more involvement with respect to what occurred in Lakewood, other than what he did, as far as being I guess you would call it the trigger man.

Judge, I know that the Court is bound by the statutory framework as far as what the sentencing must be. I'm going to ask the Court, as Mr. Welle did, to impose what I understand to be the minimum sentence for a conviction for murder, with the understanding that it would be our contention that Count 1, conspiracy, would merge with the murder charge.

My understanding is that the least amount of sentencing allowed by statute is a period of thirty years, with a thirty-year period of parole

1 ineligibility. Judge, I'm going to ask you to do that.

I've reviewed the aggravating and mitigating factors. Although I guess they apply, but they don't apply in the sense that I might be arguing for the imposition of a mandatory period of parole ineligibility, I would acknowledge, Judge, that on the aggravating side that number 3, the risk he would commit another offense, exists, and the need to deter.

On the other hand, Judge, on the mitigating factors, given my client's position that he was not involved in this, I think number 2, that he did not contemplate any conduct would cause or threaten serious harm, would apply.

And, Judge, as you can see from the presentence report, on his jail credit time, in May of 2002, and, again, in November of 2002, he was aware that there was a warrant for his arrest. His state of mind was, I didn't do anything, so he turned himself in. So based on that, Judge, I would suggest that number 12 on the mitigating side, the willingness of my client to cooperate with law enforcement authorities, would also apply.

I think, Judge, at this point a thirty over thirty would be appropriate, and I would ask you to impose that.

1 THE COURT: Mr. Maples, is there anything you 2 wish to say? 3 (No response). 4 THE COURT: Mr. Kinarney? MR. DEFENSE: Thank you, your Honor. James 5 6 Kinarney appearing on behalf of the defendant Renato 7 Santos. 8 Your Honor, I've gone over the presentence report with the defendant. He finds it to be factually 9 10 accurate and sufficient, for the purposes of sentencing, with one exception. Judge, on the, 11 12 "Assessment of Defendant'S Personality," etcetera, it 13 indicates, "The defendant was completely uncooperative 14 when interviewed for the present PSI." 15 I've discussed that with Renato. He indicated to me he was feeling physically ill on that 16 17 day -- he had a headache, a stomachache -- and that explains why the author of the report felt he was 18 19 completely uncooperative. I would ask your Honor not to consider that. 20 21 I would also ask your Honor not to consider 22 that the defendant didn't testify. And I know you won't, because I know you know that it's his 23 24 constitutional right. I only say that in light of

Mr. Welle's remarks that his client was the only

defendant to take the stand.

This defendant is a young man, Judge. He's 25 years old. Obviously, he's looking at, as a minimum, thirty, with a thirty. I would submit to the Court that he's young enough to be rehabilitatable. He has received his GED while incarcerated, and I think he's going to learn a severe lesson here.

I'm going to ask your Honor to merge the conspiracy, which is Count 1, and also the possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, which is Count 4, into Count 2, which is murder. I'm going to ask your Honor to show some mercy to this defendant, and I'm going to ask your Honor for the minimum, thirty, with a thirty.

And I only do that, Judge -- without going through the aggravating and mitigating -- because even the minimum for this type of crime is so severe that, with that, the defendant will be about 53 years old. Then he has that five-year -- because it's a NERA, he has that five-year period of supervision. So that punishment, I would submit to the Court, is sufficient.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Santos, is there anything you wish to say?

DEFENDANT SANTOS: No.

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1 THE COURT: Prosecutor? 2 MR. HEISLER: Judge, I believe the victim's 3 mother would like to address the Court, Sondra Rov. 4 THE COURT: Yes. Stand behind the rail, if you will? 6 MS. ROY: To Marvin, Khaleef, and who is

known as Gregory, Red, I knew all three of you boys, all of you. You ate at my house. You slept at my house. You ran with my sons all the time. From me you took a son, a grandson, a father, a brother, a nephew, and a cousin from my kids.

Khaleef, to me you was like Judas, you betrayed Jamal. He took you and Shakir as his own brothers. He loved y'all as his own brothers. You wouldn't see one of you in the mall without the other. But yet still this is what y'all did, for Sonya and Tosha that never have a brother to come to Florida again to play with their kids or be with their kids, for Tempest to not have a brother again. It hurts me to say that Marvin, little Marvin, can have his dad around him, and your son won't have his father around him. And, Red, you won't be around your son.

It's hurting me inside, because I love you guys, and then y'all took from me. Y'all took my first born child. But -- like Peanuts said, we can forgive,

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but we can't forget. But y'all got to get your souls 1 2 right with God, because if you're not right with God, 3 you never have peace within yourself. 4 That's all I have to sav. THE COURT: Thank you. 5 6 Mr. Heisler? 7 MR. PROSECUTOR: Judge, overall, I'll address 8 myself in the beginning to the overall circumstances 9 that would involve all three defendants. 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 drugs. 19 21 22 than that, and now they are asking for mercy. 23 Every one of these defendants has had

Judge, these defendants are standing here through counsel asking for the Court to give them mercy. And what they are standing here convicted of is nothing less than a cold-blooded execution, and it's a cold-blooded execution over drugs. We were very careful during the trial not to mention what it was about to make sure there was no prejudice and what the business they were all engaged in was, but it was And now we have this situation where, in broad daylight on a Sunday morning, Rashan Roy was executed in cold blood, shot four times, shot at more significant prior contact with the justice system. Mr. Santos has been convicted of two separate crimes,

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although he was sentenced concurrently, and it has escalated to this where we have gun play and an execution on a Sunday morning in a residential condominium complexion.

There is no reason for this Court to show any of these defendants the mercy that they did not show to Rashan Roy. None of these defendants should ever walk the streets again, Judge, and I would ask the Court in each case to impose a life sentence.

THE COURT: All right.

Initially, with regard to this matter, I would note that the defendants Maples and Santos have filed <u>pro se</u> motions for a new trial contending that the verdicts of guilty returned by the jury were against the weight of the evidence.

Rule 3:20-1 provides that, "A trial judge may grant a defendant a new trial if requested -- if required in the interest of justice, but should not set aside a jury verdict as against the weight of the evidence unless, having given due regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, it clearly and convincingly appears there was a manifest denial of justice under the law."

The defendants Santos and Worthy were both found guilty of conspiracy to murder Rashan Roy, and

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the murder of Rashan Roy, and possession of a firearm with a purpose to use it unlawfully against Rashan Roy. Defendant Maples was only charged with conspiracy to murder Rashan Roy and the murder of Rashan Roy. The jury found all of them guilty of all the charges.

The jury's verdict obviously reflects a finding of credibility with regard to the state's witnesses, a determination certainly within its province to make, based upon the evidence that was presented. There was a great deal of evidence establishing -- from which the jury could find and did find that a conspiracy, ongoing in nature, existed among the three defendants here to do physical harm and murder Mr. Roy.

There's a great deal of evidence, both direct and circumstantial, as presented to the jury in support of the jury's verdict. I find no manifest denial of justice, and the jury's verdict is well supported by the evidence in the case, so I deny the motion.

MR. WELLE: Your Honor, if I may, at this time, I was apprised by the mother of Mr. Worthy that she had mailed a <u>pro se</u> motion on his behalf that I was not aware of. I think what you've got was Santos' and Maples'. So, I'm just putting that on the record.

Where it may be -- she says she sent it certified. So

I'm just saying, if it shows up, it would be the same, but we wanted to let you know that there has been some effort on behalf of the defendant to file such a motion. 5 THE COURT: I will accept your representation 6

and acknowledge that a motion was filed by all three, and I will deny that motion also for the same reasons just stated.

MR. WELLE: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Marvin Worthy, you have forty-five days from today to appeal from the jury verdict -- from the sentence the Court is about to impose upon you as a result of a jury verdict of guilty on Indictment 2-9-1247, Count 1, conspiracy to murder, Count 2, murder, Count 3, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, second-degree.

The presentence report indicates the presence of aggravating factor 3, the risk of another offense, which I attribute to a continuous course of conduct and a substance abuse history, as well as the overwhelming involvement of substance abuse and substance dealing in the present case, and, 9, the need to deter. There's nothing present by way of mitigation.

For sentencing purposes, Count 1, conspiracy to murder, is merged into Count 2, murder, and I

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sentence you to the custody of the Commissioner of
Corrections for a term of thirty years, with a
thirty-year period of parole ineligibility. This
sentence is subject to the No Early Release Act, and
you'll be subject to five years parole supervision upon
release.

On Count 3, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, second degree, I note that this is a Graves Act offense. I sentence you to the custody of the Commissioner of Corrections for a term of ten years, with a five-year period of parole ineligibility, to run concurrent with the sentence just imposed.

There's a Violent Crimes Compensation Board penalty of \$100 on Count 2, \$50 on Count 3; a Safe Neighborhood fine of \$75 on each count; a LEOTEF of \$30; you're required to submit a DNA sample for classification.

Gregory Maples, you have forty-five days from today to appeal from the sentence the Court is about to impose upon you as a result of a jury verdict of guilty on Count 1 of Indictment 2-9-1247, conspiracy to murder, second-degree, and, Count 2, murder, first degree.

For sentencing purposes, I note aggravating factor 3, the risk of another offense, which I

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attribute to a continuous course of conduct, a substance abuse history, and, again, the overwhelming involvement with substance abuse in dealing with the present case, and, 9, the need to deter. There's nothing present by way of mitigation.

For sentencing purposes, Count 1 is merged into Count 2. On Count 2, murder, first-degree, you're sentenced to the custody of the Commissioner of Corrections for a term of thirty years, with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility. This sentence is subject to the No Early Release Act, and, upon release, you're subject to five years of parole supervision.

There's a Violent Crimes Compensation Board penalty of \$100; a Safe Neighborhood fine of \$75; a LEOTEF, \$30; and you're required to submit a DNA sample for classification.

Renato Santos, you have forty-five days from today to appeal from the sentence the Court is about to impose upon you as a result of a jury verdict of guilt on Indictment 2-9-1247, Count 1, conspiracy to murder, second degree, Count 2, murder, first degree, Count 4, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, second-degree.

For sentencing purposes, I note aggravating

factor 3, the risk of another offense, which I attribute to the history of substance abuse and, again, the overwhelming involvement of substance abuse in dealing with the present case, 6, the nature and extent of your prior record, and, 9, the need to deter.

There's nothing present by way of mitigation.

For sentencing purposes, Count 1, conspiracy, is merged into Count 2, murder, first degree. On Count 2, murder, first-degree, I sentence you to the custody of the Commissioner of Corrections for a term of thirty years, with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility. This sentence is subject to the No Early Release Act, and upon release, you're required to serve a five-year period of parole supervision.

Count 4, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose -- this, again, is a Graves Act offense -- second-degree, I sentence you on that to the custody of the Commissioner of Corrections for a term of five years, with five-year period of parole ineligibility. This is to run concurrent with the sentence just imposed.

There's a Violent Crimes Compensation Board penalty of \$100 on Count 2, and \$50 on Count 4; Safe Neighborhood fine, \$75, on each count; LEOTEF, \$30; and you're required to submit a DNA sample for

1 classification.

At this time, any and all bail with regard to the matter is discharged. Each of you are remanded to the custody of the Commissioner of Corrections for a net term of thirty years, with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility, subject to the No Early Release Act.

MR. HEISLER: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. We'll take a brief recess while the courtroom is cleared.

(The hearing was concluded.)

2.4

## CERTIFICATE

Number XIO1154, C.R.R., License Number 30XR00013600, an

Official Court Reporter in and for the State of New Jersey, do hereby certify that the foregoing to be prepared in full compliance with the current Transcript Format for Judicial Proceedings and is a true and accurate non-compressed transcript to the best of my knowledge and ability.

I, Susan Schaub-Kelly, C.S.R., License

SUSAN KELLY, C.S.R., C.R.R. Official Court Reporter

Ocean County Courthouse

Dated: 9-8-04

## NEW **FOLDER** BEGINS