NEW FOLDER BEGINS

FILED Supreme Court of Preson MAR 0 5 2006 C-82 1 SEC 2006

DOCKET NO. 60,753

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Petitioner,

v.

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CHARLES A. WATKINS III,

Defendant-Respondent.

CRIMINAL ACTION

- : On Petition for Certification to the Superior Court of New Jersey,
- : Appellate Division.
- : Sat Below:
- Hon. Howard H. Kostin, J.A.D., : Hon. Harvey Weissbard, J.A.D., Hon. Joseph L. Yannotti, J.A.D.

PETITION AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

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OF COUNSEL AND ON THE BRIEF

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STATEMENT OF THE MATTER INVOLVED

With a passing reference to the rules that a prosecutor's denial of defendant's Pretrial Intervention ("PTI") application is entitled to the highest deference on appeal, the Appellate Division has substituted its own judgment by reversing defendant's conviction and remanding this matter to the prosecutor to reconsider her denial of defendant's PTI application. In a published decision, State v. Watkins, N.J. Super. (App. Div. 2007), the Appellate Division has established a per se rule that a series of fraudulent transactions occurring over a four-month period of time can never constitute a continuing criminal enterprise simply because in the panel's view, four months is somehow not long enough. (Pa48-55).1 The court artificially focused solely on the duration of defendant's fraud and ignored the other significant circumstances surrounding the nature of defendant's crimes; namely, that defendant was a state employee who submitted nine false certifications to the Department of Labor ("DOL") over a fourmonth period and received \$5,670 of unemployment benefits to which he was not entitled. (Pal-18; Pa20-24). Significantly, defendant's course of criminal conduct continued for as long as it possibly could and terminated only because his objective had

[&]quot;Da" refers to the appendix to defendant's direct appeal brief.

[&]quot;IT" refers to the PTI appeal hearing transcript dated September 24, 2004

September 24, 2004.
"2T" refers to the PTI appeal hearing transcript dated
November 19, 2004.

[&]quot;3T" refers to the plea transcript dated February 7, 2005.

[&]quot;4T" refers to the sentencing transcript dated April 15, 2005.

[&]quot;Pa" refers to the appendix to this petition.
"PSR" refers to defendant's Adult Presentence Report.

been reached -- his completion of the training program through which he had fraudulently obtained unemployment benefits. There is no reason whatsoever to believe he would not have continued to bilk the State of more money if his training needs had gone on longer. Moreover, defendant promptly plowed his ill-gotten wealth into new business ventures, and then refused to repay any of these unlawful unemployment benefits after his fraud was discovered by the DOL a year later in 2000. (Pa20-32; Pa45). Only after his 2004 indictment, did defendant agree to repay this money, and that was not until he pleaded guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement some six years later, in February 2005. (Pa28-32; Pa41-45). Before that time, defendant had paid nothing toward the principal debt, fines and penalties totaling \$7,619.78. (2T4-20 to 25; Pa45).

In 1999, defendant, who had been temporarily laid off from Trenton Psychiatric Hospital received an extension of unemployment benefits under the DOL's "Additional Benefits During Training Program," whereby he could receive unemployment benefits while he pursued an education and job training skills in culinary arts at Mercer County Community College. (Pa31-32). Defendant, however, resumed working when he was rehired by the Hospital on January 17, 1999. (Pa24). Defendant realized that, so long as he remained in college, the DOL, through the training program, would send him unemployment checks based on his false certifications that he was not working. (3T12-3 to 20). After he was rehired, defendant submitted nine certifications to the DOL, beginning on February 1, 1999, for weeks January 23 through

May 22, 1999, indicating falsely that he was unemployed and entitled to receive unemployment benefits. (Pa1-9). In addition to falsely certifying that he was entitled to these benefits, defendant falsely certified that he was entitled to these benefits each time he endorsed and cashed the resultant nine unemployment benefit checks. (Pa10-18).

Knowing full well that he was not entitled to these unemployment benefits, defendant on numerous occasions certified that he was in fact eligible and thereafter compounded his fraud by cashing the checks. The dates defendant made these certifications and the dates he negotiated the checks were as follows:

| DATES OF FALSE CERTIFICATION | | DATES UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT CHECK NEGOTIATED |
|------------------------------------|---|---|
| February 1, 1999 | - | February 8, 1999 |
| February 16, 1999 | - | February 19, 1999 |
| March 1, 1999 | - | March 4, 1999 |
| March 15, 1999 | - | March 18, 1999 |
| March 29, 1999 | - | April 2, 1999 |
| April 12, 1999 | - | April 15, 1999 |
| April 26, 1999 | - | April 29, 1999 |
| May 10, 1999 | - | May 12, 1999 |
| May 24, 1999 | - | June 2, 1999 |

Defendant admitted at his guilty plea hearing that he knowingly failed to report his re-employment by Trenton Psychiatric Hospital to the DOL. (3T12-12 to 14).

During the time span of defendant's fraud, he opened the

"first Culinary Cafeteria at Mercer County Community College, called the 'Lucky 7 Lunch Box'" and "an off-site catering business called 'Treasured Memories Catering'" through the Hospital. (Da15-16; Pa39-40). Defendant submitted his last false certification to the DOL on May 24, 1999, and cashed the check on June 2, 1999. (Pa9; Pa18). Defendant received a culinary technician certificate of completion from the Career Training Institute of Mercer County Community College on June 4, 1999. (Pa19).

After discovering that defendant had been working at the Hospital at the same time he had been paid unemployment benefits, the Bureau of Benefit Payment Control sent defendant a letter on September 12, 2000, indicating that he had received \$5,670 in unemployment benefits to which he was not entitled. (Pa20-21). A fact-finding hearing, in which a repayment schedule would have been established, was scheduled for September 22, 2000. (2T3-4 to 4-1; Pa21). Defendant neither appeared for the hearing nor contacted the DOL. (2T3-23 to 4-1). Thereafter, a determination and demand for refund of unemployment benefits, imposition of penalties and disqualification from future benefits was made because of defendant's "false or fraudulent misrepresentation" that he was entitled to these benefits. (Pa22-23). With the assessment of penalties and fines, defendant then owed \$7,087.50. Ibid.

The State investigator assigned to this case continued to attempt to contact defendant by telephone to no avail. (2T4-2 to 20). On January 29, 2004, when defendant failed to either

cooperate or acknowledge the State's attempt to resolve this matter civilly, the State Grand Jury indicted defendant for third-degree theft by deception and fourth-degree unsworn falsification to authorities. (Pa25-30). Thereafter, defendant submitted a PTI application which was accepted by the Mercer County Criminal Division Manager. (Pa31). From the time the DOL ceased providing unemployment benefits to defendant in May 1999, until the time he was indicted on January 29, 2004, defendant had not made one voluntary repayment of these funds now totaling \$7,619.78. (2T4-20 to 25).

In a letter dated April 19, 2004, the State objected to defendant's entry into PTI for three reasons: (1) defendant's fraud from January to May 1999 constituted a continuing criminal enterprise; (2) he was a public employee; and (3) he had a 1990 disorderly persons offense conviction for receiving stolen property. (Pa31-32).

On April 26, 2004, defendant was notified by Trenton

Psychiatric Hospital that he was suspended with pay pursuant to a

Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action, which also indicated

that he was subject to forfeiture of his public office as a

result of his indictment. (Pa33-37).

On September 24, 2004, the Honorable Maria M. Sypek, P.J. Cr., after the initial oral argument on the State's denial of defendant's PTI application, adjourned the matter until November 19, 2004. The adjournment was intended to allow the State to address the issue regarding defendant's status as a public employee in its determination of whether to consent to his PTI

application. In advance of that hearing, the prosecutor submitted a letter brief and advised Judge Sypek of the following at the subsequent hearing:

- the State does not have a <u>per se</u> blanket policy denying PTI admission to public employees;
- the State's reasons for denying public employees' admission into PTI is wellgrounded within the guidelines of PTI rules adopted by the Supreme Court;
- 3. defendant's crime constituted a breach of the public trust because there was a nexus between defendant's crime of dishonesty and his public employment at Trenton Psychiatric Hospital. Defendant's admission into PTI would deprecate the seriousness of his crime;
- defendant could have resolved this matter civilly long before the criminal prosecution was begun and defendant's failure to do so was not indicative of someone who was amendable to rehabilitation, but of someone who should go through the ordinary criminal process;
- defendant made no voluntary payments toward repayment of these ill-gotten benefits;
- defendant's action constituted a continuing course of criminal activity;
- defendant's rap sheet showed that defendant had a 1990 disorderly persons offense for receiving stolen property;² and
- 8. the integrity of the Unemployment Insurance Benefit Fund has to be preserved.

[2T2-23 to 7-7.]

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Judge Sypek took the matter under advisement. (2T9-20 to

13-8). On February 22, 2006, after defendant had been sentenced

In fact, defendant also had been convicted of the disorderly persons offense of interfering with the police on April 13, 2004, and was assessed a \$1,030 fine. (4T5-11 to 14; PSR at 6).

on April 15, 2005, Judge Sypek affirmed the State's rejection of defendant's entry into PTI based on two grounds: (1) his nine false certifications submitted in a four-month period constituted a continuing criminal enterprise; and (2) he had a prior municipal court conviction in 1990 for receiving stolen property. (Pa41-47).

In its February 5, 2007, published opinion, the Appellate Division ruled that "[w]hatever may be the limits of a continuing enterprise, defendant's actions did not fit that concept" as developed by case law. Watkins, supra, ______N.J. Super. at ____ (slip op. at 8). (Pa55). Even though the court found that defendant's conduct was an enterprise, it found that it was not a "continuing" enterprise "due to the relatively brief length of time it persisted. A series of unlawful acts intended to profit the criminal do not translate into a 'business' or 'enterprise' simply because they took place over a number of months." Ibid.

On February 13, 2007, the State filed its Notice of Petition for Certification. (Pa56).

STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION PRESENTED

Did the Appellate Division err in finding that a fraud committed against the Unemployment Insurance Benefit Fund for a period of four months by a public employee does not constitute a continuing criminal enterprise under Guideline 3(i)(2) where

Contrary to the State's brief and argument at the November 19, 2004 hearing, Judge Sypek's order mistakenly indicated that the State had dropped defendant's status as a public employee as a factor in its decision to reject defendant's PTI application.

Compare Pa45-47 with 2T2-23 to 7-7.

defendant submitted nine false certifications, obtaining unemployment benefits to which he was not entitled; where defendant's scheme continued for as long as it took to reach its desired end (with no reason to believe it would not have persisted further if necessary); and where defendant refused to either acknowledge or repay these ill-gotten criminal proceeds for the ensuing five years, during which time he used his illegally-generated income to open new commercial ventures?

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

POINT I

THE APPELLATE DIVISION ERRED WHEN IT SUBSTITUTED ITS JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE PROSECUTOR AND ESTABLISHED A <u>PER SE</u> RULE THAT A FOUR-MONTH FRAUD, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE ATTENDANT FACTS, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A CONTINUING CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE UNDER GUIDELINE 3(i)(2).

Inexplicably failing to view the prosecutor's decision through the mandatory highly deferential filter of appellate review, the Appellate Division provided a mere "perfunctory recitation" of the applicable standard and failed "to provide any explanation" for the basis of its decision. State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576, 587 (1996). Ignoring all of the attendant facts of this case, the appellate court has found that the prosecutor's determination that defendant's four-month fraud constituted a continuing criminal enterprise under Guideline 3(i)(2) was a patent and gross abuse of her discretion. By its decision, the Appellate Division has "essentially evaluated the case as if it stood in the shoes of the prosecutor," and established a per se rule that a four-month fraud cannot constitute a continuing

criminal enterprise. <u>Id.</u> at 589. This ruling is untenable and has no support in well-established case law. This Court has often ruled that whether the appellate or trial court agrees with the prosecutor's decision is irrelevant, since a reviewing court has no authority to second guess a position taken by the prosecutor. <u>Ibid.</u>; <u>State v. Nwobu</u>, 139 <u>N.J.</u> 236, 254 (1995); <u>State v. DeMarco</u>, 107 <u>N.J.</u> 562 (1987); <u>accord State v. Motley</u>, 369 <u>N.J. Super.</u> 314, 321 (App. Div. 2004). Rather, the standard is "whether the prosecutor's decision could not have been reasonably made upon weighing the relevant factors." <u>Nwobu</u>, <u>supra</u>, 139 <u>N.J.</u> at 254.

Because of the close relationship between the PTI Program and the prosecutor's charging authority, courts allow prosecutors "wide latitude" in deciding whom to divert into the PTI program or whom to prosecute. State v. Negran, 178 N.J. 73, 82 (2003). It is this Court's expectation that a "prosecutor's decision to reject a PTI applicant will rarely be overturned." State v. Baynes, 148 N.J. 434, 443 (1997) (quoting Wallace, supra, 146 N.J. at 585 (quoting State v. Leonardis (II), 73 N.J. 360, 380 (1977)). In fact, the level of deference is so high that such deference is categorized as "enhanced," "extra," and "extreme." Negran, supra, 178 N.J. at 82; Baynes, supra, 148 N.J. at 443; Nwobu, supra, 139 N.J. at 246. Moreover, it is a fundamental proposition of law established by this Court that "[a]bsent evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the prosecutor considered all relevant factors before rendering a decision." Baynes, supra, 148 N.J. at 444; State v. Dalglish, 86 N.J. 503,

509 (1981).

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The enhanced or extreme deference afforded to prosecutors regarding PTI admission translates into a heavy burden for a defendant to overcome a prosecutorial veto of his admission into PTI. A defendant must clearly and convincingly establish that the alleged prosecutorial error complained of constituted a patent and gross abuse of her discretion in that her decision clearly subverted the goals of PTI. Nwobu, supra, 139 N.J. at 247 (quoting State v. Kraft, 265 N.J. Super. 106, 111-12 (App. Div. 1993)). Consequently, this Court has determined that judicial review of a prosecutor's decision is "limited to instances of the most egregious examples of injustice and unfairness," where the prosecutor's decision was more than "just an abuse of discretion as traditionally conceived," but rather, "a prosecutorial decision that 'has gone so wide of the mark sought to be accomplished by PTI that fundamental fairness and justice require judicial intervention.'" Wallace, supra, 146 N.J. at 582-583 (quoting State v. Ridgway, 208 N.J. Super. 118, 130 (Law Div.1985)).

In this case, defendant, a public employee, defrauded the Unemployment Insurance Benefit Fund of \$5,670 in unemployment benefits to which he was not entitled by submitting nine false certifications to the DOL. He thereafter endorsed the resultant nine benefits checks, which constituted additional false certifications that he was entitled to these benefits.

Defendant's crimes constituted third-degree thefts by deception;

i.e., a crime of dishonesty, which subjects defendant to

spontaneity,'" but rather, participated "in a series of deliberate and planned unlawful acts" over a period of time. State v. Bender, 80 N.J. 84, 95 (1979); State v. Marie, 200 N.J. Super. 424, 427 (Law Div. 1984); see also State v. Barrett, 157 N.J. Super. 96, 102 (App. Div. 1978); Cf. State v. Imbriani, 280 N.J. Super. 304, 318 (Law Div. 1984) ("[w] hether the conduct occurred on a daily, weekly, monthly or some other basis, it is clear that every day during that five-year period [Imbriani] knew that he had performed and was continuing to perform illegal acts and was receiving monies to which he was not entitled."), aff'd supra, 291 N.J. Super. 171. It was defendant's repetitive criminal acts (the submission of nine false certifications and illegally cashing nine unemployment benefits checks over a fourmonth period of time), which clearly provided "a negative implication when rehabilitation is considered." Marie, supra, 200 N.J. Super. at 430. Considering his repetitive course of conduct, his status as a public employee and his criminal record, the prosecutor properly rejected defendant's PTI application. Her three-pronged justification was wholly proper and her denial of defendant's PTI application should have been affirmed by the Appellate Division.

In reviewing PTI decisions, the role of an appellate court is to determine "whether the prosecutor's decision could not have been reasonably made upon weighing the relevant factors." Nwobu, supra, 139 N.J. at 254. The Appellate Division cannot say that the prosecutor's decision here "could not have been reasonably made" given the facts of this case.

Defendant had no pangs of conscience that caused him to desist from his fraud. He bilked the system for as long as he possibly could, and it ended only because his crime reached its natural conclusion -- receipt of a culinary technician certificate of completion. Defendant's criminal activity "was not of such a nature that it had to continue except for defendant's intent and purpose to continue to offend." State v. Imbriani, 291 N.J. Super. 171, 182 (App. Div. 1996).

The appellate panel was also wrong to artificially focus on the four months of false certifications when defendant's improper conduct continued long after that. Critically, defendant refused to either acknowledge or repay this substantial principal debt of \$5,670 for five years. At the time defendant applied for PTI, he had not paid one cent toward this debt. (2T4-20 to 22). Even though defendant could have availed himself of the DOL's civil resolution process three years prior to his PTI application, and could have avoided criminal prosecution altogether, defendant failed to attend a fact-finding hearing and evaded the DOL investigator's attempts to contact him. (2T4-2 to 18). Only when defendant was indicted did he seek to make restitution. He should have done so much earlier. Therefore, defendant's crime against the Fund continued for years because he did not agree to repay these illegally obtained unemployment benefits until he pleaded guilty in 2005 almost six years after he had obtained them.

Meanwhile, during the pendency of this fraud and thereafter, defendant, according to his own counsel's letter brief, was able

to open a cafeteria at Mercer County Community College and open his own personal catering business. (Da15-16; Pa39-40). Thus, defendant has treated these ill-gotten criminal proceeds of \$5,670 as if it were his own money, used it for his personal benefit, and refused to repay it until he was indicted five years later. Such a use implicates the additional crime of money laundering. State v. Harris, 373 N.J. Super. 253, 263 (App. Div. 2004), certif. denied, 183 N.J. 257 (2005) (a defendant is guilty of money laundering contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:21-25a if he "possesses property known to be derived from a criminal activity"). That the State did not charge defendant with money laundering is of no moment. The prosecutor can look to the actual facts of the case, especially when they are not in dispute, such as in this case, to determine whether defendant should be admitted into PTI. See generally, Imbriani, supra, 280 N.J. Super. at 316.

evaluations" of the prosecutor for the Unemployment Insurance
Benefit Fund regarding reasonable ways to protect the integrity
of the fund for all unemployed New Jersey workers and to secure
the repayment of ill-gotten unemployment benefits sooner as
opposed to later which were absolutely relevant to her denial of
defendant's PTI application. This Court has emphasized in no
uncertain terms that a "'reviewing court is not permitted to
'discount the prosecutor's responsiveness to the prevailing level
of local public anxiety over certain forms of misconduct and its
proper effect upon him in choosing between the goals of public

deterrence and the least burdensome form of rehabilitation for the offender.'" Wallace, supra, 146 N.J. at 590 (quoting Kraft, supra, 265 N.J. Super. at 117).

It is the prosecutor who can properly assess "the degree of local public anxiety attaching to certain forms of misconduct," such as a public employee's repeated fraud committed against the Unemployment Insurance Benefit Fund. State v. Sutton, 80 N.J. 110, 119 (1979). This Fund exists to assist "citizens of this state who pay into it and at times need it. [It is] to bridge that gap" between employment and unemployment. (2T2-23 to 7-7). This Fund does not exist to provide defendant with either windfall income or seed money to start catering businesses.

Only as a last resort did the State seek to criminally prosecute defendant, after years during which he refused to acknowledge the State's legitimate and irrefutable claim.

Defendant should not be allowed at this late juncture to avoid criminal prosecution by entering PTI which would put him back to exactly that position he rejected for so many years. To allow defendant to enter PTI after years of evading the State's attempts to obtain restitution would establish a disincentive for others to handle these matters earlier, prior to prosecution.

Civil resolution of the State's claims benefits defendants in that criminal prosecution is avoided and less interest is accrued; the State and the public benefit because these illegally obtained unemployment benefits are repaid much sooner than they otherwise would be. Both benefits would be irretrievably compromised by rewarding defendant for his abject failure to even

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respond to the DOL's legitimate requests for restitution over a five-year period.

The possible value of PTI treatment for defendant was outweighed by the public need for prosecution, given his steadfast refusal to acknowledge the State's claim during the civil remedies phase, and given that the debt went unpaid for five years. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12e(14); N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12e(17) ("the harm done to society by abandoning criminal prosecution would outweigh the benefits to be derived by society from the channeling of this defendant into PTI"); accord Imbriani, supra, 291 N.J. Super. at 181 (a defendant's refusal to settle a related civil suit is an appropriate factor to be considered when evaluating whether a defendant should receive PTI). In this case, the State appropriately determined that the public would benefit more from defendant's prosecution rather than his diversion.

The prosecutor's decision denying defendant's admission into PTI was not a patent or gross abuse of her discretion which subverted the goals of PTI. Rather, it is the Appellate Division's decision, and not the prosecutor's, which patently subverts the goals of PTI. The court has "cherry picked" from the prosecutor's multi-faceted justifications one factor, the duration of defendant's fraud, and has examined it completely out of context. The court skewed the analysis with the result that the duration of a defendant's crime is singularly determinative of whether it constituted a continuing criminal enterprise. Thus, the Appellate Division has established a bright line that a

defendant's fraud committed over a four-month period of time can never support a finding of a continuing criminal enterprise.

This ruling constitutes error. Whereas this Court has cautioned against prosecutors establishing per se rules regarding PTI, which by their very nature require a disregard of relevant factors, the Appellate Division has established its own per se rule and disregarded the prosecutor's valid justifications for denying defendant's PTI application. Compare State v. Caliquiri, 158 N.J. 28, 44 (1999); Baynes, supra, 148 N.J. at 445 ("the presumption that the prosecutor has considered all relevant facts is overcome" when a defendant establishes that the prosecutor relied on a per se rule).

The time span over which defendant committed his crimes is not determinative of whether he is entitled to PTI. Temporal parameters can never be divorced from the attendant facts. For instance, the Marie Court noted that "a single criminal act may... be of such consequence as to permit a prosecutorial decision against admission to PTI" because of the nature of the offense charged alone. Marie, supra, 200 N.J. Super. at 430. This Court's decision in Nwobu proves this point. While this Court found that Nwobu's six week second-degree fraud may not have constituted a continuing criminal enterprise because ordinarily "'a continuing criminal business or enterprise' in Guideline 3(I) is predicated on more long-standing criminal involvement," this Court nonetheless affirmed the prosecutor's denial of defendant's PTI application. Nwobu, supra, 139 N.J. at 251. The nature of Nwobu's offense, a second-degree fraud, was the most significant

Court's guidance, this case "presents a question of general public importance which has not been but should be settled by" this Court. R. 2:12-4.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully urges that certification be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

STUART RABNER
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER

BY: Leslie-Ann M. Justys
Deputy Attorney General

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
OF COUNSEL AND ON THE PETITION

CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that this application is made in good faith, presents a substantial question, and is not made for purposes of delay.

Leslie-Ann M. Justus Deputy Attorney General


DATED: March 9, 2007



C. Complete this Section only if you worked or received holiday or vacation pay during the weeks claimed. If you returned to work FULL-TIME, complete items # #2 and #3. DO NOT complete items #4 and #5. If you are claiming PARTIAL BENEFITS, complete items #1, #2, and #3. Mail proof of your earnings, signe by your employer, OR complete item #4 and have your employer complete item #5.

| 1 Did you return to work: FULL TIME PART TIME | 4 WEEK 1 | | | WEE | K2 | | |
|--|--|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------|---------|---|
| | Day | Date | Hours | Gross Wages | Date | Hours | Gross Wages |
| f you returned to work full-time, enter date; | Sunday | | | | | | |
| Occupation and Rate of pay: \$ Per | Monday | | | | | | |
| Are you still working? | Tuesday | | | | | | |
| f NO, enter last day of work and explain why in REMARKS below. | Wednesday | | | | A | | |
| 2 EMPLOYER NAME | Thursday | | | | | | |
| ADDRESS | Friday | | | | | | |
| ADDITION OF THE PROPERTY OF TH | Saturday | | | | | | |
| CITY, STATE, ZIP Telephone | | Total | | \$ | Total | | \$ |
| 3 Enter the amount of gross wages you earned including holiday or vacation pay WEEK 1 \$ WEEK 2 \$ | Employer Instr that it is accur please provide wages. | ructions: rate. If co e correct | Review rrect, co t informa | mplete the empl tion. Employee | tips MUST | be incl | laimant to ensu below. If incorre- uded in the gro- work offered a |
| | earned less the | han full-t | ime rem | uneration as sh | own above | | |


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
C. Complete this Section only if you worked or received holiday or vacation pay during the weeks claimed. If you returned to work FULL-TIME, complete items # #2 and #3. DO NOT complete items #4 and #5. If you are claiming PARTIAL BENEFITS, complete items #1, #2, and #3. Mail proof of your earnings, signe by your employer, OR complete item #4 and have your employer complete item #5.

| Did you return to work: | FULL TIME | LI PARI TIME | 4 WEER | 44. | | | | | |
|---|------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|------------|-----------|--|------------|------------|------------------|
| you returned to work full-time | | | Day | Date | Hours | Gross Wages | Date | Hours | Gross Wages |
| Occupation | | | Sunday | | | , ,,,,,, | | | |
| | | | Monday | | | | | | |
| Rate of pay: \$ are you still working? | □ YES □ |] NO | Tuesday | | | | | | |
| NO, enter last day of work EMARKS below. | | | Wednesday | | 1. | | × . | | |
| EMPLOYER NAME | | | Thursday | | | | | 1 | |
| DORESS | | | Friday | | | | | | |
| | | | Saturday | | | | | | |
| ITY, STATE, ZIP | Tel | ephone | | Total | | \$ | Total | | \$ |
| B Enter the amount of gross wage | es you earned includin | g holiday or vacation pay | 5 Verifica | tion o | f Parti | al Earnings | | | |
| WEEK 1 \$ | WEEK 2 | \$. | Il that it is accum | rata If on | rrect co | the information implete the emple | over certi | rication t | elow. If incorre |
| REMARKS: | | | please provide wages. | e correct | t informa | tion. Employee to bove individual tuneration as sho | nas accer | ted all | uded in the gro |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | Signature X | | | | () | | |

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
| Did you return to work: FULL TIME PART TIME | 4 WEEK 1 | | | WEE | (2 | | |
|---|---|---------------------------------------|---|--|-------------------------|-------------------|---------------|
| you returned to work full-time, enter date; | Day | Date | Hours | Gross Wages | Date | Hours | Gross Wage |
| | Sunday | | | | | | |
| Occupation and Rate of pay: \$ Per | Monday | | | | | | |
| Are you still working? | Tuesday | | | | | | |
| f NO, enter last day of work and explain why in | Wednesday | | | | a _N | | |
| EMPLOYER NAME | Thursday | | | | | | |
| ADDRESS | Friday | | | | | | |
| , | Saturday | | | | | T PE | |
| CITY, STATE, ZIP Telephone | | Total | | \$ | Total | | \$ |
| 3 Enter the amount of gross wages you earned including holiday or vacation pay WEEK 1 \$ WEEK 2 \$ REMARKS: | Employer Inst that it is accur please provid wages. Employer Ce | ructions: rate. If co e correct | Review to rrect, con information: The ab | Il Earnings the information in pilete the emploion. Employee to ove individual interation as sho | oyer certificities MUST | be inclinated all | uded in the g |



C. Complete this Section only if you worked or received holiday or vacation pay during the weeks claimed. If you returned to work FULL-TIME, complete items # #2 and #3. DO NOT complete items #4 and #5. If you are claiming PARTIAL BENEFITS, complete items #1, #2, and #3. Mail proof of your earnings, signe by your employer, OR complete item #4 and have your employer complete item #5.

| 1 Did you return to work: FULL TIME PART TIME | 4 WEEK 1 | | | | WEEK | (2 | | |
|--|--|--|-------------------------------------|--|-------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| f you returned to work full-time, enter date; | Day | Date | Hours | Gross W | lages | Date | Hours | Gross Wage |
| Occupationand | Sunday | | | | | | | |
| Rate of pay: \$ Per | Monday | | | | | | | |
| Are you still working? | Tuesday | | | 1 | | | | A.S. S.S. |
| If NO, enter last day of work and explain why in REMARKS below. | Wednesday | | - | 1. | | Α | | |
| 2 EMPLOYER NAME | Thursday | | | | | | 1 | |
| ADDRESS | Friday | | | | | 1. | | |
| | Saturday | | | | | | 1 | |
| CITY, STATE, ZIP Telephone | | Total | | s | | Total | | \$ |
| 3 Enter the amount of gross wages you earned including holiday or vacation pay WEEK 1 \$ WEEK 2 \$ REMARKS: | 5 Verifica Employer Instr that it is accur please provide wages. Employer Cer earned less th | ructions: ate. If co correct tification | Review rrect, con information | the inform mplete the tion. Emple bove indivi | emplo oyee tip | yer certifos MUST as accep | fication b be included all v | elow. If incoming ded in the gr |
| | Employer's Signature X | | | | | | | |
| | Signature A | | | | | | | |

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Complete this Section only if you worked or received holiday or vacation pay during the weeks claimed. If you returned to work FULL-TIME, complete items # 2 and #3. DO NOT complete items #4 and #5. If you are claiming PARTIAL BENEFITS, complete items #1, #2, and #3. Mail proof of your earnings, signe by your employer, OR complete item #4 and have your employer complete item #5.

| Occupation Rate of pay: \$ Are you still working? f NO, enter last day of work | Per | NO and explain why in |
|--|------------------------|--------------------------|
| REMARKS below. 2 EMPLOYER NAME | | |
| ADDRESS | | |
| CITY, STATE, ZIP | Tel | ephone |
| 3 Enter the amount of gross wag | es you earned includin | g holiday or vacation pa |
| WEEK 1 \$ | WEEK 2 | \$ |
| REMARKS: | | |
| | | |

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
| 4 WEEK 1 | | | WEE | WEEK 2 | | | | | | | |
|-----------|-------|-------|-------------|--------|-------|-------------|--|--|--|--|--|
| Day | Date | Hours | Gross Wages | Date | Hours | Gross Wages | | | | | |
| Sunday | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Monday | | | | | | · · · | | | | | |
| Tuesday | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Wednesday | | | | 1- | 3.4 | | | | | | |
| Thursday | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Friday | | | 1. 9 | | | | | | | | |
| Saturday | | - | | | | | | | | | |
| | Total | | \$ | Total | | \$ | | | | | |

5 Verification of Partial Earnings

Employer Instructions: Review the information provided by the claimant to ensure that it is accurate. If correct, complete the employer certification below. If incorrect, please provide correct information. Employee tips MUST be included in the gross wages.

Employer Certification: The above individual has accepted all work offered and earned less than full-time remuneration as shown above.

Tel# (



| c. | Complete this Section only if you worked #2 and #3. DO NOT complete items #4 by your employer, OR complete item #4 as | or received holiday or va and #5. If you are claim nd have your employer o | acation pay during hing PARTIAL BENI complete item #5. | the week | s claimed. omplete ite | | | proof of yo | ur earnings, signe |
|----|---|--|--|----------|---------------------------|-------------|------|-------------|--------------------|
| _ | | | 4 WEEK 1 | | | WEE | | | Gross Wages |
| 1 | Did you return to work: FULL TIME | | Day | Date | Hours | Gross Wages | Date | Hours | Gloss Wages |
| | work full-time, enter date_ | <u> </u> | Cunday | | | | | | |

| Occupation Rate of pay: \$ Are you still working? NO, enter last day of work REMARKS below. | Per - | 0 | NO and explain why in |
|---|----------------------|-------|--------------------------|
| EMPLOYER NAME | | | |
| ADDRESS | | | |
| CITY, STATE, ZIP | | Telep | hone |
| 3 Enter the amount of gross was | ges you earned inclu | ding | holiday or vacation p |
| WEEK 1 \$ | WEEK | 2 | \$ |
| REMARKS: | | | |
| | | | |


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| L WEEK 1 | WEEK 2 | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------|--------|-------|-------------|----------|-------|-------------|--|--|--|--|
| Day | Date | Hours | Gross Wages | Date | Hours | Gross Wages | | | | |
| Sunday | | | | | | | | | | |
| Monday | | | | | | | | | | |
| Tuesday | | | | 1 | | | | | | |
| Wednesday | | | | <u> </u> | | | | | | |
| Thursday | | | | - | - | | | | | |
| Friday | | | | | - | | | | | |
| Saturday | | | | - | - | + | | | | |
| | Total | | \$ | Total | 1 | \$ | | | | |

5 Verification of Partial Earnings

Employer Instructions: Review the information provided by the claimant to ensure that it is accurate. If correct, complete the employer certification below. If incorrect, please provide correct information. Employee tips MUST be included in the gross wages.

Employer Certification: The above individual has accepted all work offered and earned less than full-time remuneration as shown above.



C. Complete this Section only if you worked or received holiday or vacation pay during the weeks claimed. If you returned to work FULL-TIME, complete items #1 #2 and #3. DO NOT complete items #4 and #5. If you are claiming PARTIAL BENEFITS, complete items #1, #2, and #3. Mail proof of your earnings, signed by your employer, OR complete item #4 and have your employer complete item #5.

| Did you return to work: | J FULL TIME | ☐ PART TIME | 4 WEEK 1 | | CONTRACTOR DESCRIPTION | VVEE | | | |
|--|------------------------|-------------|---------------------------|------------|------------------------|---|------------|-------------------|------------------|
| If you returned to work full-time, enter date; | | | Day | Date | Hours | Gross Wages | Date | Hours | Gross Wages |
| | | | Sunday | | | | | | |
| Occupation | | | Monday | | | | | | |
| Rate of pay: \$Are you still working? | D VES [|] NO | Tuesday | | | | | 333 | |
| NO, enter last day of work _ REMARKS below. | | | Wednesday | | | 3. | ~ | 1. | |
| EMPLOYER NAME | | | Thursday | | | | | | |
| ADDRESS | | | Friday | | | | | | |
| | | | Saturday | | 1 | | | | |
| CITY, STATE, ZIP | Tel | phone | | Total | | \$ | Total | | \$ |
| 3 Enter the amount of gross wag | es you earned includin | | Employer Inst | uctions | Review | al Earnings the information | provided t | by the cl | aimant to ensur |
| REMARKS: | | • | please provide wages. | correct | informatic: The at | mplete the employee to bove individual h | ips MUST | be included all v | ided in the gros |
| | | | Employer's Signature X | nan tull-t | ime remu | uneration as sho | wn above | | |

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S1: 2 OF NEW JERSEY
Lepartment Of Labor
Employment Security Agency

· CHECK NUMBER 18081264

02/01/99 .. Warrant Check 136-62-9156

C.W.E. DATE 01/23/99 01/30/99

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DATOR PAY Six Hundred Thirty Dollars and No Cents
To The
Order Of: CHARLES WATKINS III
67, GENERAL GREEN AVE
TRENTON NJ 08606

DATOR
TO THE
TO

1808 126 km #:031200730# 0127# 3496#

",00000 3 0 0 0 ",



ST E OF NEW JERSEY
partment of Labor
Employment Security Agency

· · · CHECK NUMBER 18242529

DATE OF CHECK

NEFIT ACCOUNT 92/16/99 Warrant Check 136-62-9156

02/06/99 02/13/99 07287

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DATE PAY Six Hundred Thirty Dollars and No Cents
To The
Order Of: CHARLES WATKINS III
67 GENERAL GREEN AVE
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PAY Six Hundred Thirty Dollars and No Cents

Date
To The
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67 GENERAL GREEN AVE
TRENTON NJ 08618-5517

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03/29/99 136-62-9156 CWE. DATE 03/20/99

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PAY Six Hundred Thirty Dollars and No Couls ...

To The Order OI: CILIRLES WATKINS III 67 GENERAL GREEN AVE TRENTON NJ 08618-5517

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STA OF NEW JERSEY : L_antment Of Labor Employment Security Agency

. DATE OF CHECK

C.W.E. DATE

04/03/99

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Area PAY Six Hundred Thirty Dollars and No Cents
To The
Order Of: CILIRLES WATKINS III
67 GENERAL GREEN AVE
TRENTON NJ 08618-5517

STATED NEW JERSEY NATIONAL BANK

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DATE OF CHECK

C.W.E. DATE 05/01/99 05/08/99

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Department of Labor

Employment Security Agency

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EFIT ACCOUNT | 05/24/99 | 05/15/99 | 10 06738

And | DAY Six Hundred Thirty Dollars and No Cents

Date | To The | CHARLES WATKINS III |

Order Of: 67 GENERAL GREEN AVE | TRENTON NJ 08618-5517 | C. N.J. 08608

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available for work and made an active search for work except as reported 1 reported all my carnings and holiday/vacation pay and me; all other eligibility requirements in accordance with New Jersey law. I know the law provides penalties for laise statements made in connection with this claim.

19070987

"OOOD 30000"







MERCER COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE JAMES KERNEY CAMPUS CAREER TRAINING INSTITUTE

THIS CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION IS AWARDED TO


Charles Watkins

FOR HAVING EARNED THE CERTIFICATE OF

CULINARY TECHNICIAN

PRESENTED THIS 4TH DAY OF JUNE, 1999

andra & Heller





NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF LABOR BUREAU OF BENEFIT PAYMENT CONTROL

CHARLES WATKINS III 67 GENERAL GREEN AVE TRENTON, NJ 08618 DATE OF MAILING: 9-12-00 SSN: 136-62-9156

AS A RESULT OF AN INVESTIGATION OF YOUR UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE CLAIM, EVIDENCE HAS BEEN OBTAINED THAT YOU MAY HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED BY THE EMPLOYER(S) SHOWN BELOW AT SOME TIME DURING THE WEEK(S) LISTED BELOW, DURING WHICH TIME YOU ALSO RECEIVED UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS.

| WEEK | INCO | EMPLOYERBENEFITS | AMOUNT |
|----------|----------|---------------------------------------|----------|
| | REPORTED | FADNED PAID ALLOWED | OVERPAID |
| PAID | .00 | 295 OZITRENTON PSYCH HOSP 315 00 .00 | 315.00 |
| 01/23/99 | | 482.41 TRENTON PSYCH HOSP 315.00 .00 | 315.00 |
| 01/30/99 | .00 | 482.41 TRENTON PSYCH HOSP 315.00 .00 | 315.00 |
| 02/06/99 | .00 | 578.89 TRENTON PSYCH HOSP 315.00 .00 | 315.00 |
| 02/13/99 | .00 | 578.89, TRENTON PSYCH HOSP 315.00 .00 | 315.00 |
| 02/20/99 | .00 | | 315.00 |
| 02/27/99 | .00 | 185 Of IKBRION LOLON MOST SESTED | 315.00 |
| 03/06/99 | .00 | 482.41 TRENTON PSYCH HOSP 315.00 .00 | |
| | .00 | 482.41 TRENTON PSYCH HOSP 315.00 .00 | 315.00 |
| 03/13/99 | .00 | 482 ATTRENTON PSYCH HOSP 315.00 .00 | 315.00 |
| 03/20/99 | | 578.89 TRENTON PSYCH HOSP 315.00 .00 | 315.00 |
| 03/27/99 | .00 | 385.93 TRENTON PSYCH HOSP 315.00 .00 | 315.00 |
| 04/03/99 | .00 | 578.89 TRENTON PSYCH HOSP 315.00 .00 | 315.00 |
| 04/10/99 | .00 | 578.89 TRENTON PSYCH HOSP 315.00 .00 | 315.00 |
| 04/17/99 | .00 | ART AT TRENTUN PSICH HOSE SISSES | 315.00 |
| 04/24/99 | .00 | 278 71 TRENTON POICH HOUSE SECTION | 315.00 |
| 05/01/99 | | 1.02 AT TRENTON PSICE HOSE SESSE | |
| 05/08/99 | | 164 32 TRENTON PSYCH HOSP 315.00 .00 | |
| 05/06/99 | | 470 35 TRENTON PSYCH HOSP 315.00 .00 | |
| 05/15/99 | | 385.93 TRENTON PSYCH HOSP 315.00 .00 | 315.00 |
| 05/22/99 | .00 | 303.73 110 | |

TOTAL AMOUNT OVERPAID \$5,670.00

ACCORDINGLY, YOU MAY BE SUBJECT TO REFUND, DISQUALIFICATION, FINES AND/OR PROSECUTION PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(G). (SEE REVERSE FOR EXTRACT OF THIS STATUTE)



SCHEDULE OF OVFRPAYMENTS

136-62-9156

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5/24/98 CHARLES WATKINS III

| WEEK | BENEFITS PAID | WAGES EARNED | AMOUNT OVERPAID |
|-----------|---------------|-----------------|--------------------|
| 1/23/99 | . 315 | 385.00 | 315.00 |
| 1/30/99 | 315 | 482.00 | 315.00 |
| 2/06/99 | . 315 | 482.00 | 315.00 |
| 2/13/99 | 315 | 578.00 | 315.00 |
| 2/20/98 | 315 | 482.00 | 315.00 |
| 2/27/99 | 11/79 315 | 385.00 | 315.00 |
| 3/06/99 | . 315 | 482.00 | 315.00 |
| 3/13/99 | VIS/19 315 | 482.00 | 315.00 |
| 3/20/99_ | . 315 | 482.00 | 315.00 |
| 3/27/99 | 129/99315 | 578.00 | 315.00 |
| 4/03/99 | 315 | 385.00 | 315.00 |
| 4/10/99 | 13-199 315 | 578.00 | 315.00 |
| 4/17/99 | 315 | 482.00 | 315.00 |
| 4/24/99 4 | 24/49315 | 378.00 | 315.00 |
| 5/01/99 | 315 | 482.00 | 315.00 |
| 5/08/99 | 10/9 315 | 464.00 | 315.00 |
| 5/15/99 | 315 | 470.00 | 315.00 |
| | 24,99 315 | 385.00 | 315.00 |
| | | | |

TOTAL OVERPAYMENT INCLUDING FINES

PARTMENT OF LABOR NEW JERSEY : BART185 DIVISION OF UNE PLOYMENT AND DISABILITY INSURANCE LOOPS REFUND ENTRY REPORT (BPC-308)

SRFE: 62 DATE: 00/09/08

************************* D060 SSN: 136-62-9156 PC: 10 DOC: 05/24/98 DETECT REPORT SEP POSS REF EXAMINER PRIMARY DETERM CODE TYPE CODE CODE ABLE ISSUE 308 2 1

> END DATE ISSUE CODE START DATE 05/22/99 01/17/99 20

> > 5670.00 PRINCIPAL:

PENALTY:

1417.50

**************** PC: 10 DOC: 05/24/98 A040 SSN: 136-62-9156

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| | OLD | NEW | DEIDCITCH COLL. | 308 |
|----------|----------|----------|-----------------|-----|
| CWE DATE | EARNINGS | EARNINGS | REFUND TYPE: | 1 |
| 01/23/99 | 0.00 | 385.93 | | ** |
| 01/30/99 | 0.00 | 482.41 | | |
| 02/06/99 | 0.00 | 482.41 | | |
| 02/13/99 | 0.00 | 578.89 | | |
| 02/20/99 | 0.00 | 482.42 | | |
| 02/27/99 | 0.00 | 385.93 | | |
| 03/06/99 | 0.00 | 482.41 | | |
| 03/13/99 | 0.00 | 482.41 | | |
| 03/20/99 | 0.00 | 482.41 | | |
| 03/27/99 | 0.00 | 578.89 | | |
| | OLD. | NEW | DETECTION CODE: | 308 |
| CWE DATE | EARNINGS | EARNINGS | REFUND TYPE: | 1 |
| 04/03/99 | 0.00 | 385.93 | | |
| 04/03/99 | 0.00 | 000,100 | | |

578.89 04/10/99 482.41 0.00 04/17/99 04/24/99 0.00 378.21 0.00 482.41 05/01/99 464.32 05/08/99 0.00 05/15/99 0.00 470.35 05/22/99 0.00

等等 美名了紹 分配的 S, IND FA GILATS HI/PAYMEN SIR WAY ON/C: D/PAYME S I CLAIM

PC: 10 DOC: 05/24/98 RO30 SSN: 136-62-9156

EMP NAME: TRENTON PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL

WAIT WEEK IS UNKNOWN

REMARKS: ,

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PREPARED BY: SANDY ALPHONSE

ENTERED BY:

CRIMINAL **PROSECUTION**



State of New Jersey DEPARTMENT OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY

DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

PETER C. HARVEY
Attorney General

PO Box 085 Trenton, NJ 08625-0085 Telephone (609) 984-6500

VAUGHN L. McKoy Director

December 30, 2003

Mr. Charles A. Watkins III 67 General Green Avenue Trenton, NJ 08618

> Re: State of New Jersey v. Charles A. Watkins III DCJ No. 2003-2454-S

Dear Mr. Watkins:

The New Jersey Department of Labor, Division of Unemployment and Disability Insurance, has referred information regarding your claims for Unemployment Insurance Benefits to this office for criminal prosecution. This information is currently being reviewed and may be presented to a Grand Jury for indictment.

I ask that you or your attorney contact State Investigator Gary O'Brien by January 9, 2004 to advise us of your position regarding these charges. SI O'Brien may be reached at (609) 292-4995.

SI O'Brien will be happy to discuss this matter with you or your attorney in an effort to arrive at a mutually acceptable disposition of this matter.

David W. Kiefer
Deputy Attorney General

c: SI Gary O'Brien

AAPS

New Jersey Is An Equal Opportunity Employer



State of New Jersey DEPARTMENT OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

PETER C. HARVEY
Attorney General

PO Box 085 Trenton, NJ 08625-0085 Telephone (609) 984-6500

VAUGHN L. McKoy Director

January 5, 2004

Mr. Charles A. Watkins III 67 General Green Avenue Trenton, NJ 08618

Re: State of New Jersey v. Charles A. Watkins III
DCJ No. 2003-2454-S

Dear Mr. Watkins:

Based upon a recent investigation, it is the State's position that you wrongfully obtained unemployment insurance benefits by representing that you were unemployed while working for Trenton Psychiatric Hospital. Such an offense is a third degree violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4 (Theft by Deception) and a fourth degree violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:28-3a (Unsworn Falsification to Authorities).

I am writing to you in an attempt to resolve this matter before presenting it to a State Grand Jury for indictment. If you are represented by an attorney, please provide this letter to him or her and review it with him or her as soon as possible. This offer will remain open until January 16, 2004. If written acceptance is not received by this office on or before that date, the offer will expire.

Sentencing Exposure

The violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4 charged in the Accusation carries a statutory range of up to five years imprisonment and a \$15,000 fine, restitution, or both. In addition, you will be required to pay a VCCB assessment of \$50, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.1, a Safe Neighborhoods assessment of \$75, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.2, and a Law Enforcement Officers Training Fund assessment of \$30, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.2.

Agreements

Conditioned on the understandings specified below, the State of New Jersey will file with the Court an Accusation, charging one count of third degree Theft By Deception, in violation of

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N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4 and one count of fourth degree Unsworn Falsification to Authorities in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:28-3a.

You and the State of New Jersey agree to the following terms and conditions of sentencing, subject to the approval of the Court:

- (a) The State of New Jersey will recommend a period of non-custodial probation conditioned upon full restitution to the State of New Jersey, Department of Labor in the amount of \$7,610.78 and the execution of a Civil Consent Judgment described in paragraph (b) below in exchange for a guilty plea on the count of third degree Theft By Deception in the Accusation. If you fully comply with the terms of this agreement, this Office will not bring any further charges against you relating to the above-captioned matter.
- (b) You shall enter into a Civil Consent Judgment for the full restitution amount. The Civil Consent Judgment shall provide that upon default on your restitution payments, the State may execute said judgment, less credit for any payments made. The Civil Consent Judgment shall be entered by the Court at the time of sentencing. The Civil Consent Judgment shall be in addition to, and not to the exclusion of any other rights that the State might have as a result of any failure to make restitution payments.
- (c) You shall forfeit your employment with the Trenton Psychiatric Hospital and any other position with the state of New Jersey that you currently hold.

Very truly yours,

PETER C. HARVEY

ACTING ATTORNEY GENERAL

Bv:

David W. Kiefer

Deputy Attorney General

APPROVED:

Nancy L. Faust, Chief

Labor Prosecutions Unit

BUPERIOR COURT OF N.J.
FILED

JAN . 29 2004

DONALD E. PHELANICLERK

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION - CRIMINAL

State Grand Jury
Number SGJ489-04-2
Superior Court
Docket Number 64 - 01 - 90008-S

STATE OF NEW JERSEY

v. .

CHARLES A. WATKINS III)

. INDICTMENT

The Grand Jurors of and for the State of New Jersey, upon their oaths, present that:

COUNT ONE

.. (Theft By Deception-Third Degree)

CHARLES A. WATKINS III

between on or about May 24, 1998 and on or about May 22, 1999, at the City of Trenton, in the County of Mercer, elsewhere, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, purposely did obtain by deception property of the State of New Jersey valued in excess of \$500; that is, the said CHARLES A. WATKINS III did purposely obtain unemployment insurance benefits in the amount of \$5,670.00 by submitting or causing to be submitted documents for unemployment insurance benefits to the State of New Jersey, thereby creating or reinforcing false impressions to the State of New Jersey that the said CHARLES A. WATKINS III was unemployed;

WHEREAS IN TRUTH AND IN FACT, as the said CHARLES A. WATKINS III then and there well knew, he was employed, all contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4, and against the peace of this State, the government and dignity of the same.

COUNT TWO

(Unsworn Falsification to Authorities-Fourth Degree)
CHARLES A. WATKINS III

on or about February 1, 1999, at the City of Trenton, in the County of Mercer, elsewhere, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, knowingly did make a written false statement which he did not believe to be true on or pursuant to a form bearing notice, authorized by law, to the effect that false statements made therein are punishable; that is, the said CHARLES A. WATKINS III did make and submit or cause to be submitted Unemployment Insurance Benefit check number 18081264 dated February 1, 1999, containing a false statement that the said CHARLES A. WATKINS III did report all earnings and holiday or vacation pay and otherwise met all eligibility requirements to receive unemployment insurance benefits for the weeks ending January 23, 1999 and January 30, 1999 and said form bearing notice, authorized by law, to the effect that false statements made therein are punishable, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:28-3a, and against the peace of this State, the government and dignity of the same.

TERRENCE HULL, Chief
Major Financial Crimes Bureau

TRUE BILL:

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Foreperson



OFFICE OF NEW Jersey
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY
DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
FOR EXECUTIVE CAUPUS - SUITE 203
CHERRY FILL, NI 08002
TELEFRONE: (250) 426-3900

PETER C. HARVEY
Attorney General

VAUGHN L. McKoy

JAMES B. McGREEVEY
GOVERNOR

-April 19, 2004

Janet VanFossen, Assistant Division Manager Superior Court of New Jersey Mercer Criminal Division Court House, Room 105 Trenton, New Jersey 08650

Re: Charles Watkins III

Dear Ms. VanFossen:

This letter is in response to the admission of Charles Watkins III into Mercer County's Pre-Trial Intervention Program. For the following reasons the State must withhold its consent from Mr. Watkins' admission into the diversionary program.

As your postponement order indicated, a two-count indictment was returned on January 29, 1004 charging Charles Watkins III with theft by deception (third degree) and unsworn falsification to authorities (fourth degree). These charges are based on misrepresentations that Mr. Watkins made to the New Jersey Department of Labor (DOL) in order to receive unemployment benefits to which he was not entitled. Mr. Watkins began receiving unemployment insurance benefits it May 1998 when he was temporarily laid-off from Trenton Psychiatric Hospital. Mr. Watkins memployment benefits were extended in 1999 under the "Additional Benefits During Training Program" (ABT) whereby certain "eligible" claimants may obtain an extension of unemployment insurance benefits while pursing education and job training skills to enhance their employment opportunities. Mr. Watkins pursued a degree at the community college while receiving UI benefits under the ABT program but knowingly failed to report his re-employment with the Trenton Psychiatric Hospital to the Department of Labor.

Between January 23, 1999 prough May 22, 1999 Mr. Watkins cashed nine unemployment checks, all of which required him to certify that he was unemployed, collecting \$5,670 in unemployment benefits. Based upon his earnings at Trenton Psychiatric Hospital

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during this time period, Mr. Watkins was not entitled to any of this money.

The facts of this case indicate that the fraud continued from January to May 1999, a five-month period of time, involving nine separate instances where Mr. Watkins lied about his employment status in order to cash us employment checks. Accordingly it is the State's position that the defendant's crime falls within the ambit of Guideline 3(i)(2) of Rule 3:28 as a continuing criminal enterprise justifying his rejection from PTI. Mr. Watkins committed a substantial fraud over a lengthy period of time. The croumstances surrounding this case coupled with his status as a public employee clearly demonstrates that he is not amenable to a rehabilitative process.

Pinally, although there are no explicit per se rules excluding offenders from PTI eligibility, the statute provides that "supervisory treatment should ordinarily be limited to persons who have not previously been convicted of any criminal law..." N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12a., According to NCIC, Charles Watkins has a 1990 municipal court conviction for receiving stolen property. Obviously Mr. Watkins proper experience with the criminal justice systems has not had a significant deterrent effect on him and further indicating that he is not a suitable candidate for PTI

In conclusion, the State has considered all relevant and material factors pertaining to Mr. Watkins PTI application and concludes that he is not a candidate amendable to the diversionary process and accordingly, must withhold its consent.

Respectfully submitted,

Denise Grugan

Deputy Attorney General



JAMES E. MCGREEVEY

Governor

State of New Jersey
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
DIVISION OF MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES
TRENTON PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL
OFFICE OF COOPERATIVE LABOR RELATIONS

JAMES DAVY Commissioner

GREGORY P. ROBERTS Chief Executive Officer

Tel (609) 633-1500

In reply respond to: P.O. BOX 7500 WEST TRENTON, NJ 08628

April 26, 2004

Denise Grugan, Esq. Labor Prosecutions Unit Division of Criminal Justice 25 Market Street PO Box 085 Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0085

RECEIVED

RE: Charles Watkins, III DOB: 13-19-66 APR 2 9 2004

LABOR PROSECUTIONS UNIT

Dear Ms. Grugan:

This letter is regarding the above referenced Trenton Psychiatric Hospital employee who was indicted on January 29, 2004 for theft by deception, third degree and falsification to authorities, fourth degree (NJSA 2C:20-4 and NJSA 2C:28-3a). A conviction of this charge would impact on this individual's continued employment due to various State Statues including NJSA 2C:51-2 and 30:4-3.5.

I am requesting your cooperation to consult with me prior to entering into any disposition of the charges that may impact on this facility's ability to comply with the above mentioned statutes. I look forward to hearing from you regarding this matter.

Sincerely,

Gregory P. Roberts Chief Executive Officer Phone: (609) 633-1588 FAX: (609) 396-5701

Enclosure: Title 4A:2-2.7 with case notes C: Linda W. Rutskin, ERC File

DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL - STATE OF NEW JERSEY

| NAME OF EMPLOYEE Charles Watkins STREET 67 General Green Avenue You are hereby notified that the following charge(s) has been made against you: (if necessary, use additional sheets and attach.) You have been charged under the following statute: N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4 and N.J.S.A. 2C:28-3a. NOTE: It is your responsibility to immediately in the outcome of this pending indictement. Fall notice will impact on any determination to religious of that statute. NOTE: N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2 may apply to you and you may choose to consult with an attorney concerning the provisions of that statute. If checked, charges are continued on attached page | | | |
|--|----------------|------------------------|--|
| DIVISION, INSTITUTION OR AGENCY TRENTON PSYCHIATRIC HOSP NAME OF EMPLOYEE Charles Watkins STREET Gr General Green Avenue (Tou are hereby notified that the following charge(s) has been made against you: If necessary, use additional sheets and attach.) HARGE(S): On January 25, 2004, you were indicted with vand NJSA 20:28-3a. NOTE: N.J.S.A. 20:28-3a. NOTE: It is your responsibility to immediately in the outcome of this pending indictment. Fail notice will impact on any determination to religible that statute. If the checked, charges are continued on attached page You are hereby suspended effective April 26, 2004 with pay pending the outcome of accordance with NJAC 4A:2-2.7 (Check box and indicate if employee is suspended pending final disposition of the matter) If YOU DESIRE A DEPARTMENTAL HEARING ON THE ABOVE CHARGE(S), NOTIFY THIS OFFICE WITHIN 17. DAYS OF RECEIPT OF THIS FORM. IF YOU REQUEST A DEPARTMENTAL HEARING IT WILL BE HELD ON 2002 at (time) at (place of hearing) The tollowing disciplinary action may be taken against you: Suspension for working days, beginning and ending Removal, effective (date) TO BE DETERMINED effective (date) | | | |
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ATTACHMENT 1

TRENTON PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL

NOTICE OF INFORMAL PRETERMINATION HEARING

NAME OF EMPLOYEE: Charles Watkins, Human Services Technician

You are hereby notified to attend the required informal pretermination hearing, which has been scheduled as follows:

DATE: April 30, 2004

TIME: 10:00 a.m.

PLACE: EMPLOYEE RELATIONS CONFERENCE ROOM STRATTON BUILDING/THIRD FLOOR

A summary of the evidence supporting the stated charge(s) and specification(s) is as follows:

 Copy of Indictment, Count One (Theft by Deception – Third Degree) and Count Two (Unsworn Falsification to Authorities – Fourth Degree)

You are hereby notified that during this hearing you will be given the opportunity to respond to the charges and supporting evidence. You may do this through testimony or documentary evidence. You will not be required to testify, you may be cross-examined.

The purpose of this hearing is to determine if there are reasonable grounds to believe the charges are supported by the evidence or that the charges should be dismissed. You will receive a written decision.

(d) Within 20 days of the hearing, or such additional time as agreed to by the parties, the appointing authority shall make a decision on the charges and furnish the employee either by personal service or certified mail with a Final Notice of Disciplinary Action.

Case Notes

Due process. Carr v. Sharp, C.A., 454 F.2d 271 (1971).

Requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies. City of New Brunswick v. Speights, 157 N.J.Super. 9, 384 A.2d 225 (Co.1978).

Res judicata: delay in hearing: limits on de novo hearing. In re Darcy, 114 N.J. Super. 454, 277 A.2d 226 (1971).

Receipt of second copy of final notice of disciplinary action did not extend time for filing appeal. Russ v. Human Services Department, 95 N.J.A.R.2d (CSV) 647.

Public employee voluntarily and deliberately planned his nonappearance at hearing and was not entitled to further hearing. Cue v. Camden County, 92 N.J.A.R.2d (CSV) 131.

4A:2-2.7 Actions involving criminal matters

- (a) When an appointing authority suspends an employee based on a pending criminal complaint or indictment, the employee must be served with a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action. The notice should include a statement that N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2 may apply to the employee, and that the employee may choose to consult with an attorney concerning the provisions of that statute.
 - 1. The employee may request a departmental hearing within five days of receipt of the Notice. If no request is made within this time, or such additional time as agreed to by the appointing authority or as provided in a negotiated agreement, the appointing authority may then issue a Final Notice of Disciplinary Action under (a)3 below. A hearing shall be limited to the issue of whether the public interest would best be served by suspending the employee until disposition of the criminal complaint or indictment. The standard for determining that issue shall be whether the employee is unfit for duty or is a hazard to any person if permitted to remain on the job, or that an immediate suspension is necessary to maintain safety, health, order or effective direction of public services.
 - 2. The appointing authority may impose an indefinite suspension to extend beyond six months where an employee is subject to criminal charges as set forth in N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.5(a)2, but not beyond the disposition of the criminal complaint or indictment.

3. Where the appointing authority determines that an indefinite suspension should be imposed, a Final Notice of Disciplinary Action shall be issued stating that the employee has been indefinitely suspended pending disposition of the criminal complaint or indictment.

DEPT. OF PERSONNEL

- (b) When a court has entered an order of forfeiture pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2, the appointing authority shall notify the employee in writing of the forfeiture and record the forfeiture in the employee's personnel records. The appointing authority shall also forward a copy of this notification to the Department of Personnel.
 - 1. If the criminal action does not result in an order of forfeiture issued by the court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2, the appointing authority shall issue a second Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action specifying any remaining charges against the employee upon final disposition of the criminal complaint or indictment. The appointing authority shall then proceed under N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.5 and 2.6.
- (c) Where an employee has pled guilty or been convicted of a crime or offense which is cause for forfeiture of employment under N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2 but the court has not entered an order of forfeiture, the appointing authority may seek forfeiture by applying to the court for an order of forfeiture. The appointing authority shall not hold a departmental hearing regarding the issue of the applicability of N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2. If the court declines to enter an order of forfeiture in response to the appointing authority's application, the appointing authority may hold a departmental hearing regarding other disciplinary charges, if any, as provided in (b)1 above.

Amended by R. 1989. d. 569, effective November 6, 1989.
See: 21 N.J.R. 1766(a), 21 N.J.R. 3448(b).
In (a)1: added text, "The standard ... public services."
Amended by R. 1992. d.414, effective October 19, 1992.
See: 24 N.J.R. 2491(a), 24 N.J.R. 3716(a).
Revised (a).
Public Notice: Notice of Receipt of a Petition for Rulemaking.

See: 29 N.J.R. 5333(a). Amended by R.2000 d.433, effective October 16, 2000. See: 32 N.J.R. 2275(a), 32 N.J.R. 3870(a). Rewrote (b) and (c).

Case Notes

Forfeiture of public office was not unconstitutional. State v. Timoldi, 277 N.J.Super. 297, 649 A.2d 872 (A.D.1994), certification denied 142 N.J. 449, 663 A.2d 1356.

Merit System Board of State Department of Personnel did not have exclusive jurisdiction for prosecution of forfeiture action against senior corrections officer. State v. Lee, 258 N.J.Super. 313, 609 A.2d 513 (A.D.1992).

Whether public employee's conviction involves or touches employment does not depend upon whether criminally proscribed acts took place within immediate confines of employment's daily routine. Moore v. Youth Correctional Institute at Armandale, 230 NJ.Super. 374, 553 A.2d 830 (A.D.1989), affirmed 119 N.J. 256, 574 A.2d 983.

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Senior corrections officer's criminal conviction for harassing his immediate superior was one "involving or touching" his employment. Moore v. Youth Correctional Institute at Annandale, 230 N.J.Super. 374, 553 A.2d 830 (A.D.1989), affirmed 119 N.J. 256, 574 A.2d 983.

Automatic termination of correction sergeant based on conviction for crime of dishonesty affirmed. Christian v. Department of Corrections, Northern State Prison, 97 N.J.A.R.2d (CSV) 636.

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of service due to the advanced progression of the cancer. Despite his protracted battle, the disease spread to his brain and spine, finally killing his spirit in 2001. Prior to his death, Charles Watkins Sr. was confined to a wheelchair and needed constant assistance, provided by the defendant. During this time frame, not only was Charles Watkins, III giving around the clock care to his father, Mr. Watkins was responsible for the full time care of his mother, Pauline Watkins and brother, Larry Steel, both diagnosed as being terminally ill.

Specifically, Pauline contracted cancer of the bladder and ultimately died on April8, 1996. Defendant's brother, Larry Steele, contracted the HIV virus in the early 1960's due to intravenous drug use. Ultimately, the virus advanced to full blown Aids, causing liver failure. Larry died on March 23, 1996, just (2) two week before his mother. Both family members died at defendant's home and under his care. Not only did he support them physically and emotionally,

but financially as well.

Defendant has extremely strong commitment to family. Aside from the care and compassion provided to his mother, father, and oldest brother, defendant took in his youngest brother, Curtis Watkins, Jr. and his (2) two children Dominique, age (8) eight and Curtis, age (5) five. Curtis Sr. has battled a drug addiction for many years and is losing. Recently losing his home, Curtis and his (2) two young children would have been put out into the street if not for the kindness of defendant. Charles provided not only a roof over their heads and food on the table, but provides a stable environment and a steady parental figure to these kids. Aside from the financial commitment extended to Curtis, defendant made sure that his brother entered a long term rehabilitation center and is finally completing a stay at the "Carrier Clinic". I am advised that the children's mother is also an addict and has no contact with the kids. Certainly, she provides no financial support towards their care.

Notwithstanding the above personal setbacks, defendant has provided himself with an education and has a strong work history, In 1985, defendant received a certificate from Mercer County Community College for Secretarial and Clerical Skills. After working several unfulfilling office jobs throughout the Trenton area, defendant re-entered school in Philadelphia attending the "Art and Fashion Institute of Pennsylvania", studying Fashion Merchandising, Marketing and

Design, receiving an additional certificate in 1987.

In 1988, defendant was hired by the Trenton Psychiatric Hospital as a Human Service Assistant. Soon thereafter, defendant was promoted to a Human Service Technician where he has worked for over the last (14) fourteen years. In 1998, due to the massive State downsizing and financial pressure, defendant was temporarily laid off. It was during this time frame that defendant re-entered Mercer County Community College to study Culinary Arts. Ultimately, defendant completed an extensive program through Rutgers University, graduating with Honors. In the summer of 1999, defendant's job at Trenton Psychiatric Hospital was re-extended to him, at which time he worked full time and completed advanced credits at school, again graduating with Honors.

Subsequently, defendant started applying his skills and talents at the Trenton Psychiatric Hospital cooking for his clients and promoting an over-all better living environment. Defendant also started an off-site catering business called "Treasured Memories Catering" through the Hospital which is benefiting everyone. Clearly, this is a man that loves his job and is extremely devoted to his colleagues and clients.

Additionally, during his Culinary Arts education, defendant opened the first Culinary Cafeteria at Mercer County Community College, called the "Lucky 7 Lunch Box". (The name

was derived due to the fact that only seven students were able to complete the courses successfully)

It should be noted that it was during this time frame that the within offense was committed.

Defendant has represented that he is extremely willing to make restitution and will execute a Civil Judgment. Given the fact that he is a state employer, a conviction of this nature will result in the termination of his employment with Trenton Psychiatric Hospital. Aside from the obvious financial hardship that would be endured by the defendant, his family member, specifically his young niece and nephew will suffer as well.

It is acknowledged that defendant has a prior mark on his criminal record, but it also respectfully pointed out that the charge was only municipal court conviction dating back to 1990, over fourteen (14) years ago. The crime entailed "receiving stolen property". This was not a crime of violence and is extremely old. It is respectfully submitted that given the nature of this offense and its date, it should not even be factored into considering whether the defendant would

make a good P.T.I. candidate.

In conclusion it is submitted that there is more to Charles Watkins, III than meets the eyes. He is a compassionate, motivated hardworking individual that loves his family and is devoted to his patients. He made a minor mistake in 1990 and has spent the last (14) fourteen years trying to rebuild his life. In 1999, he made a mistake, but it was one of opportunity, not one that was premeditated. Defendant is willing to make full restitution, participate in community service, and successfully meet any and all conditions of PTI. Failure to permit defendant a chance to prove himself as a good PTI candidate, will result in the termination of his employment. Aside from the devastating effects same will have upon his dependant family, defendant will have a conviction on his record, making securing future employment even more difficult. Without a steady income, defendant will be hard-pressed to make time!y restitution payments.

The court is urged to view defendant as a whole person and not to consider the offense in a vacuum. Defendant has expressed deep remorse and shame for his actions. It is submitted that he is exactly the kind of candidate that the legislature and Courts contemplated. It is further submitted that the State's rejection is capricious and arbitrary and that the Deputy Attorney General failed to consider all the relevant factors. In support of defendant's appeal, the following

legal argument and authorities are offered, infra.

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| DEFENDANT'S NAME | 4 | 46 N. 17 | Prosecutor File | Number | |
| before Judge M. K | | - Endew | S.C. | 1, | |
| 7 | | | 3.4. | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | |
| 1. List the charges to whi | ich you are pleading guilty: | | | | |
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| | offense(s) to which you ar | 940 | | (Y | [NO] |
| the judge what you | that before the judge can fu did that makes you guilty o | nd you guilty, yo | ou will have to | o tell | [OM] |
| 3. Do you understand wh | nat the charges mean? | | | (X) | [NO] |
| Do you understand the them are: | at by pleading guilty you ar | e giving up certa | ain rights? A | nong | |
| a. The right to a jury to reasonable doubt? | rial in which the State must | prove you guilt | y beyond a | (Y) | [NO] |
| b. The right to remain | silent? | | | TY | [NO] |
| c. The right to confron | t the witnesses against you' | 7 | | [ŶĪ | [NO] |
| 5. Do you understand that | t if you plead guilty: | | | > | |
| 2. You will also a crim | ninal record? | | | m | [NO] |
| maximum time in co | ement provides otherwise, onfinement, to pay the max opensation Board Assessme | mum fine and to | ntenced to ser | ve the | ES] [NO] |
| (\$100 minimum if y you please guilty? (P | imum Violent Crimes Com ou are convicted of a crime enalty is \$30 if offense occ inclusive. \$25 if offense occ | of violence) for | each count to anuary 9, 198 | o which | [NO] |
| and you are being so pay a wansaction tel installment paymen and the sentence is t financial obligations | red on or after February 1, 1 antenced to probation or a S or up to \$1.00 for each oc t is made? If the offense oc to probation, or the sentence is to the probation division, casion when a payment or i | tate correctional casion when a p curred on or aft to otherwise requivou must pay a | ayment or er March 13, hires payments transaction fe | must 1995 s of e of up | ES] [NO] |
| VIOLENT CRIMES COMPENSATION | ON BOARD ASSESSMENT | | | 01 |) |
| dministrative Office of the Co | ourts - Revised November 6, 200 Corrected December 31, 1 |)3; | dant's Initials | Ch | page 1 of |

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| 5. e. If the offense occurred on or after August 2, 1993 you must pay a \$75 Safe Neighborhood Services Fund assessment for each conviction? | [YES] [NO] |
| f. If the offense occurred on or after January 5, 1994 and you are being sentenced to probation, you must pay a fee of up to \$25 per month for the term of probation? | [YES] [NO] |
| g. If the crime occurred on or after January 9, 1997 you must pay a Law Enforcement Officers Training and Equipment Fund non-live 1997. | [YES] [NO] |
| h. You will be sequired to previde a DNA sample, would could be used by law enforcement for the investigation of criminal activity; and pay for the cost of testing? | [YES] [NO] |
| 6. Do you understand that the court could, in its discretion, impose a minimum time in confidence to be served before you become shipped for parole, which period could be as long as one half of the period of the custodial sentenced imposed? | [YBS] [NO] |
| 7. Did you enter a piece of guilty to any charges that require a mandatory period of parole incligibility or a mandatory extended term? | [YES] [NO] |
| a If you are pleading guilty to such a charge, the minimum mandatory period of parole ineligibility is years and menths (RH in the number of years/months) and the maximum period of parole ineligibility can be years and menths (RH in the number of years/months) and this period cannot be reduced by good time, work, or minimum custody predits. | |
| 3. Are you pleading guilty to a crime that contains a presumption of imprisonment which means that it is almost certain that you will go to state prison? | 1 [YES] (NO) |
| '. Are you presently on probation or parole? [YES] | NO |
| a. Do you realize that a guilty plea may result in a violation of your probation or parole? [YES] | [NO] [N/A] |
| 0. Are you presently serving a custodial sentence on another charge? [YES] | (NO) |
| a.Do you understand that a guilty plea may affect your parole eligibility? [YES] | [NO] (N/A] |
| 1. Do you understand that if you have plead guilty to, or have been found guilty on other charges, or are presently serving a custodial term and the plea agreement is silent on the issue, the court may require that all sentences be made to run consecutively? | [NO] [N/A] |
| 2. List any charges the presecutor has agreed to recommend for dismissal: | |
| Ind/Acc./Compl# Count Nature of Offense and Degree Offense and Degree June 1 | photo. |
| 81.38.34 14 Jake. | |
| | |
| 3. Specify any sentence the prosecutor has agreed to recommend: | 11020 5 |
| under & 3 2 3 del pressure west to | Plea- |
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| Defendant's Initials | CW |
| ministrative Office of the Courts – Revised Nevember 6, 2003; Corrected December 31, 2003 | nage 2 of 3 |

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page 2 of 3

14. Has the prosecutor promised that he or she will NOT: [YES] a. Speak at sentencing? b. Seek an extended term of confinement? c. Seek a stipulation of parole ineligibility 15. Are you aware that you must pay restitution if the court finds there is a victim who has suffered a loss and if the court finds that you are able or IN/A1 will be able in the future to pay restitution? 16. Do you understand that if you are a public office holder or employee, you can be required to forfeit your office or job by virtue of your plea of MOI IN/A] guilty? 17. Do you understand that if you are not a United States citizen or national. NO you may be deported by virtue of your plea of guilty? 18. Have you discussed with your attorney the legal doctrine of merger? [NO] [YES] 19. Are you giving up your right at sentence to argue that there are charges [YES] [NO] you pleaded guilty to for which you cannot be given a separate sentence? 20. List any other promises or representations that have been made by you, the prosecutor, your defense attorney, or anyone else as a part of this plea of guilty: 1. Have any promises other than those mentioned on this form, or any threats, been made in order to cause you to plead guilty? 2. a. Do you understand that the judge is not bound by any promises or recommendations of the prosecutor and that the judge has the right to reject the plea before sentencing you and the right to impose a more severe sentence? b. Do you understand that if the judge decides to impose a more severe sentence than [NO] recommended by the prosecutor, that you may take back your plea? c. Do you understand that if you are permitted to take back your plea of guilty because of the judge's sentence, that anything you say in furtherance of the guilty plea [NO] cannot be used against you at trial? 3. Are you satisfied with the advice you have received from your lawyer? 4. Do you have any questions concerning this plea? EFENSE ATTORNE ROSECUTOR This plea is the result of the judge's conditional indications of the maximum sentence he or she would impose independent of the prosecutor's recommendation. Accordingly, the "Supplemental Plea Form for Non-Negotiated Pleas" has been completed.

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| | State of | New Jersey | | w Jersey Superior Court aw Division – Criminal Mercer County |
|--|--|---|--|---|
| Defendant: | Charles A. Watk | dins | | OF CONVICTION |
| Specify Complete No DATE OF BIRTH | 3/19/66 | SBI NUMBER 698108b | ORDER FOR | R COMMITMENT T / ACCUSATION DISMISSED |
| DATE OF ARREST | 4/26/04 | DATE INDICTMENT/ ACCUSATION FILED 1/29/04 | | OF ACQUITTAL |
| DATE OF ORIGINAL PLEA | 4/5/04 | ORIGINAL PLEA Not Guilty Guilty | : | • |
| ADJUDICATIO | | TE: 2/7/05 NON-JI | URYTRIAL DATE: | |
| ORIGINAL CH | ARGES | | DEGRE | E STATUTE |
| IND / ACC NO. | COUNT DESCRIP | | 3rd | 2C:20-4 |
| Ind: 04-01-0 Pros: 04-039 | 00 | by Deception orn Falsification to Authorities | . 4 th | 2C:28-3a |
| | | | | |
| FINAL CHARG | FR | | | E STATUTE |
| COUNT | DESCRIPTION | | DEGRI 3 rd | 2C:20-4 |
| Ct. 1 | Theft by Decepti | ion | 3 | 20.204 |
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| 35 or 36 of Title 2C, 1) A mandatory Drug E imposed for each cc 1st De 2st De 3st De 3st De | courred on or after July 9, 1987, and is for a violation of Chapte inforcement and Demand Reduction (D.E.D.R.) penalty is bunt. (Write in # times for each.) gree © \$3000. 4 th Degree © \$750 Disorderly Persons or Petty |
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| | Total D.E.D.R. Penalty \$ |
| Court further Orders | that collection of the D.E.D.R. penalty be suspended upon |
| defendant's entry in | to a residential drug program for the term of the program. y fee of \$50 per offense is ORDEREDOffenses @ \$50. |
| 2) A forensic laborator | Total Lab Fee \$ |
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| Nh. | |
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COPHES TO: CHEEF PROBATION OFFICER STATE POLICE. ACC CRIMINAL PRACTICE DIVISION

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two other aforementioned bases. After considering those bases for rejection, the Court finds that the State's denial was not arbitrary or capricious and, therefore, denies the defendant's appeal of his PTI rejection.

MARIA M. SYPEK,

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STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CHARLES A. WATKINS, Defendant-Appellant.

DOCKET NO. A-3853-05T4

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE DIVISION

2007 N.J. Super. LEXIS 38

December 5, 2006, Submitted February 5, 2007, Decided

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [*1] Approved For Publication February 5, 2007.

PRIOR HISTORY: On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, Ind. No. 04-01-0008.

COUNSEL: Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Abby P. Schwartz, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Stuart Rabner, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Leslie-Ann M. Justus, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).

JUDGES: Before Judges Kestin, Weissbard and Payne. The opinion of the court was delivered by WEISSBARD, J.A.D.

OPINION BY: WEISSBARD

OPINION: The opinion of the court was delivered by

WEISSBARD, J.A.D.

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Defendant, Charles Watkins, appeals from

an order of February 22, 2006, denying his appeal of the State's rejection of his application for entry into the Pre-Trial Intervention (PTI) program, R. 3:28, following his indictment for third-degree theft by deception, N.J.S.A 2C:20-4 (count one), and fourth-degree unsworn falsification to authorities, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-3a (count two). Following the denial of his appeal, defendant entered a guilty plea to count one and, pursuant to a plea agreement, was sentenced to [*2] a three-year probationary term with a condition of restitution in the amount of \$ 7619.78. If defendant completed the restitution before three years, his probation would be terminated after two years. Appropriate penalties and assessments were also imposed.

On appeal, defendant argues that the State's rejection of his PTI application, in the face of a recommendation for admission by the Criminal Division Manager, constituted a gross abuse of discretion. We reverse and remand for reconsideration of defendant's application in light of the views expressed in this opinion.

The facts leading to defendant's indictment were set forth in the State's rejection letter of April 19, 2004:

These charges are based on misrepresentations that Mr. Watkins made to the New Jersey Department of Labor (DOL) in order to receive unemployment benefits to which he was not entitled. Mr. Watkins began receiving unemployment benefits in May 1998 when he was temporarily laid-off from Trenton Psychiatric Hospital. Mr. Watkins' unemployment benefits were extended in 1999 under the "Additional Benefits During Training Program" (ABT) whereby certain "eligible" claimants may obtain an extension of unemployment [*3] insurance benefits while pursing [sic] education and job training skills to enhance their employment opportunities. Mr. Watkins pursued a degree at the community college while receiving UI benefits under the ABT program but knowingly failed to report his reemployment with the Trenton Psychiatric Hospital to the Department of Labor.

Between January 23, 1999 through May 22, 1999, Mr. Watkins cashed nine unemployment checks, all of which required him to certify that he was unemployed, collecting \$5,670 in unemployment benefits. Based upon his earnings at Trenton Psychiatric Hospital during this time period, Mr. Watkins was not entitled to any of this money.

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Apparently efforts were made to resolve the matter civilly but to no avail. The indictment

followed.

In denying defendant's appeal, the judge wrote as follows:

During the hearings on the appeal, the State initially asserted three bases for PTI denial: the fact that the defendant was a state employee and the policy of the Attorney General's Office was to hold state employees to a higher standard of conduct and deny them PTI entry; the fact that the offense occurred over a five-month period of time and involved [*4] nine separate unemployment checks; and the defendant's prior criminal behavior, which involved a 1990 disorderly persons conviction for receiving stolen property. At a subsequent hearing conducted on November 19, 2004, the State withdrew the defendant's employment with the State as a basis for rejection and relied upon the two other aforementioned bases. After considering those bases for rejection, the Court finds that the State's denial was not arbitrary or capricious and, therefore, denies the defendant's appeal of his PTI rejection.

At the outset, we note our limited scope of review. Due to the close relationship between the PTI Program and the prosecutor's charging authority, "courts allow prosecutors wide latitude in deciding whom to divert into the PTI Program and whom to prosecute through a traditional trial. The deference has been categorized as 'enhanced' or 'extra' in nature." State v. Negran, 178 N.J. 73, 82, 835 A.2d 301 (2003) (quoting State v. Baynes, 148 N.J. 434, 443-44, 690 A.2d 594 (1997)).

Thus, a prosecutor's decision rejecting a PTI application "rarely will be overturned." State v. Kraft, 265 N.J. Super. 106, 111, 625 A.2d 579 (App. Div. 1993) [*5] (quoting State v. Leonardis (II), 73 N.J. 360, 380 n.10, 375 A.2d 607 (1977)). We review "to check only the most egregious examples of injustice and unfairness." Ibid. (quoting State v. DeMarco, 107 N.J. 562, 566, 527 A.2d 417 (1987)); see also Negran, supra, 178 N.J. at 82, 835 A.2d 301.

To overturn a prosecutor's rejection, a defendant must clearly and convincingly establish that the prosecutor's decision constitutes a patent and gross abuse of discretion. Negran, supra, 178 N.J. at 82, 835 A.2d 301; State v. Nwobu, 139 N.J. 236, 246, 652 A.2d 1209 (1995); State v. Motley, 369 N.J. Super. 314, 321, 848 A.2d 875 (App. Div. 2004). A patent and gross abuse of discretion has been defined as "more than just an abuse of discretion as traditionally conceived; it is a prosecutorial decision that 'has gone so wide of the mark sought to be accomplished by PTI that fundamental fairness and justice require judicial intervention." State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576, 582-83, 684 A.2d 1355 (1996) (quoting State v. Ridgway, 208 N.J. Super. 118, 130, 504 A.2d 1241 (Law Div. 1985) [*6] (citations omitted)). Defendant must show that the prosecutor's decision "'(a) was not premised upon a consideration of all relevant factors, (b) was based upon a consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or (c) amounted to a clear error in judgment." Negran, supra, 178 N.J. at 83, 835 A.2d 301 (quoting State v. Bender, 80 N.J. 84, 94, 402 A.2d 217 (1979)). Because we conclude that the Prosecutor, and the judge, misinterpreted a critical factor, we remand for reconsideration.

The bases for defendant's rejection were also set forth in the prosecutor's rejection letter of April 19, 2004. Immediately following the statement of facts quoted above, the Deputy

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Attorney General (DAG) stated:

The facts of this case indicate that the fraud continued from January to May 1999, a five-month period of time, involving nine separate instances where Mr. Watkins lied about his employment status in order to cash unemployment checks. Accordingly it is the State's position that the defendant's crime falls within the ambit of Guideline 3(i)(2) of Rule 3:28 as a continuing criminal enterprise justifying his rejection from PTI. Mr. Watkins [*7] committed a substantial fraud over a lengthy period of time. The circumstances surrounding this case coupled with his status as a public employee clearly demonstrates that he is not amenable to a rehabilitative process.

Finally, although there are no explicit per se rules excluding offenders from PTI eligibility, the statute provides that "supervisory treatment should ordinarily be limited to persons who have not previously been convicted of any criminal [offense] " N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12a. According to NCIC, Charles Watkins has a 1990 municipal court conviction for receiving stolen property. Obviously, Mr. Watkins [sic] prior experience with the criminal justice system has not had a significant deterrent effect on him and further indicating that he is not a suitable candidate for PTI.

Thus, a key element in the rejection determination was the DAG's conclusion that defendant's crime fell within Guideline 3(i)(2)

as a "continuing criminal enterprise." Such a conclusion "generally constitutes sufficient justification for rejection from pretrial intervention." State v. Imbriani, 280 N.J. Super. 304, 317, 654 A.2d 1381 (Law Div. 1994), aff'd, 291 N.J. Super. 171, 677 A.2d 211 (App. Div. 1996). [*8] The Guideline reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

(i) Assessment of the Nature of the Offense:

Any defendant charged with crime is eligible for enrollment in a PTI program, but the nature of the offense is a factor to be considered in reviewing the application. If the crime was (1) part of organized criminal activity; or (2) part of a continuing criminal business or enterprise; or (3) deliberately committed with violence or threat of violence against another person; or (4) a breach of the public trust where admission to a PTI program would deprecate the seriousness of defendant's crime, the defendant's application should generally be rejected.

While Guideline 3(i)(2) does not define its terms, the concept has been addressed in a number of cases, not always consistently.

In a comprehensive discussion in State v. Marie, 200 N.J. Super. 424, 491 A.2d 784 (Law Div. 1984), Judge Haines concluded, after examining numerous cases, that a "continuing criminal enterprise" consists "of a course of conduct involving a series of transactions continuing over a period of time." Id. at 429, 491 A.2d 784. "It is a defendant's repetitive criminal activities which [*9] provide a negative implication when rehabilitation is considered." Id. at 429-30, 491 A.2d 784. In

Marie, the defendant was arrested based on the discovery of eighty-five pounds of marijuana in a vehicle in which he was a passenger. Id. at 426, 491 A.2d 784. He was thereafter indicted for possession and possession with intent to distribute narcotics. Ibid. While recognizing that defendant's activity, although a single transaction, "may well be a link in a chain of further activities dealing with the disposition of marijuana," the judge concluded that it was "not, however, the kind of continuing criminal activity which requires the defendant to face the high barrier created by Guideline 3(i). There is no showing of any repetitive criminal activity. Guideline 3(i) should not be applied." Id. at 430, 491 A.2d 784.

In the course of his opinion, Judge Haines catalogued the cases that had, to that date, addressed Guideline 3(i), beginning with State v. Bender, 80 N.J. 84, 402 A.2d 217 (1979), in which defendant, a licensed pharmacist, diverted narcotics from his employer's inventory over a four-year period to feed his cocaine addiction. The Court stated [*10] as follows:

We agree with the State that in order for a series of criminal acts to constitute a continuing enterprise, it is not necessary that a "profit" be realized in the sense that the fruits of those crimes be sold to third persons and hence be converted into cash. Nonetheless, the defendant's course of conduct must ordinarily involve commercial overtones. That is, the crimes perpetrated must be undertaken for the purpose of enriching defendant in some material way.

As such, the crimes here engaged in by defendant cannot be characterized as a continuing criminal business or enterprise in the sense of being undertaken for commercial purposes. Although defendant systematically diverted cocaine from his employer's stocks over a four-year period, his course of conduct was not motivated by a desire to, nor did it, add to his worldly possessions or in any other manner result in financial gain. Rather, his crimes were merely undertaken in order to satisfy his need for drugs.

Support for this construction of "continuing criminal business or enterprise" can be gleaned from the language of the Guidelines themselves. One of the main purposes of PTI is "[t]o provide a mechanism for [*11] permitting the least burdensome form of prosecution possible for defendants charged with 'victimless' offenses." Guideline 1(c). Clearly, this purpose would be entirely frustrated were persons who unlawfully consume controlled dangerous substances over a prolonged time span to be deemed engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise and hence "generally" to be rejected pursuant to Guideline 3(i)(2). Although in the present case defendant's crime was not truly "victimless" -inasmuch as his cocaine diversions harmed his employer as well as himself -- the underlying rationale of Guideline 1(c) is nevertheless applicable. Defendant's later thefts, being precipitated in large part by his drug dependence, cannot be characterized as part of a continuing business or enterprise.

[Id. at 95-96, 402 A.2d 217.]

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In a companion case, State v. Sutton, 80 N.J. 110, 402 A.2d 230 (1979), the defendant had obtained public assistance funds and food stamps over a four and one-half year period, while failing to report that she had obtained work as a part-time school bus driver. If the earnings had been reported, defendant's welfare benefits would have been reduced. Id. at 114, 402 A.2d 230. [*12] The Court held that defendant's PTI application was properly rejected because her conduct constituted a continuing criminal enterprise. Id. at 118, 402 A.2d 230. The Court stated:

Defendant did not merely fail to report one or a few sporadic accessions to her income. Rather, over a four and one half year period, she regularly received compensation deriving from her employment as a part-time school bus driver. She was thus guilty of a series of "fail[ures] to disclose a material fact which it [was her] duty to reveal," and these nondisclosures allowed her to "obtain * * * from [an] agency of the county * * * money, property, [and] other thing[s] of value * * *." N.J.S.A. 2A:111-2.

[Ibid.]

In State v. Masucci, 156 N.J. Super. 272, 383 A.2d 781 (Law Div. 1978), the defendant admitted that he sold marijuana "on the street," for profit. Id. at 276, 280, 383 A.2d 781. The judge upheld defendant's PTI rejection, stating:

It is everywhere recognized that the street sale of marijuana is part of a larger drug traffic which has its genesis outside of this country. His participation in this insidious venture is clear evidence of [*13] his involvement in a continuing criminal business or enterprise.

[Ibid.]

In State v. Barrett, 157 N.J. Super. 96, 384 A.2d 558 (App. Div. 1978), defendant engaged in a scheme over a period of three years to sell unregistered securities to the public through a company of which he was President. Id. at 98-99, 384 A.2d 558. We reversed a Law Division order that had overturned the Attorney General's rejection of defendant's PTI application, on the basis that the activity fell within Guidelines 3(i)(1) and (2). Id. at 102, 384 A.2d 558. Defendant was "part of an organized and continuous criminal activity." Id. at 103, 384 A.2d 558.

Several of the other cases cited in Marie did not touch on Guideline 3(i)(2). Thus, State v. Markt, 156 N.J. Super. 486, 384 A.2d 162 (App. Div. 1978), turned on defendant, treasurer of the Joint Free Public Library of Morristown and Morris Township, having engaged in a breach of public trust by virtue of a series of six embezzlements and forgeries over a sixmonth period, id. at 489, 493, 384 A.2d 162, in violation of Guideline 3(i)(4). Id. at 492, 384 A.2d 162. And, in State v. Smith, 92 N.J. 143, 455 A.2d 1117 (1983), [*14] premises were allegedly being used for a large scale gambling operation which, based on records seized, had been ongoing for about eight years. Id. at 144, 455 A.2d 1117. The Court upheld the prosecutor's rejection of defendant's PTI application on the ground that his conduct was "part of organized criminal activity" in violation of Guideline 3(i)(1). Id. at 145-47, 455 A.2d 1117.

Subsequent to Marie, we confronted a single mother of three young children who wrongfully received public assistance benefits during four periods totaling twenty-seven months over a four-year time span. State v. Mickens, 236 N.J. Super. 272, 273, 565 A.2d

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720 (App. Div. 1989). Defendant was rejected for PTI enrollment based on Guideline 3(i). Id. at 273, 565 A.2d 720. We assumed that the Guideline applied to her conduct, but nevertheless concluded that her reasons for committing the offense and her prospects for rehabilitation compelled her admission to the program. Id. at 278-80, 565 A.2d 720. Significantly, we made no mention of State v. Sutton, supra, a remarkably similar case with an opposite outcome. Indeed, the court in Mickens, id. at 279, 565 A.2d 720 [*15] made only passing reference to State v. Burger, 222 N.J. Super. 336, 536 A.2d 1295 (App. Div. 1988), in which we concluded that obtaining welfare benefits and food stamps over a sixyear period while continuously - and falsely certifying to no outside income, id. at 339, 536 A.2d 1295, "fell within the ambit of Guideline 3(i)(2) as a continuing criminal enterprise." Id. at 341, 536 A.2d 1295 (citing Sutton, supra, 80 N.J. at 117-18, 402 A.2d 230). n1 Finally, in Imbriani, supra, 280 N.J. Super. at 316, 318, 654 A.2d 1381, defendant, a Superior Court judge, diverted over \$ 173,000 to his own use over a period of five years from a private real estate partnership, using a variety of fraudulent schemes. It was in that context that the Law Division found defendant's offense to constitute a continuing criminal enterprise, applying the definition of that term in State v. Marie, quoted above. Id. at 317-18, 654 A.2d 1381. We agreed with that conclusion, noting that "the criminal activity here was not of such a nature that it had to continue except for defendant's intent and purpose to continue to offend." Imbriani, supra, 291 N.J. Super. at 182, 677 A.2d 211 [*16]

> nl Other cases cited by defendant in which PTI rejections have been overturned do not deal with the continuing criminal enterprise Guideline.

State v. DeMarco, supra; State v. Munos, 305 N.J. Super. 9, 701 A.2d 920 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 152 N.J. 186, 704 A.2d 16 (1997); State v. Fitzsimmons, 291 N.J. Super. 375, 677 A.2d 767 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 146 N.J. 568, 683 A.2d 1163 (1996); State v. Hoffman, 224 N.J. Super. 149, 539 A.2d 1254 (App. Div. 1988).

With this background, we return to the present case. To repeat, defendant received \$ 5670 in unemployment benefits in the form of nine checks over a four-month period; to continue receiving benefits, defendant was required to certify bi-weekly that he was unemployed. Defendant admitted that he knew of his obligation to report his renewed employment to the DOL. The question is whether his conduct constituted a continuing criminal enterprise, as that term is used in Guideline 3(i)(2). [*17] While one could parse the phrase into its components, i.e., "continuing," "criminal" and "enterprise," we believe a proper analysis requires the words to be read as a unit. Thus, while defendant's actions were certainly criminal, did they amount to a "continuing . . . enterprise"?

As noted earlier, Bender, supra, 80 N.J. at 95, 402 A.2d 217, held that the "course of conduct must ordinarily involve commercial overtones," although it is not necessary that there be third parties, such as buyers of illegally obtained goods, involved. Yet, the Court went on to clarify its statement by observing that the crimes "must be undertaken for the purpose of enriching the defendant in some material way." Ibid. If that statement were taken literally, defendant would clearly fit within the Guideline since he was enriched in a material way by receiving the checks to which he was not entitled. However, we believe that the Court's statement cannot be understood without reference to its factual context,

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particularly the length of time involved - four years. In that case, of course, the Court ultimately held that the Guideline did not apply since defendant's thefts were for the sole purpose [*18] of supporting his addiction, and not for pecuniary gain. In Sutton, supra, the defendant's conduct, which was clearly undertaken for personal financial gain, took place over a four and one-half year period. 80 N.J. at 118, 402 A.2d 230. Other cases discussed earlier have likewise involved criminality over an extended period of time. Barrett, supra, (three years); Burger, supra, (six years); Imbriant, supra, (five years).

The dictionary defines "enterprise" as inter alia, an undertaking of "great scope, complication or risk," a "business organization," or a "systematic and industrious activity." Webster's II New College Dictionary 375 (1995). n2 The reference to a "business organization" is significant because, in seeking the meaning to be accorded the term "enterprise" in Guideline 3(i)(2), we also note that the entire phrase speaks of a continuing "business or enterprise" (emphasis added). See State v. Sisler, 177 N.J. 199, 206-07, 827 A.2d 274 (2003) (quoting Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. State Bd. of Tax Appeals, 131 N.J.L. 565, 567, 37 A.2d 111 (E. & A. 1944)) [*19] ("The coupling of words denotes an intention that they shall be understood in the same general sense"). "Continuing" is defined, insofar as relevant here, as existing "over an extended period." Webster's Dictionary, supra, at 244.

n2 When seeking the "ordinary and well-understood meanings" of words, courts frequently look to the dictionary definitions. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 384, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995).

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FILED

MAR 0 2 2006

February 23, 2007

Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices Supreme Court of New Jersey CN 970 Trenton, New Jersey 08625

Re: State v. Charles A. Watkins
Docket No. A-3853-05T4

Your Honors:

The Public Defender has received the Petitic. for Certification filed by the state in the above-captioned matter. The Public Defender opposes the granting of this petition and relies upon the opinion of the Appellate Division and the brief she submitted to the Appellate Division, nine copies of which are enclosed herewith.

The Public Defender urges the Court to deny the state's petition since no substantial question is raised therein.

Should the Court grant the petition, however, the Public Defender reserves the right to seek an order permitting the filing of a supplemental brief pursuant to \underline{R} . 2:12-11.

Respectfully submitted,

YVONNE SMITH SEGARS Public Defender

ABBY P. SCHWARTZ

Assistant Deputy Public Defender

Enc. c: Leslie-Ann Justus, D.A.G.

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CASE TITLE: STATE OF NJ VS CHARLES WATKINS

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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION, CRIMINAL PART MERCER COUNTY, NEW JERSEY INDICTMENT NO. 04-01-0008 A.D. #_

STATE OF NEW JERSEY

8 SEP 2006 TRANSCRIP!

OF

CHARLES WATKINS III,

v.

Defendant.

HEARING

Place: Mercer County Courthouse

209 South Broad Street Trenton, NJ 08650

September 24, 2004 Date:

BEFORE:

THE HON. MARIA M. SYPEK, P.J.S.C.

TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY:

KELLY ANDERSON SMITH, ESQ. (Garces & Grabler, P.C.)

APPEARANCES:

DENISE L. GRUGAN, Deputy Attorney General Attorney for the State

KELLY ANDERSON SMITH, ESQ. (Garces & Grabler, P.C.) Attorney for the Defendant

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· Video Recorded

to May. From my review of the discovery, we're talking about nine checks:

During that interim, which is the key period of time that's at issue for the complaint, Mr. Watkins was rehired by the State, and he went back to work, yet he still cashed those checks. This is not a crime of violence, and the outpouring of support from not only friends and family but employers, colleagues, and people in the community has been just an amazing -- I was impressed, and I do these all the time. And just -- it was incredible the people that have stepped forward.

This is exactly the type of individual that PTI contemplates. If this man is given a probationary sentence and has a conviction, he will lose his job, which is pretty much everything he's worked for, which seems to me incredibly unfair and unjust, given what we're talking about. We're talking about a theft by deception. We're not talking about a crime of violence or selling drugs into the community. We're talking about a mistake.

He's perfectly willing to take responsibility for that mistake and is perfectly willing to make payments to restore that amount. I think the exact figure is approximately \$5,600. With taxes and

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penalties it was, I think, an additional 2,000. I don't have the exact figure in front of me, but we're talking a total of about 7,500, \$7,600 in total. He's willing to make that payment. He's willing to move forward with his life.

Unfortunately, despite the fact that he's an excellent candidate under the law and the purview of all the elements that they lay out for PTI candidates, and criminal case management, by the way, found him to be a suitable candidate, the State has determined pretty much that he's not. And what is that based on? It's based on the fact, first of all, that he's a State employee. He's being held to a higher standard which, in my estimation, is -- that in and of itself is arbitrary and capricious.

Secondly, they're looking at that 1990 conviction. That was 14 years ago, and it was a municipal court conviction. I think that case is much too old to be seriously contemplated.

And the other argument that the State's making is the fact that this was ongoing, which was four months of unemployment. I don't think that constitutes a scheme against society. He made a mistake, and he's willing to pay for it.

I think the case law completely supports his

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admission in the PTI, given all the factors, and I think that's another downfall of the State. They're not looking at this particular individual as a whole, what he's done for the community, what he's done for his job, what he's done for his family. They're looking at him in a vacuum, and you can't do that. That's arbitrary.

But the fact that he's being held to a higher standard because he's a State employee is completely inappropriate for a PTI determination. If I had committed the same offense, I'd be getting into PTI because I work for a private employer. If I was still working for the PD office which I had done many years, I wouldn't get into PTI by virtue of the fact that I'm a State employee, and that's not right. There's a bias that's built in there that's completely capricious.

I can't think of a more suitable candidate. The State has a remedy in the event that this is a farce, which I can assure the Court it's not. But in the event that this is a farce, then he's putting on a hell of a show just to get into PTI. If he fails or he fails to make one payment, he can be violated and we could go right back to a guilty plea.

Mr. Watkins is even willing to plead guilty as a condition of getting into PTI. That just goes to

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show you his motivation and just not have it executed, but he will lose his job. It seems to me under the circumstances and the nature of this offense that the appropriate remedy here is to commit this individual in PTI. Not to make a sweeping generalization that all theft by deceptions should be admitted, but this individual, and it needs to be a case by case fact sensitive analysis, and he's an excellent candidate. He's the perfect candidate I would respectfully submit.

And again, the -- I've spelled out the case law in support of my position, and I know the Court is well read in that regard. So I won't belabor the point. I just wanted to hit the highlights. But it's just this is one of those cases where policy should be thrown in the wind, and the individual should be taken at face value.

THE COURT: All right, the State's position?

MS. GRUGAN: Your Honor, indeed it is the
policy of the State of my office that we do not grant
PTI to State workers. It's not arbitrary and
capricious. We hold workers to a higher standard, and
one of it is a preservation of our pension fund.

Also because we're dealing with State workers, we -- at certain times, and this happened at the time when this matter arose with Mr. Watkins, they

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will do what's called a quarterly cross-match, where they will look at employees -- employer's records, and cross them with recipients of UI benefits, and they did a clean sweep for all State workers. And this is justified because we want to make sure that we don't have people that are working for the system and also taking advantage of the system.

Mr. Watkins -- when they determined what your monetary benefits are, it's set up in a reserve, \$6,000 approximately, in this matter. His benefits -- he depleted those benefits, and they were even extended further, given a whole new time frame for him to extend his benefits.

So he got the benefit of more unemployment insurance benefits, but he also got the benefit of getting an education while he was collecting those benefits and still working. So he was getting a lot of assistance from the State, and he took advantage of that assistance that's being afforded to him, something that is very gratuitous and generous, I think, by the State.

This isn't just one bad instance. He cashed nine checks consecutively, over and over and over again. And attached to each of those checks is a claim form where he fills out and says if he's working or not

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working, and in this instance he returned those claim forms stating over and over and over again I'm unemployed and therefore entitled to these benefits.

And on the back of each of these checks when he endorses these checks there's a certification where the claimant has to state I'm entitled to these benefits, I am unemployed, and I reported to the State all of my wages and earnings during this time. So they're given every opportunity and notified you can't cash these checks unless you're entitled to them.

And also with regard to, you know, to the context of being a State worker, Mr. Watkins was employed as a human services technician. From what I've been told by his employer, he is responsible for handling a lot of patients' monies and valuables, and I guess that that's what's being considered. If he does have a conviction on his record, there's nothing precluding him from going to another job and getting a position, and they can take that responsibility of knowing that they've hired someone who has a conviction on his record.

But he's had every opportunity to change his course of action. Not only that, but even before these matters were transferred over to our office for criminal prosecution, they notify defendants or

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ignored by the defendant which is why it comes over to

THE COURT: Do you have any of those

claimants and say, let's come and negotiate this. that matter wasn't pursued here. It was largely

our office for prosecution. That's all.

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looking?

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documents that you're referencing?
MS. GRUGAN: Yes, Your Honor..... THE COURT: Anything in response while she's

MS. SMITH: Judge, I can't -- Mr. Watkins has informed me they did reach out to him to make payment. He went down to the office in order to do that. tried to make payment. It was -- it never came about, but I don't think it was on his shoulders. They never re-contacted him. He didn't know.

Now, you can easily say well, it's still your responsibility, but he was willing at that time. He has never not been willing. And the fact of the matter is not withstanding this -- the nature of this charge, it's mandated that he lose his job. So it's not really discretionary on the employer. If in fact this goes down as a conviction, that's it. He will lose his job. That's a double punishment.

It's, you know, the -- with all the due respect to my adversary, it's a lot easier said than

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done to go out and find a decent paying job with decent benefits when you have a conviction on your record. And not to say well, he shouldn't take responsibility for his actions. He has taken responsibility for his actions. He knows he made a mistake. He regrets it greatly because his whole future -- and he's sorry about it.

But it was a mistake. And that's what PTI is It's for that person that makes a mistake. for. Again, this is not a crime of violence. It's not a crime of selling drugs. He's willing to make the restitution. Why not give him that opportunity? He is paying his taxes. He's given back to the community.

He has just had a plethora of community support, many of which are employers and colleagues and patients at this job. So obviously he's doing his job well. his employer has the discretion, if they wanted to, they could fire him right now pending the outcome of this. They haven't done that. So he must be doing something right.

Why not give him that opportunity and just -again, not to belabor the point, but whether it's a policy throughout the office or not, the policy is flawed. You cannot hold someone to a higher standard just by virtue of the fact that they're a State

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employee. That's not for the Attorney General's Office to do. Who died and made them the king that says well, we're going to hold New Jersey employees to that higher standard? Where's the justification for that? Where in the law does it say that they have that ability?

There is a law that says that he will lose his job

There is a law that says that he will lose his job if he has a conviction. But there's nowhere in the law, and certainly nowhere in the cases and its progeny of PTI cases where it says the State of New Jersey has the ability and the authority to say okay, you're a New Jersey State employee so we're going to hold you to a higher standard. Therefore, that's the reason you can't get into PTI. There's no foundation for it. That's what makes it arbitrary.

So whether it's an office-wide policy or not, it's a wrong policy. And I will bet you dollars to doughnuts that if this case went up to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court would agree on it. There is no authority for that basis. That's what makes it capricious.

THE COURT: So you're suggesting this is a policy of the Attorney General's Office, the State of New Jersey, that no one who is an employee of the State of New Jersey can receive PTI from -- at any time?

MS. GRUGAN: I was told by my office that

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this is their position, that because he's a State worker, they would not give him -- they would not allow him into PTI. They would not take that position. That policy aside, Your Honor, I just wanted to point out what's in front of you, the mail claim benefit forms and Question 7. On that mail claim benefit form, he is asked were you working? If yes, fill out the back and tell us when you worked and what hours you worked and take it to your employer and make sure your employer certifies that these were your earnings.

He did this over and over and over again, and I would argue he knew exactly what he was -- for example, on the front of that claim form he has to sign, date and mail it by a specific date. And they are --

THE COURT: Well, I'm sure that there's no doubt that, you know -- we don't make things a crime that aren't somewhat, you know, intentional. So obviously if he had just made an error in it, you wouldn't be charging him with a crime. So I understand what you're saying in terms of what's required to be done here, and I don't think he is now denying that.

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THE COURT: Well, you know, that is fraught with some difficulty in terms of the application. just flies in the face of PTI and what the analysis is supposed to be in terms of case by case. You look at the individual, you look at the ability to rehabilitate, and so that policy gives me concern.

The municipal matter is, you know, one that if I were making the decision, I would not consider in terms of an old municipal conviction. But then again, that's not the standard. What I would do is of no moment. It's what the State does and whether the State is acting arbitrarily and capriciously.

The third one, as I understand it, is the fact that this was alleged to be an ongoing crime, that it happened nine times over the course of what I believe, four months. And as a result of that, he can

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THE COURT: So the crux of the issue is this nine times that it was done, in my view because the other two -- I think there's an argument that can be made that if that be the case, that there is this blanket policy, that that may be a decision that the State has made that flies in the face of what PTI is intended to do.

But the question is whether or not, looking at the nine times that this was done, is sufficient basis to have Mr. Watkins excluded from PTI.

MS. SMITH: Judge, if I may respond? I can't tell you the countless theft by deception, specifically welfare fraud or -

THE COURT: You don't have to tell me about I see it every day. But that's not the standard. I mean, if the standard is whether or not

the action under this circumstance is arbitrary.

MS. SMITH: I understand that. But if -- how can you reconcile where welfare fraud with they're receiving -- which is a similar, you know, mirror image of this case, where they are receiving benefits repeatedly over a course of time, which I would submit to you four months is not that long, but over a course

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of time -- or whether it be unemployment benefits or whatever benefits they're not entitled to, given the circumstances, that how can you reconcile the fact that those individuals are in PTI? And I can think of one right off the top of my head where it was a ten year period.

How can you reconcile that and not acknowledge the fact that you have the Deputy Attorney General telling you right now that she was advised by her supervisors that he's being held to a higher standard, and that's how the DAG opened her remarks to the Court?

THE COURT: That's true.

MS. SMITH: We're holding this individual as a State employee to a higher standard because of, you know, the benefits and the State was generous with him and all this other -- but the fact of the matter is, he is being held to a higher standard. That's what's arbitrary. So it's convenient that this happened over a four month period of time and involves nine checks.

But the fact of the matter is we do have one indictment, and the Court itself has acknowledged the fact that these types of cases on a routine basis get into PTI. So you can't disregard this higher standard. That's what's arbitrary here. I guarantee you that if

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THE COURT: Is this -- do you know if there is such a policy? Let me just ask today, does any --MS. GRUGAN: I'm really not sure. I was just told by -- since I indicted this case, I've had two supervisors and I went back to both -- to each of them, and I've asked them both for their consideration. They said no. We do not allow it. And I was never given any better explanation than that.

MS. SMITH: Your Honor, you know, just for the record, this is no fault of this particular Deputy Attorney General. She's getting her marching orders from the superiors in her office, but it's very clear that that's the -- whether this policy is applied uniformly throughout all defendant cases or not, the thing applied to this individual, and that's unfair. That's arbitrary.

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MS. GRUGAN: Now, it is applied to all other public employees as well. See, we deal with this also at the municipal level, and I know that that's always been the position, that they're probation cases. I also just want to point out that when Mr. Watkins received the benefits under the extended program -it's called ABT Program, what they do is they figure out a monetary reserve. He depleted his monetary reserve under the initial time he was given --

THE COURT: And they extended it.
MS. GRUGAN: -- unemployment benefits. they give him a whole new set of second monetary reserve

THE COURT: You told me that. MS. GRUGAN: -- of 6,000. And the reason he depleted almost all of that -- \$5, 061 is the total theft, falling just short of the 6,000 reserve. So, you know, but for this quarterly cross-match, you know, he got caught. You know, he never came forward. You know, this isn't Mr. Good Samaritan and said oh, you know --

THE COURT: No, this is being handled as a crime. I understand that, you know, and he's apparently willing to even plead to it. So I understand that. You know, most of the times we don't

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24 25 look for Good Samaritans when we're dealing with, you know, these issues.

So the concern that I have is -- you've placed in this case the fact that he is a State employee and therefore not entitled to PTI. So I think I need something -- if there's a policy, do you have any case law-because you didn't cite any then ---

MS. GRUGAN: No. THE COURT: -- to suggest that that's an

appropriate --MS. GRUGAN: No, I just know that this is the

THE COURT: -- factor to consider? And why would that be appropriate?

MS. GRUGAN: I can't give you an answer to

that right now. THE COURT: Well, I'll give you an opportunity to supplement the record with something that would argue that State employees are not entitled to PTI, or this particular person, being a State employee under these circumstances, is not allowed entry into PTI, but for some reason. Give me some reason why it is that a State employee would be barred, if it's a general policy. Or if it's specific to this individual, then why this specific individual?

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MS. GRUGAN: Your Honor, the State -- the fact that he's a State employee, putting that aside, we do have enough here that merits his disqualification from the program. THE COURT: Oh, I still want to hear this. This is the first time I'm ever hearing that no State

employee can be given PTI. MS. GRUGAN: But I believe that the thrust of the PTI program is to give prosecutors substantial discretion into who gets into the diversionary program.

THE COURT: Oh, it gives case management and the prosecutor's office -- absolutely true. But it can't be arbitrary. It can't be capricious. And if there's a blanket policy that excludes a large portion of the population, then there should be some reasonable basis for that exclusion. I just want to hear what it is. You haven't submitted it in writing, and you don't feel that you can do it today to tell me about that.
And if that's the umbrella under which all the

other aspects of this case are being evaluated, then I think the argument is well placed by the defense that anybody else, other than Mr. Watkins, who would not be a State employee rather, I should say -- anybody else not being a State employee would have otherwise been given this opportunity.

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instead of the Tuesday after Columbus Day would be that Friday?

THE COURT: You're talking about October. said November 12th, but you want October 15th? Is that what you're saying?

- MS. SMITH: Yes, okay. I'm sorry. November -

THE COURT: I'm just giving the State some

time to submit something, so --

MS. SMITH: Judge, would you mind making it the 19th, November 19th? I'm still in two counties. THE COURT: November 19th.

MS. SMITH: Thank you so much. Would that be

at nine or 1:30? THE COURT: 1:30.

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CERTIFICATION

I, BETH ANNE PRUNCHAK, the assigned transcriber, do hereby certify the foregoing transcript of proceedings on videotape B, index number 02:01:26 to 02:21:55, is prepared in full compliance with the current Transcript Format for Judicial Proceedings and is a true-and accurate compressed transcript of the proceedings as recorded, and to the best of my ability.

BETH ANNE PRUNCHAK

Approved by:

JOHANNA LIMATO

J&J TRANSCRIBERS, INC.

Date: Movember 9, 2004

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THE COURT: All right, State versus Charles Watkins III, Indictment 04-01-0008. This is a State Grand Jury matter, 04-0398 is the Prosecutor File Number. We're here for the hearing on the PTI appeal. Counsel, if you'll place your appearance on the record? MS. SMITH: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

Kelly Smith, Garces and Grabler, on behalf of Mr. Watkins.

MS. GRUGAN: Denise Grugan, Deputy Attorney General.

THE COURT: All right, and you can all be seated. Thank you very much. All right, I have received the appeal and the submission from the State. I think there were two. I'm not sure if there were two. There's a -- yes, there were two responses from the State.

MS. GRUGAN: There was an earlier one that I sent to Janet Vonfossen (phonetic), and then I responded to my adversary's brief.

THE COURT: You replied, a letter, right, okay. All right. Counsel?

MS. SMITH: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, I know I gave you a lengthy brief and several

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submissions that were somewhat piecemeal. But the bottom line is that this is an individual who has a prior municipal court record dating back to 1990. was a municipal court charge of receiving stolen property, downgraded. Other than that, his record has been meticulously clean.

This is an individual that has suffered great heartache from home. He has taken care of both his parents who died from terminal diseases as well as his brother. He's put another brother through a drug rehab, and while he was going through that drug rehab. took in his brother's children.

This is the same individual that has had a very consistent work history while putting himself through school when money was not at an abundance. has given back to his community. He's had a State job for 14 years plus working for Trenton State Hospital.

This is -- he's led an extraordinary life.

In 1998 after approximately ten years of service with Trenton State Hospital, there was a massive downsizing. At that time, Mr. Watkins was temporarily let go, and he pursued unemployment benefits. Unemployment sent him to school and simultaneously was sending him an amount of money each month which he signed for. We're talking about a four month period. It was from January

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to May. From my review of the discovery, we're talking about nine checks:

During that interim, which is the key period of time that's at issue for the complaint, Mr. Watkins was rehired by the State, and he went back to work, yet he still cashed those checks. This is not a crime of violence, and the outpouring of support from not only friends and family but employers, colleagues, and people in the community has been just an amazing -- I was impressed, and I do these all the time. And just -- it was incredible the people that have stepped forward.

This is exactly the type of individual that PTI contemplates. If this man is given a probationary sentence and has a conviction, he will lose his job, which is pretty much everything he's worked for, which seems to me incredibly unfair and unjust, given what we're talking about. We're talking about a theft by deception. We're not talking about a crime of violence or selling drugs into the community. We're talking about a mistake.

He's perfectly willing to take responsibility for that mistake and is perfectly willing to make payments to restore that amount. I think the exact figure is approximately \$5,600. With taxes and

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penalties it was, I think, an additional 2,000. I don't have the exact figure in front of me, but we're talking a total of about 7,500, \$7,600 in total. He's willing to make that payment. He's willing to move forward with his life.

Unfortunately, despite the fact that he's an excellent candidate under the law and the purview of all the elements that they lay out for PTI candidates, and criminal case management, by the way, found him to be a suitable candidate, the State has determined pretty much that he's not. And what is that based on? It's based on the fact, first of all, that he's a State employee. He's being held to a higher standard which, in my estimation, is -- that in and of itself is arbitrary and capricious.

Secondly, they're looking at that 1990 conviction. That was 14 years ago, and it was a municipal court conviction. I think that case is much too old to be seriously contemplated.

And the other argument that the State's making is the fact that this was ongoing, which was four months of unemployment. I don't think that constitutes a scheme against society. He made a mistake, and he's willing to pay for it.

I think the case law completely supports his

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admission in the PTI, given all the factors, and I think that's another downfall of the State. They're not looking at this particular individual as a whole, what he's done for the community, what he's done for his job, what he's done for his family. They're looking at him in a vacuum, and you can't do that. That's arbitrary.

But the fact that he's being held to a higher standard because he's a State employee is completely inappropriate for a PTI determination. If I had committed the same offense, I'd be getting into PTI because I work for a private employer. If I was still working for the PD office which I had done many years, I wouldn't get into PTI by virtue of the fact that I'm a State employee, and that's not right. There's a bias that's built in there that's completely capricious.

I can't think of a more suitable candidate. The State has a remedy in the event that this is a farce, which I can assure the Court it's not. But in the event that this is a farce, then he's putting on a hell of a show just to get into PTI. If he fails or he fails to make one payment, he can be violated and we could go right back to a guilty plea.

Mr. Watkins is even willing to plead guilty as a condition of getting into PTI. That just goes to

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show you his motivation and just not have it executed, but he will lose his job. It seems to me under the circumstances and the nature of this offense that the appropriate remedy here is to commit this individual in PTI. Not to make a sweeping generalization that all theft by deceptions should be admitted, but this individual, and it needs to be a case by case fact sensitive analysis, and he's an excellent candidate. He's the perfect candidate I would respectfully submit.

And again, the -- I've spelled out the case law in support of my position, and I know the Court is well read in that regard. So I won't belabor the point. I just wanted to hit the highlights. But it's just this is one of those cases where policy should be thrown in the wind, and the individual should be taken at face value.

THE COURT: All right, the State's position?
MS. GRUGAN: Your Honor, indeed it is the
policy of the State of my office that we do not grant
PTI to State workers. It's not arbitrary and
capricious. We hold workers to a higher standard, and
one of it is a preservation of our pension fund.

Also because we're dealing with State workers, we -- at certain times, and this happened at the time when this matter arose with Mr. Watkins, they

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will do what's called a quarterly cross-match, where they will look at employees -- employer's records, and cross them with recipients of UI benefits, and they did a clean sweep for all State workers. And this is justified because we want to make sure that we don't have people that are working for the system and also taking advantage of the system.

Mr. Watkins -- when they determined what your monetary benefits are, it's set up in a reserve, \$6,000 approximately, in this matter. His benefits -- he depleted those benefits, and they were even extended further, given a whole new time frame for him to extend his benefits.

So he got the benefit of more unemployment insurance benefits, but he also got the benefit of getting an education while he was collecting those benefits and still working. So he was getting a lot of assistance from the State, and he took advantage of that assistance that's being afforded to him, something that is very gratuitous and generous, I think, by the State.

This isn't just one bad instance. He cashed nine checks consecutively, over and over and over again. And attached to each of those checks is a claim form where he fills out and says if he's working or not

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working, and in this instance he returned those claim forms stating over and over and over again I'm unemployed and therefore entitled to these benefits.

And on the back of each of these checks when he endorses these checks there's a certification where the claimant has to state I'm entitled to these benefits, I am unemployed, and I reported to the State all of my wages and earnings during this time. So they're given every opportunity and notified you can't cash these checks unless you're entitled to them.

And also with regard to, you know, to the context of being a State worker, Mr. Watkins was employed as a human services technician. From what I've been told by his employer, he is responsible for handling a lot of patients' monies and valuables, and I guess that that's what's being considered. If he does have a conviction on his record, there's nothing precluding him from going to another job and getting a position, and they can take that responsibility of knowing that they've hired someone who has a conviction on his record.

But he's had every opportunity to change his course of action. Not only that, but even before these matters were transferred over to our office for criminal prosecution, they notify defendants or

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That's not for the Attorney General's Office employee. to do. Who died and made them the king that says well, we're going to hold New Jersey employees to that higher standard? Where's the justification for that? Where in the law does it say that they have that ability?

There is a law that says that he will lose his job if he has a conviction. But there's nowhere in the law, and certainly nowhere in the cases and its progeny of PTI cases where it says the State of New Jersey has the ability and the authority to say okay, you're a New Jersey State employee so we're going to hold you to a higher standard. Therefore, that's the reason you can't get into PTI. There's no foundation for it. That's what makes it arbitrary.

So whether it's an office-wide policy or not, it's a wrong policy. And I will bet you dollars to doughnuts that if this case went up to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court would agree on it. There is no authority for that basis. That's what makes it capricious.

THE COURT: So you're suggesting this is a policy of the Attorney General's Office, the State of New Jersey, that no one who is an employee of the State of New Jersey can receive PTI from -- at any time?

MS. GRUGAN: I was told by my office that

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THE COURT: Well, I'm sure that there's no doubt that, you know -- we don't make things a crime that aren't somewhat, you know, intentional. So obviously if he had just made an error in it, you wouldn't be charging him with a crime. So I understand what you're saying in terms of what's required to be done here, and I don't think he is now denying that.

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THE COURT: Well, you know, that is fraught with some difficulty in terms of the application. It just flies in the face of PTI and what the analysis is supposed to be in terms of case by case. You look at the individual, you look at the ability to rehabilitate, and so that policy gives me concern.

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THE COURT: I wouldn't think it would have been. So, you know, that's the other, I guess, the other factor that was being considered. It's a legitimate factor, and the defendant finds himself in a position where the State has the power, essentially, as long as they don't abuse it, as long as they're not arbitrary, as long as they're not capricious in their analysis, whether it be just on one of the factors. It would have to be on all three.

So in my view, without more analysis and without more information, because I don't know whether it actually can be represented today by -- on behalf of the Attorney General's Office, if there's just a blanket policy that no State employee is ever afforded the opportunity to enter into PTI. I'm not sure if that's accurate. I'm not sure if you're comfortable saying that today. I don't know --

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MS. GRUGAN: Now, it is applied to all other public employees as well. See, we deal with this also at the municipal level, and I know that that's always been the position, that they're probation cases. I also just want to point out that when Mr. Watkins received the benefits under the extended program -it's called ABT Program, what they do is they figure out a monetary reserve. He depleted his monetary reserve under the initial time he was given --

THE COURT: And they extended it.
MS. GRUGAN: -- unemployment benefits. they give him a whole new set of second monetary reserve .

THE COURT: You told me that. MS. GRUGAN: -- of 6,000. And the reason he depleted almost all of that -- \$5, 061 is the total theft, falling just short of the 6,000 reserve. So, you know, but for this quarterly cross-match, you know, he got caught. You know, he never came forward. know, this isn't Mr. Good Samaritan and said oh, you know --

THE COURT: No, this is being handled as a crime. I understand that, you know, and he's apparently willing to even plead to it. So I understand that. You know, most of the times we don't

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instead of the Tuesday after Columbus Day would be that Friday?

THE COURT: You're talking about October. I said November 12th, but you want October 15th? Is that what you're saying?

- MS. SMITH: Yes, okay. I'm sorry. November -

THE COURT: I'm just giving the State some

time to submit something, so --MS. SMITH: Judge, would you mind making it the 19th, November 19th? I'm still in two counties.

THE COURT: November 19th.

MS. SMITH: Thank you so much. Would that be at nine or 1:30?

THE COURT: 1:30.

CERTIFICATION I, BETH ANNE PRUNCHAK, the assigned transcriber, do hereby certify the foregoing transcript of proceedings on videotape B, index number 02:01:26 to 02:21:55, is prepared in full compliance with the current Transcript Format for Judicial Proceedings and is a true-and accurate compressed transcript of the proceedings as recorded, and to the best of my ability.

BETH ANNE PRUNCHAK

Approved by:

JOHANNA LIMATO

J&J TRANSCRIBERS, INC.

Date: Movimber 9, 2004

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION, CLIMINGL PART MERCER COUNTY, NEW DRS. INDICTMENT NO. 04-01-000 A.D. #_

STATE OF NEW JERSEY

TRANSCRIPT

· OF HEARING

CHARLES WATKINS III,

v.

Defendant.

Place: Mercer County Courthouse

209 South Broad Street

Trenton, NJ 08650

Date: September 24, 2004

BEFORE:

THE HON. MARIA M. SYPEK, P.J.S.C.

TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY:

KELLY ANDERSON SMITH, ESQ. (Garces & Grabler, P.C.)

APPEARANCES:

DENISE L. GRUGAN, Deputy Attorney General Attorney for the State

KELLY ANDERSON SMITH, ESQ. (Garces & Grabler, P.C.) Attorney for the Defendant

> Transcriber, Beth Anne Prunchak J&J COURT TRANSCRIBERS, INC. 268 Evergreen Avenue Hamilton, NJ 08619

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· Video Recorded

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okay.

THE COURT: All right, State versus Charles Watkins III, Indictment 04-01-0008. This is a State Grand Jury matter, 04-0398 is the Prosecutor File Number. We're here for the hearing on the PTI appeal. Counsel, if you'll place your appearance on the record? MS. SMITH: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Kelly Smith, Garces and Grabler, on behalf of Mr.

Watkins. MS. GRUGAN: Denise Grugan, Deputy Attorney

General. THE COURT: All right, and you can all be seated. Thank you very much. All right, I have received the appeal and the submission from the State. I think there were two. I'm not sure if there were two. There's a -- yes, there were two responses from

the State. MS. GRUGAN: There was an earlier one that I sent to Janet Vonfossen (phonetic), and then I responded to my adversary's brief.

THE COURT: You replied, a letter, right, All right. Counsel?

MS. SMITH: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, I know I gave you a lengthy brief and several

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submissions that were somewhat piecemeal. But the bottom line is that this is an individual who has a prior municipal court record dating back to 1990. was a municipal court charge of receiving stolen property, downgraded. Other than that, his record has been meticulously clean.

This is an individual that has suffered great heartache from home. He has taken care of both his parents who died from terminal diseases as well as his brother. He's put another brother through a drug rehab, and while he was going through that drug rehab, took in his brother's children.

This is the same individual that has had a very consistent work history while putting himself through school when money was not at an abundance. He has given back to his community. He's had a State job for 14 years plus working for Trenton State Hospital.

This is -- he's led an extraordinary life. In 1998 after approximately ten years of service with Trenton State Hospital, there was a massive downsizing. At that time, Mr. Watkins was temporarily let go, and he pursued unemployment benefits. Unemployment sent him to school and simultaneously was sending him an amount of money each month which he signed for. We're talking about a four month period. It was from January to May. From my review of the discovery, we're talking about nine checks:

During that interim, which is the key period of time that's at issue for the complaint, Mr. Watkins was rehired by the State, and he went back to work, yet he still cashed those checks. This is not a crime of violence, and the outpouring of support from not only friends and family but employers, colleagues, and people in the community has been just an amazing -- I was impressed, and I do these all the time. And just -- it was incredible the people that have stepped forward.

This is exactly the type of individual that PTI contemplates. If this man is given a probationary sentence and has a conviction, he will lose his job, which is pretty much everything he's worked for, which seems to me incredibly unfair and unjust, given what we're talking about. We're talking about a theft by deception. We're not talking about a crime of violence or selling drugs into the community. We're talking about a mistake.

He's perfectly willing to take responsibility for that mistake and is perfectly willing to make payments to restore that amount. I think the exact figure is approximately \$5,600. With taxes and

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penalties it was, I think, an additional 2,000. I don't have the exact figure in front of me, but we're talking a total of about 7,500, \$7,600 in total. He's willing to make that payment. He's willing to move forward with his life.

Unfortunately, despite the fact that he's an

Unfortunately, despite the fact that he's an excellent candidate under the law and the purview of all the elements that they lay out for PTI candidates, and criminal case management, by the way, found him to be a suitable candidate, the State has determined pretty much that he's not. And what is that based on? It's based on the fact, first of all, that he's a State employee. He's being held to a higher standard which, in my estimation, is -- that in and of itself is arbitrary and capricious.

Secondly, they're looking at that 1990 conviction. That was 14 years ago, and it was a municipal court conviction. I think that case is much too old to be seriously contemplated.

And the other argument that the State's making is the fact that this was ongoing, which was four months of unemployment. I don't think that constitutes a scheme against society. He made a mistake, and he's willing to pay for it.

I think the case law completely supports his

admission in the PTI, given all the factors, and I think that's another downfall of the State. They're not looking at this particular individual as a whole, what he's done for the community, what he's done for his job, what he's done for his family. They're looking at him in a vacuum, and you can't do that. .That's arbitrary.

But the fact that he's being held to a higher standard because he's a State employee is completely inappropriate for a PTI determination. If I had committed the same offense, I'd be getting into PTI because I work for a private employer. If I was still working for the PD office which I had done many years, I wouldn't get into PTI by virtue of the fact that I'm a State employee, and that's not right. There's a bias that's built in there that's completely capricious.

I can't think of a more suitable candidate. The State has a remedy in the event that this is a farce, which I can assure the Court it's not. But in the event that this is a farce, then he's putting on a hell of a show just to get into PTI. If he fails or he fails to make one payment, he can be violated and we could go right back to a guilty plea.

Mr. Watkins is even willing to plead guilty as a condition of getting into PTI. That just goes to

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show you his motivation and just not have it executed, but he will lose his job. It seems to me under the circumstances and the nature of this offense that the appropriate remedy here is to commit this individual in PTI. Not to make a sweeping generalization that all theft by deceptions should be admitted, but this individual, and it needs to be a case by case fact sensitive analysis, and he's an excellent candidate. He's the perfect candidate I would respectfully submit.

And again, the -- I've spelled out the case law in support of my position, and I know the Court is well read in that regard. So I won't belabor the point. I just wanted to hit the highlights. But it's just this is one of those cases where policy should be thrown in the wind, and the individual should be taken at face value.

THE COURT: All right, the State's position? MS. GRUGAN: Your Honor, indeed it is the policy of the State of my office that we do not grant PTI to State workers. It's not arbitrary and capricious. We hold workers to a higher standard, and one of it is a preservation of our pension fund.
Also because we're dealing with State

workers, we -- at certain times, and this happened at the time when this matter arose with Mr. Watkins, they

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will do what's called a quarterly cross-match, where they will look at employees -- employer's records, and cross them with recipients of UI benefits, and they did a clean sweep for all State workers. And this is justified because we want to make sure that we don't have people that are working for the system and also taking advantage of the system.

Mr. Watkins -- when they determined what your monetary benefits are, it's set up in a reserve, \$6,000 approximately, in this matter. His benefits -- he depleted those benefits, and they were even extended further, given a whole new time frame for him to extend his benefits.

So he got the benefit of more unemployment insurance benefits, but he also got the benefit of getting an education while he was collecting those benefits and still working. So he was getting a lot of assistance from the State, and he took advantage of that assistance that's being afforded to him, something that is very gratuitous and generous, I think, by the State.

This isn't just one bad instance. He cashed nine checks consecutively, over and over and over again. And attached to each of those checks is a claim form where he fills out and says if he's working or not

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working, and in this instance he returned those claim forms stating over and over and over again I'm unemployed and therefore entitled to these benefits.

And on the back of each of these checks when he endorses these checks there's a certification where the claimant has to state I'm entitled to these benefits, I am unemployed, and I reported to the State all of my wages and earnings during this time. So they're given every opportunity and notified you can't cash these checks unless you're entitled to them.

And also with regard to, you know, to the context of being a State worker, Mr. Watkins was employed as a human services technician. From what I've been told by his employer, he is responsible for handling a lot of patients' monies and valuables, and I guess that that's what's being considered. If he does have a conviction on his record, there's nothing precluding him from going to another job and getting a position, and they can take that responsibility of knowing that, they've hired someone who has a conviction on his record.

But he's had every opportunity to change his course of action. Not only that, but even before these matters were transferred over to our office for criminal prosecution, they notify defendants or

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1 claimants and say, let's come and negotiate this. 2 that matter wasn't pursued here. It was largely 3 ignored by the defendant which is why it comes over to our office for prosecution. That's all.

THE COURT: Do you have any of those 4 5 6

documents that you're referencing? MS. GRUGAN: Yes, Your Honor.....

THE COURT: Anything in response while she's looking?

MS. SMITH: Judge, I can't -- Mr. Watkins has informed me they did reach out to him to make payment. He went down to the office in order to do that. He tried to make payment. It was -- it never came about, but I don't think it was on his shoulders. They never re-contacted him. He didn't know.

Now, you can easily say well, it's still your responsibility, but he was willing at that time. He has never not been willing. And the fact of the matter is not withstanding this -- the nature of this charge, it's mandated that he lose his job. So it's not really discretionary on the employer. If in fact this goes down as a conviction, that's it. He will lose his job. That's a double punishment.

It's, you know, the -- with all the due respect to my adversary, it's a lot easier said than

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done to go out and find a decent paying job with decent benefits when you have a conviction on your record. And not to say well, he shouldn't take responsibility for his actions. He has taken responsibility for his actions. He knows he made a mistake. He regrets it greatly because his whole future -- and he's sorry about it.

But it was a mistake. And that's what PTI is for. It's for that person that makes a mistake. Again, this is not a crime of violence. It's not a crime of selling drugs. He's willing to make the restitution. Why not give him that opportunity? He is

paying his taxes. He's given back to the community.

He has just had a plethora of community support, many of which are employers and colleagues and patients at this job. So obviously he's doing his job well. his employer has the discretion, if they wanted to, they could fire him right now pending the outcome of this. They haven't done that. So he must be doing something right.

Why not give him that opportunity and just -again, not to belabor the point, but whether it's a policy throughout the office or not, the policy is flawed. You cannot hold someone to a higher standard just by virtue of the fact that they're a State

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That's not for the Attorney General's Office employee. to do. Who died and made them the king that says well, we're going to hold New Jersey employees to that higher standard? Where's the justification for that? in the law does it say that they have that ability?

There is a law that says that he will lose his job if he has a conviction. But there's nowhere in the law, and certainly nowhere in the cases and its progeny of PTI cases where it says the State of New Jersey has the ability and the authority to say okay, you're a New Jersey State employee so we're going to hold you to a higher standard. Therefore, that's the reason you can't get into PTI. There's no foundation for it. That's what makes it arbitrary.

So whether it's an office-wide policy or not, it's a wrong policy. And I will bet you dollars to doughnuts that if this case went up to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court would agree on it. There is no authority for that basis. That's what makes it capricious.

THE COURT: So you're suggesting this is a policy of the Attorney General's Office, the State of New Jersey, that no one who is an employee of the State of New Jersey can receive PTI from -- at any time?

MS. GRUGAN: I was told by my office that

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this is their position, that because he's a State worker, they would not give him -- they would not allow him into PTI. They would not take that position. That policy aside, Your Honor, I just wanted to point out what's in front of you, the mail claim benefit forms and Question 7. On that mail claim benefit form, he is asked were you working? If yes, fill out the back and tell us when you worked and what hours you worked and take it to your employer and make sure your employer certifies that these were your earnings.

He did this over and over and over again, and I would argue he knew exactly what he was -- for example, on the front of that claim form he has to sign, date and mail it by a specific date. And they are --

THE COURT: Well, I'm sure that there's no doubt that, you know -- we don't make things a crime that aren't somewhat, you know, intentional. So obviously if he had just made an error in it, you wouldn't be charging him with a crime. So I understand what you're saying in terms of what's required to be done here, and I don't think he is now denying that.

The issue only becomes, at this time, you know, whether or not the State has taken a position

that's arbitrary and capricious, excuse me.

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is a statewide policy which I'm actually hearing for the first time that there's a policy that no one who is a State employee would be entitled to PTI; I can't imagine that that's true.

MS. GRUGAN: I was just told in this case. This is one of the first State workers that I've had, and I have gone back to my supervisors, and they ve all told me we will not allow PTI or endorse a candidate for PTI who is a State worker.

THE COURT: Well, you know, that is fraught with some difficulty in terms of the application. It just flies in the face of PTI and what the analysis is supposed to be in terms of case by case. You look at the individual, you look at the ability to rehabilitate, and so that policy gives me concern.

The municipal matter is, you know, one that if I were making the decision, I would not consider in terms of an old municipal conviction. But then again, that's not the standard. What I would do is of no moment. It's what the State does and whether the State is acting arbitrarily and capriciously.

The third one, as I understand it, is the fact that this was alleged to be an ongoing crime, that it happened nine times over the course of what I believe, four months. And as a result of that, he can

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be excluded for the reasons that this was not just a one time crime. I don't know whether logically Mr. Watkins, if he were to be indicted on this charge, would -- oh, he is indicted. How was it indicted? it indicted with nine counts? MS. GRUGAN: Nø, it was just one count of

theft by deception.

THE COURT: I wouldn't think it would have So, you know, that's the other, I guess, the other factor that was being considered. It's a legitimate factor, and the defendant finds himself in a position where the State has the power, essentially, as long as they don't abuse it, as long as they're not arbitrary, as long as they're not capricious in their analysis, whether it be just on one of the factors. It would have to be on all three.

So in my view, without more analysis and without more information, because I don't know whether it actually can be represented today by -- on behalf of the Attorney General's Office, if there's just a blanket policy that no State employee is ever afforded the opportunity to enter into PTI. I'm not sure if that's accurate. I'm not sure if you're comfortable saying that today. I don't know -MS. GRUGAN: I don't know too much about the

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THE COURT: So the crux of the issue is this nine times that it was done, in my view because the other two -- I think there's an argument that can be made that if that be the case, that there is this blanket policy, that that may be a decision that the State has made that flies in the face of what PTI is intended to do.

But the question is whether or not, looking at the nine times that this was done, is sufficient basis to have Mr. Watkins excluded from PTI.

MS. SMITH: Judge, if I may respond? I can't tell you the countless theft by deception, specifically welfare fraud or --

THE COURT: You don't have to tell me about I see it every day. But that's not the standard. I mean, if the standard is whether or not the action under this circumstance is arbitrary.

MS. SMITH: I understand that. But if -- how

can you reconcile where welfare fraud with they're receiving -- which is a similar, you know, mirror image of this case, where they are receiving benefits repeatedly over a course of time, which I would submit to you four months is not that long, but over a course

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of time -- or whether it be unemployment benefits or whatever benefits they're not entitled to, given the circumstances, that how can you reconcile the fact that those individuals are in PTI? And I can think of one right off the top of my head where it was a ten year period.

How can you reconcile that and not acknowledge the fact that you have the Deputy Attorney General telling you right now that she was advised by her supervisors that he's being held to a higher standard, and that's how the DAG opened her remarks to the Court?

THE COURT: That's true.

MS. SMITH: We're holding this individual as a State employee to a higher standard because of, you know, the benefits and the State was generous with him and all this other -- but the fact of the matter is, he is being held to a higher standard. That's what's arbitrary. So it's convenient that this happened over a four month period of time and involves nine checks.

But the fact of the matter is we do have one indictment, and the Court itself has acknowledged the fact that these types of cases on a routine basis get into PTI. So you can't disregard this higher standard. That's what's arbitrary here. I guarantee you that if

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24 25 he was not a State employee, this would not be an issue. He would already be in PTI. And that's the problem.

And I don't think the Attorney General's Office is going to issue to the Court a written proclamation stating its policy. The fact of the matter is that's their policy, and that's certainly. being -- that's the policy that's being applied here by the very candor of the Deputy Attorney General.

THE COURT: Is this -- do you know if there is such a policy? Let me just ask today, does any --MS. GRUGAN: I'm really not sure. I was just told by -- since I indicted this case, I've had two supervisors and I went back to both -- to each of them, and I've asked them both for their consideration. They said no. We do not allow it. And I was never given any better explanation than that.

MS. SMITH: Your Honor, you know, just for the record, this is no fault of this particular Deputy Attorney General. She's getting her marching orders from the superiors in her office, but it's very clear that that's the -- whether this policy is applied uniformly throughout all defendant cases or not, the thing applied to this individual, and that's unfair. That's arbitrary.

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MS. GRUGAN: Now, it is applied to all other public employees as well. See, we deal with this also at the municipal level, and I know that that's always been the position, that they're probation cases. I also just want to point out that when Mr. Watkins received the benefits under the extended program -it's called ABT Program, what they do is they figure out a monetary reserve. He depleted his monetary reserve under the initial time he was given --

THE COURT: And they extended it.
MS. GRUGAN: -- unemployment benefits. they give him a whole new set of second monetary reserve .

THE COURT: You told me that. MS. GRUGAN: -- of 6,000. And the reason he depleted almost all of that -- \$5, 061 is the total theft, falling just short of the 6,000 reserve. you know, but for this quarterly cross-match, you know, he got caught. You know, he never came forward. know, this isn't Mr. Good Samaritan and said oh, you know --

THE COURT: No, this is being handled as a I understand that, you know, and he's apparently willing to even plead to it. So I understand that. You know, most of the times we don't

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look for Good Samaritans when we're dealing with, you know, these issues.

So the concern that I have is -- you've placed in this case the fact that he is a State employee and therefore not entitled to PTI. So I think I need something -- if there's a policy, do you have -any case law-because you didn't cite any then ---

MS. GRUGAN: No. THE COURT: -- to suggest that that's an appropriate --

MS. GRUGAN: No, I just know that this is the

THE COURT: -- factor to consider? And why would that be appropriate?

MS. GRUGAN: I can't give you an answer to that right now.

THE COURT: Well, I'll give you an opportunity to supplement the record with something that would argue that State employees are not entitled to PTI, or this particular person, being a State employee under these circumstances, is not allowed entry into PTI, but for some reason. Give me some reason why it is that a State employee would be barred, if it's a general policy. Or if it's specific to this individual, then why this specific individual?

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MS. GRUGAN: Your Honor, the State -- the fact that he's a State employee, putting that aside, we do have enough here that merits his disqualification from the program.

THE COURT: Oh, I still want to hear this. This is the first time I'm ever hearing that no State employee can be given PTI.

MS. GRUGAN: But I believe that the thrust of the PTI program is to give prosecutors substantial discretion into who gets into the diversionary program.

THE COURT: Oh, it gives case management and the prosecutor's office -- absolutely true. But it can't be arbitrary. It can't be capricious. And if there's a blanket policy that excludes a large portion of the population, then there should be some reasonable basis for that exclusion. I just want to hear what it is. You haven't submitted it in writing, and you don't feel that you can do it today to tell me about that.

And if that's the umbrella under which all the other aspects of this case are being evaluated, then I think the argument is well placed by the defense that anybody else, other than Mr. Watkins, who would not be a State employee rather, I should say -- anybody else not being a State employee would have otherwise been

given this opportunity.

MS. GRUGAN: Well, Your Honor, you know, to call this a single mistake -- this isn't a single mistake. This is a --

THE COURT: You've made your point about

that. MS. GRUGAN: And he's made a mistake before. THE COURT: I need further information, and ____ I'm asking you to submit something further on the issue of the policy. The fact of the matter is that -- and maybe it's because your office does something different. But most of the prosecutions occur within the County itself. And so I don't have a great wealth

of information from the Attorney General's Office and admissions into PTI. So I'm at a loss.

But I can tell you that routinely, welfare fraud with five, eight, ten, eleven thousand dollars -there are some monetary guidelines that have been developed within case management that if it's, you know, \$75,000 or \$25,000, the problem is that that probably cannot be paid off in the three year time period that PTI usually covers. So it would be impossible for restitution to be paid. And under those guidelines, then PTI is not an appropriate way to deal with the given case. That's the only time the money issue comes in. But they're often on a repeated basis.

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It's an ongoing issue. So in and of itself, though you may consider that, and that's what I said before, my concern is that others of similar offenses would be allowed into PTI except for this policy that the State has. Now, you may find out more information about that. You may not. And then I'm going to be required then to make a decision based upon what I have here before me. But it does give me concern. I've never heard this before, where State employees are not entitled to PTI. I'm a State employee, and I'd like to know whether I'd be entitled to PTI.

MS. GRUGAN: I wouldn't say State employees. I'd say public employees.

THE COURT: God forbid I ever did anything.

Pardon?

MS. GRUGAN: Public employees. THE COURT: Public employees. Well, now, that's a redefinition as opposed to any State employee? MS. GRUGAN: Well, yes, I mean, public employees could be someone who's working for the County or the, you know, another agency of this -- within this State but -- versus a State. I'm employed by the State versus someone who is employed by the County. THE COURT: So now you're saying anyone

Psychiatric Hospital as well as their personal property and possessions. There's a nexus between his position and the responsibility of taking care of personal property and a crime involving dishonesty.

Finally, there's, you know, I mentioned also in my first brief that this is a continuing course of conduct. And I know I brought this up earlier. You know, Unemployment, when they look at an application -and they're only allowed to file one unemployment claim per year. This defendant filed a claim. He was given a monetary reserve. He depleted that claim and then a whole new reserve was extended to him. As a result of that extension, he was given a whole new set of unemployment claims. Those claims were fully depleted by the defendant. If it had been 10,000, 15 - 20,000 that had been put in reserve for the defendant, that's how much he would have stolen from the State. integrity of the Unemployment Insurance Fund has to be preserved. It's there for the citizens of this state who pay into it and at times need it. It's to bridge that gap. This defendant exploited it. He took advantage of it and he abused it. And he's been afforded a lot of opportunity prior to indictment to handle this matter with the State.

You know, and I know Your Honor said that you

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weren't going to consider his 1990 Municipal Court conviction. You know, we do look at that. We look at a lot of factors and that was one that came up on his criminal rap sheet that we also take into account.

And for those reasons, Your Honor, the State respectfully requests that his admission into PTI be denied.

MS. SMITH: Your Honor, the Deputy Attorney General has now just indicated that they don't have a policy, but I provided Your Honor with a transcript of the proceeding and let's very briefly just refer to Page 7. And I'm going to quote, "Your Honor, indeed it is the policy of the State of my office that we do not grant PTI to State workers. It is not arbitrary and capricious. We hold workers to a higher standard and one of it is a preservation of our pension fund."

Now whether the DAG misspoke at that hearing or not, it would seem to me that there is a policy just by virtue of what's been argued now. She is holding her -- excuse me, her office is holding a State employee to a higher standard. That's the real issue. It's not really about the 1990 conviction. It's not really about this continuing course of conduct. It's the fact that he is a State employee.

I would submit to Your Honor if he was

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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY A-3853-05 T4 MERCER COUNTY, NEW JERSEY INDICEMENT. A.D. #_ #-00 3853 05

RECEIVED APPELL ATE DIVIGION

STATE OF NEW JERSEY

TRANSCRIPT OF

APR 20 2006

CHARLES WATKINS,

HEARING

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

v.

Defendant.

FILED APPELLATE DIVISION

Place: Mercer County Courthouse

209 South Broad Street

Trenton, NJ 08650

APR 2 0 2006

Date:

November 19, 2004

ende BEFORE:

THE HON. MARIA M. SYPEK, P.J.Cr.P.

TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY:

STEPHAN MARTINEZ, Office of the Public Defender

APPEARANCES:

DENISE L. GRUGAN, Deputy Attorney General Attorney for the State

KELLY SMITH, ESQ. (Garces and Grabler)

Transcriber, Mary L. Polito J&J COURT TRANSCRIBERS, INC. 268 Evergreen Avenue Hamilton, NJ 08619

(609) 586-2311 (609) 587-3599 FAX NO.

jjcourt@optonline.net E-mail:

Video Recorded Video Operator, Sue Hamer Colloquy

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Department of Labor. Shortly thereafter, the investigator assigned to this case called the phone number that was listed on Mr. Watkins' UI claim form, when he filed that claim for application. The number is 609-656-1064, and this was in the report that I gave my adversary. And she wrote in her report, the person (sounded like a young man) that answered the telephone stated that Mr. Watkins was not at home. I then told this person that I wished to speak with Mr. Charles Watkins, III. This person then stated that Mr. Watkins, III was not at home. I then asked if Mr. Charles Watkins resided at 67 General Green Avenue and this person said yes. It is noted that this person refused to identify himself. It is further noted that I asked this person to have Mr. Watkins, III contact me at the Trenton Regional Investigation Office to arrange an appointment. Complainant has not responded. As a result, this matter was referred to the Division of Criminal Justice. It is also important to point out that no voluntary payments have been made by the defendant towards the State's allegation and on this claim. the defendant comes here now, now that he's been indicted saying please disregard the State's charges. He's had every opportunity pre indictment to handle

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This is indicative of someone whose character is not amenable to rehabilitation and should go through the ordinary criminal process.

Yes, we wanted to handle this pre indictment. Now he's asking the State to dismiss its charges through letting him in the PTI. Tangential to the defendant's argument is he wants us to take into And I am indeed account challenging family situations. sympathetic towards those family situations that were outlined in the letters. However, I have seen, as a prosecutor and I'm sure Your Honor has also seen, that every defendant that comes before Your Honor has similar types of family challenges. And this in no way should be taken into account by the Court. He should be allowed to confront the charges that the State has presented.

Now the guideline that I discussed in my brief, Guideline 3, talks about where there's a breach of the public trust, where admission into PTI would deprecate the seriousness of the defendant's crime and the defendant's application should generally be rejected. This is where the State looks at this statute when it applies within the context of a public employee. Here we have a defendant who is responsible for taking care of mental patients at Trenton

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Psychiatric Hospital as well as their personal property and possessions. There's a nexus between his position and the responsibility of taking care of personal property and a crime involving dishonesty.

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I would submit to Your Honor if he was

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employed by a private hospital with those same obligations and responsibilities of caring for the patient, caring for their property, that trust issue, we would not be here today. But because he's employed by the State, and quite frankly I don't see the nexus at all. He has not been charged with any sort of inappropriate behavior on the confines of his employment. This was unemployment benefits. mistake. We're not contesting that. He is guilty of receiving unemployment benefits when he wasn't supposed It's a third degree crime. He is willing to pay the money back. It's completely irrelevant what has occurred with respect to the State's investigation by the Unemployment Office as far as his repayment prior to him being charged. Because if that matters, they can't prove or disprove whether or not he received messages, whether or not he was informed. I think that's completely irrelevant and I don't think it's appropriate to be argued here.

The fact of the matter is whether it's a written policy, whether it's a known policy that's put under the rug, the DAG right now right here is saying that he's being held to a higher standard because he's a State employee. You can't do that under the law. don't see a shred of case law binding that policy. You

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can't do it.

So I would ask Your Honor, since that's the real issue here and beyond his family circumstances, he's an excellent PTI candidate. I can't see how Your Honor cannot acknowledge the fact that whether it's spoken or not, there is a policy in this office with regard to State workers and that's what's arbitrary and capricious.

I don't know if you want me to address any of the other points raised. I think that this was --

THE COURT: It's up to you if you wish to --MS. SMITH: I pretty much exhausted them last time we were here so I don't want to belabor the point. But I believe that was the point of coming back today So unless Your Honor has to address that issue. specific questions, I'll submit on whatever I argued.

THE COURT: All right, thank you. Anything

else in response?

MS. GRUGAN: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, well, I'm going to take some time to think on this one because as I indicated the last time I was here and we were altogether, I liken this case to others that I see on a routine basis of where welfare benefits are taken when people are not entitled to them. And one of the things

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that I see very often being offered is PTI. No, these people, I could tell you, often don't have a job. don't know whether they work for the State, they work for private industry. I don't know, but it's certainly something that is often extended to an individual.

And perhaps I'll hear that it's tied to the amount of money that is involved because there might be a more significant meaning to that for a number of reasons or it might have something specifically to do with the ability to pay restitution and it just may not be able to do something like that over the course of a three-year PTI period.

But in any event, you know, I see this in a very similar way and what I need to now analyze since I have really received nothing further than -- no further real direct proof that there is some policy by the State that anyone who is employed by the State in a similar situation would be denied admittance into PTI because of the status of being a State employee. That's what I expected to explore today.

I'm being told that, you know, that doesn't exist, but rather there's a different analysis going on. And I frankly have to look at this carefully to see if I accept your argument that, in fact, it is universal application essentially made by the Attorney

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General's Office under these circumstances. I'm not sure whether I can agree with that or not. But I have this discomfort with the fact that for all other purposes except for the issues raised today that there are opportunities allowed for Mr. Watkins to have availed himself to civil remedies, failing to go to those remedies means that he is someone who disregards paying back the money and therefore disregards and perhaps is not rehabilitatable. That may be one way to look at that.

On the other hand, it continues to be unsettling to me that if the State affords that opportunity to resolve these matters in a civil way -under the civil proceedings with a fact finding hearing and perhaps a payment schedule being worked out, once it's referred to the State, presumably similar people who have resolved it without a criminal consequence and admittedly those people responded in that civil

Nonetheless, those that don't, they are now not afforded an opportunity for PTI because they didn't do well in the civil portion, they didn't respond, I don't know.

So there are a nur or of layers here that I have to really sort out. I also understand that the

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Court has very limited authority to overturn a prosecutor's decision. It is given great deference unless the prosecutor in this case, the State Attorney General's Office, has grossly abused their discretion, acted arbitrarily. Then I, of course, cannot adjust it and I need to digest what has happened here and what the circumstances are. I think the State certainly can make a cogent argument that they have considered Mr. Watkins as an individual and considered all the relevant factors and nonetheless find him that he should not be allowed the opportunities of PTI.

But in the unusual circumstances I have here with the prior argument having been made, I believe I need to digest this a bit further and I will issue a written decision, okay? Let me give myself a short, as short as I can, date so that the next time -- I guess I should give it at least a tracking date so I don't lose this case. This is now -- it's actually indicted. Is it on a track anywhere? Did you appear before Judge Bielamowicz?

MS. GRUGAN: (Indiscernible) Judge Bielamowicz, but I think it's been kind of put on hold til this matter is resolved.

THE COURT: Yes, because of me. Okay, so if my decision is to deny the appeal, the case would go

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back before Judge Bielamowicz for further disposition. If I grant the appeal, then it would be up to the State to either appeal that decision or, you know, allow the admission. So I'm just trying to factor in where I — let me place it for January 10th. That would be before Judge Bielamowicz unless you hear from me otherwise and then we'll have to do the necessary — each one of us, okay? All right, thank you.

MS. SMITH: Thank you, Your Honor.
MS. GRUGAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

PLEA

3 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Before we continue then, I'll ask that you be sworn. Would you please produce the Bible from the podium. Place your left hand on the Bible, raise your right hand, and the court clerk will administer an oath. WATKINS, III, ALONDO CHARLES DEFENDANT, SWORN.
THE CLERK: State your full name for the 9 10 record. THE DEFENDANT: Charles Alondo 11 Watkins, III. 12 THE COURT: According to the plea form,
Mr. Watkins, if you enter this guilty plea, the state
Will recommend that you be placed on probation for a
term of two years. There will be no probation
supervision fees, but there will be a consent judgment,
and you're preserving the right to appeal the denial of
your PTI application. Count 2 will be dismissed. 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 20 21 22 23 THE COURT: That is your understanding of the plea? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: I did read that correctly? MS. GRUGAN: Yes. I just wanted to ex 24 Yes. I just wanted to explain

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we were going to ask the Court to waive any probation fee because the consent judgment is not just -- it is principal plus penalty and interest, and it is
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        substantial.
                              THE COURT: Okay. I have no problem at all
        with that. And what is the amount, have you agreed on
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        it?
        MS. GRUGAN: Yes. The total principal, penalty, and interest is $7,610.78. Do you want a break-out of that, what is principal?

THE COURT: No, as long as Mr. Watkins has an understanding of the amount of restitution that he will be required to pay as a condition of probation.
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        Do you understand that?
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                               THE DEFENDANT:
                                                                  Yes.
        THE COURT: Is it realistic to expect that he will be able to do this in two years?
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        MR. CARUSO: To answer that question,

Judge, he is currently collecting disability for a
work-related injury. I'm not entirely optimistic it
will be paid within the two years. I told him to make
a good-faith effort at paying it, given the fact right
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        now he has a limited income.
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     is able to complete payment before then, then probation
     can be terminated after two.
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                  MR. CARUSO:
THE COURT:
                                   That would be preferable.
                  THE COURT: Is that agreeable?
MR. CARUSO: That would be preferable.
THE COURT: All right. Then I'll make that
     adjustment on my copy.
     MS. GRUGAN: I do have a signed consent judgment that needs your signature. May I approach
     your law clerk?
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                  THE COURT: Yes.
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    MR. CARUSO: Just so Mr. Watkins understands, if he pays it earlier and complies with
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     probation, he wouldn't be precluded from early
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     termination below the two-year mark?
THE COURT: You agree to that?
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                                   Yes.
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                                          All right. Were there
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     any other promises or statements of any type that were
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     made to you to convince you to plead guilty other than
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     what I placed on the record, sir?
                  THE DEFENDANT: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: For the record, what is your
     date of birth?
                  THE DEFENDANT: March 19th, 1966.
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PLEA

7 sir? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 2345 THE COURT: Would you take a look at it and confirm that that is your signature. THE DEFENDANT: Yes And did you sign this plea form 67 THE COURT: of your own free will? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: Did you do so after reviewing 8 9 the questions on all three pages? 10 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 11 Did you answer all of the THE COURT: 12 questions? 13 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 14 THE COURT: Are all of the answers that are 15 circled or filled-in your answers? 16 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 17 And are they truthful? THE COURT: 18 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 19 THE COURT: By reviewing the information on 20 21 22 23 24 this plea form, sir, do you understand that you would be required to pay a number of mandatory penalties? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: I'm going to review these with \$50 Violent Crimes Compensation Board penalty. 25 you.

which you agreed with the state?

other conditions of probation, other than those to

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THE COURT: Are you also aware I can impose

9 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 23 THE COURT: For instance, community service? 4 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: All right. Mr. Watkins, are you also aware instead of entering a guilty plea today, 5 6 7 you have a right to a trial by jury? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Do you understand if you went to trial, you would be presumed innocent unless and until the state proved that you were guilty beyond a 9 10 11 reasonable doubt? 12 13 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Do you also understand that at trial you would have had the right, through your 14 15 attorney, to cross-examine or ask questions of all of the state's witnesses? 16 17 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 18 THE COURT: And you also could have called 19 witnesses to testify on your behalf, are you aware of 20 21 that? 22 THE DEFENDANT: Right. Yes. 23 THE COURT: Do you have any questions so far? 24 THE DEFENDANT: No.

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15 guilty plea of your own free will? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Counsel, do you have any supplementary questions you would like to ask 3 Mr. Watkins for the record? No questions, but I can MS. GRUGAN: clarify though because we have the evidence. It was 7 through a mail certification that he would receive in 8 the mail, he has to certify that he was unemployed for 9 a two-week period. If he sends in those mail 10 certificates by a certain date, the Department of Labor 11 holds them for two or three days, and then a check is 12 cut, so that is how. 13 That is pretty consistent with THE COURT: 14 what he indicated. 15 MS. GRUGAN: As far as the unemployment 16 period, I think it's just important to point out he was eligible to collect, he did indeed collect, and then 17 18 his benefits were extended, again, on a special program that they -- the state offers where you can work if 19 20 you're going to college. So his benefits were extended for a whole second term as long as he continued his education. However, he did not notify the state that 21 22

he was still employed, and that is what happened.

THE COURT: Okay.

PLEA MR. CARUSO: Make sure you go down there.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I will.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
MR. CARUSO: Your Honor, thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.
(Plea is concluded.) CERTIFICATION I, ROSEMARIE LEVANDOWSKI, C.S.R., C.R.R., License Number 994, an Official Court Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of New Jersey, do hereby certify the foregoing to be prepared in full compliance with the current Transcript Format for Judicial Proceedings and is a true and accurate compressed transcript to the best of my knowledge and compressed transcript to the best of my knowledge and ability. Bestane Official Court Reporter Mercer County Courthouse

-3853-0514

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION - MERCER COUNTY IND. NO. 04-01-0008 APP. DIV. NO. A-3853-05 T4

THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

vs.

STENOGRAPHIC TRANSCRIPT OF

PLEA

CHARLES WATKINS,

Defendant.)

PLACE: Mercer County Courthouse

209 South Broad Street

Trenton, New Jersey

DATE: February 7, 2005

BEFORE:


HONORABLE MARYANN K. BIELAMOWICZ, J.S.C.

APPRILATE DIVISION

Transcript Ordered By:

OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER

JUN 0 5 2006



APPEARANCES:

PETER C. HARVEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: DIANE L. GRUGAN, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL For the State of New Jersey

JOHN D. CARUSO, ESQUIRE (Garces & Grabler) For the Defendant APPELLATE DIVISION
JUN 05 2006
SUPERIOR COURT
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PLEA
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THE COURT: For the record, what is your
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     date of birth?
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                  THE DEFENDANT: March 19th, 1966.
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PLEA Do you read and write the THE COURT: English language? 2 Yes. THE DEFENDANT: And what is the highest level THE COURT: of education you've completed? 5 THE DEFENDANT: College. College for like I received culinary certificates, two years. clerical/secretarial, computers. 8 THE COURT: All right. And are you under the influence today of any substance including medication that could affect your ability to think 10 11 clearly and understand these proceedings? 12 THE DEFENDANT: No. 13 THE COURT: Do you have a copy of the plea 14 15 form there? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 16 THE COURT: All right. Now, this plea form consists of three pages. Did you review the questions 17 18 on all three pages with your attorney? 19 Yes, I did. THE DEFENDANT: 20 THE COURT: Did he read the questions to you, did you read them to yourself, or did both take 21 22 23 place? THE DEFENDANT: Both took place. 24 Did you sign the back page, THE COURT: 25

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sir? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 2 THE COURT: Would you take a look at it and confirm that that is your signature.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 3 4 5 THE COURT: And did you sign this plea form 67 of your own free will? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
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THE COURT: I'm going to review these with 23 24 \$50 Violent Crimes Compensation Board penalty. you.

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unemployment.
                                        In '98?
                     THE COURT:
     THE DEFENDANT: '98, yes. I am sorry. I was eligible for unemployment benefits and I was
     receiving them, and at the same time they offered to allow us to go to school if we wanted to get another
     degree or anything and I went, took them up on that offer and was going to school. And I think like towards the end of '98 or either the beginning of '99, I was called back to my job, but I wasn't finished school yet and I kept going to school. As long as I was going to school they were conding to the
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     was going to school they were sending me the
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      unemployment checks, and I was working and receiving
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     unemployment at the time.
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                      THE COURT: You were going to school and
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      working?
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                      THE DEFENDANT:
                                              Yes.
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                      THE COURT: Did you understand you were
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      obligated to report any income?
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                      THE DEFENDANT:
                                               Yes.
      THE COURT: And how did you -- did you have to go to the office periodically or did you have to
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      call in and report?
                       THE DEFENDANT: To be honest, I don't quite
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                               I think it was as long as I was in
      remember how.
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PLEA
    school and my attendance stayed above average, they
    send me the checks.
                THE COURT: Did you understand once you
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    began working and getting a paycheck you had the obligation to report that income?
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                                  Yes.
                THE DEFENDANT:
                THE COURT: Wasn't there a periodic
    reporting that you had to make to ensure that no
    circumstances had changed?
                                          Yes.
                THE DEFENDANT:
                                  Yes.
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                THE COURT: And how did you do that, By phone? In person?
THE DEFENDANT: To be honest, I don't
                             And how did you do that, in
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    writing?
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               I think it was by writing. If I'm not it was by writing or call in, it was one of
    remember.
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    mistaken,
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    the two.
                THE COURT: And did you know you should
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    have reported the income?
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                THE DEFENDANT:
                                   Yes.
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                THE COURT: And you didn't do that?
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                                   correct.
                THE DEFENDANT:
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                              And do you agree during the
                THE COURT:
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     time period in which you were receiving a paycheck and
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     were receiving unemployment it began on May 24th, 1998,
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     on or about --
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PLEA
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               THE DEFENDANT:
                               Yes.
                           -- and it continue until
               THE COURT:
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    May 22nd -
               THE DEFENDANT:
                                Yes.
56789
                            -- in 1999?
               THE COURT:
               THE DEFENDANT:
                                Yes.
                           And what happened in May of
               THE COURT:
    1999 that changed the situation?
                                Actually, I got a phone
               THE DEFENDANT:
    call from, I guess it was the --
10
                            Prosecutor's office.
11
               MR. CARUSO:
                               -- attorney general's
12
               THE DEFENDANT:
    office, and I had spoken with a man, I think his name
13
    was David, in regards to that it needs to be paid back.
14
    At that point in time I did let him know that I was in
15
    the process of seeking to start paying it back.
16
    asked me have I ever been on a payment plan with them
17
    before and I said no. And, he said, well, I'll call
18
    you back. He never called me back. The next thinknew I got a letter in the mail stating they were
                                            The next thing I
19
20
21
    pressing charges.
               THE COURT: And how do you plead to theft
22
23
    by deception?
24
               THE DEFENDANT:
                                Guilty.
25
               THE COURT:
                            And are you entering this
```

PLEA

```
guilty plea of your own free will?
                THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
    THE COURT: Counsel, do you have any supplementary questions you would like to ask
3
4
    Mr. Watkins for the record?
                 MS. GRUGAN: No questions, but I can
    clarify though because we have the evidence. It was
    through a mail certification that he would receive in
    the mail, he has to certify that he was unemployed for
9
    a two-week period. If he sends in those mail
10
11
    certificates by a certain date, the Department of Labor
12
    holds them for two or three days, and then a check is
13
    cut, so that is how.
                 THE COURT: That is pretty consistent with
14
15
    what he indicated.
                MS. GRUGAN: As far as the unemployment
16
    period, I think it's just important to point out he was eligible to collect, he did indeed collect, and then
17
18
19
    his benefits were extended, again, on a special program
    that they -- the state offers where you can work if
20
    you're going to college. So his benefits were extended for a whole second term as long as he continued his education. However, he did not notify the state that
21
22
23
    he was still employed, and that is what happened.
24
                 THE COURT: Okay.
```

MR. CARUSO: My only supplemental comment is that we litigated before Judge Sypek at great length his amenability to PTI, and I still maintain before this honorable court he should have gotten PTI and that is why this is a conditional plea of guilty, reserving his rights to appeal to the appellate tribunal the decision on the prosecutor's discretion and 5 67 8 Judge Sypek. E COURT: I understand. That is
I know from the history of this case that 9 THE COURT: 10 understood. the PTI decision was made by Judge Sypek following your 11 12 client's application. Judge Sypek never made a 13 MR. CARUSO: decision on the record. 14 THE COURT: No, I was advised it was a 15 16 denial. MR. CARUSO: It was a denial. She never made her findings of fact or conclusions of law, but 17 18 I'm told a written opinion is forthcoming. 19 THE COURT: Right, that is my understanding 20 21 as well. The Court accepts Mr. Watkins' guilty plea. I'll order a presentence report, and schedule 22 23 sentencing for Friday, April 1st.

Before you leave here today, sir, you need 24

PLEA

to report to Room 105 in this building on the first floor. There, you will be interviewed by a probation officer who will obtain some background information from you that will be incorporated in a presentence report. You'll get a copy of that report before the date of sentence, you should review it before you come to court. If there is anything in there that you don't agree with, you can bring it to my attention on the date of sentencing. THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 10 THE COURT: If you don't show up, a bench
ll be issued. This is the only notice you'll 11 warrant will be issued. This is receive of your sentencing date. 12 13 14 15 THE DEFENDANT: Yes All right. Any questions, sir? THE COURT: THE DEFENDANT: Do you know how long it 16 17 takes in the Room 105 room? THE COURT: Do you, Sandy? Probably a half-hour. 18 19 THE CLERK: 20 21 22 23 THE COURT: If it is a problem today, make an appointment. THE DEFENDANT: I am supposed to be at the doctor's at 3:30 for an MRI. 24 All right. THE COURT: Just make an appointment, you can come back tomorrow and do it.

| | PLEA |
|--|---|
| | 18 |
| | MR. CARUSO: Make sure you go down there. |
| 1 1 | THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I will. |
| 2 | THE COURT: All right. Thank you. |
| 3 | MR. CARUSO: Your Honor, thank you. |
| 4 | THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. |
| 5 | (Plea is concluded.) |
| 6 | (Plea 15 Concluded.) |
| 1 6 | |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | |
| 10 | CERTIFICATION |
| 10 | CERTIFICATION |
| 112 | I, ROSEMARIE LEVANDOWSKI, C.S.R., C.R.R., |
| 12 | distribution of an Official Court Reporter and |
| 14 | |
| 15 | hereby certify the foregoing to be prepared in full |
| 16 | hereby certify the foregoing to be prepared in full compliance with the current Transcript Format for |
| 17 | and a seal proceedings and it a little dill dictuided |
| 18 | compressed transcript to the best of my knowledge and |
| 19 | ability. |
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| 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 | Date |
| 24 | Official Court Reporter Date |
| 25 | Mercer County Courthouse |

3853-0574

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION-MERCER COUNTY Ind. No. 04-01-0008 App. Div. No. A-3853-05T4

FILED APPELLATE DIVISIO

JUN 2 8 20061

THE STATE OF NEW JERSE

VS.

CHARLES WATKINS,

Defendant.

7) IS NOCHAPHIC TRANSCRIPT

SENTENCE RECEIVED APPELLATE DIVISION

JUN 28 2006

PLACE: Mercer County Courthouse 209 South Broad Stre**SUPERIOR COURT**Trenton, New Jersey **OF NEW JERSEY**

DATE: April 15, 2005

BEFORE:

THE HONORABLE MARYANN K. BEILAMOWICZ, J.S.C.

Transcript Ordered By:

LOUIS G. GONNELLA, A.D.P.D. (Office of the Public Defender)

APPEARANCES:

PETER C. HARVEY, NEW JERSEY ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: DENISE L. GRUGAN, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL Attorney for the State

JONATHAN A. KESSOUS, ESQUIRE (Garces and Grabler) Attorney for the Defendant

> CATHERINE M. HICKS, CSR, CRR Official Court Reporter 209 South Broad Street Trenton, NJ 08650

Sentence THE COURT: Good morning, please be seated. I understand that State versus Watkins is ready? MS. GRUGAN: Yes, your Honor.

MR. KESSOUS: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Watkins, do you want to stand in back of the podium, please, sir?

Okay, sir, you're before the Court today for sentencing on Indictment 04-01-0008. You entered a guilty plea on February 7th of 2005 to a third degree theft by deception. The state is recommending that you be placed on probation conditioned upon restitution 8 9 10 you be placed on probation conditioned upon restitution 11 which, unless any payments have been made, is an amount 12 of \$7,619.78. 13 Appearances of counsel, please. 14 MS. GRUGAN: Denise Grugan, Deputy Attorney 15 General. 16 MR. KESSOUS: Jonathan Kessous, law offices 17 of Garces and Grabler, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 18 representing the defendant. 19 THE COURT: Anything on behalf of the 20 21 state? MS. GRUGAN: No, your Honor. We move that 22 you sentence in accordance with the negotiated plea 23 agreement. 24 THE COURT: Okay. 25

Sentence

MR. KESSOUS: Thank you, your Honor. The Court should note that my client today has signed the consent order for the civil judgment. 3 THE COURT: Yes. MR. KESSOUS: My client, therefore, has elected to pay full restitution regardless of the outcome of any PTI appeal, which the Court is aware he has reserved his right to appeal within 45 days of 4 5 7 8 today's Court sentencing. 9 with that being said, your Honor, I also point the Court's attention to the numerous certifications and community support letters that have 10 11 12 been attached to the PSIR. Under those circumstances, 13 your Honor, the Court can see that this was to a 14 certain degree an isolated incident, one that my client will be paying for in the long run because his job for 15 years is in jeopardy, which as the Court is aware, was the true engine behind the PTI appeal. Under those circumstances, your Honor, I respectfully submit that he is being punished for the present offense 15 16 17 18 19 20 accordingly, and therefore, I respectfully request that the plea agreement with the reservation, initial guilty 21 22 23 24 plea reservation be entered and the sentence go on.
THE COURT: You got your PTI decision? MR. KESSOUS: Actually, Judge, I did not

Sentence which is what I was going to ask the Court. That was not my decision. 234 THE COURT: MS. GRUGAN: It was Judge Sypek. MR. KESSOUS: I understand. THE COURT: You'll need top contact her 567 chambers. MR. KESSOUS: I'll be going up there now. THE COURT: All right, Mr. Watkins, first 8 9 of all, did you have an opportunity to review your 10 presentence report? 11 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Is there any information in 12 your report that you don't agree with or that you would 13 14 like to comment on? 15 THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am. THE COURT: Is there anything you would 16 like to say before I sentence you, sir?

THE DEFENDANT: Only that I -- no.

THE COURT: Okay. All right, I've reviewed your presentence report, sir. You're 38 years of age. 17 18 19 20 You have two disorderly person's convictions in your 21 background, but no prior indictable convictions. 22 23 The heart of this offense is that you collected unemployment benefits while you were working 24 for Trenton Psychiatric Hospital for a period of five 25

Sentence

months, and I've indicated what that total amount is, including penalties and fines. 2 It is recommended that the period of probation be three years, but that it be terminated earlier in the event that you're able to pay 5 restitution by that time. You're currently on worker's comp for an injury sustained at your job. You've worked at Trenton Psychiatric for 15 years, but as your attorney indicated, you've been suspended without pay as a result of this incident. 6 8 9 10 You are single, have no children. In '90, you may have a municipal court conviction for receiving stolen property, and in 2004, for interfering with the police. It is noted that you have strong community ties. You received your GED in 1986 and have attended some other classes beyond that, including classes at the Art and Fashion Institute of Philadelphia and Mercer County Community College, and those certificates as well as letters are attached.

In reviewing the aggravating and mitigating 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 In reviewing the aggravating and mitigating factors, I find the following apply: Of course, 20 21 there's a need to deter you and others from violating the law, and I also find aggravating factor ten, that the offense involved deceptive practices against a division of state government. 22 23 24

Sentence

On the mitigating side, I have considered that you have no prior indictable convictions, and that you are particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment and that you will compensate the unemployment fund for this offense.

Under those circumstances, I find that the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating, and it's unfortunate that this occurred, because you do have a rather positive background, all of which I have considered. I certainly conclude under all of these circumstances that probation is an appropriate disposition, and I sentence you accordingly. And we'll just have to wait and see what the Appellate Division does with respect to PTT.

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Probation is conditioned upon restitution in the full amount that I have indicated, \$7,619.78 minus any credits that you might be due. In light of the amount of restitution and the fact that you're on worker's comp, I'm not going to impose any other

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conditions. I don't know they're really necessary. I don't have a concern that you will violate the law again, frankly.

I will require that you pay the mandatory penalties, however, a \$50 Violent Crimes Compensation Board penalty, \$75 Safe Neighborhoods Services Fund assessment, \$30 Law Enforcement Officers Equipment and Training Fund penalty, and of course, you are obligated to provide a DNA sample.

Probation recommended against a probation servicing fee. I will agree with that and will impose none.

If you violate the condition of probation, that is the regular payment of restitution, of course, you can be charged with a violation of probation, although we have the civil judgment, so. I'm not so sure what probation will do with that. In any event, if you do violate probation, I'm obligated to tell you that you do face up to five years in prison as a result. You have no jail credits.

Finally, sir, you have 45 days to appeal this sentence. If you have any questions about the process of filing appeal, I'm sure your attorney can answer them for you.

And did you, in fact, sign this civil

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION-MERCER COUNTY Ind. No. 04-01-0008 App. Div. No. A-3853-05T4

FILED APPRLATE DIVING

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) STENOGRAPHIC TRANSCRIPT

VS.

OF

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Defendant.

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21 Finally, sir, you have 45 days to appeal
22 this sentence. If you have any questions about the
23 process of filing appeal, I'm sure your attorney can
24 answer them for you.

And did you, in fact, sign this civil

Sentence 8 consent judgment? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Did you review it with your attorney before you signed it? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
THE COURT: Did you sign it of your own free will? 8 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: All right, thank you, counsel. 10 Good luck. (At which time, the matter was concluded.) 11 12 CERTIFICATE 13 I, CATHERINE M. HICKS, C.S.R., License Number an Official Court Reporter and Notary Public in 14 949, an Official Court Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of New Jersey, do hereby certify the foregoing to be prepared in full compliance with the current Transcript Format for Judicial Proceedings and 15 16 17 18 is a true and accurate compressed transcript of my 19 stenographic notes taken in the above matter to the best of my knowledge and ability. 20 21 22 23 CATHERINE M. HICKS, CSR, CRR Date: 6-22-66 209 South Broad Street 24 Mercer County Courthouse Trenton, New Jersey

NEW FOLDER BEGINS